Lyric Subjectivity, Ethics, Contemporary Poetics: Claudia Rankine, Fanny Howe, Elizabeth Robinson by Gallagher, Maureen
Duquesne University
Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 1-1-2006
Lyric Subjectivity, Ethics, Contemporary Poetics:
Claudia Rankine, Fanny Howe, Elizabeth Robinson
Maureen Gallagher
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
This Worldwide Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact
phillipsg@duq.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gallagher, M. (2006). Lyric Subjectivity, Ethics, Contemporary Poetics: Claudia Rankine, Fanny Howe, Elizabeth Robinson (Doctoral
dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/77
  
LYRIC SUBJECTIVITY, ETHICS, CONTEMPORARY POETICS:  
CLAUDIA RANKINE, FANNY HOWE, ELIZABETH ROBINSON 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
Presented to the McAnulty Graduate School of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
Duquesne University 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
By 
Maureen Gallagher  
 
December 2015 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Maureen Gallagher 
 
2015
  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
LYRIC SUBJECTIVITY, ETHICS, CONTEMPORARY POETICS: 
CLAUDIA RANKINE, FANNY HOWE, ELIZABETH ROBINSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By  
 
Maureen Gallagher 
 
Approved October 27, 2015 
  
 
 
________________________________ 
Dr. Linda Kinnahan 
Professor of English 
(Committee Chair) 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Dr. Faith Barrett 
Associate Professor of English 
(Committee Member) 
________________________________ 
Dr. Laura Engel 
Associate Professor of English 
(Committee Member) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Dr. James Swindal 
Dean, McAnulty Graduate School of 
Liberal Arts  
Professor of Philosophy 
 
 
________________________________ 
Dr. Greg Barnhisel 
Chair, English Department  
Professor of English 
 
  
 iv 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
LYRIC SUBJECTIVITY, ETHICS, CONTEMPORARY POETICS: 
CLAUDIA RANKINE, FANNY HOWE, ELIZABETH ROBINSON 
 
 
 
By  
Maureen Gallagher 
December 2015 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Linda Kinnahan 
This dissertation investigates ethics and lyric subjectivity in the writings of three 
American women poets. I consider select poems and poetics of Claudia Rankine, Fanny Howe, 
and Elizabeth Robinson, in order to argue that their postlanguage lyric poetry retains lyric 
subjectivity and reformulates it as ethical insofar as it is “circumspective” or “other-oriented”; 
that is, the lyric “I” is depicted as constituted through its relations with alterity. I apply 
contemporary literary-ethical methodology, notably the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas, the poetics of Paul Celan, the hauntology of Jacques Derrida, and the poethics of Joan 
Retallack, in order to demonstrate how these poets retain and revise the lyric. All three poets 
register the lyric subject’s interiority and exteriority, use extensive intertextuality, and deploy 
self-reflexivity. Furthermore, I examine the ethics of reading and writing poetry, and suggest that 
these poets deploy what I term the Levinasian-Celanian model of postlanguage lyric poetry, 
  
 v 
wherein the poetic text is conceptualized as a site of ethical encounter between writer and reader. 
Rankine, Howe, and Robinson present a range of explorations of a lyric “I” that acknowledges 
alterity within subjectivity. Rankine critiques what she depicts as the deadening mythology of 
autonomous subjectivity in American culture and language. She uses the textual strategies of 
fragmentation, interruption, and juxtaposition to demonstrate the subject as both violable and 
capable of revitalization through ethical encounter within the lyric. Howe, a Catholic poet, puts 
the traditions of Romantic and Objectivist poetry in conversation and draws on liberation 
theology adds both a spiritual and politically committed dimension to the Levinasian-Celanian 
model of lyric encounter. Howe uses serial/spiral poetic form to underscore subjectivity as 
wandering, dynamic, and constituting “being-in-the-world” for the Other. Robinson draws on 
supernatural tropes, including the doppelgänger and the ghost, to underscore the distortions of 
lyric reflections of the self and the otherness inherent in self-encounter. Further, Robinson’s 
conceptualizations of lyric voice and lyric address are Levinasian in their potential for ethical 
encounter between reader and poet, but she modifies this model with a Derridean emphasis on 
the persistence of difference and distance between the lyric “I” and the lyric “you.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
You want pronouns to take on the corporeal,  
but they are like the static of a sick-dream,   
almost amenable and at the same time,   
frizzy, off their marks.  
(Elizabeth Robinson, “Allege or Elegy,” Counterpart 77) 
 In everyday uses of spoken and written language, we employ personal pronouns to 
indicate others and ourselves. But whom, or what, do we really invoke when we use personal 
pronouns? As contemporary poet and critic Elizabeth Robinson observes in the opening lines of 
her 2012 poem “Allege or Elegy,” the uses of personal pronouns in language are so naturalized 
that we assume that the “almost amenable” personal pronouns like “I,” “you,” and “we” simply 
correspond to the “corporeal,” the embodied persons to whom we refer. But, of course, discourse 
always takes place within a context, and pronouns in particular are always shifting based on the 
participants, situations, and perspectives in any given instance of interpersonal communication or 
written text. The pronouns “I,” “you,” “he,” “she,” etc., cannot “take on the corporeal,” for they 
are always “frizzy, off their marks”—it cannot be otherwise.   
 On another level, Robinson’s opening lines also allude to the field of contemporary 
poetry studies over the last four decades, where the deployment of one personal pronoun in 
particular—the short, common, and seemingly humble “I”—has been the source of much heated 
debate and intellectual exploration.1 Many poets and poetry critics have become invested in the 
ideological, political, and ethical implications of both conventional and unconventional uses of 
                                                        
1 Or perhaps the “I” is not so humble after all: it seems telling that only English users capitalize the singular, first-
person subjective pronoun, just as we do with proper nouns. According to Caroline Winter, the “I” began to be 
capitalized in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, possibly for the legibility of scribes’ transcriptions. However, 
as Winter notes, it is hard not to think that the capitalization of the “I” may reflect and/or reinforce Anglo-American 
cultural values such as individualism, ambition, and self-importance (“Me, Myself, and I”). 
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the lyric “I.” Indeed, the “I” has often been read as a marker that divides the common critical 
narrative of the two “camps” of late twentieth-century poetry and their contrasting approaches to 
the lyric.  
“Two Camps” 
In the critical discourse of the final two decades of the twentieth century, contemporary 
poetry in the U.S. has often been divided into “two camps.” In the one “camp,” often called 
mainstream poetry, the first-person subject of the poem is closely identified with the poet.2 
Indeed, this type of poetry, having “incorporated the centrality of self and the belief in the 
importance of individual history” (Swensen xix), has been understood by its critics as predicated 
on the expression of authentic experience either lived through or witnessed by a lyric “I,” a first-
person, stable speaking subject. Rooted in Romantic lyric verse, contemporary iterations of 
expressive poetry have been refracted through developments in mid-twentieth century formalist 
and confessional poetries; contemporary poetic texts of this type often display the tight 
construction of formalist poetry but are highly personal in tone and content. In academic 
criticism, expressive, mainstream, and postconfessional are various terms that are used to 
describe such types of poetic texts.  
The other “camp” of late twentieth century poetry identifies itself as avant-garde and/or 
experimental and traces its lineage to key avant-garde and modernist poets of the early twentieth 
                                                        
2 The division between “two camps” is only one way to describe the poetic landscape of the late twentieth century. 
In a 2002 essay, critic Mark Wallace describes five contemporary “major networks of poetry production”: 1) New 
Formalists, who advocate the return to traditional poetic forms; 2) postconfessional poetry, which is associated with 
university MFA programs; 3) “identity-based poetries” that are associated with both MFA programs and, 
increasingly, spoken-word “slam” poetry; 4) proponents of “New American speech-based poetries,” which are 
successors to the Beat generation, the New York school, and practitioners of ethnopoetics; and 5) the avant-garde, 
most recognizably the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E network. While postconfessional poetry probably comes in for the 
most frequent attacks by Language writers, the rhetoric of the “two camps” division might place group 5, the avant-
garde/language school, in opposition to the “mainstream” poetry produced by poets across any or all of the other 
four groups, as Steve McCaffrey essentially does in his essay “Language Poetry,” which I reference in chapter one. 
Wallace himself acknowledges that these groups aren’t always distinct, as there is much crossover among them; in 
particular, groups 4 and 5 “are so intermingled as to be indistinguishable in many cases” (193). As a result, what 
counts as “avant-garde” and what counts as “mainstream” or “conventional” poetry varies within literary discourse. 
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century. The preeminent type of poetry in this “camp” has been the writings of the Language 
(originally spelled L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E) network of writers, who developed a movement in 
North America in the 1970s and 1980s. In Language writing, language as a non-transparent 
medium is emphasized and self-reference is often absent; the lyric “I” may disappear completely. 
Influenced by poststructuralist and Marxist theories, Language poets are suspicious of ideas of 
authenticity in language. For example, Language writer and critic Charles Bernstein emphasizes 
that no language is “natural,” for every element is chosen (49). According to Marjorie Perloff, 
the most influential critic who champions contemporary avant-garde poetry, the more radical 
poetic writings of the final decades of the twentieth century have opened the field of poetry not 
through an embrace of “authenticity” but as a turn toward artifice, highlighting poetry as making 
(praxis) rather than self-expression. Along with the challenge to language as a transparent 
medium through the deployment of experimental and often obscure formal strategies, Language 
poetry aims to interrogate underlying assumptions behind conventional lyric poetry; as Perloff 
argues, the “Romantic formula ‘irreducible human values’ is fabricated” (93). Paramount among 
the “Romantic” human values Perloff alludes to is the Enlightenment/post-Enlightenment 
concept of a stable, autonomous subject that has often been seen as assumed in lyric poetry—that 
is, a self-determining subject who is presented as existing outside of larger cultural contexts and 
inside the privacy and interiority of the mind. Thus, Perloff, Bernstein, and other critics and 
Language writers link the first-person subject to an expression of what cultural studies critic Paul 
Smith has called “the ideological ‘I,’” the cultural concept of personhood in the West that is 
often so internalized that individuals assume it to be “natural” and “universal” (105). This 
“ideological ‘I’” has been thoroughly critiqued through poststructuralist demystifications of 
authoritative Western ideologies and their capitalist, patriarchal, imperialist, and racist 
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foundations. Thus, the critiques of mainstream poetry by avant-garde poets and their critical 
advocates are highly political, for they claim that the assumption of the transparent use of 
language is complicit in the replication of dominant Western ideologies. Avant-garde critiques 
are also made on ethical grounds and center on the acts of reading and writing, for they assert 
that twentieth-century lyric poetry, with the use of postconfessional voice in particular, either 
oppress essentially passive readers with an overpowering, singular voice, or offer readers a 
model of subjectivity that retreats inward, into the private and interior world of the self and away 
from others. Interiority in poetry, the critique goes, promotes solipsistic narcissism and/or a 
soothing reassurance of the reader’s own presumptions of autonomy and coherence. In the wake 
of the critiques posed by Language writers—and, more broadly, poststructuralists—a 
contemporary poet who is interested in retaining recuperating lyric poetry faces a central 
question: how can one deploy lyric subjectivity ethically?  
Contemporary Women’s Poetry and the Lyric “I” 
Furthermore, the ethics of the lyric “I” is a particularly significant issue for contemporary 
American women poets. Feminist poets and critics have long interpreted the conventional lyric 
“I” as gendered masculine in its quest for domination and/or solipsistic detachment (Sewell 2). In 
the 1980s and early 1990s, feminist critical discourse on women’s poetry also drew on the 
polarities of “two camps” rhetoric, with a focus on the gendered implications of the first person. 
Some feminist critics championed the reclamation of a strong, female lyric “I” alongside an 
expressive and/or representational depiction of women’s personal experiences in order to provide 
an empowering model of subjective agency for (women) readers. Meanwhile, feminist critics 
who advocated for avant-garde experimentation charged that expressive women’s poetry either 
reproduces the patriarchal power dynamics inherent in conventional lyric forms or tends to 
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replicate male/female binaries of subjectivity.3 As a result of the gendered history of lyric poetry 
and specific feminist conversations within the broader context of the “two camps” poetry 
debates, the issue of lyric subjectivity has been of particular consequence for many contemporary 
women poets.    
In response to the “two camps” rhetoric, over the last two decades, a new critical 
conversation has emerged that describes the development of a late-twentieth/early twenty-first 
postlanguage lyric poetry that has been variously theorized as hybrid, Elliptical, exploratory, 
postmodern lyric, or, more broadly, as “third way.” This emerging postlanguage poetry seeks 
alternative means of exploring lyric poetry and lyric subjectivity by deploying both lyric 
conventions and experimental formal strategies. Many contemporary women poets in particular 
have been instrumental in the development of postlanguage lyric poetries that neither centers on 
nor excises the “I.” What I find intriguing are the ongoing efforts of many contemporary women 
poets to explore, through aesthetic means, what poststructuralist and ethical depiction of 
subjectivity might look like. In other words, many women poets are taking on the serious task of 
imaginatively conveying a lyric subjectivity that is neither wholly constructivist nor completely 
autonomous. Such lyric texts reframe agency and interiority as inextricably interrelated with 
exteriority. Postlanguage lyric texts advance a decentered “I” that is explored affirmatively in 
order to advance the subject within ethical relation with the Other.  
In this dissertation, I investigate some of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
poetry and poetics of three postlanguage lyric women poets—Claudia Rankine, Fanny Howe, 
                                                        
3 In the 1980s and early 1990s, feminist critics such as Alicia Ostriker, Sandra Gilbert, Susan Gubar, and Susan 
Stanford Friedman had championed women’s poetry, such as the work of Adrienne Rich and Audre Lorde, where 
the poet spoke from an expressive, postconfessional voice, used a plain, more “accessible” style, and often centered 
on overtly political themes. With the rise of poststructuralism in the academy in the 1980 and early 1990s, feminist 
critics such as Margaret Homans, Janet Montefiore argued that such a focus marginalized more experimental and 
avant-garde women’s poetry. These critics looked to work of contemporary and previous poets they argued drew on 
the French feminist concept of ecriture feminine—that is, writing characterized as open, multiple, diffuse, 
fragmented, questioning, subversive, decentered, and nonrational. 
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and Elizabeth Robinson—to consider some selections of postlanguage lyric poetry in terms of 
their exploration of both lyric subjectivity and the ethics of reading and writing poetry. Given the 
critiques of Language writing and poststructuralism, how do these contemporary women poets 
deploy the lyric “I” ethically? In what specific ways do they broach the apparently diverging 
conventions and values of lyric and experimental poetries? What new models of lyric 
subjectivity are offered? What relations between poet and reader are articulated? What ethics do 
these writers draw from and/or advance? 
In this project, I align myself with poetry critics who argue that innovative poetry can 
deploy the lyric “I” in myriad ways that replicate neither an overpowering nor a solipsistic “I.” 
Instead, this project explores a range of possibilities for subjectivity within poetic texts. This 
dissertation builds from the starting point of late-twentieth century feminist criticism on 
experimental women’s poetry—a discourse I will outline more fully in chapter one—that both 
acknowledges the value of the Language writing’s critique of the “voice poem” and affirmatively 
explores subjectivity. Building on the foundation of feminist criticism, I argue that the women 
postlanguage lyric poets I survey in this dissertation are centrally concerned with articulating the 
lyric “I” ethically. 
Ethical Lyric Subjectivity 
  What do I mean by ethical articulations of lyric subjectivity? Centrally, contemporary 
lyric subjectivity is ethical insofar as displays an orientation towards otherness, in contrast to 
lyric poetry’s presumed inward directionality. I draw from critic Daniel Barbiero’s concept of 
“circumspective,” rather than “introspective” postlanguage lyric poetry. According to Barbiero, a 
“circumspective” lyric recognizes that the subject is inserted into a given set of circumstances. 
Rather than directing inward, as often understood in traditional lyric poetry: “the inner dimension 
  
 7 
of experience is reimagined as a porous domain susceptible to partial and ongoing constitution 
from outgoing agencies, be these social forces, the givenness of language, or the already existing 
state of the discipline in which one writes” (363). Thus, the postlanguage, circumspective 
position allows for the lyric subject’s interiority and spirituality, while ultimately aiming for an 
other-orientation rather than self-absorption. Such formulations demonstrate the lyric “I” as 
intersubjective. Their formulations of lyric intersubjectivity allow postlanguage poets to explore 
spaces between, or alternative to, the extremes of an uncomplicated embrace of conventional 
subjectivity and the avant-garde rejection of the subject. Rankine, Howe, and Robinson critique 
what they see as narcissistic, solipsistic, and enervating articulations of the lyric “I” and/or the 
underlying assumptions of the Enlightenment-based “ideological I.” Their writings are also 
highly reflexive, signaling their awareness that the “I” is a linguistic construction. As a result, 
these poets aim not to express authentic feeling or experience. Rather, they signal an 
intentionality to construct mediated articulations of ethical lyric subjectivity. At the same time, 
they do not reject all qualities associated with conventional constructions of lyric subjectivity or 
themes. Instead, statements of sincerity, experiences of transcendence, and the exploration of 
subjective thought, feeling, and spirituality are present in the poems I will analyze. But this 
poetry does not depict a pure or universalist interiority occurring, as if in a vacuum; their texts 
place the lyric subject and its various experiences and modes within larger social, political, 
and/or discursive contexts.  
Literary-Ethical Methodology  
The ethical articulations of lyric subjectivity in the writings of Rankine, Howe, and 
Robinson are involved in a dynamic wherein reader and writer engage in an ethical encounter 
through the text. In order to develop such a model, I adopt a methodology of literary-ethical 
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inquiry as it has emerged in literary criticism in the last twenty years. The consideration of ethics 
and/of/in literature has developed its current shape in response to the ascendancy of 
poststructuralist theory and numerous politically-oriented approaches to literary criticism 
(including feminist, Marxist, post-colonial, race theory) in the 1970s and 1980s. Taking 
poststructuralist and other theoretical critiques of individualistic subjectivity as a given, 
intersubjective, dialogic understandings of ethics have been central to what literary critic Tim 
Woods identifies a consequent “‘ethical turn’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s” (Poetics 10-11). 
The emerging model or subdiscipline of ethical approaches to literature is described by 
Lawrence Buell’s introduction to a 1999 special issue of PMLA, “Ethics and Literary Study.” 
Buell notes that much of the appearance of “literary-ethical inquiry” can be traced to the shift 
towards ethics in the work of key poststructuralist thinkers, and he identifies as central to this 
critical conversation Derrida’s ongoing dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas, which concluded with 
Derrida’s ultimate affirmation of the importance of Levinas’s ethics upon his friend’s death in 
his 1995 eulogy “Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas” (7). 4 “Adieu” includes Derrida’s assertion that 
Levinas’s thought has “awakened” for us the theme of “an ‘unlimited’ responsibility for the other 
that exceeds and precedes my freedom” (Adieu 3). While Levinas has surfaced as a central 
theorist for poststructuralist literary-ethical inquiry, it must be noted that Derrida plays a 
significant role in this “ethical turn,” for he not only promoted Levinas’s ethics and used them as 
a foundation for his own writings, he also complicated Levinas’s formulation of ethics over the 
decades (Buell 9). Hence, the “ethical turn” in literary studies at the turn of the twenty-first 
century is interwoven with the “ethical turn” in poststructuralism and deconstruction, which in 
                                                        
4 Buell also notes the shift to ethics in the later works of Michel Foucault (9-10, 14). While Foucault’s ethics 
involves a shift from practices of domination to self-actualization, Levinas’s ethics (and Derrida’s modified adoption 
of them) prioritizes the subject’s responsibility to the other, and this is the theoretical lens I use to explore 
postlanguage poetry.  
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turn establishes the relevance of ethical inquiry in literary criticism. The ethical philosophies of 
both Levinas and Derrida provide the major framework for my own literary-ethical inquiry of 
postlanguage lyric poetry; I will provide an overview of their ethical concepts and terminology in 
chapter one. 
Ethics and Politics in Literary Criticism 
The “ethical turn” in literary criticism may be seen as a perhaps inevitable mode of 
inquiry after the destabilizations of poststructuralism, particularly the poststructuralist criticisms 
of the ideological “I.” Ethical-literary inquiry raises the question: after the ascendancy of 
poststructuralist theoretical critiques that decenter the Enlightenment/Romantic subject and 
undermine the concept of language as a transparent medium—commonplace stances of 
postmodern thought that operate largely by negation—how can a postmodern (or post-
postmodern) subject be described in affirmative terms? As Woods explains, the “ethical turn” 
involves   
a reinstatement of the responsibilities of subjectivity. However, this reinstated 
subject is not a sovereign, founding subject but one that is shaped by models of 
existence which look to aesthetic experience and its forms as ways of 
understanding aspects of subjectivity that are not reducible to the cognitive or the 
rational . . . The ‘ethical turn’ is part of an attempt to preserve the role of the 
subject in view while respecting the difference of the (other) object … (“The 
Ethical Diversity” 466-67)  
Woods’s emphasis on the preservation of the subject, both in agency and in responsibility, 
articulates a central concern of recent literary-ethical inquiries. Critiques of powerful Western 
ideologies (capitalist, patriarchal, imperialistic, racist) that have emerged from politically-
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oriented theories of the 1970s and 1980s tend to emphasize public discourses and institutions in 
their investigations of power. But what can intersubjectivity look like across both the public and 
private dimensions of individuals’ lives? Given the demystifications of ideology and the 
“ideological I,” how can one go about rethinking one’s subjectivity and conducting a good life? 
Can “interpersonal” actions and communication provide helpful models of intersubjectivity? 
Ethical inquiry can provide terminology to examine such concerns, for ethics addresses private 
and public domains in ways that are not limited to investigations of the workings of power on the 
levels institutions and the state.  
How does literary-ethical inquiry differ from politically based literary criticisms? As 
David Parker observes, considerations of politics and ethics cover much similar territory; he 
notes that critics Richard Bernstein and Wayne Booth have argued that ethics and politics are 
essentially inseparable (5). However, the literary-ethical inquiry of the last twenty years has 
emerged as a critical discourse whose aims are distinct from politically-oriented literary critical 
writings that aim to criticize mechanisms of power and demystify ideology (Buell 7; Parker 4). 
As critic G. Matthew Jenkins argues, ethics “is not reducible to politics, for one, because ethics 
does not involve the just distribution of resources or even a choice between two evils. Secondly, 
ethics does not coincide with what poststructuralists would call the political either because ethics 
for them is in essence the limit of power, not the archaeology of its workings” (7).5 Thus, the 
ends of literary-ethical inquiry are not to dissect the operations of power alone. Literary-ethical 
inquiry thus departs from certain strains of poststructuralist and politically based theories.  
                                                        
5 Another key distinction that emerges in literary-ethical inquiry is the one between ethics and morality. Although I 
acknowledge that the border between the ethical and the moral can be ambiguous, in my definition of ethics, I rely 
on the distinction that Derek Attridge makes, for he also works from Levinasian ethical thought, which insists that 
ethics involves unpredictability and risk, while morality involves “specific obligations governing concrete situations 
in a social context, which require the greatest possible control of outcomes” (“Innovation, Literature, Ethics” 28).   
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Literary-ethical inquiry presents risks, however. As Woods observes, during the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s, some critics considered ethics as passé, ultimately “a liberal humanist apology 
for the bourgeois subject” (Poetics 6). Parker explains that key theorists—he singles out Frederic 
Jameson—have vilified ethics, arguing that it is an ideological mask of hegemonic classes or 
groups that devise moral binary oppositions and applies the imagined quality of “evil” to the 
Other of the dominant group (5). Furthermore, Buell mentions the concern that a focus on ethics 
may possibly involve the “privatization of human relations” to such a degree that it makes “the 
social or political secondary” (14). While Buell’s reservation is understandable, I suggest that it 
is possible to see literary-ethical inquiry as a possible corrective or complement that can operate 
alongside politically based literary criticism. As Parker argues, literary discourse must go further 
than “ideological demystification,” for politics, like any belief system, can partake in self-
righteous, zealous, and intolerant judgmentalism or “Pharisaism” that operates on pre-determined 
binary oppositions (7). I argue that it is possible to draw on the concept of interpersonal 
encounter in order to allow writers and readers to explore models of intersubjectivity that 
maintains a fundamental focus on responsibility for others. Furthermore, such models of 
intersubjectivity need not be limited to the realm of private or intimate relations; historical, 
political, and linguistic contexts can be taken into account. Of course, the specific ethical 
methodology makes a real difference: rather than a bourgeois/humanist “universalist” position, 
the ethics of Levinas and Derrida adopts an other-oriented approach (Woods Poetics 6-7). Thus, 
I argue, while poststructuralist political investigations have revealed much about constructions of 
subjectivity, the incorporation of other-oriented ethics provides an essential model for 
affirmative articulations of postmodern understandings of subjectivity that are inherently 
intersubjective. 
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The distinction between politics and ethics in literary criticism is relevant to my 
exploration of the specific postlanguage women poets I am studying. While adopting various 
political stances, all three writers investigate ways of articulating intersubjectivity in language, 
explore ethical interpersonal relations between self and Other, and trace the possibility of ethical 
encounter within literary texts. In Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, the immersion of the “I” in 
political and public discourses in the media-saturated, post 9/11 era is explored alongside 
accounts of interpersonal encounters and interrogations of the polarized oppositions drawn in the 
Bush era’s dualistic political rhetoric. Thus, while she engages with political discourses, Rankine 
foregrounds the subject’s ethical responsibilities to the other, in contrast to the contemporary 
culture of spectacle. Meanwhile, the poetic texts I examine by Fanny Howe demonstrate an 
overt, often didactic political stance that is informed by the writings of Liberation Theology. Her 
poetic texts, too, sustain a strong ethical dimension alongside political and spiritual 
commitments, and literary-ethical inquiry provides a valuable lens to consider Howe’s spiritual 
model of lyric subjectivity. Finally, Elizabeth Robinson, as a less overtly political writer than 
Rankine and Howe, frames the ethics of her writing in terms very similar to Parker’s. In other 
words, Robinson resists an explicitly politicized stance in her poetry, for she is instead interested 
in how poetry can be an ethical corrective to rigidly determined political narratives, as she 
recognizes that even the progressive politics with which she claims affinity can become ossified 
through dualistic rhetoric.   
Literary-Ethical Inquiry and Modern Poetry 
Over the past twenty years, a significant number of critics have engaged in literary-
ethical inquiry that draws on Levinasian ethics.6 My application of literary-ethical inquiry to 
                                                        
6 For an earlier example of Levinasian ethics applied to literature, see Jill Robbins, Altered Readings: Levinas and 
Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1999). Also see the critical anthology Levinas and Twentieth Century 
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modern poetry has significant predecessors. In Ethics and Dialogue: in the Works of Levinas, 
Bakhtin, Mandel’shtam, and Celan (2000), Michael Eskin uses Bakhtin’s dialogic model of 
reading texts and Levinas’ Other-oriented ethics to frame a reading of European poets Osip 
Mandel’shtam and Paul Celan. Gerald Bruns also ties Levinasian ethics to Celan’s poetics to 
make a case that poetry can be ethical insofar as it attempts to reach towards the other. Indeed, 
Mandel’shtam and Celan’s “message in a bottle” poetics of encounter, often refracted through 
Levinasian ethics, has made them important figures in ethical criticism of twentieth century 
poetry, as I will discuss in chapter one. While Bakhtin has emerged as an important theorist for 
some ethical models of poetic textuality,7 Levinas has emerged more frequently.8 Of particular 
relevance for my project is Woods’ survey of twentieth century American poetry. Woods insists 
upon the centrality of Objectivism in the twentieth-century recalibration of poetic subjectivity as 
other-oriented (“The Ethical Diversity” 454). Woods is not alone in his emphasis of ethics in the 
work of the Objectivists, and George Oppen in particular; indeed, I draw on the work of various 
critics who trace Oppen’s ethics in support of my exploration of Fanny Howe’s poetry in chapter 
two.9 G. Matthew Jenkins also uses Levinas’ ethics to provide an ethical critical reading of 
Objectivist poets, and he then traces a lineage through postwar experimental twentieth-century 
poetry, concluding with the avant-garde poetry of Susan Howe and the Language writing of Lyn 
Hejinian. While I am indebted to Woods and Jenkins’ work in their application of Levinasian 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Literature: Ethics and the Reconstitution of Subjectivity, edited by Donald R. Wehrs (Newark: U of Delaware P, 
2013).  
7 Another critic who uses Bakhtin to argue for a dialogic model of ethics applied to modern poetry is Mara Scanlon, 
in “Ethics and the Lyric: Form, Dialogue, Answerability,” College Literature 34.1 (2007): 1-22. Also, like Eskin, 
N.S. Boone draws on both Bakhtin’s dialogism and Levinas’s concept of alterity in order to foreground what he sees 
as William Carlos Williams’ focus on the “humanism of the other man” in Paterson (“Paterson as a Satyrical Work: 
Epistemology of the Dance,” in Wehrs, 133-156).  
8 Another notable example of Levinasian-based, literary-ethical inquiry applied to contemporary poetry is Xiaojing 
Zhou’s The Ethics and Poetics of Alterity in Asian American Poetry (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 2006).  
9 See The Objectivist Nexus: Essays in Cultural Poetics. Eds. DuPlessis, Rachel Blau, and Peter Quartermain. 
Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 1999, in particular, the essays by Peter Nicholls, “Of Being Ethical: Reflections on 
George Oppen” (240-253) and Alan Golding, “George Oppen’s Serial Poems” (240-53). 
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ethics to poetic subjectivity, my project differs from theirs most notably as their trajectories 
conclude with considerations of Language poets or, in the case of Susan Howe, a contemporary 
poet who is often considered as “experimental” rather than either “lyric” or participating in both 
experimental and lyric traditions. My project, in light of the critical debates surrounding “third 
way” or “hybrid” poetry that I will discuss in chapter one, extends Levinasian ethics to 
considerations of the postlanguage lyric, which I argue is highly invested in ethical articulations 
of lyric subjectivity. In my project, I suggest that the postlanguage lyric poets I investigate 
actively and self-consciously seek to transform the lyric through the form and content of their 
texts by moving to both the ethical articulation of the lyric “I” and the enactment of 
intersubjective relations between self and other, writer and reader.    
Gender, Ethics and Postlanguage Lyric Poetry 
Given that all of the postlanguage lyric poetry that I consider in this dissertation is 
women’s poetry, what role does gender play in their ethical projects? I must note that, while 
Rankine, Howe, and Robinson focus on gender—specifically, women’s experiences—more 
explicitly elsewhere in their writings,10 gender issues are not foregrounded in the specific poetic 
texts that I examine in this dissertation. However, I maintain that it is not necessary for gender to 
be a central focus for there to be a feminist sensibility brought to a particular poetic project. In 
chapter one, I will trace in more detail the discourse surrounding contemporary women’s poetry 
and the lyric “I” that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s—that is, in the wake of both second wave 
feminism and the Language school’s critique of conventional lyric subjectivity. I position my 
reading of Rankine, Howe, and Robinson’s writings with what Lisa Sewell identifies in the 
introduction to the poetry anthology Eleven More American Women Poets as a marker of third 
                                                        
10
All three poets I explore do foreground gender concerns elsewhere in their writings. For example, all three address 
experiences of pregnancy, motherhood, or domesticity, as in Fanny Howe’s O’Clock (1995), Claudia Rankine’s Plot 
(2001), and Elizabeth Robinson’s Under that Silky Roof (2006).   
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wave feminism that is present in many innovative women’s poetries. Third wave feminism, 
Sewell argues, is evident in such writings as they showcase feminism as “an always already 
jumping-off point” and is not based on common second-wave feminist themes such as “bodily 
experience, shared oppressions and identity politics,” but on a feminist sensibility that seeks 
intersubjective models of interaction that avoid binaries (5). In other words, the ethical 
articulations of the lyric “I” in Rankine, Howe, and Robinson’s writings shift towards 
subjectivity that does not produce a new male/female binary, and therefore do not produce the 
opposite of the masculine lyric “I” with a subjectivity that is necessarily identifiable as 
female/feminine. Instead, these writings explore a lyric “I” that is open to the recognition of 
alterity of the Other as constitutive of subjectivity itself.  
Another way that an implicit feminism may be present in the selected writings of 
Rankine, Howe, and Robinson concerns the interrelation of private and the public discourses and 
experiences. I have already noted a division between literary-ethical inquiry and politically based 
literary criticism. This distinction of the ethical—often inclusive of the interpersonal—and the 
political raises the specter of the old binary of private/public “spheres,” which have traditionally 
been gendered as feminine/masculine. However, I aim to avoid replicating the outmoded, 
private/public binary with an ethical/political binary. Of course, second wave feminism in 
particular did much to link the personal and political and, as literary critic Clair Wills observes, 
social changes throughout the twentieth century did much to make the public/private divide 
obsolete; thus, “there isn’t a pristine sphere of the lyric self which is not politicized and 
constructed” (39). I suggest that innovative poetry of Rankine, Howe, and Robinson that I select 
for this project foreground the ways in which public and private discourses and experiences are 
interwoven within the subject. In this way, these poets continue an ongoing feminist dimension 
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of innovative women’s poetry that Sewell identifies. Further, I read the importance of 
interpersonal encounter in the writings of the postlanguage lyric women poets I have selected as 
a response to the tendencies of much (predominantly male-authored) Language/avant-garde 
writing and certain influential thinkers of poststructuralism—such as Foucault and certain 
Marxist thinkers (Althusser, DeBord, Baudrillard)—to diminish subjective agency while 
emphasizing state and institutional structures. There can be an implicit feminism within the move 
to illustrate, not the already established notion that the personal is political, but that a focus on 
interpersonal relations can complement and inform the political.  
At the same time, the arguments I make in the course of this dissertation largely rest on 
ethical philosophies of Levinas and Derrida’s Levinasian-based ethics, not feminist theories. 
Many feminist critics, beginning with his contemporary, Simone de Beauvoir, have 
understandably accused Levinas of androcentrism and chauvinism because of numerous 
instances of sexist language in his writings. Particularly problematic was his use of the 
“feminine” in Totality and Infinity to describe alterity in a way that reinforces patriarchal notions 
of femininity as mysterious and ineffable (Chanter 25). Neverthless, as feminist scholar Tina 
Chanter suggests, it is possible to allow an ambivalent or even generous reading of Levinas’s 
treatment of the feminine, as indeed Derrida does in the Adieu, where he sees the potential tie 
between feminine/feminism and the foundation of the category of the ethical (17). In another 
vein, feminist critic Diane Perpich argues that Levinas’s thinking can be allied with feminism. 
Perpich asserts that Levinas’s ethics can improve upon approaches to identity politics that rely on 
fixed notions of gender because Levinas’s notion of alterity allows us “to do justice both to the 
uniqueness of individual lives and to the ways in which those lives are embedded, for better and 
worse, within social, cultural and religious communities” (28). Sewell also cites Levinas’s notion 
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of alterity to reference the tendency in innovative contemporary American women’s poetry to 
“enact, represent, or recognize radical, unassimilable difference” (2). In my readings of 
postlanguage lyric poetry by women, I similarly posit that Levinasian ethics can be used as a 
theoretical framework that describes models of subjectivity as constituted through encounters 
with alterity. Using this ethical framework, I demonstrate how the poets Rankine, Howe, and 
Robinson, participate in the ongoing, implicitly feminist project in innovative women’s poetry to 
reconceptualize the lyric “I” through the exploration of both interpersonal encounters and public 
discourses.  
Overview of the Chapters 
In chapter one, I preface my analysis of the writings of Rankine, Howe, and Robinson 
with a selection of broader literary contexts and critical discourses that provide the theoretical 
foundation for my argument. In order to clarify key definitions and familiarize the reader with 
specific literary and methodological discourses, I provide an overview of major topics, including 
the poststructuralist critique of subjectivity, the literary history of definitions of lyric poetry, the 
influential Language school critiques of lyric poetry, and the discourses surrounding 
contemporary American innovative and hybrid/third way poetries. Furthermore, chapter one 
includes a summary of the ethical theories of Levinas and Derrida, which provide the theoretical 
framework of this project, as well as an overview of significant criticism that applies ethical 
concepts to literary texts. Of particular note is the work of feminist poet-critic Joan Retallack, for 
her concept of poethics, which foregrounds the ethical uses of language as it applies to the 
writing and reading of contemporary poetic texts, offers a foundational concept for my 
interpretation of postlanguage lyric poetry by Rankine, Howe, and Robinson. 
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In chapter two, I offer a poethical reading of Claudia Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely 
(2004) that explores the text’s depiction of how various American cultural discourses in the 9/11 
era—political rhetoric, news media, consumer capitalism, popular culture—shape contemporary 
American understandings of the “ideological ‘I.’” I then go on to argue that the text re-thinks the 
“I” in ethical terms by offering a model of a self-reflexive, fragmented subject that emerges from 
within discursive contexts and interpersonal interactions. Furthermore, I suggest that Don’t Let 
Me Be Lonely asserts the relationality and response-ability of the subject as it emphasizes the 
importance of ethical practice. Rankine advances the activities of writing and reading poetry as 
ethical practice in two ways. First, Rankine gestures to the potential for the speaking subject to 
serve as poetic witness, rather than as an enervated spectator. Second, Rankine advances the 
concept of the lyric text as the enactment of ethical encounter by directly introducing the ideas of 
two writers, philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and poet Paul Celan. The thinking of Levinas and 
Celan, on ethics and poetics, respectively, provide the basis for a model of the lyric as ethical 
encounter between writer and reader. The Levinasian-Celanian model of postlanguage lyric 
poetry delineated in DLMBL will then serve as a paradigm that my readings of other poetic texts 
in this dissertation will both follow and depart from.  
In chapter three, I consider Fanny Howe’s deployment of the lyric subject in order to 
investigate her poethics as illustrated in selections from Howe’s later works of poetry, prose-
poetry, and poetics, specifically those that are reprinted or originally appear in Selected Poems 
(2000), The Wedding Dress: Meditations on Word and Life (2003), and On the Ground (2004). I 
seek to illuminate Howe’s poethics by tracing her poetry’s inheritance of Oppen’s Objectivist 
ethical focus on poetry writing, its demonstration of the influence of liberation theology, and its 
resonances with the transcendental ethics of Levinas. I suggest that Howe’s ethical recalibration 
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of lyric subjectivity is demonstrated through her characterization of the wandering lyric subject. 
Also significant is Howe’s use of serial (or what she terms “spiral”) form, for many literary 
critics have theorized serial form as fundamentally ethical in its resistance to the domineering 
claims of the speaking subject or reductive classifications of otherness. Furthermore, Howe’s 
spiritual poetry presents alternatives to certain avant-garde/Language school strictures in that it 
registers and rethinks the lyric subject’s interrelated experiences of exteriority and interiority, 
immanence and transcendence. 
In chapter four, I consider the poethics of selections of Elizabeth Robinson’s writings 
from Counterpart (2012), On Ghosts (2013), and Apostrophe (2006). In this final chapter, I shift 
from a Levinasian-Celanian model of lyric as ethical encounter to consider Derrida’s thinking on 
ethics, deconstruction, and hauntology. Derrida’s ethics deploy a subjectivity that is Levinasian 
insofar as it focuses on the self’s obligation for the other. At the same time, Derrida complicates 
some of the utopian overtones of Levinas and Celan’s paradigms for relation between self and 
other, writer and reader by insisting on the persistence of individual difference and potential 
conflict within all interactions. Through a consideration of Derrida’s deconstructive theory of the 
doubleness of language, I argue that Robinson draws on the figure of the double in her often 
allusive poetry in order to reconfigure the lyric “I” as a site of doubleness and difference. 
Consequently, lyric self-encounter need not be solely inward, for it can demonstrate ethical 
engagement between the subject and her surroundings. I then examine Robinson’s poetic 
explorations of lyric textuality and lyric subjectivity through the lens of Derrida’s ethics, 
including the concepts of radical hospitality, the gift, and hauntology. Derridean hauntology is a 
theoretical approach that uses the trope of the unstable ghost who, akin to both the Levinasian 
Other and a figure of deconstruction, is neither fully absent nor present, but nevertheless delivers 
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ethical injunctions. Finally, I investigate Robinson’s treatment of lyric address, which considers 
how the constructions of lyric subjectivity and lyric voice both gesture to the writing subject and 
are constituted through the reception of the reader as they emerge between the events of reading 
and writing. Robinson emphasizes that the text is a space that holds potential for encounter and 
carries the possibility that, as reader and writer, the text can be a place where “we do / not meet” 
(Apostrophe 72).  
These three poets present a range of figurations of the lyric “I”: Rankine’s lyric subject is 
fragmented, flattened, and diminished; Howe’s lyric subject dynamically wanders across 
serial/spiral lyrics; and Robinson’s lyric subject hovers between absence and presence and 
registers the uncanny interplay of familiarity and dissonance. Certain qualities of these poets’ 
lyric subjects underscore their shared concerns as postlanguage lyric poets. For example, all 
three deploy a high degree of reflexivity in their deployments of lyric subjectivity and lyric 
voice, for their writings demonstrate the writers’ awareness that these models are linguistic 
constructs. Furthermore, all three poets are interested in the lyric subject as constituted by the 
interrelation between exteriority and interiority, and Howe and Robinson in particular explore 
how mystical experiences link exteriority and interiority. Also, all three poets engage in 
extensive intertextuality that advances an ethical model of writing that demonstrates how the 
poet’s texts are always informed by interactions with other texts. The wide-ranging allusiveness 
in Rankine, Howe, and Robinson’s writings demonstrate how writing is necessarily communal, 
rather than self-created or individualistic. As such, I suggest that the writings of Rankine, Howe, 
and Robinson demonstrate a key feature of “hybrid” or “third way” poetry: the inclination to 
draw from a wide variety of previous writings and build on both lyric and experimental 
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techniques, in order to construct a postlanguage lyric poetry that advances ethical articulations of 
the lyric “I.”  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL AND LITERARY CONTEXTS: CONTEMPORARY SUBJECTIVITY, 
WHERE LYRIC MEETS LANGUAGE, AND THE ETHICS OF POETIC ENCOUNTER 
In this opening chapter, I preface my analysis of poetry by Rankine, Howe, and Robinson 
with an overview of literary contexts and critical discourses that inform my readings. This 
chapter is designed to clarify several key definitions and to familiarize the reader with the range 
of critical discourses I draw on throughout the subsequent chapters. As the lyric “I” is a topic 
central to classifications of contemporary poetry, I begin with the broad issue of subjectivity. 
What exactly do I mean by the conventional model of subjectivity that has come under attack in 
poststructuralism? What thinking about subjectivity has emerged in the wake of the 
poststructuralist theories? I then turn to another important definitional question: what is lyric 
poetry? In order to describe conventional lyric poetry, I provide a summary of various definitions 
of the lyric as it has developed in literary criticism since Romanticism, the late-twentieth critical 
debates surrounding the “two camp” model of contemporary poetry, and responses to the “two 
camp” division in contemporary innovative women’s poetry and feminist criticism. I also 
provide a brief overview of the 1980s’ text My Life by Language poet Lyn Hejinian, for it serves 
as an important predecessor to the postlanguage women’s poetry I examine in this dissertation. 
Furthermore, the critical reception of My Life provides an important foundation to my own 
inquiry about lyric subjectivity in contemporary women’s poetry. After this discussion, I then 
trace the emergent, twenty-first century discourse of “hybrid” or “third way” poetry in order to 
elucidate what I mean by postlanguage lyric poetry in particular.  
After arriving at the contemporary moment of discourse on poetic subjectivity, I shift to 
literary-ethical inquiry by providing an overview of the major ethical concepts and terminology 
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that I employ in the readings of specific poems in later chapters. First, I include a discussion of 
Levinas and Derrida, the major theorists of contemporary ethics whose writings I draw upon to 
establish a guiding framework in this project. I then conclude this chapter by providing an 
overview of some of the poets and critics who provide valuable models for conceptualizing 
reading and writing literary texts and/or lyric poetry as ethical encounter, including Paul Celan, 
Joan Retallack, Mutlu Konuk Blasing, Derek Attridge, Scott Brewster, and William Waters. I 
draw on the work of these writers in order to explicate specific considerations related to the 
application of ethics to literary texts. In particular, these literary-ethical concepts enable me to 
position postlanguage lyric poetry as a rhetorical/performative construct that can be a site of 
ethical encounter between writer and reader. 
Conceptualizing Subjectivity 
The notion of a unified self that exists independently from social contexts is rooted in 
philosophical and ideological traditions in the West. While there are many different ways of 
considering the self, very influential are what philosopher Susan Brison calls “traditional 
accounts” of subjectivity that have been delineated in metaphysics since the Enlightenment era. 
Exemplified by the Cartesian cogito, the concept of the self as a kind of metaphysical substance, 
this traditional model views the “self as individualistic” and “assumes one can individuate selves 
and determine the criteria for identity over time independent of social context” (Brison 41). 
These traditional or metaphysical accounts of selfhood privilege the mind over the body or 
material world. Sociologist Ian Burkitt points out that, in addition to the metaphysical concept of 
the Cartesian cogito, another traditional account of subjectivity in the West is fundamentally 
ideological and can be captured in political philosopher’s C.B. Macpherson’s term, “‘possessive 
individualism,’” a type of individualism found in capitalist societies and built on the conviction 
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that “each individual is thought to be the possessor of their own skills or capacities, owing 
nothing to society for the development of these” (2). According to the social psychologist John 
Shotter, possessive individualism also sets up a dichotomy of the internal mind as separate from, 
and superior to, the external, material world. He argues that the pervasive belief in possessive 
individualism encourages us to account “for our experience of ourselves . . . in such an 
individualistic way . . . as if we all existed from birth as separate, isolated individuals already 
containing ‘minds’ or ‘mentalities’ wholly within ourselves, set over against a material world 
itself devoid of any mental processes” (136). Traditional accounts of subjectivity in the post-
Enlightenment West, then, posit a universal notion of selfhood: unified, stable across time, 
ahistorical, and disembodied. Moreover, these traditional accounts encourage a highly 
individualistic worldview that resists acknowledgement of the influence of the material world or 
social relations with others.  
Poststructuralist and postmodern theorists in the latter half of the twentieth century have 
challenged the philosophical and ideological assumptions behind traditional notions of 
subjectivity.11 In poststructuralist academic discourse, subjectivity in the twenty-first century is 
now commonly seen as dispersed rather than coherent, decentered rather than stable, historically 
and ideologically contextualized rather than universal and ahistorical, and embodied rather than 
purely metaphysical. However, while the characterization of subjectivity has been challenged 
within academic discourse, in the words of literary critic Paul John Eakin, an “enduring vitality 
of the myth of autonomy” persists in Western culture (62). The cultural mythology that 
undergirds the traditional accounts of subjectivity is particularly relevant to the activity of 
writing because, as Shotter observes, the myth of autonomy is born in and reinforced through 
                                                        
11 I am referring to the rejection of traditional notions of individualistic subjectivity found in the work of 
poststructuralist and postmodern theorists since the 1970s, notably in the work of Lacan, Derrida, Althusser, 
Foucault, and Barthes, as well as in the work of many feminist, postcolonial, and queer theorists.   
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language. Shotter argues that we are disciplined to talk as if we are self-determined individuals 
by processes of “‘social accountability’”: “what we talk of as our experience of our reality is 
constituted for us largely by the already established ways in which we must talk in our attempts 
to account for ourselves . . . to the others around us. [. . .] And only certain ways of talking are 
deemed legitimate . . . [so] our understanding, and apparently our experience of ourselves, will 
be constrained also” [emphasis in the original] (140, 141). Thus, through language, we are 
socially trained to see ourselves as products of self-determination, and, consequently, 
conditioned not to see relationality in subjectivity.12 Furthermore, the “myth of autonomy,” made 
commonplace through everyday language, is far from neutral. Burkitt argues that possessive 
individualism is pernicious for it is “a political theory that distorts human nature, because each 
one of us develops our capacities in society” (2-3).  
While one can observe the persistence of the “myth of autonomy” despite the advent of 
poststructuralism, this is not to say that philosophical and political critique can have no bearing 
on lived experience, or that theoretical, academic discourses exist separately from everyday life. 
On the contrary, it is important to underscore the link between metaphysical and ideological 
concepts of subjectivity on the one hand and lived experience on the other. As Burkitt argues, the 
way we think about the self and the way we experience the self mutually influence one another 
through language:  
                                                        
12 Shotter is not the first to discuss how ideological concepts of subjectivity are shaped through discourse; the works 
of Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser are foundational and widely influential. But, as Eakin argues, Shotter’s 
description has advantages over these theorists: “In contrast to the comparatively abstract analyses of Michel 
Foucault and Louis Althusser, which unfold at the level of social institutions and the state, Shotter’s focus on the 
structure of interpersonal communication models the interface between the individual and culture with a telling 
immediacy” (63). Moreover, Burkitt argues that Foucault’s arguments rely on “under-emphasis on relations to 
others, and also the over-extension of forms of scientific, medical and legal knowledge and practice to constitute the 
whole of experience and of the self” (102). I read the writings of Rankine, Howe, Robinson as drawing on 
interpersonal experiences and communications (or lack of them); thus, I preface my reading of these poets’ writings 
with Shotter, Burkitt, and, as I will indicate below, Charles Taylor’s articulations of subjectivity and language.  
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... while some ideological and metaphysical abstractions, which need to be 
critiqued, have acted upon individuals in everyday life, shaping self-identities, 
there is a reciprocal relation between political and philosophical abstraction on the 
one hand, and everyday life and selfhood on the other. The two inform each other, 
with ideas about what it is to be a self that emerge from everyday social relations 
seeping into concepts of the self in the social sciences, psychology and the 
humanities, while these concepts can then filter back into everyday 
understandings of who we are. (27)  
According to Burkitt, notions about selfhood are not proscribed by philosophers and political 
ideologues and imposed upon a passive populace; they are articulated and circulate through all 
sorts of discourses, formal and informal, official and unofficial. Both Shotter and Burkitt argue 
that we need to reconceptualize the self as relational rather than individualistic, and that we can 
reframe how we consider language as rhetorical and dialogic acts in order to orient our concept 
of selfhood as intersubjective. Furthermore, contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor takes up 
similar considerations in his project to revise subjectivity in the wake of poststructuralism. 
Taylor sees that, while the conventional subject—stable, unified, and in control of language—is 
problematic, so is the other extreme, articulated by some proponents of poststructuralism, where 
language is a code that completely constructs and dominates the subject, thus stripping it of 
agency.13 Taylor seeks a space between the two extreme positions of sovereign or powerless 
subjectivity by observing that we are only deliberating selves or agents insofar as we are parts of 
a language community, what he calls social “webs of interlocution” (qtd. in Parker 10). Thus, the 
                                                        
13 Poetry critic Charles Altieri puts the challenge to articulate subjectivity in positive terms in another way: how to 
move beyond “the standard postmodernist slogans content with claims that the subject is irreducibly decentred, and 
hence bound to oscillate between anxious instability and provisional ingenuity” (“What difference can contemporary 
poetry make in our moral thinking?” 141n2).  
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self emerges through ongoing, dialogic processes. The analyses of Shotter, Burkitt, and Taylor on 
language and subjectivity preface my reading of Rankine, Howe, and Robinson, for their poetry 
demonstrates reciprocal relations between the philosophical ideological critiques of subjectivity 
and the experience of everyday life.14 In particular, these poets investigate how the myth of 
possessive individualism persists with a particular tenacity in American culture through a 
multitude of textual forms and everyday uses of language, as reinforced in speech, media, and 
commonplace narratives. Rankine, Howe, and Robinson seek to use language in innovative ways 
to reconceptualize the idea of the self as intersubjective, and, correspondingly, the lyric subject 
as ethically engaged.   
Definitions of Lyric 
What is the relation between “traditional accounts” of subjectivity and lyric poetry? First 
of all, it is important to consider what is meant by lyric poetry. It might seem easy to identify 
lyric poetry—notions that spring to mind include brevity, an emphasis on the melodious qualities 
of language, emotional intensity, and the expression of thoughts and feelings from a first-person 
perspective. However, contemporary critics routinely comment on how notoriously difficult it is 
to define lyric because critical discourses surrounding the term emphasize a range of attributes 
and, consequently, engender much confusion.15  
                                                        
14 While Shotter, Burkitt, and Taylor are not the first to theorize intersubjectivity. For example, mid-twentieth 
century psychoanalysts Melanie Klein and Donald Winicott contributed to theories of intersubjectivity. However, I 
find the articulations of intersubjectivity in the writings of Shotter, Burkitt, and Taylor to be helpful because, as 
contemporary thinkers, they frame their observations in response to poststructuralist discourses. 
15 Definitional claims of the lyric draw on an extensive critical history. While Willis and Barbiero offer abbreviated 
versions in their essays, in the critical anthology, The Lyric Theory Reader, Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins 
include several introductory and theoretical sections where they outline various approaches to definitions of the lyric 
even as they observe how “notoriously difficult” it is (1). In broader terms, Scott Brewster also outlines critical 
perceptions of the difficulty of the definition of lyric, including René Welleck’s argument that “One must abandon 
attempts to define the general nature of the lyric and the lyrical. Nothing beyond generalities of the tritest kind can 
result from it” (Lyric 4).  
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One can turn to mid-twentieth century critic M.H. Abrams for a succinct description of 
lyric as “any short poem presenting a single speaker (not necessarily the poet himself) who 
expresses a state of mind involving thought or feeling” (Glossary 48). While Abrams’ 
articulation is useful as a conventional definition of lyric, many of the assumptions underlying 
this understanding of lyric as “expressive” have been contested. In contrast to an understanding 
that emphasizes lyric as expression, some contemporary critics emphasize lyric’s performative or 
rhetorical dimensions. This performative character is present in the etymology of the term:  
“lyric” is derived from the ancient Greek term “lyre,” which indicates poetry that is performed 
with musical accompaniment. While the association between lyric and music lives on today, with 
the term “lyric” used for the words sung in popular and folk music, twentieth and twenty-first 
century lyric poetry is often produced primarily in textual print form, without musical 
accompaniment (Brewster 2). However, even as a textual form, lyric can be understood to be 
performative. Furthermore, while lyric has often been considered to be timeless, clearly the term 
“lyric” is historically contingent and has changed over time. Literary critic Scott Brewster argues 
that, in the West, it has always been changing, emerging in multifarious forms in different 
historical eras and cultures, dating back to ancient Greece. Brewster traces a genealogy of what 
he considers to be various lyric forms through Western history, including the ceremonial, 
elegiac, and oratorical verses of antiquity, the troubadours’ songs and religious hymns of the 
medieval era, the courtly love sonnets of early modern times, the neoclassical odes of the 
eighteenth century, and the vast majority of poetry in the Romantic and post-Romantic era (17-
32). In broader terms, Mutlu Konuk Blasing similarly argues that the “lyric is a foundational 
genre, and its history spans millennia; it comprises a wide variety of practices, ranging in the 
West from Sappho to rap” (4). Brewster and Blasing’s descriptions of the lyric as encompassing 
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diverse forms through history and across cultures is important, for they do so while emphasizing 
lyric’s roots as a discursive or rhetorical mode that is fundamentally performative and therefore 
concerned with address to readership. Furthermore, in Poetry’s Touch: On Lyric Address, 
William Waters also argues for an understanding of lyric (a term he uses interchangeably with 
“poetry”) as tending toward address of the reader (1-2 n.2). In his concentration on poems that 
employ the vocative, Waters cites examples from across European languages and time periods 
from antiquity to the mid-twentieth-century. Thus, his argument rests on the idea that lyric 
extends across a multiplicity of subgenres throughout Western history, but that there is an overall 
tendency of lyric poetry to reach or call to the reader.  
In contrast, in Dickinson’s Misery: A Theory of Lyric Reading (2005), Virginia Jackson 
argues that the idea of lyric poetry as the oldest form of literary expression is in fact a modern, 
post-Enlightenment invention that developed through nineteenth and twentieth century reading 
practices and critical discourses.16 Jackson contends that, through the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, critical reading practices effectively contributed to the “lyricization” of a 
vast array of various types of poetry—hymns, ballads, odes, elegies, drinking songs, etc. (8). As 
a result, “lyric” emerged as what Gerard Genette calls an “archigenre” or all-encompassing term 
that overarches and retrospectively includes a plethora of empirically observed cultural forms 
(Jackson and Prins 12). While one might be tempted to place all the responsibility on the New 
Critics for this abstraction of the lyric, in the introduction to the critical anthology, The Lyric 
Theory Reader, Jackson and co-editor Yopie Prins acknowledge New Criticism as quite 
significant but also as one “part of a longer history of abstraction in which various verse 
genres…were collapsed into a large, lyricized idea of poetry as such” (5). In their respective 
                                                        
16 Jackson’s influential argument has been seen as heralding the “New Lyric Studies,” which is also the name of the 
January 2008 issue of PMLA  (123.1) that offers various perspectives on current lyric studies. 
  
 30 
arguments, Brewster and Jackson concur that “lyric” has ascended to become the dominant 
descriptor for the vast majority of poetries since Romanticism, but they differ on whether or not 
one can accurately define the comparatively richer array of earlier, pre-Romantic poetic forms as 
“lyric.” Consequently, they disagree on the relative value of “lyric” as an umbrella term; while 
Brewster views this as an indicator of lyric’s strength (4), to Jackson, “lyricization” narrows a 
richer and more historically contextualized understanding of a great number of poetic forms, 
reinforcing the notion of lyric as a “temporally self-present or unmediated” (9). Furthermore, 
while Jackson argues that referring to pre-Romantic forms anachronistically and reductively 
applies a modern concept onto earlier literary forms, for her part, Blasing counters that 
“‘[h]istoricizing’ the lyric as essentially a late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European 
invention in effect universalizes a historically and geographically specific model of a subject. 
And the term ‘lyric,’ still used in this sense, has come to serve as an ideological weapon in the 
ongoing politicized poetry wars” (4). In other words, although Jackson’s argument claims to 
honor modern lyric’s mutability, in its bid to historicize the lyric, it ultimately reifies the 
conventional identification of lyric as Romantic monologue and lyric subjectivity as directed 
inward. It is indeed this conventional version of the lyric that has become a flashpoint in the “two 
camps” debates. As such, Jackson’s compelling argument does not illuminate the projects of 
twenty-first century postlanguage lyric poets who seek to preserve the lyric as a category while 
expanding upon the possibilities for lyric subjectivities. In contrast, Brewster, Blasing, and 
Waters provide valuable models for reading lyric poems in their discursive, performative, and/or 
rhetorical dimensions, and these models rest on considerations of lyric that extend throughout a 
broader history, before, during, and after Romanticism. I will turn to a fuller explanation of 
Brewster, Blasing, and Waters’ models of lyric as rhetorical construct and such models’ relations 
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to the ethics of lyric poetry towards the end of this chapter. But first, to convey what is at stake 
with these various readings of the lyric, it is important to delineate the definition of lyric poetry 
and the critical narrative of lyric subjectivity as rooted in theories and practices shaped in the 
Romantic period and developed through the influence of, or reaction against, Romanticism and 
post-Romanticism as it came to be understood across the following two centuries of literary 
criticism. 
Romantic Lyric Poetry and Subjectivity  
Poetry written during the Romantic era is central to the modern literary critical concept of 
the lyric poem as organized around a lyric “I.” The Romantic lyric subject has often been 
characterized as rooted in the “traditional account” of subjectivity, that is, the post-
Enlightenment model of a coherent, autonomous, static, uniquely individualized subjectivity that 
is capable of transcending bodily, material, and/or social realities. Thus, the conventional lyric 
“I” is identified with the private interiority of a solitary self. Consequently, the lyric has often 
been understood to be a direct, sincere, and self-revelatory expression or utterance of thoughts 
and feelings that emerges from a pure interiority. A key figure in Romantic poetry’s elevation 
and autobiographical identification of the lyric poet is William Wordsworth, who famously 
defines poetry in the 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful 
feelings” which is then “recollected in tranquility,” at which time the poet contemplates and 
“gradually produces” an emotion, similar to the original, in his mind (756). Romantic verse, as 
defined and, in select examples, produced by Wordsworth, has often been interpreted as the 
paradigm for modern lyric poetry as more or less direct expression of the poet’s feelings and 
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thoughts.17 Furthermore, many critics have characterized Romantic lyric subjectivity as one that 
aims to transcend material/social conditions through the workings of the mind.  
Another quality that has come to be identified with lyric poetry is its status as a 
monologic genre. Victorian writer John Stuart Mill influentially promoted lyric as specifically 
monologic. Mill’s writings on poetry, which draw on the work of canonical Romantic poets, 
contribute greatly to the idea of lyric poetry as solitary, expressive, authentic speech. Mill 
distinguishes between rhetoric and poetry in the statement that “eloquence is heard, poetry is 
overheard” and his assertion that “[p]oetry is feeling confessing itself to itself, in moments of 
solitude,” which thus situates readers as eavesdroppers (12). For a text to be classified as poetry, 
and not “eloquence” or rhetoric, Mill argues that the “act of utterance” should be an end in itself, 
not “a means to an end” to influence the feelings, beliefs, or actions of others (13). Mill’s 
formulations have remained influential through much of twentieth century criticism. For 
example, in 1957, structuralist critic Northrop Frye takes Mill’s formulation one step further, 
arguing that poetry “preeminently the utterance that is overheard” for “the poet, so to speak, 
turns his back on his listeners” (32). Thus, by the mid-twentieth century, lyric, as derived from 
Romanticism, was routinely understood to be a monologic genre that articulated the direct 
expression of the poet’s feelings; indeed, this characterization of lyric poetry has lingered 
through the late-twentieth century. 
It is important to note, however, that the idea of “Romantic verse” is a “retrospective 
construction” that later readers place on Romantic poetry (Brewster 74). Indeed, the conventional 
idea of Romantic lyric verse can be identified as a sub-type of Romantic poem that Abrams 
defined as a paradigmatic “greater Romantic lyric” in the essay “Structure and Style in the 
                                                        
17 While certain poems of Wordsworth arguably exemplify his poetics—for example, “I Wandered Lonely as a 
Cloud”—not all do; Wordsworth’s poems in Lyrical Ballads, for example, demonstrate a more complex relation 
between lyric subjectivity and poetic composition.  
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Greater Romantic Lyric.”18 This type of “descriptive-meditative poem” presents “a determinate 
speaker in a particularized, and usually a localized, outdoor setting, whom we overhear as he 
carries on, in a fluent vernacular which rises easily to a more formal speech, a sustained 
colloquy, sometimes with himself or with the outer scene, but more frequently with a silent 
human auditor, present or absent” (528, 527). In its depiction of a speaker communing with 
nature, the poem focuses on the workings of the speaker’s mind, which culminates in an 
epiphany as the “lyric speaker achieves an insight, faces up to a tragic loss, comes to a moral 
decision, or resolves an emotional problem” (528). The “greater Romantic lyric,” Abrams 
argues, showcases the Romantics’ humanism, for the speaker/poet’s interaction with the “non-
human” ultimately serves only as “the occasion for the activity which defines man: thought, the 
process of intellection” (528). Another way of looking at the Romantic lyric subject in the 
“greater Romantic lyric” is an “I” who engages with exteriority only to turn inward, thereby 
assimilating alterity to the sameness of the self. Abrams’ description of the “greater Romantic 
lyric” thus conjures qualities frequently ascribed to all Romantic and post-Romantic poetries, 
including interiority, sincerity, stasis, unique individuality, union with nature, and an idealized 
and/or idyllic vision of transcendent experience, centrally focused on the spiritual/meditative 
experience of the lyric subject’s mind. However, “the greater Romantic lyric” is only one type of 
Romantic lyric poem, and the focus on this type overlooks the poetry and poetics of even 
traditionally canonical Romantic poets. For example, Byron’s darkly ironic, narrative-driven 
long poems resist the sincerity of the “greater Romantic lyric,” and, in a letter to Richard 
Wodehouse, John Keats explicitly rejects what later come to be seen as conventional ideas of 
                                                        
18 For examples of “greater Romantic lyric,” Abrams cites (among others) Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey” and 
“Ode: Intimations of Immortality”; Coleridge’s “Eolian Harp” and “Dejection: An Ode”; Shelley’s “Stanzas Written 
in Dejection,” and “Ode to the West Wind”; and Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale.” Abrams notes that Byron did not 
write in this mode (527).  
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Romantic subjectivity in his denunciation of what he saw as the “wordsworthian or egotistical 
sublime” and an embrace of his role as a “camelion [sic] Poet” which advances a depersonalized, 
textual lyric subjectivity: “‘it is not itself—it has no self—it is every thing and nothing—It has 
no character’” (Letters 172).19 Despite the wide range of actual Romantic poetry and poetics, 
Romantic lyric—and, subsequently, all lyric poetry—came to be understood in the terms that 
Abrams describes.  
In the mid-twentieth century, the New Critics did much to perpetuate the identification of 
the lyric with the “greater Romantic lyric” (Jackson and Prins 5). As Jackson and Prins observe, 
the New Critics also played a major pedagogical role in developing a very influential twentieth-
century model of reading lyric poetry as dramatic monologue, in which the lyric “I” is a persona 
who is distinct from the poet and is therefore “a fictional person of all times and all places, the 
first-person speaker of the lyric could speak to no one in particular and thus to all of us” (5). This 
model was no doubt influenced by the New Critical embrace of “depersonalized,” “High 
Modernist” poetry of the early twentieth century, where the “I” adopted an elaborate persona or 
mask that might be mythological, shifting, or decentered (Brewster 97-8). However, a range of 
American poetic movements emerged in the mid-twentieth century that reacted against, or 
significantly modified, earlier poetic and critical models of modernist depersonalization and 
personae-based poetries. Notably, confessionalism came to dominate mid-twentieth century 
American poetry. In the 1970s and 1980s, Language writers, and critics who championed them, 
                                                        
19 I am providing a broad overview that mentions only a few of the traditionally canonical British Romantic poets. 
Within scholarship on Romanticism, the conventional view of Romantic lyric subjectivity has been considerably 
challenged by, for example, feminist critics such as Anne K. Mellor who observe the construction of a great variety 
of female subjectivities in the work of many British Romantic women poets, such as Anna Barbauld and Mary 
Robinson (Romanticism & Gender, New York: Routledge, 1993). Another case that argues for the presence of 
outward and dynamic articulations of Romantic subjectivities, even in the work of canonical poets, can be found in 
Jefferey Cane Robinson’s Unfettered Poetry: Fancy in British Romanticism (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006).  
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singled out for attack what they called the “voice poem,” a type of poetic text linked to both 
confessionalism and the Romantic lineage of lyric poetry.  
The Language School Critique 
The practitioners and critical advocates of Language writing have posed significant 
critiques of poetry as practiced in dominant modes of production and reception in mid-late 
twentieth century U.S. Emerging in the 1970s and early 1980s in the Bay Area, New York, and 
Toronto, the movement that became known as Language writing or Language poetry involved 
writing that adopted a wide range of styles and forms (McCaffrey 141). Language poetry inclines 
toward syncretism, collage, and the adoption of multiple discourses in poetry that is widely noted 
for its “designed opacity and strategic unworkability within normative readerly expectations” 
(McCaffrey 151).20 Thus, as Language poet and critic Steve McCaffery notes, the Language 
school lacks a “unitary poetic” (151). However, Language writers have been classified as a 
movement insofar as they are united in their commitment to language as the central concern of 
poetic activity and their shared understanding—shaped by poststructuralist and Marxist 
theories—“that language was not a neutral conduit for ideas or feelings but an active agent … in 
the social construction and the real” (McCaffrey 143).  Thus, Language writers assert that the 
political possibilities of poetry could be re-envisioned and expanded through the relation of the 
notion of communication “to textual materiality and production” (McCaffrey 143).  
The stance of the Language writers involves the rejection of the “so-called voice poem.” 
According to its Language detractors, the “voice poem” assumes a model of communication 
wherein an essentially dictatorial poet directly conveys a message or emotion to a disempowered 
reader through the transparent, neutral conduit of language (Hartley xii). Furthermore, in this 
                                                        
20 Language poems can make for a challenging read; they are also known for “their indeterminate pronoun relations, 
catachresis, a preference for parataxis … and non-syllogistic articulations … over grammatical and clausal 
subordination (hypotaxis), and extreme disjunction” (McCaffrey 151-52). 
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model, both poet and reader are assumed to be self-present subjects (Hartley xii). Language 
writers argue that their poetry, because of its density and disruptions to readers’ expectations, 
does not involve a (self-present) poet directing readers through the overdetermined literary or 
rhetorical cues of a “closed”/unitary/commodified text. Instead, Language writing promotes 
active collaboration between reader and writer in what Language poet Lyn Hejinian calls the 
“open text” in her well-known essay, “The Rejection of Closure.” According to Language 
writers, the reader must actively navigate linkages and associations among various elements of 
an open text, in contrast to the relatively straightforward activity of reading a “voice poem.” 
What kinds of poetry do Language writers invoke when they use the term “voice poem”? 
McCaffrey details three strands of predominant mid-to-late twentieth-century American poetic 
proclivities that Language writers oppose. First, he explains that the “voice poem” involves “the 
consecration of the individual voice (linguistically marked by the axis of the ‘I’ understood as a 
marker of self-plenitude, ‘truth,’ and ‘sincerity’) in the ego-chamber of the confessional lyric 
stance” which became entrenched in postwar American literature via the poetry of Sylvia Plath, 
Robert Lowell, John Berryman, Louise Glück, and Jorie Graham and “in a multiplicity of MFA 
programs and those poems that populate the pages of such venues as the American Poetry 
Review and The New Yorker” (146). Secondly, Language Writers opposed “the ego-cosmological 
syntax” of Robert Duncan “and the processual, physiological, and predominantly speech-based 
poetics grounded on organic models of the poem that … culminate[d] in Olson’s valorization of 
breath and syllable in his important 1950 pamphlet ‘Projective Verse’ and Denise Levertov’s 
theorizing of the poem as organic form” (147). Finally, Language writers also disavow the “so-
called poetry of accommodation,” a term Jerome McGann has coined “to describe a prevailing 
poetry of social disaffection that failed to advance into an area of meaningful linguistic critique” 
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for, “[p]oems of emotionally charged disaffection … ultimately resolve into a lyric attenuation 
that at its base seeks to clarify a single subject position” (147). As McCaffery amply describes, 
Language writers oppose the dominant articulations of lyric subjectivity within major strands of 
mid-to-late American twentieth century poetry, and thus, it is fair to consider Language writing, 
broadly, as anti-subjective.  
Language writing critiques of the “voice poem” often target the lyric “I” as signifying a 
unitary, self-present subject and/or singular writer, and the “I” thus becomes a convenient 
linguistic marker for a host of associated assumptions about naturalized language and naïve ideas 
about subjectivity in a range of lyric poetries that stem from a Romantic, “expressive” lineage 
and may be identified as confessionalism, organicism, mysticism and/or political protest. 
Language writers view “expressive” poetry that centers on the self as fundamentally misguided, 
as Charles Bernstein explains in an interview: “‘It’s a mistake, I think to posit the self as the 
primary organizing feature of writing. As many others have pointed out, a poem exists in a 
matrix of social and historical relations that are more significant to the formation of an individual 
text than any personal qualities of the life or voice of an author’” (qtd. in Perloff Dance of the 
Intellect 220). Thus, “voice poems,” the Language writers argue, ultimately do the work of 
reifying the individualistic lyric “I” over against an essentially passive readership, and thus leave 
untouched the insidious ideologies of conventional language and authoritative discourses of late 
capitalism in American postmodernity. In the discourse which has been outlined here, the use of 
the first-person speaking subject, the “I” of the poetic text, with its concomitant invocation of the 
expressive self, has often been treated as a battleground. Critics and poets have tended to 
advocate relatively either straightforward use of the first-person singular or its total banishment. 
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The Lyric “I” in Contemporary Women’s Poetry 
How did the Language critiques of the lyric “I” impact American women’s poetry in 
particular? In the criticism of contemporary women’s poetry, informed by the second-wave 
feminism of the 1970s and 1980s, the practice of using the lyric “I” has been an especially 
contested field. Disagreement has centered on whether or not women poets should use the first-
person subject as a place of stability and coherence in order to represent women’s experiences 
and thereby advocate for—and provide a model of—women’s empowerment. Fundamental to 
these debates have been disagreements over models of subjectivity and power dynamics. On the 
one hand, critics including Susan Stanford Friedman and Nancy K. Miller warn of the dangers of 
poststructuralism to women and minority poets, who, unlike white male poets, come from a 
traditionally oppressed social group, and therefore should be wary of readily abandoning the 
notion of “subject” or “author.” On the other hand, avant-garde poet-critics such as Joan 
Retallack and Rae Armantrout argue that using the first-person singular subject is not 
empowering to readers of women’s poetry. Retallack and Armantrout argue that, rather than 
modeling a strong female subject or allowing for newer, feminist reading practices, poets such as 
Adrienne Rich and Sharon Olds, in their use of the “I,” may be replicating the unitary, 
patriarchal subject that exerts dominance and oppressive authority over readers and/or persons 
they describe within the poetry. Finally, women (and men) poets who have employed the lyric 
subject have been accused of a lack of political or larger social engagement; the lyric in general, 
and the (post)confessional voice in particular, has often been associated with retreat or escape 
into the private and interior world of the self—ultimately, a form of solipsistic narcissism. 
Avant-garde women’s poetry that eschews the first-person subject, according to this logic, 
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facilitates a turn away from interiority and towards questions of larger social relevance and the 
role that language plays in perpetuating patriarchal ideologies.  
However, while these feminist critical debates of the 1980s and 1990s were often framed 
in stark, polarizing terms, women’s poetic practice was more complex. In 1982, experimental 
poet Kathleen Fraser wrote in the notes to Ron Silliman’s Ironwood anthology that the Language 
writers’ “esthetic distaste for self-referentiality and/or evident personal investment in one’s 
subject immediately introduces a series of prohibiting factors. For a writer whose awareness has 
been tuned by a growing need to claim her own history and voice/s, such as feminism provides, 
Language Writing’s concerns are often experienced (if not intended) as directives she cannot 
afford” (137). In her writings, Fraser recounts that she experienced a feeling of “double 
marginality,” for if Language writing’s banishment of the subject was too prohibitive, neither did 
she seek to fulfill the prescriptions of second-wave feminist poetics, which insisted on self-
expression of feelings and direct representation of women’s experiences (qtd. in Keller 3-4). 
Consequently, Fraser founded the innovative women’s poetry journal HOW(ever), which ran in 
print from 1983 to 1992 and traced a lineage between experimental women modernist poets and 
contemporary, innovative women writers (Keller 4). Furthermore, as Linda Kinnahan observes, 
by at least the early 1990s, a number of feminist critics and experimental women poets “wrestled 
with Language Poetry’s ‘given’ of subject banishment,” for they found it to be “a closed model 
for reading a range of works positioning themselves differently in relation to the masculine, 
white, and Western model of subjectivity” (12). According to such feminist writers, including 
Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Caroline Bergvall, Romana Huk, and Clair Wills, the litmus test for 
innovative poetry should not be the presence or absence of the lyric subject. Innovative women’s 
poetry can deploy the lyric “I” in myriad ways that do not replicate the patriarchal “ideological I” 
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but instead explore a range of possibilities for subjectivity within poetic texts. Indeed, this 
dissertation builds from the starting point of feminist experimental women’s poetry and feminist 
criticism that acknowledges the value of the Language writing’s critique of the “voice poem” but 
who resist a simple rejection of the lyric “I” or the dismissal of any exploration of subjectivity. 
Accordingly, although my project concentrates largely on work produced in the late 1990s and 
the early years of the twenty-first century, it can be helpful to look at My Life, a significant 
Language text written in the 1980s by Lyn Hejinian, who is considered one of the founders of the 
Language movement. An exploration of the critical discourse surrounding My Life and 
Hejinian’s poetics can elucidate the critical position concerning women’s experimental poetry 
and subjectivity upon which my current project builds.   
Subjectivity in Language Writing: Lyn Hejinian’s My Life  
My Life is a significant text of postmodern experimental poetry for several reasons, including 
its popularity. As critics Craig Dworkin and Lisa Samuels have noted, by the mid-1990s, My Life 
could be considered the most popular contemporary experimental book of poetry.21 Furthermore, 
the critical conversation surrounding My Life, which so often focuses on poetic subjectivity, 
illuminates both the stakes and the possibilities for Hejininan’s poetic contemporaries and 
successors, including postlanguage women poets who write innovative poetry that retains and 
revisits the poetic “I.”  
My Life, first published in 1980 and expanded in a new edition in 1987, is a text that 
confounds generic classifications; critics and readers alternately consider it a postmodern 
autobiography, a short novelette, or a work of experimental prose poetry. As Lisa Samuels 
                                                        
21 See Dworkin, “Penelope Reworking the Twill” and Samuels, “Eight Justifications.” By 1996, My Life had sold 
around 8,000 copies and had reached its 6th printing; while this may not seem like a high figure, it far exceeds the 
sales of other non-“mainstream” poetry books, and it has been taught frequently at the college and high school levels 
(Samuels 103).  
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observes, it can be considered an exemplary model of postmodern procedural verse, in which a 
predetermined conceit dictates its form (107-8). In the 1980 version, when Hejinian was 37 years 
old, My Life contained thirty-seven sections for each year of the writer’s life, with thirty-seven 
sentences each. In the 1987 version of My Life, these sections were expanded to correspond with 
the poet’s current age of 45, so each of the previous sections had eight additional sentences 
included in various points of each text’s section, and eight additional sections of 45 lines each 
were added.22 This conceit, and the book’s title, set up conventional expectations of 
autobiographical writing, such as highly personal content and a linear narrative that culminates to 
the present time, with the writer reflecting on the past. However, the text of My Life plays with 
these expectations, for each section presents a series of sentences that are juxtaposed in what 
Michael Davidson calls a “nondiscursive, nonsyllogistic fashion,” (212) as is evident in the oft-
cited opening, which begins with an italicized phrase in the upper left corner, “A pause, a rose / 
something on paper” and then continues:  
A moment yellow, just as four years later, when my father returned home from 
the war, the moment of greeting him, as he stood at the bottom of the stairs, 
younger, thinner than when he left, was purple—though moments are no longer so 
colored. Somewhere, in the background, rooms share a pattern of small roses. 
Pretty is as pretty does. In certain families, the meaning of necessity is at one with 
the sentiment of prenecessity. The better things were gathered in a pen. The 
windows were narrowed by white gauze curtains which were never loosened. 
Here I refer to irrelevance, that rigidity which never intrudes. Hence, repetitions, 
free from all ambition. The shadow of the redwood trees, she said, was 
oppressive. (7) 
                                                        
22 All citations are from the 1987 edition of My Life.  
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On one level, the text is rather accessible: the syntax within each sentence is relatively intact and 
the diction is straightforward. However, with the text’s deployment of parataxis, the links 
between the sentences are unclear, and so the reader is faced with disjunctive juxtapositions 
rather than a stable narrative or clear character development. Moreover, as the text continues, 
many phrases are repeated as leitmotifs, including “A pause, a rose, something on paper” and the 
gender-laden cliché “Pretty is as pretty does.” However, such repetitions—which are described 
in this opening section as “free from all ambition”—are always juxtaposed among different 
surrounding sentences and therefore within a variety of contexts; connections among various 
descriptive elements are thus never fixed. The overall effect is to distance the descriptions from 
the personal life of a singular author, and instead a discourse emerges through the interplay of 
repetition and differences in language.  
Several critics in the dozen or so years after the appearance of My Life read Hejinian’s 
deployment of these experimental formal elements as a representative Language school text; 
these critics include Marjorie Perloff, Michael Davidson—who asserts that My Life is an 
exemplary illustration of Language writer Ron Silliman’s “new sentence” (212)—and David 
Jarraway, who goes so far as to title a 1992 essay “‘My Life’ through the Eighties: The 
Exemplary L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E of Lyn Hejinian.” Davidson and Jarraway also read My Life 
in the grain of Hejinian’s essay, “The Rejection of Closure,” with its advocacy for an “open text” 
that resists the author-centric (often “I”-centric), domineering nature of the “closed text” by 
encouraging readerly participation. In these readings, the concept of “open text” is applied to My 
Life, which thus indicates that readers must actively participate as textual creators by filling in 
gaps or links that the text does not complete.  
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 Another strain of criticism of My Life emphasizes the role of gender in the text. In an 
early reading, Perloff observes that, while the text may be “anybody’s autobiography,” 
ultimately, the speaking subject is definitively female, for “My Life conveys what the archetypal 
life of a young American girl is like” (Dance of the Intellect 225). In a highly theoretical 
approach, Laura Hinton draws on psychoanalytic theory of fetishism and fetishistic nostalgia, to 
read My Life as a postmodern romance (and also an anti-romance) that explores the postmodern 
female subject by exploring its representational crisis in language and visual imagery. 
Meanwhile, Hilary Clark and Juliana Spahr read My Life as a key text for women’s 
autobiography. Clark argues that it presents a “feminist critique” of paternal authority as 
“manifested and perpetuated in language” and traditional structures of autobiography (328). In 
contrast, Spahr applies Judith Butler’s theories of gender performativity to argue that My Life 
presents a way out of the discourse of women’s multiple but fixed subjectivities (such as found 
in the writings of Gloria Anzaldúa and Maxine Hong Kingston) by presenting a continually 
“resignified,” fluctuating subject that emerges through the reading process. Furthermore, Spahr 
applies Hejinian’s “Rejection of Closure” to argue that agency is effectively transferred to the 
reader in My Life.23 
 As these descriptions of the gender-based criticism of My Life demonstrate, much of the 
discussion of Hejinian’s writing focuses on issues of subjectivity. Given the text’s focused 
exploration of subjectivity, does this, then, mark a departure from other Language school 
writings? Critics differ in their assessment of this question when considering Hejinian’s poetry 
and poetics. Michael Greer takes up Hejinian’s influential essay, “The Rejection of Closure,” to 
contrast it with Ron Silliman’s essay on poetics, “Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the 
                                                        
23 Another analysis that foregrounds gender is by Craig Dworkin. Dworkin also reads My Life in the grain of 
Hejinian’s essay “Rejection of Closure” and likens the text to another art form, the nineteenth-century patchwork 
quilt, which is associated with feminine creativity (“Penelope Reworking the Twill”). 
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World.” Greer treats these essays as illustrations of the two major strains in Language poetry: 
Silliman, who engages with Marxist theory, represents a turn outwards to the historicity of 
literary forms in an effort to participate in class resistance, while Hejinian deploys the 
poststructuralism of Barthes and French feminists, including Irigaray, Cixous, and Kristeva, to 
turn “inward” in her consideration of discursive subjectivity (345). Greer further asserts that 
“Rejection of Closure” includes moments of humanism in its exploration of the subject, a quality 
he praises. However, not all critics examining Language school are interested in both of the 
strains that Greer identifies. For example, in his book-length synoptic treatment of the 
movement, George Hartley acknowledges that no single political position applies to everyone 
labeled a “Language poet,” but he focuses on those poets who make specifically Marxist 
claims—and all of these poets turn out to be men.24 The majority of poets who have been 
identified as Language writers are men, so Hartley’s focus on male poets is understandable. But 
his criticism illustrates the ongoing identification of certain men poets as aligned with the 
Language movement’s core agenda, which involves the outright rejection of “I”-centric writing 
and banishment of subjectivity. The characterization of Language writing as anti-subjective, as 
also evident in McCaffrey’s retrospective essay, thus stands in contrast with Greer’s proposal of 
two strains of Language poetry. 
If Language poetry is defined as purely anti-subjective, then Hejinian’s My Life may not 
be an exemplary text of Language poetry after all; however, depending on one’s point of view, 
that may not be such a bad thing. For example, Samuels argues that one of the strengths of My 
Life is its “subjectively motivated proceduralism” that includes an “I” that is flexible, unstable, 
and “inhabitable” by the reader (113). Samuels reads the “I” of My Life as unconventionally open 
                                                        
24 The Language poets Hartley focuses on are Ron Silliman, Bob Perelman, Barrett Watten, Charles Bernstein, 
Bruce Andrews, and Steve McCaffery (xv).  
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but nevertheless deviating from the Language poetry’s central agenda: “This inhabitable I, by the 
way, is unlike the concern with obviating the ‘I’ that many see as a critical project of Language 
poetry. If word focus and phrasal repetition make My Life a Language text, its I-centeredness 
does not. … Though [a] focus on the human is not what Hejinian usually preaches in her essays 
on writing, it is what her writing usually enacts” (113). Thus, unlike many other critics, Samuels 
reads My Life against the grain of the poetics Hejinian articulates in her own poetics—that is, as 
much more subject-oriented and (as Greer argues) humanist than Hejinian may intend. While I 
am content for My Life to remain classified as Language poetry, Samuels’ articulation of the 
text’s exploration of subjectivity, rather than its anti-subjectivity, is a key insight.  
 Like Samuels, Clair Wills also reads My Life somewhat against the grain of Hejinian’s 
poetics. In an essay that serves as an important precursor for my own argument, Wills also 
observes more of an “I-centeredness” than many other critics.25 Wills argues that it is erroneous 
to read My Life as evincing an absence of subjectivity, which contrasts with Hejinian’s own 
stated disavowal of the subject as a “person” and the work of art as an expression of an inner self 
that is unique and autonomous. Wills asserts that, while My Life questions the coherence of any 
poetic “voice” and denies any consistent speaking “I,” there is introspection and interiority, but 
without straightforward “self-expression” or “representation.” Instead, My Life reveals an 
attention to the ways in which the female self negotiates a place within the discourses that 
construct her. Interiority is not absent, but it is articulated by language, which, as indicated by 
clichés and reified fragments of discourse, is both impersonal and personal: “by identifying with 
certain objects or bits of language, these become constitutive elements in their expression of 
themselves … through a process of appropriation ‘become’ the writer … seemingly arbitrary or 
                                                        
25 Unlike Samuels, however, Wills’ argument is not concerned with whether or not My Life is an exemplary text of 
the Language movement or if it in fact departs from the Language movement’s central agenda. 
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contingent words and phrases gain and retain their significance because of their associative 
contexts within the life. They are what make the life ‘mine’” (Wills 44).  
In her argument, Wills is interested in a critical movement beyond the “two camps” 
model of women’s poetry in particular, which she places within the gendered context of the 
ongoing transformation of public and private spheres throughout the twentieth century. While 
Wills acknowledges that “there isn’t a pristine sphere of the lyric self which is not politicised and 
constructed,” she distinguishes herself from Perloff, whom she sees as too fully embracing the 
perspective of French postmodern theorist Jean Baudrillard, who argues that the self is emptied 
completely by mass media and electronic technology. Instead, Wills asserts, many experimental 
women poets do not insist on the absence of self and/or interiority, for they instead explore  
the ways in which the relationship between the public world of the mass media 
and the experience of being an individual is mediated. … Much of this poetry 
reveals not the absence of privacy but the ways in which that private or intimate 
realm of experience is constructed ‘through’ the public, and therefore elements of 
‘expressivity,’ though radically divorced from notions of authenticity, are present. 
(40-41)  
Wills ultimately argues that poetry that demonstrates “new forms of interiority, which are more 
reflexive and more negotiated, remain possible, and with them—presumably—the traces of a 
transformed, opened-out, but still recognisable lyric self” (39).  
 Wills’ investigation provides a key model for my own project. In the light of Wills’ 
reading, Hejinian’s explorations of subjectivity in My Life may be read as a text that illustrates 
how women’s experimental poetry can acknowledge the fallacies of the mainstream “voice” 
poem and its assumptions of authenticity, stability, and straightforward representation, while 
  
 47 
retaining a version of lyric subjectivity that signals an awareness that the lyric “I” is always 
mediated through language. Therefore, innovative texts, like the ones I will examine in this 
project, need not be anti-subjective, for they explore how one’s (private) interiority is not 
nonexistent but constructed through (public) discourses. By using Wills’ reading of My Life as a 
foundation, one can see how the seeds of postlanguage lyric poetic explorations of subjectivity 
were sown within the very movement that is often defined in opposition to the subjective as 
such.  
After Language: Lyric in the Turn of the Twenty-First Century  
The influence that Language writers have had on both their contemporaries and their 
successors has been considerable. Poetry critic Jed Rasula observes that “[t]he legacy of 
language poetry has been disseminated into the environment of poetic innovation at large” by the 
turn of the twenty-first century (Syncopations 18). In particular, Rasula notes that “[m]ost 
pertinent among the effects of Language poetry is its erosion of the complacent security on 
which the lyrical ego hoists its banner. The lyrical ego is by no means deposed as such but the 
diversification of poetic means and strategies open up sites of ‘agency’ which do not require 
validation by an heroic ego, and do not serve as vigilant fortifications of identity” (“Ten 
Different Fruits” 28). Much of the Language critiques that concern the “lyrical ego” might 
understandably be read as a rejection of lyric poetry. However, this is not the whole story, as 
Daniel Barbiero argues: “[w]hile a certain type of lyric does seem to have been rejected, it is also 
true that Language writing’s critical program served to produce an alternative, more self-
conscious understanding of lyric. Rather than being simply rejected in full, lyric conventions 
were subjected to a critical scrutiny that chose to emphasize the role of artifice in the production 
of lyric effect” (355). As such, Rasula observes that, emerging from the “two-camp” discourse, 
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the overall Language school critique “seems to have nourished poetic practice in markedly 
nondenominational ways” (Syncopations 24). Contemporaneous with, and after, the heyday of 
Language writing, many poets writing in the 1980s, 1990s and early twenty-first century have 
sought to compose poetry that incorporates both lyric and innovative techniques, thus carving out 
what has sometimes been considered a “third way” or a “third space” (Keller 6).  
With references to the work of Linda Kinnahan, Kathleen Fraser, and Clair Wills, I have 
noted how several women poets and feminist critics through the 1980s and 1990s have explored 
poetry that both acknowledged the Language writers’ critiques of the conventional lyric “I” 
while providing nuanced explorations of subjectivity in works of poetry and/or literary criticism. 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that in the twenty-first century discourse surrounding “third 
way” poetry women poets have played a key role, first with the “Where Lyric Meets Language” 
conference that was organized by Claudia Rankine and held at Barnard College in April 1999, 
and then in the 2002 anthology American Women Poets in the 21st Century: Where Lyric Meets 
Language, edited by Rankine and Juliana Spahr (Spahr “Introduction” 1). In the introduction to 
American Women Poets, Spahr argues that the innovative poetry of the women writers 
represented in the collection “makes room within lyric for language writing’s more politicized 
claims” (2). Spahr describes innovative lyric poetry as incorporating “modernist techniques such 
as fragmentation, parataxis, run-ons, interruption, and disjunction” while simultaneously 
avoiding the conventions of “linear narrative development, of meditative confessionalism, and of 
singular voice” (2). Poetry critic Lynn Keller also notes the prominence of women’s innovative 
poetry in Thinking Poetry: Readings in Women’s Exploratory Poetics, a critical work on what 
she describes as the “exploratory” poetry of several women writers of the 1990s and early 
twenty-first century. Keller notes that, around the turn of the twenty-first century in the U.S., 
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“many of the most visible and compelling experimentally inclined/exploratory poets writing 
today are women” (9). Keller describes her aim as joining “existing efforts to foster recognition 
that Language poetry is not the only form of contemporary poetic linguistic experimentation and 
that female poets are playing a key role in expanding the possibilities for alternative poetic 
practices” (2). While Fraser and Kinnahan’s aforementioned descriptions of the double 
marginalization of experimental women poets by the prescriptions of Language poetry and 
second-wave feminist poetics provide one key context for the prominent role women poets have 
played in producing innovative poetry, Spahr and Keller also trace possible reasons for the surge 
of innovative poetry by women in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. Spahr mentions the 
long and vexed history that women have had with lyric poetry, particularly the patriarchal 
tradition of the Petrarchan love sonnet, and points to criticism that foregrounds women poets’ 
reclamation of the lyric through different historical eras across centuries in the West 
(“Introduction” 2). Keller speculates that one reason may be because “gender may be a 
significant circumstance affecting one’s perception of the utility of common language,” and 
therefore women, who have historically been outside dominant power structures, are keenly 
attuned to subverting that “common language” through linguistic experimentation (9). Keller 
also cites the claims of influential poets and critics who point to the increased sociopolitical 
power of women and expansion of feminist viewpoints in late twentieth century U.S. to explain 
why so many women poets have been writing innovative poetry that is not constrained by 
second-wave feminist prescriptions for gender empowerment (9-10).26 While it may be difficult 
                                                        
26 Keller cites DuPlessis’s argument that women write disruptive poetry to reject oppressive social structures 
encoded in linguistic and literary conventions; Retallack’s point that “only recently have women ‘finally’ grown 
‘powerful enough sociopolitically to undertake the risks of this feminine challenge in their own texts’”; 
Armantrout’s case that “experimentalism and feminism are ‘natural allies’” because women as outsiders can 
interrogate constructed identities and conventions such as the “unified Voice” and, as such, “the expanded field of 
feminist experimentalism simply reflects the permeation of feminist perspectives through literary America”; and 
Rasula’s claim that, “in the aftermath of the second wave of feminism with its prescriptive sense of what the poem 
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to pinpoint the exact causes of the emergence of so many innovative women postlanguage poets, 
suffice it to say that they are many in number, and their work is rich and varied.  
A number of poets and critics—women and men, feminist and otherwise—have theorized 
the emergence of turn of the twenty-first century poetry that deliberately explores a space 
between or apart from the “two camps” model and its delimited, dual offerings of either 
representation or disappearance of lyric subjectivity. For example, in a 1998 review of Susan 
Wheeler’s collection Smokes for the Boston Review, Stephen Burt identifies what he terms a 
“school” that he calls “Ellipticism”: “Elliptical poets try to manifest a person—who speaks the 
poem and reflects the poet—while using all the verbal gizmos developed over the last few 
decades to undermine the coherence of speaking selves. They are post-avant-gardist, or post-
‘postmodern’: they have read (most of them) Stein’s heirs, and the ‘language writers,’ and have 
chosen to do otherwise.”27 Furthermore, in the critical anthology Telling it Slant:  
Avant-Garde Poetics of the 1990s (2002), edited by Mark Wallace and Steven Marks, two 
significant essays appear that address emerging trends in contemporary poetry. In “The Arena in 
the Garden: Some Thoughts on the Late Lyric,” poet-critic Elizabeth Willis argues against the 
term “post-language poetry” because it suggests “that a literary movement is something one gets 
over and that succeeding manifestations within the same genre spring forward from it while 
negating their chronological or stylistic predecessors” (225). Instead, Willis offers the term “late 
lyric,” which she describes as “lyric practice whereby the overall structure and strategy of the 
lyric is overlaid or mixed with other influences, forms, and rhetorical sampling” (228). This lyric 
does not aim “to unify or commodify or even represent human experience but to stress language 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
should be and do, women are less invested in specific forms of gender empowerment … even while they remain 
wary of the conventions entangled with social structures that so long excluded or oppressed them” (9-10). 
27 Burt identifies as “Elliptical books” several collections that appeared in the 1990s, including Susan Wheeler’s 
Smokes, Lucie Brock-Broido’s The Master Letters, Mark Ford’s Landlocked and Mark Levine’s Debt. 
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in such a way as to evoke an alternate experience for its readers, not an objective correlative to a 
universal experience but an engagement in the process of finding out” (229). Willis invokes lyric 
as embracing the process of wandering and bewilderment, rather than resting in cognitive or 
experiential stability (231). In terms of lyric subjectivity, Willis treads a fine line between the 
poet’s subjective presence and her absence, interiority and exteriority, arguing that “[a]nywhere 
from Aristotle to Dickinson to Lorca to Spicer it has been acknowledged that the lyric poem 
comes not strictly from within but from elsewhere; it is not self-expressive except to the extent 
that ideas of self or voice are never entirely absent form the tonal shadings of language” (228). 
Moreover, in his essay, Mark Wallace delineates what he sees as five major strains of 
contemporary poetry and goes on to advocate what he calls a “free multiplicity of form,” 
whereby “a wide variety of forms can be used by any writer and can exist side by side with other 
forms” without those forms being controlled by divisive rhetoric (197). In a “free multiplicity of 
form,” “issues of poetic form are not repressed and controlled by poetry production networks 
competing for ownership of forms” and “use of a form would no longer be considered 
necessarily an attack, or even a critique, of other possible forms” (196, 197). Thus, Willis and 
Wallace advance critical attempts to disrupt boundaries and rigid ideological boundaries that 
Language writings and avant-garde poetry critics tend to draw in their rhetoric. Furthermore, for 
my project, Daniel Barbiero presents a key argument that addresses the emerging trends of 
contemporary poetry. In an essay published in a 2001/2002 issue of Talisman, he argues that 
lyric should be considered not as a genre but as a mode that involves the “‘representation of an 
act of self-expression’” rather than “a properly expressive utterance” (356). Barbiero calls for a 
new understanding of “post-Language lyric,” which is produced by poets who largely accept 
Language writers’ critiques of “traditional” lyric’s assumptions of “ordinary language 
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conventions” like authenticity and transparency (366). However, unlike Language writing, “post-
Language lyric” does not foreground artifice, for it has instead “has incorporated lyric elements 
into a larger context” and thus “has extended the boundaries of the self-consciously non-
expressive lyric” (366). Of particular relevance to “post-Language” poets are issues of lyric 
interiority and lyric subjectivity, and, as I mention in the introduction, Barbiero argues that the 
new lyric can be described as “predominantly circumspective in nature, rather than—as in 
traditional lyric—introspective” (363). Barbiero’s description of “post-Language” lyric as 
“circumspective” and interiority as “porous” as it is constituted by exterior forces and discourses, 
thus echoes key elements of Wills’ interpretation of My Life, and his articulation is similarly 
significant for my project.  
In my understanding of postlanguage lyric poetry, I argue that the poets I survey do as 
Barbiero describes, for they preserve lyric features while taking into account Language writing’s 
critique of simplistic lyric subjectivity, thus seeking to construct a lyric that is “circumspective.” 
Accordingly, I accept Barbiero’s definition of lyric as “the linguistic presentation of a speaker’s 
state of mind,” a mode that “pivots on the indication, whether directly or indirectly, of the 
(broadly speaking) subjective or phenomenal states of the poem’s speaker” (356). This 
definition’s emphasis on “linguistic presentation” rejects the idea of direct self-expression of 
thought and therefore highlights the rhetorical and performative elements of lyric poetry. At the 
same time, subjectivity is still granted a central role in this definition of lyric poetry. In other 
words, the postlanguage lyric subject’s views matter, but with the understanding that we are 
“situated within the center of the circumstances surrounding us. But it is understood that such a 
center is not something we create, but rather is a kind of point of insertion into the given” (356). 
Barbiero’s definition of postlanguage lyric at the turn of the twenty-first century applies to the 
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work of Rankine, Howe and Robinson, for their work indeed indicates the “subjective or 
phenomenal states of the poem’s speaker” that is “situated within the center of the circumstances 
surrounding us.”28   
Contemporary American Poetry and the Discourse of Hybridity  
 Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the concept of “third way” contemporary poetry 
has grown in momentum. Many critics have theorized the emerging subgenre, particularly in the 
introductions of a number of poetry anthologies that have appeared since American Women 
Poets in the 21st Century. Like their predecessor, these anthologies address the emergence of 
poetic texts where “lyric meets language,” but they often include poetry written by women and 
men. These volumes include follow-up anthologies edited by Rankine and Lisa Sewell, 
American Poets in the Twenty-First Century: The New Poetics (2007) and Eleven More 
American Women Poets in the 21st Century: Poetics Across North America (2012); Reginald 
Shepherd’s Lyric Postmodernisms: An Anthology of Contemporary Innovative Poetries (2008); 
Cole Swensen’s and David St. John’s American Hybrid: A Norton Anthology of New Poetry 
(2009); and Ann Keniston and Jeffrey Gray’s The New American Poetry of Engagement: A 21st 
Century Anthology (2012). The introductions to these anthologies emphasize how, in Lisa 
Sewell’s words, “innovative, materialist poetic practices” such as “interruption, parataxis, 
narrative discontinuity, and alinearity to produce fragmentation and disjunction” now appear in 
                                                        
28 Barbiero’s definition of postlanguage lyric at the turn of the twenty-first century appears within a discourse over 
the expansion of an understanding of what counts as poetry and what counts of lyric. The question of whether the 
critical discourse surrounding the avant-garde involves an expansion or repudiation of the lyric is unresolved. While 
the major critical champions of contemporary avant-garde poetry, Marjorie Perloff and Charles Altieri, have been 
understood as being among “the forefront of the expansion of the poetic canon to include more experimental writing 
in the 1980s” and for having “both helped turn American poetry criticism away from a reduction of the poetry to the 
lyrical,” (Nealon, “The Matter of Capital” 488), their work has also been read by Jackson and Prins as having 
“sustained an expanded sense of the lyric in their new critical poetics” (456). While Nealon reads Perloff and Altieri 
as “anti-lyric,” Jackson and Prins reads their critiques aimed at not the lyric as such, but at critical models that adopt 
ahistorical definitions of the lyric (often based in ideas about Romantic lyric poetry) and ahistorical models reading 
the lyric (such as those espoused by New Criticism, and often assumed by later critics).  
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the poetry of writers across groups, including “the lyric mainstream and multicultural poetries of 
identity politics” (3). Furthermore, all of these introductions indicate that such poetry has 
absorbed the Language school critique of the stable speaking subject or lyric ego, while 
nevertheless seeking to explore lyric subjectivity. Shepherd frames the poetry in Lyric 
Postmodernisms as “lyric investigations” that “combine lyricism and avant-garde 
experimentation in a new synthesis” (xi). In their anthology, Swensen and St. John offer the 
much-discussed concept of “hybrid” poetry. According to Swensen’s introduction to American 
Hybrid, “[h]ybrid poems honor the avant-garde mandate to renew the forms and expand the 
boundaries of poetry—thereby increasing the expressive potential of language itself—while also 
remaining committed to the emotional spectra of lived experience” and remaining “audible and 
comprehensible to the population at large” (xxi). Hybrid poems straddle the categories of the 
avant-garde and the lyric by accessing “a wealth of tools” which is associated with both the 
“conventional” poetry and “experimental” work (xxi).29    
Swensen and St. John’s model of “hybridity” of has perhaps been the most influential—
for example, Keniston and Gray adopt it as the paradigm for their anthology—and the most 
critiqued. Critic Hank Lazer argues that the “tale of happy hybridity” and tolerance is a kind of 
dilettantism that promotes poetry which evades any real commitment or risk (165). To Lazer, the 
discourse of hybrid poetry obscures both a lingering animosity against Language writing and an 
overall climate of persistent anti-intellectualism (165-66).30 While Lazer remains committed to 
                                                        
29 In their selection of poets, Swensen and St. John include all three of the poets I investigate in this dissertation. 
30 Lazer is not the only proponent of avant-garde writing who remains invested in an ongoing division between 
experimental and conventional poetries. In his introduction to the 2011 anthology of conceptual poetry that he co-
edited with Kenneth Goldsmith, Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing, Craig Dworkin defines 
their project as intrinsically opposed to the lyric subject, for its writings aim to “explore the potential of writing that 
tries to be ‘rid of lyrical interference of the individual as ego’ (as Charles Olson famously put it). Our emphasis is on 
work that does not seek to express unique, coherent, or consistent individual psychologies and that, moreover, 
refuses familiar strategies of authorial control in favor of automatism, reticence, obliquity, and modes of 
noninterference” (“The Fate of Echo” xliii).  
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the recognition of what he sees as ongoing and unresolved divisions in an essentially polarized 
field, other critics who seek alternative understandings of the “two-camp” discourse nevertheless 
disagree with the hybridity model. Keller sees the rhetoric surrounding the “third way” as a 
“problematically tidy model” of Hegelian thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, arguing that her 
concept of “exploratory” poetry seeks to capture more of the nuances of poetic development in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.31 Similarly, in his contribution to the essay 
“Hybrid Aesthetics and its Discontents,” which is based on a conference panel delivered at the 
2010 Association of Writers and Writing Programs Conference, Mark Wallace also reads 
“hybridity” and other “third way poetics” as recalling a Hegelian synthesis that diminishes 
difference in order to forge a middle ground through the construction of a new, non-competing 
unity (125). Meanwhile, other critics have questioned whether the two-camp model has been 
truly left behind. Megan Volpert argues that Swensen’s hybridity is “just the rose of the avant-
garde by another name” (145), and Oren Izenberg similarly asserts that the hybridity model 
constitutes “an argument for the ascendancy of the avant-garde tradition under a different name” 
(191n23). Moreover, Izenberg echoes Lazer with the objection that “to treat some poetic 
possibilities as moves or gestures free for redeployment and resignification is to sever them from 
their most fundamental commitments” (191n23). Reena Sastri, on the other hand, worries that 
the new hybridity model reclaims values of experiment for lyric; she argues that surface clarity 
and, therefore, reader accessibility suffers (191). Finally, in contrast to critics who claim that 
hybridity essentially re-names experimental poetry and heralds the “ascendancy of the avant-
garde tradition,” Jennifer Ashton argues that the current notion of the eroding opposition 
                                                        
31 Although Keller directs this criticism to Shepherd’s specific articulation of a “new synthesis,” she clearly means 
to include the “hybridity” model in her critique as well. There is a key difference between “third way” poetics as 
espoused by Shepherd and Swensen/St. John and Keller’s model of “exploratory” poetics: Keller remains committed 
to expanding the category of “experimental” poems rather than positing a third space or bridge between mainstream 
and innovative poetries. 
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between the avant-garde (anti-lyric) and the mainstream (lyric) poetry indicates that, “in a certain 
sense, the lyric has won” (216). Ashton cites the introductions to the anthologies by Rankine and 
Spahr and Swensen and St. John in order to argue that their “commitments to interiority and 
intimate speech are nothing if not committed to highly particularized subject positions” and to 
the emotional experiences of individuals (218). Ashton attacks what she sees as the ongoing 
legacy of twentieth century American poetry’s concentration on the subject and considers 
“individual and experiential effects” to be “irrelevant, immaterial” because the “world’s formal 
structure” cannot “be altered by our responses to it or by its effects on us—by, say, our feeling 
‘complete’ … [it] can only be altered by a change to [its] form” (227-28).32 While “the world’s 
formal structure” is undoubtedly fundamental in shaping political and material realities, Ashton’s 
outright dismissal of individual experiences, whether emotional, spiritual, or cognitive, arrives at 
a rather grim and dehumanizing conclusion.  
The critiques of hybridity or other “third way” models of contemporary poetry, taken 
together, raises the questions such as, which is ascendant, lyric poetry or avant-garde poetry?  
And are these essentially avant-garde poems with lyric features, or lyric poems with avant-garde 
features? I suggest that such critiques largely further the false binary between the avant-garde 
and the lyric. Furthermore, while I appreciate concerns about what values or nuances may be lost 
in the critical concept of hybridity, I am largely sympathetic to the various models of “third way” 
poetry, for I would like to emphasize what may be gained in postlanguage lyric poetry that draws 
from various lyric and experimental lineages. Moreover, my classification of Rankine, Howe, 
                                                        
32 Ashton provocatively argues that the entire trajectory of postwar American poetry is fixated on subjectivity. 
Citing Hejinian’s poetics, Ashton subsumes the “anti-lyric” Language school, with its advocacy of the “open text,” 
as also primarily concerned with the subject, for Language writers merely transfer an emphasis on the writing 
subject to the reading subject. Furthermore, she argues that the conceptual poetry composed advanced by Dworkin, 
Goldsmith, and others highlight the subjective presences doing the shaping and editing behind their transcriptive and 
citational practices. While these particular critiques are thought-provoking, Ashton’s conclusion that the lyric and 
the anti-lyric constitute two sides of the same coin problematically elides significant differences of the approaches 
towards subjectivity among a great variety of American avant-garde and conventional poetic traditions.    
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and Robinson as “postlanguage lyric” poets stems partly from how extensively these writers seek 
to claim the lyric in their writing projects. It is true that, at certain points of their writings on 
poetics (in both poetic texts and in essays), Rankine, Howe, and Robinson emphasize their 
differences from mainstream or postconfessional poetry, and their writings indicate a keen 
awareness of Language writing’s critiques. At the same time, they all signal their embrace of 
lyric poetry: Howe named her 2007 collection The Lyrics: Poems; Rankine gave the same 
subtitle, An American Lyric, to both Don’t Let Me Be Lonely (2004), and Citizen (2014); and 
Robinson has spoken of what she calls her strong and unfashionable affiliation with lyric poetry 
(Rosenthal 250). For these reasons, I find Barbiero’s classification of “post-Language lyric” to 
be the most fitting formulation for the poets I consider in this study, for this name gestures to 
both the elements of Language writing and lyric poetry that all three poets draw on. As Willis 
observes, this is an imperfect label, for it indicates a chronological succession when there is not 
necessarily any; in fact, Fanny Howe is of the same generation as the Language writers. 
Nevertheless, “postlanguage lyric” is more descriptive of the literary historical landscape than 
Willis’s proposed term, “late lyric,” indicates. Further, the use of the term “postlanguage” has 
circulated more extensively. “Postlanguage lyric” is the designation that Paul Hoover uses in the 
second edition of the Norton Anthology of Postmodern American Poetry, where he claims that 
Howe and Robinson are among poets whose work in “postlanguage lyric” illustrates “the natural 
inclination of poetry toward sweetness and depth of expression; moreover, subjectivity, while 
often tempered with irony, is granted a role” (xlvii).33 I suggest that Rankine fits the description 
                                                        
33 Critic Christopher Nealon uses the term “post-Language poet” to describe American and Canadian poets in the 
generation after Language poets, including Joshua Clover, Kevin Davies, Lisa Robertson, and Rod Smith. Nealon 
emphasizes these poets’ inheritance of Language writing that emphasizes Marxist theory and the Frankfurt School in 
particular; he argues that they strike a “camp posture” toward the “damage” of late-late capitalism, thus 
reinterpreting Adorno and Benjamin’s messianism (“Camp Messianism” 579). Thus, Nealon’s use of the term “post-
Language poet” differs from Barbiero and Hoover’s emphasis on “post-Language lyric” poetry’s lyricism and the 
role of the subject.  
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of “postlanguage lyric” poet as well; indeed, she has played a major role—as writer, editor, and 
conference organizer—in identifying and participating in the emerging contemporary poetry as a 
site “Where Lyric Meets Language,” as the significant 1999 conference title suggests.  
As the label “postlanguage lyric” indicates, poets such as Rankine, Howe, and Robinson 
engage in the kinds of hybridizing strategies Swensen articulates, for they borrow from, and 
honor, differing poetic lineages and techniques. In contrast to Lazer and Izenberg’s assertions 
that contemporary poetry that draws on both avant-garde and lyric traditions lacks commitment 
to those respective traditions’ values, I maintain that it is possible for a poet to embrace values 
that are associated with a range of poetic predecessors. As the subsequent chapters of this project 
will illustrate, the poetry of Rankine, Howe, and Robinson deploy innovative poetic gestures and 
techniques from lyric and avant-garde traditions while remaining highly aware of various types 
of poetry’s “fundamental commitments.” Indeed, I argue, these three postlanguage poets are 
centrally engaged in using poetic forms to convey the commitment to construct postlanguage 
lyric poetry that articulates lyric subjectivities ethically.  
The Ethics of Levinas and Derrida 
Since the conventional lyric subject has been so extensively associated with the 
problematic dimensions of the “ideological I,” the ethics of postlanguage lyric poetry must 
involve the critique of Western, post-Enlightenment subjectivity. As I note in the introduction, 
the writings of Levinas have come to serve as the basis for the leading theoretical methodology 
of literary-ethical inquiry that has emerged in the turn of the twenty-first century. I also noted 
that Sewell has invoked Levinas’s concept of alterity to describe representations “unassimilable 
difference” in contemporary women’s poetry (Eleven More Women Poets 2). In this project, I 
build on Sewell’s observation by using the ethics of Levinas and Derrida as the major theoretical 
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framework for my readings of contemporary poetic texts. The following summary is intended to 
elucidate key concepts and definitions that I employ in the subsequent chapters.  
Levinasian thought advances a critique of Western metaphysics, particularly the 
emphasis on ontology, or being in-itself, which, Levinas argues, perpetuates a self-centered 
subjectivity. As theologian Alain Mayama observes, Levinas particularly critiques the turn 
toward the subject that emerged in the Enlightenment era through the concept of Rene Descartes’ 
disembodied and autonomous cogito, and Immanuel Kant’s continued identification of a self-
sufficient subject as the center of epistemological inquiry who, consequently, justifies egocentric 
moral and political thought and behavior (45). Levinas asserts that “ethics as a first philosophy” 
places the subject’s obligation to the other as prior to ontology. Levinas rejects a self-centered 
subjectivity and redefines subjectivity as “being-in-the-world” for the Other (Mayama 95).  
It is important to note that the “Other” is a term from Continental philosophy that, in 
considerations of intersubjectivity, is described as both the counterpart to the “self” and a figure 
of radical alterity. The term the “Other,” however, has been taken up in very different ways by 
alternate theoretical approaches. In influential strands of contemporary literary criticism, 
including feminist and postcolonial theories as initially articulated by Simone de Beauvoir and 
Edward Said, respectively, the “Other” has come to signify difference in terms of social power 
dynamics, where the individuals who are “othered” have been denigrated as different, weaker, 
and marginalized. Therefore, members of dominant groups, guided by patriarchal, racist, and/or 
imperialist ideologies, consider these “Others” to be justifiably oppressed. In contrast, for 
Levinas, the Other is prior to and superior to the subject; the subject approaches the Other almost 
as an object of worship. In Levinas’s ethics, the face of the Other, both in flesh and in language, 
interrupts the subject’s autonomy and demands a response (Totality 82-84): “the first fact of 
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existence is neither being in-itself (en soi) nor being for-itself (pour soi) but being for the other 
(pour l’autre); in other words . . . human existence is a creature” (“Transcendence of Words” 
149). Levinas also defines subjectivity as “welcoming the Other, as hospitality” (Totality 27). 
Hospitality or welcome involves the recognition of the Other’s radical alterity, that is, the 
irreducibility of the Other to thought or classification because the encounter with the Other 
involves a relation with infinity (Totality 48-50). Accordingly, the type of ethical encounter 
Levinas describes is not an occurrence where the subject intends to shape the Other through 
thought or action, but rather involves the subject’s openness toward the alterity of the Other. In 
his articulation of encounter with the face of the Other, Levinas advances a peaceful model of 
intersubjective relations, in distinction from, for example, Hegel’s master-slave model, in which 
relation intrinsically involves a bid for domination.  
Levinas engaged with Derrida in an ongoing dialogue over the decades, and much of 
Derrida’s ethics build upon Levinasian thought. Derrida advances Levinasian ideas through his 
articulation of the gift and hospitality. With these concepts, the subject aims, in Levinasian 
fashion, to prioritize the Other as recipient or guest in radical terms. In contrast to the 
conventional ideas of giving and hosting, in which the giver or host circumscribes the conditions 
of offer and may expect reciprocity or exchange, Derrida links gift to excess (rather than limited 
offering) and hospitality as visitation (rather than invitation). Furthermore, Derrida’s hospitality 
of visitation involves a radical openness and vulnerability to the Other, even to the stranger who 
has not been invited, prepared for, expected or foreseen (“Hostipitality” 361). Thus, Derrida’s 
ethics are based on Levinas’s model of the Other as prior to and honored before the Subject.  
In his 1993 volume of essays, Specters of Marx, Derrida extends these ethical concepts to 
the concept of “hauntology,” a play on words that displaces “its near-homonym ontology,” the 
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study of being—which, like Levinas, he critiques as overly emphasized in Western metaphysics 
(Davis 9). As critic Colin Davis summarizes, “[h]auntology supplants its near-homonym 
ontology, replacing the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost as that which 
is neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive” (9). Hauntology is fundamentally an ethical 
concept, involving the ethical imperative to offer “respect” and “responsibility” for “ghosts,” 
whom Derrida describes as all others who are not living at present. Ghosts are either those who 
have died or who have not yet been born, and hauntology thus extends to both the past and the 
future. In Davis’ words, “[a]ttending to the ghost is an ethical injunction insofar as it occupies 
the place of the Levinasian Other: a wholly irrecuperable intrusion in our world, which is not 
comprehensible within our available intellectual frameworks, but whose otherness we are 
responsible for preserving” (9).  
As Derrida himself acknowledges, much of his articulation of ethics can be attributed to 
Levinas. However, in the 1967 essay “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas,” he also criticizes Levinas. First, Derrida argues that Levinas’s articulation 
of encounter relies too much on the assumption of physical presence; in this way, the emphasis 
in hauntology on the Other as ghost, who marks both presence and absence, is a modification of 
Levinasian encounter of the Face. Furthermore, as theologian Steven Shakespeare summarizes, 
Derrida critiques Levinas’s ethics as 
too idealized, too cut-off from the actual experience of otherness as we encounter 
it. For Derrida, there is no ethics without that relationship of sameness-in-
difference between me and my other. Only this relationship can be the basis for 
me to desire the other’s well-being. The corollary of this is that the possibility of 
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violence can never be wholly eliminated from the world. There is no absolute 
peace or absolutely nonviolent ethics. (92)  
While Levinas posits a subjectivity that extends to the Other as infinite, Derrida insists that a 
subject can only experience otherness “in finitude and mortality (mine and its)” (“Violence and 
Metaphysics” 114-15). Therefore, rather than an absolute extension of the subject in submission 
to the Other’s singular alterity, Derrida insists that “every reduction of other to a real moment of 
my life, its reduction to the state of empirical alter-ego, is an empirical possibility, or rather 
eventuality, which is called violence” (“Violence and Metaphysics” 128). In other words, the 
actual appearance of the other as finite and mortal always involves the possibility of the subject 
reducing the Other to his or her understanding. Consequently, the possibility of violence—that is, 
the conflict, oppression, and the bid for mastery that Levinas’s ethics aim against—always 
remains. Derrida does not disagree with Levinas’s goals, but insists upon the continued 
appearance of conflict and difference in encounters between the subject and Other. Derrida 
concludes not by giving up the project of peace or ethics, but instead espousing an “economical” 
ethics “as the most peaceful gesture possible” (“Violence and Metaphysics” 128). Thus, while 
Derrida ultimately affirms the significance of Levinasian thought in the aforementioned eulogy 
“Adieu,” his ethics nevertheless emphasizes the continued occurrence of difference and conflict 
in intersubjective relations.   
Poethics: Contemporary Poetry and Ethics 
In addition to the theories of Levinas and Derrida, I also draw on the work of poet and 
feminist critic Joan Retallack. Retallack’s concept of poethics foregrounds the ethical uses of 
language as it is deployed within aesthetic processes, particularly as it applies to the writing and 
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reading of contemporary poetic texts (12).34 In Poethical Wager, Retallack considers ethics as 
the “Aristotelian concern for the link between an individual and public ethos in pursuit of the 
good life” that must be sought within the chaos of what she calls the “continuous contemporary” 
(11).35 Retallack explains that the concept of poethics can be used both analytically, in the 
investigation of the ethical conditions and effects of form of specific literary texts, and 
descriptively, as a term “denoting what one takes to be the best uses of a positively constructive 
imagination in relation to contemporary conditions as they intersect with history” (43). By “best 
uses” Retallack refers to literature that “enacts, explores, comments on, further articulates, 
radically questions the ethos of the discourses from which it springs” (11). She advocates for 
poetic texts that develop attentiveness to the “continuous contemporary,” innovate through the 
creation of new forms and configurations of language, and welcome readers “into an ethos of the 
collaborative making of meaning” (12). Ultimately, the concept of poethics considers how acts 
of reading and writing particular aesthetic and generic forms constitute living certain ways of life 
                                                        
34 Michael Eskin also uses the term “poethical,” but his sense is distinct from and narrower than Retallack’s. Eskin’s 
use of the term poethics “signifies [his] unique attitude—in the phenomenological sense” towards the dialogue 
between the specific poetic texts of Paul Celan and Osip Mandel’shtam as refracted “through the prism of Levinas’s 
and Bakhtin’s writings” (162). In this project, I apply Retallack’s sense of the term poethics, for it is both more 
general, allowing the space for a variety of inquiries into the relation between ethics and aesthetics within specific 
poetic texts, and more relevant to my project, as Retallack focuses on contemporary poetry and poetics.   
35 While Retallack foregrounds Aristotelian ethics in her definition, this does not necessarily foreclose the possibility 
of extending her formulation poethics alongside of the twentieth century ethics of Levinas and Derrida, although the 
twentieth century theorists espouse an ethics that emphasizes the self’s Other-orientation rather than the Aristotelian 
equilibrium invoked in the statement that describes “a link between an individual and public ethos.” Furthermore, 
Aristotle’s ethics is based on the individual’s use of reason, and Levinas’ ethics as first philosophy is situated as 
both prior to reason and a critique of the emphasis on the totalizing tendencies of ontology in the Western 
metaphysical tradition, including the work of Aristotle. However, some contemporary scholars of philosophy make 
the case that Aristotle and Levinasian ethics have much in common. For example, Christopher P. Long argues that 
Levinas retrieves the obfuscated legacy of Aristotelian ontology that “attempt[s] to do justice to the individual as 
such” (9). Furthermore, Claudia Barrachi argues that Levinas’s “modern” concept that encounter with “phenomena, 
the world, or nature” is a matter of ethos is in fact “found in the heart of Greek thought” as traced in the works of 
Aristotle (105). In addition to these scholarly efforts that find connections across the ancient and modern ethical 
philosophers, I read Retallack’s formulation of poethics draws on an understanding of ethics broad enough to 
encompass Aristotle’s and Levinas’s ethics as involving the individual’s pursuit of the good and his or her social 
responsibilities. 
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(12).36 Both creators/writers and consumers/readers are called upon to consider the ethics of 
aesthetic production and consumption. To Retallack, aesthetic innovation is needed to change the 
ethos of the status quo and to disrupt the “fatal momentum” of mass culture, which encourages 
inward-seeking fantasy instead of active imagination, “a consumer-centered me-ethos” rather 
than responsible awareness, and capitulation to media saturation rather than attention to 
contemporary cultural conditions (33). I find Retallack’s observations about the contrast between 
innovative art and contemporary media culture particularly relevant to Rankine’s Don’t Let Me 
Be Lonely, and I draw on poethics most extensively in chapter two. Furthermore, Elizabeth 
Robinson, cites Retallack’s thinking on poethics as a direct influence on her exploration of ethics 
and poetic language. 
Retallack also articulates the concept of the poethical wager by drawing on the concept 
of the bet that 17th century philosopher, Blaise Pascal famously describes in Pensées; she also 
cites the scientific concept of chaos theory as well. She argues that the “continuous 
contemporary” is a chaotic system in a fragile, dynamic equilibrium, and that the artist, like 
Pascal, grapples with a potentially crippling sense of radical uncertainty. Ultimately, however, 
the artist wagers—indeed, must wager—that change can occur as a result of sustained efforts 
over time (3). The possibility for cultural change—that is, “contributions to climates of value and 
opinion”—is akin to the “butterfly effect” (3). In other words, an artist cannot know or control 
the possible effects of his or her work, and consequences may be infinitesimal and subject to 
many “swerves.” Nevertheless, the artist hopes that a project may be useful, and so seeks to 
guide it with courage, concern, and responsible awareness. Retallack’s description not a claim 
for the artist heroically acting in isolation, for artistic projects must work through “some kind of 
                                                        
36 Retallack poses the following questions as examples of what she means by poethical inquiry: what kind of life is 
one living when one reads experimental poetry, conventional I-lyric verse, modernist novels, or popular fiction? Or 
when one views films or watches television? (12).  
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dynamic equilibrium between intention and receptivity, community and alterity” (3). 
Furthermore, in the kind of innovative contemporary poetry that Retallack is interested in, 
readers are an integral part of the aesthetic process, for they are invited to “realize the work for 
her- or himself. There’s always at least a dual perspective, that of poet and reader, two very 
different starting points of equal importance” (41).  
Retallack theorizes an ethical model of writing and reading contemporary texts that 
presents alternatives to previous reading models. Buell observes that many critics engaged in 
literary-critical inquiry, while recognizing the social construction of texts, resist Roland Barthes’ 
poststructuralist reading model of “the death of the author” in order to claim the significance of 
some measure of authorial agency and intentionality (12). Critic Derek Attridge argues for as 
much in his acknowledgement of a literary work’s “authoredness” (“Innovation, Literature, 
Ethics” 26). Moreover, Retallack advances an ethical model of writing and reading that departs 
from the classic reader-response theory which, as Buell summarizes, transfers interpretive power 
from author to reader and celebrates the reader’s invention and appropriation (12). While 
Retallack’s insistence on active reader participation largely aligns itself with Hejinian’s concept 
of the “open text,” I read the phrase “dynamic equilibrium between intention and receptivity, 
community and alterity” as an important shift in emphasis from Hejinian’s reader-centered 
model to one in which ethical encounter occurs between reader and writer. As such, Retallack, 
like other critics engaged in literary-ethical inquiry, advances a model of reading that is akin 
“conscienceful listening” (Buell 12). Various readings might produce unpredictable “swerves” in 
the reception of any poetic text, but those productions result not from a power struggle between 
writer and reader, nor a power transfer from writer to reader, but, rather, as Attridge argues, a 
textual encounter that results in innovative and creative reading practices that emerge from 
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readerly responsibility (“Innovation, Literature, Ethics” 29). Retallack’s model allows room to 
respect some measure of authorial agency and intentionality, while acknowledging that it occurs 
within a larger matrix of community, context, and reader reception. In line with this respect for 
“authoredness,” my readings tend to treat the poetic texts of Rankine, Howe, and Robinson 
within the grain of their own writings on poetics. Accordingly, along with the readings of each 
writer’s poetry, I cite instances in their essays on poetics that signal the ethical intentions of their 
work, even as I significantly extend those poets’ observations to a larger literary-ethical 
framework that is based on the ethics of Levinas and Derrida.  
Finally, Retallack’s ideas of the “poethical wager” and the “butterfly effect” provide a 
nuanced, and arguably realistic model of effecting cultural change through the production and 
consumption of poetry. This model contrasts some of the hyperbolic claims for revolutionary, 
political poetry in the 1960s and 1970s, such as certain writings by anti-war, second-wave 
feminist, or Black Arts Movement poets. Rather than delivering a model of poetry in which an 
empowered or, some might argue, domineering, poet-speaker transmits a direct message to move 
her readers (or listeners) to act for social change, the postlanguage poets I consider in this project 
engage in the kind of poethical wager that Retallack describes. As they signal their ethical 
intentionality and delineate social critiques in their poetic texts, Rankine, Howe, and Robinson 
allow space for reader interpretation. Furthermore, their poetry tacitly acknowledges an 
awareness that the possible cultural and social effects of their work may be modest in scope and 
unknowable to the poets’ themselves. I contend that the poetry by Rankine, Howe, and Robinson 
that I will consider in this project fulfills Retallack’s criteria for poethical texts, and, in the 
following chapters, I will use the term poethics both analytically and descriptively in my 
exploration of these texts.  
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Ethics, Encounter, and Address in Literature and Lyric  
 Retallack’s indication of reading the text through the lens of a “dynamic equilibrium 
between intention and receptivity” highlights poetry as a discourse within a rhetorical context, in 
which the poet and reader both participate. Retallack thus departs from the traditional concept of 
poetry as monologic and implicitly emphasizes its rhetorical elements, including the poet’s 
concern with address to readers and readers’ active reception. I would like I extend Retallack’s 
poethical model by turning to additional literary critics who have stressed the link between the 
rhetorical/performative and ethical dimensions of literature in general or lyric poetry in 
particular. In order to flesh out my considerations of literature and lyric in 
rhetorical/performative capacities, I draw on models of lyric and lyric subjectivity, including 
Derek Attridge’s model of literature as a performance that is an event/encounter with otherness, 
Brewster’s argument which emphasizes the lyric as discursive and performative, William 
Waters’ approach to lyric address as indicating claims of responsibility on the reader, and 
Blasing’s model of lyric subjectivity as a linguistic and rhetorical construct that builds its claims 
on ethical grounds and advances models of selfhood. These critics’ emphasis on the 
rhetorical/performative dimensions of lyric poetry provides the foundation for my literary-ethical 
readings of postlanguage lyric poetry, for their writings productively describe the possibility of 
encounter—albeit one mediated, tenuous, and even ghostly—between a writer and reader 
through a poetic text. 
In Singularity of Literature, Derek Attridge argues that literature is an event or 
performance that emerges between the acts of writing and reading. Attridge draws on the ethics 
of Levinas and Derrida to liken the reader’s encounter with a “literary work” to an interpersonal 
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encounter.37 Attridge emphasizes that, by “the other” he means “not, strictly speaking, a person” 
but “a relation—or a relating—between me, as the same, and that which, in its uniqueness, is 
heterogeneous to me and interrupts my sameness” (Singularity 33). This concept the other as a 
relation “between” the reading subject and a disruptive heterogeneity provides the basis of 
Attridge’s understanding of literature as emerging only as an event that occurs between writer 
and reader. Attridge defines a literary work as “an act, an event, of reading, never entirely 
separable from the act-event (or acts-events) of writing that brought it into being as a potentially 
readable text” (Singularity 59); elsewhere, he extends the metaphor of staging to “acts-events” 
and asserts that “the literary work only exists in performance” (Singularity 95). Thus, Attridge 
posits the act of reading responsibly as an essential part of the performance that brings literary 
work into being. He consequently places a high ethical demand on the reader to recognize, with 
responsiveness and responsibility, the singularity and alterity of the artwork. Like Retallack, 
Attridge argues for the value of formally innovative art as that which “most estranges itself from 
the reader,” for it “makes the most sharply challenging . . . ethical demand” in its requirements 
that the reading subject re-shape his or her preconceived notions and approach to epistemology 
(Singularity 130). Thus, Attridge enjoins the reader to engage in “readerly hospitality, a 
readiness to have one’s purposes reshaped by the work to which one is responding” (Singularity 
80). At the same time, Attridge emphasizes that demanding art facilitate further creative artistic 
works in turn. Therefore, Attridge claims that responsible reading is not a mere imposition of the 
author’s will on the reader, for it instead involves the reader both affirming the literary work’s 
singularity and responding with his or her own creative or critical work (Singularity 92-93). For 
my project, Attridge advances a valuable model for establishing the literary text as ethical 
                                                        
37 Attridge chooses the term “literary work,” rather than Barthes’ “text,” to emphasize that literature is created by an 
author’s labor (Singularity 103). 
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encounter between writer and reader. Moreover, his understanding of ethical reading that both 
responsibly and creatively responds to previous artistic work provides a useful way of thinking 
about the highly allusive nature of the poetry of Rankine, Howe, and Robinson, which 
extensively cites and, at times, emulates, others’ writings.  
While Attridge’s discussion of the ethics of reading and writing emphasizes the 
performative nature of all literature, I also draw on the work of critics who theorize lyric in 
particular as a performative or rhetorical form. Earlier, I noted my adoption of Barbiero’s 
definition of lyric as the representation of the act of self-expression; other theorists have 
developed the notion of lyric as performance at greater length. In Lyric, a history of the genre, 
Scott Brewster focuses on the “lyric as a performance” (2). Brewster argues for a 
conceptualization of lyric text as performative by referencing J.L. Austin’s speech-act theory, 
which conceptualizes performatives as statements that have “the capacity both to say and do, to 
describe and also perform an action” (41). Brewster foregrounds the lyric as discursive and 
performative in order to argue against the conventional understanding that lyric is expressive and 
monologic. Brewster argues, “lyric is fundamentally concerned with the conditions and nature of 
address” (2). Significantly, Brewster hearkens back to pre-Romantic poetic forms to emphasize a 
longer lineage of lyric poetry that is rooted in rhetoric and performance and that emerges in 
diverse forms in various cultures in the West since antiquity. His readings assert that, as we can 
trace lyric’s roots to performance within larger community or public contexts, its performative 
dimension remains, and one must consider lyric as a discursive, rather than a monologic form 
that is focused solely on individual or private concerns.38  
                                                        
38 While Brewster acknowledges that some lyric poetry in some literary-historical periods have more of a tendency 
to be performed in public, he maintains that the performative nature of lyric is present in many examples of oft-
presumed “expressive” lyric poetry, including British Romantic verse and twentieth-century American confessional 
poetry. 
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William Waters, in Poetry’s Touch: On Lyric Address, also emphasizes the tendency of 
lyric poetry to be fundamentally concerned with address. Waters engages in an extended 
treatment of direct address in lyric poetry across European languages and historical periods from 
antiquity through the mid-twentieth century, with a focus on both poetic form and 
“phenomenology,” which he defines as “what it is like to be someone reading (here, now)” (15 
n26).39 Waters’ claim is that “we as readers may feel in second-person poems, in a poem’s touch, 
an intimation of why poetry is valuable, why it matters to us, and how we might come to feel 
answerable to it” (2). Waters argues that address is not just one linguistic feature among many, 
but “the meridian of all discourse” upon which language depends (5). Particularly significant for 
my project is Waters’ exploration of Paul Celan’s poetics of address. Waters considers the 
poetics of Russian poet Osip Mandelstam, whose metaphor of a message in a bottle to describe 
the way poetry is “sent” and “received” (150) is later adopted by Paul Celan’s poetics, as 
delineated in the well-known speech, “The Meridian” (151). Indeed, Celan’s thinking plays an 
important role of in this dissertation as well, for I apply his poetics of encounter to the poetry of 
Rankine and Howe, both of whom reference Celan in their writings. Waters also examines 
Celan’s metaphors of poetry as encounter, including the poem as handshake (which is cited by 
Rankine) and the poem as gift to the attentive. Based on his reading of Mandelstam’s and 
Celan’s poetics, Waters asserts that the reader/receiver can experience a sense of presence with 
the poet/sender, who may be distant or dead (151). Thus, while acknowledging that poetry 
cannot literally touch a reader, Waters’ argument emphasizes how “the fixity of the printed word 
can stir, and reach, and call,” thus gesturing beyond the disembodied medium to enable physical 
communication (161). Like Attridge, Waters emphasizes how literature links the acts of writing 
                                                        
39 Waters claims that formal and “phenomenological” considerations, which carry different critical vocabularies, are 
ultimately “two sides of one coin,” and a discussion of form makes no sense without taking up the question of the 
reader’s experience (14). 
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and reading, which thereby places ethical demands on the reader to be answerable to the message 
that has been received. In Waters’ words, “[w]hat is at stake … is our ability to acknowledge the 
claims made on us by works of art with which we engage” (158).  
Whereas Waters focuses on the second person, a key theorist of the first person in lyric 
poetry is Mutlu Konuk Blasing, who, like Brewster, argues that the lyric, far from private self-
expression, is “the most rhetorical of poetic genres” (34), “a social medium safeguarding a 
personal experience of language” (52). According to this line of thinking, lyric’s use of language, 
as necessarily rooted in linguistic communities, always emerges from the interplay between the 
personal and the social. The lyric “I”—a linguistic construction that conveys “virtual subjectivity 
in the shape of a given language” and existing only in discourse (4)—is crucial in lyric’s 
rhetoric. Blasing asserts that the lyric “I” is a rhetorical construction of a voice that depends upon 
the speaker’s credibility and the authority of a shared linguistic code to persuade an auditor to 
trust the speaker. In other words, the lyric “I” and “the existential and historical subject-agent”—
the person of the poet—“must seem to coincide” (31). The lyric subject’s rhetoric necessarily 
entails ethics, for this “rhetorical coincidence is, properly, a moral ground, a figural coincidence 
that would convince us that the speaking ‘I’ stands by his words. Thus the intending ‘I’ as 
accountable for his words marks the ethical turn of the formal system, as well as linking the 
author and reader in a community sharing that intentionalizing turn of the ‘I’” (31). In her 
emphasis of lyric as rhetoric, Blasing argues that “[p]oetic language . . . institutes the ethical 
figure of the intending speaker and marks a will to mean even as it secures a full view of the 
abyss” (35).40 Of course, the ends of lyric as rhetoric are not merely to persuade readers to 
                                                        
40 It is important to note that Blasing’s argument allows for readings of, for example, Romantic, postromantic, 
Confessional, postconfessional, or “mainstream” lyric poetry as ethical, for, according to her argument, all lyric 
poetry institutes “the ethical figure of the intending speaker.” This is distinct from Retallack, who values formally 
innovative work as potentially more ethical than “idealistic strain” of Romantic lyric verse. As I suggest here, 
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believe the lyric “I” seems to coincide with the speaker. Instead, as Izenberg explains, “[w]hen 
we describe a poem as having a ‘speaker,’ or as giving ‘voice’ to a person … we are taking the 
artifice of voice in the poem to offer something like a model or a theory of the person, or even a 
pedagogy of personhood. In its orchestrations of perception, conception, and affect, a poem 
elaborates upon or expands the possibilities of what a person can see, think, and feel” (2). 
Blasing’s view of lyric as rhetoric establishes several key parameters for my investigations: her 
approach establishes the lyric as rhetorical, and therefore provides an interface between the 
personal and social, rather than solely expressive; it articulates how the lyric and the 
establishment of the lyric “I” are always based on ethical grounds; and it articulates how 
“speaker” and “voice” advance models of subjectivity for readers of the poem.  
I suggest that the poetry of the postlanguage lyric poets I investigate in this project can be 
illuminated by the theories of Brewster and Waters, in their emphasis on the lyric as 
rhetorical/performative/discursive, that is, concerned with address of readers. In addition, 
Attridge’s Levinasian emphasis on the literary as encounter and Waters’ emphasis on lyric as 
Celanian address, taken together, help to articulate the Levinasian-Celanian model of lyric as 
ethical encounter that serves as this dissertation’s foundational paradigm. Furthermore, Blasing’s 
model of lyric as rhetoric illuminates the ethics that postlanguage lyric poets advance as they 
retain revised versions of the lyric “I” in their poetry. Throughout the following chapters, I will 
reference the concepts of ethics and address by the aforementioned poets and literary critics in 
various analyses of specific poems. I now turn to poethical readings of specific poetic texts.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Blasing’s model nevertheless help to illuminate the projects of postlanguage lyric poets, who seek to retain an 
ethical version of the lyric “I” in a way that modifies many of the qualities that are associated with Romantic and 
confessional poetry.  
  
 73 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE FIRST PERSON, ETHICS, AND ENCOUNTER IN CLAUDIA RANKINE’S DON’T LET 
ME BE LONELY: AN AMERICAN LYRIC 
The first poetic text I will explore in this project is the 2004 book, Don’t Let Me Be 
Lonely: An American Lyric by contemporary African-American poet, Claudia Rankine. The 
guiding questions for my poethical reading of DLMBL, as for all of the poetic writings I 
consider, include the following: What model of lyric subjectivity does the text offer? How does 
Rankine present an ethical articulation of the lyric “I”? What ethics do Rankine draw from, and 
what ethics does she advance? What relations between writer and reader are advanced in the text, 
and how might they promote writing and reading as ethical practices?  
This chapter also sets up important parameters for the project as a whole, for the text of 
DLMBL demonstrates the isolating, enervating, and deadening effects of the commonplace 
concept of autonomous subjectivity with concrete examples drawn from twenty-first century 
American culture. More than any other text I consider in this dissertation, DLMBL presents an 
extended critique of how various cultural discourses—including news media, cinema, television, 
political rhetoric, consumer capitalism, written texts of prose and lyric poetry—shape the 
contemporary American understanding of the “ideological I.” Drawing on and responding to the 
consumerist, media-saturated, and politically divided culture of post-9/11 America in general and 
New York City in particular, Rankine’s text demonstrates that the commonplace belief in a 
stable, self-determined subject—the self articulated in the ideology of possessive 
individualism—reflects a particularly American fantasy of autonomy. This fantasy of autonomy 
reinforces, and is reinforced by, a culture of spectatorship and consumerism that in turn 
perpetuates the pervasive social isolation and loneliness referenced in the title. The loneliness of 
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contemporary hyper-individualistic American culture is depicted in the text as producing a kind 
of living death. 
As the text progresses, DLMBL counters the isolation and fatalism of autonomous 
subjectivity by asserting the relationality and response-ability of the subject through an emphasis 
on ethical practice. The text of DLMBL engages in ethical practice in two main ways. First, the 
text presents the speaking subject as shifting away from the role of distracted spectator and 
towards the position of poetic witness. Second, DLMBL offers textual strategies that counter 
commonplace ideas of the “I” with an ethical model of fragmented subjectivity that is 
circumspective insofar as it recognizes the subject as porous, that is, as shaped by interactions 
with exteriority. Additionally, the text advances ethical practice by theorizing how the lyric can 
be viewed as ethical encounter. Towards the conclusion of the text, DLMBL directly introduces 
the ideas of two central thinkers, philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and poet Paul Celan, whose 
respective thinking on ethics and poetics, taken together, provide the basis for a model of lyric 
poetry as ethical encounter between writer and reader. Rankine asserts that the acts of writing 
and reading, as ethical encounter, are critical to survival. The imperative of the title—Don’t Let 
Me Be Lonely—both invokes the textual theme of contemporary isolation and demands a 
response through the address of its readers. This use of the vocative enjoins readers to provide a 
companionship that does not necessarily bring easy solace to participants, but allows them to be 
more fully engaged and alive. Furthermore, the text of DLMBL positions the poet as a participant 
within encounters not only through its extension towards the reception of reading others, but also 
through conscious and creative responses to previous artists’ writings and performances. The 
Levinasian-Celanian model of lyric poetry as ethical encounter delineated in DLMBL is 
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foundational for this dissertation, for it will serve as a paradigm that the other poetic texts I 
investigate will both follow and depart from.41  
I begin my reading of DLMBL with a general description of the text. I will then discuss 
how the text investigates concrete examples of the ways cultural discourses construct and 
reinforce the concept of autonomous and coherent subjectivity. I then consider the writing and 
                                                        
41 Some of the published critical discourse on Don’t Let Me Be Lonely to this date intersects with mine insofar as it 
has examined issues of media saturation in contemporary culture and has considered the text in relation to political 
issues. In “Unheard Writing in the Climate of Spectacular Noise: Claudia Rankine on TV” (2009), Kevin Bell uses 
the Lyotardian concept of “drift” or “critical de-positionality” to argue that DLMBL implicitly critiques “the 
ideological position of critique itself” because the text suspends “the movement of intentionality that presumptively 
characterizes the standard practice of critique” (99). In Bell’s argument, examples of “standard practice of critique” 
include the writings of Adorno, Debord and Baraka. Furthermore, in “Politics and Poetics of Fear after 9/11: 
Claudia Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely” (2011), Emma Kimberly argues that, in the fear-based, post-9/11 era, 
DLMBL uses multiple and parallel texts (visual, textual, footnotes) to model for readers a process of de-naturalizing 
media images by heightening awareness of their mediated nature. According to Kimberly, the process of media 
analysis allows for the interrogation of the responsibilities involved in making representations for public 
consumption. She argues that the text models a process by which we readers can extricate ourselves from the post-
9/11, media-driven climate of fear, thus enabling more compassionate, genuine human relations.  
Like Kimberly, I recognize both Rankine’s emphasis on more compassionate human relations and the 
argument that media saturation are a hindrance to such relations. However, neither critic explores what I am calling 
a poethical examination of the writing and reading strategies that Rankine advances for poetry, that is, a 
consideration of how the writing and reading of poetic texts, especially in the deployment of the lyric “I,” can be 
considered as a means of greater social connection and way of living an ethical life.  
In “A Prescription Against Despair: On Claudia Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely” Erik Anderson 
acknowledges that Don’t Let Me Be Lonely is not an overtly spiritual text, but argues that it can be read as prayer in 
that it “enacts the intersection of private and public grief, a ritual to address our wounds.” While Anderson’s 
argument covers much similar ground as mine, in its observation of the text’s treatment of social issues and its 
poetics of lyric address, it does not focus on the ethics of either the text’s deployment of the “I,” nor the ethics of 
writing and reading as encounter.  
In an unpublished dissertation from 2009, “Saying ‘I am’: Experimentalism and Subjectivity in 
Contemporary Poetry by Claudia Rankine, M. Nourbese Philip, and Myung Mi Kim,” Dawn Lundy Martin takes up 
the issue of the lyric “I” in contemporary American women’s poetry, with a particular focus on the articulation of 
the raced subject in poetry by women of color. While I consider some of the same issues that Martin does, 
particularly Rankine’s exploration of fragmented subjectivity within the context of poetry debates on the lyric “I” 
within American cultural contexts, our methodology and conclusions are very different. Martin uses psychoanalytic 
and critical race theories to argue that Rankine’s use of the fragmented “I” indicates both racial subject formation in 
particular and American subject formation in general, resulting from the pathology of melancholia, or inability to 
mourn for loss (8-9, 38). In contrast, I consider the deployment of the fragmented “I” in terms of its social 
responsibility and locate within that deployment the advancement for an ethical poetics that enables a means to 
ethical practice in writing, reading, and ways of living. 
Furthermore, I must note that DLMBL has been anthologized in several ways that emphasize various 
aspects of possible interpretation. Swensen and St. John include an excerpt of it as an example of hybrid poetry in 
American Hybrid. Ann Keniston and Jeffrey Gray, who build on Swensen and St. John’s model of hybridity, include 
an excerpt of DLMBL in The New American Poetry of Engagement that emphasizes the text’s political investment as 
a poetry of witness. In another vein, Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith include a passage from DLMBL in 
Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 2011) that is arguably 
“conceptual” in that it not expressive or imaginative; the excerpt includes a transcription of a list of pharmaceutical 
companies “that filed suit in order to prevent South Africa’s manufacture of generic AIDS drugs” (DLMBL 117).  
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reading strategies that DLMBL deploys to counter destructive cultural discourses with an 
ethically grounded first-person subject and the life-enhancing possibility of textual encounter 
between writer and reader. 
Description of the Text 
What does the text of Don’t Let Me Be Lonely look like? DLMBL resists straightforward 
classification, for it is a hybrid text of prose, poetry and visual images. While its subtitle is An 
American Lyric, much of the text does not look like conventional lyric poetry. First of all, much 
of the verbal text does not conform to conventional lyric lineation, wherein the poetic line break 
is clearly demarcated on the right hand margin. The indexical classification of the book is “Lyric 
Essay/Poetry,” and, indeed, the majority of the text looks much more like prose and often reads 
like personal essay, life writing, and narrative, as it is presented in sentence and paragraph form 
and subscribes to syntactic and grammatical conventions for prose.42 The prose pieces take the 
form of brief, episodic narratives, which are presented as rooted in either the speaking subject’s 
interpersonal interactions or experiences of consuming contemporary media, especially 
television news. Often, these episodes are followed by digressions that take on the form of 
micro-essays. The prose text does not present a narrative arc: some of the essays and episodes 
build on or gesture back to the preceding material, while others emerge without clear connection 
to what appeared before.  
A key element of the text is its tone. The speaker—often an “I,” but at times switching into 
other pronouns such as “we” or “you”—intones observations in a flat, detached way. The 
                                                        
42 In the micro-essay “Who is Flying this Plane? The Prose Poem and the Life of the Line,” Hadara Bar-Nadav uses 
Don’t Let Me Be Lonely as an example of how, contrary to conventional expectations for prose poetry as having no 
line breaks, Rankine “write[s] both through and against the margin” (44). Bar-Nadav compellingly argues that the 
unique formatting of the published book compresses the text of Rankine’s prose poetry within narrow margins, and 
this form relates to the text’s content, for its “squeezed lines suggest how narrow the vision of America (and poetry) 
may be” (45). 
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dullness of tone corresponds to the limbo-like experiences of both insomnia and habitual 
television viewing, examples of which are invoked frequently in the content, as in the following, 
early passage: “In the night I watch television to help me fall asleep, or I watch television 
because I cannot sleep. My husband sleeps through my sleeplessness and the noise of the 
television. Eventually it is all a blur. I never remember turning the TV off, but always when I 
wake up in the morning, it is off. Perhaps he turns it off. I don’t know” (29). The flatness of the 
speaker’s tone establishes a frequently disoriented perspective and creates an atmosphere where 
“all” is a “blur,” permeated by indeterminacy and confusion. This particular passage goes on to 
describe antidepressant commercials; both depression and pharmaceutical treatments are 
discussed at several points in DLMBL. The flatness of tone indeed suggests a depressive, 
enervated state, indicating a speaker who is stymied despite, or perhaps because of, her 
considerable knowledge and thoughtfulness. Furthermore, the flat tone helps to establish the 
speaker as an anonymous everywoman whose personally identifying features emerge as if they 
were incidental.   
The dulled, rather anonymous voice that distances itself from a particular identity is an 
interesting choice for Rankine, an African-American woman writer who was born in Jamaica in 
1963 and immigrated to New York as a child. Indeed, the speaker of DLMBL casually alludes to 
her own gender, racial and cultural identities, as if in passing. While the prose style and 
references demonstrate the speaker’s advanced education, middle-class status, and age (on page 
104: “It occurs to me that forty could be half my life or it could be all my life”), much of the text 
distances itself from strong identifications with gender. As in the example above, there are 
references to the speaker having a husband, and a cab driver in a reported dialogue refers to the 
speaker as seeming like a “smart lady,” (89) but these references to gender are interspersed 
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throughout the text, rather than serving as an object of focus. Moreover, allusions to the 
speaker’s nationality and race are portrayed in relative terms: the same cab driver asks the 
speaker how many years she has been in the U.S. (“Over thirty”) and if she has noticed “these 
white people, they think they are better than everyone else?” (89). While this dialogue 
demonstrates that the speaker is a woman of color from an immigrant background, a later 
passage emphasizes race, nationality, and class as a relative classifications: “In third-world 
countries I have felt overwhelmingly American, calcium-rich, privileged, and white” (106).43 
Along with the speaker’s deadened tone, the content of DLMNBL underscores the relativity, 
rather than fixity, of social identities. The text thus allows a platform from which to project the 
speaker’s voice as an anonymous, enervated everywoman with whom a broad range of readers 
may readily identify.  
Another major element of DLMBL is its use of visuals. While much of the verbal text is 
presented in paragraph form, these paragraphs are often fragmented, for they are frequently 
disrupted by visual graphics such as photographs, illustrations, and diagrams. Thus Rankine 
incorporates what Sidonie Smith and Julie Watson call an “interface” between verbal and visual 
media. According to Smith and Watson, in life writing, “the interface is a site at which visual and 
textual modes are interwoven but also confront and mutually interrogate each other”; such 
interfaces may serve to contextualize an artist’s self-representation by citing “sociohistorical 
sources that situate her individual ‘I’ in a cultural surround” (Interfaces 21, 25). The “cultural 
surround” that Rankine emphasizes is the twenty-first century electronic media landscape. 
                                                        
43 Rankine’s follow-up work, Citizen: An American Lyric (2014), shares many qualities with DLMBL, including the 
flat narratorial tone and a distanced speaker. However, Citizen marks a marked shift in Rankine’s engagement with 
race. While DLMBL takes up examples of black men in American who have been killed and terrorized, the central 
focus of Citizen is an extended exploration of white attitudes and behaviors towards African-Americans, including 
numerous examples of micro-aggressions, media portrayals of black celebrities and events such as Hurricane 
Katrina, publicized murders of black men and adolescents, and racial iniquities within the American criminal justice 
system.  
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Televisions appear with great frequency in DLMBL, both in form—as visual representations, 
sometimes displaying other visual images—and in content, as described in the verbal text. The 
text begins with the graphic image of a television set displaying white static on its screen; this 
same image appears throughout the book, dividing the text into sections that are otherwise 
unmarked. The narrating speaker of the text describes her channel surfing habits, and one can 
read the television screens as marking changes of the channel. Moreover, many of the 
photographs are displayed on a graphic illustration of television sets, and they originate from 
television, including stills from films, broadcast news programs, and advertisements. In addition 
to the juxtaposition of graphic illustrations and photographs, paragraphs are also disrupted by 
visual representations of other texts, such as words on a prescription bottle, a scrawled message 
scratched into a chalkboard, or a Google web site main search page on a computer. The text of 
DLMBL thus buffets its readers with visual images delivered through multimedia technologies, 
just as a stream of changing images continually inundates television viewers.   
Rankine’s text is highly allusive; in addition to the visual materials, Don’t Let Me Be Lonely 
includes cultural references ranging from “high” art to popular culture. For example, Rankine 
cites thinkers and writers like Hegel, Gertrude Stein, and Cornel West, films such as Boogie 
Nights and The Wild Bunch, and television shows such as The Sopranos and Murder, She Wrote. 
The allusiveness to multiple texts demonstrates a model of subjectivity as shaped largely through 
discourse, for the speaking subject is deeply embedded within a larger cultural fabric and 
intellectual exchange of ideas. Moreover, the text includes a large amount of factual information 
on topics ranging from current events in the media and politics to medical information. Rankine 
assiduously documents references and factual information in the endnotes, where she includes 
even more information on historical narratives, the pharmaceutical industry, and books of poetry 
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and philosophy. The erudite and allusive nature of the text presents the writing process as 
necessarily and consciously wide-ranging in areas of study, deeply engaged in contemporary 
events, and highly indebted to previous thinkers, writers, and artists.  
The abundance of prosaic, visual, and academic elements of much of DLMBL calls the text’s 
subtitle, An American Lyric, into question. What is lyrical about this text? And what is American 
about it? What features of conventional lyric does DLMBL embrace, and what do they depart 
from? More specifically, how does DLBML use form to explore lyric subjectivity as emerging 
from contemporary American cultural life? 
On the one hand, there are passages of verbal text that conform to lyric convention. The 
overtly lyrical passages of DLMBL take the form of lyrical dialogues, which are interspersed 
throughout the text.44 These dialogues are verbal fragments that frequently disrupt the prose 
paragraphs and look more like lyric poetry because they conform to conventional poetic 
lineation. These sections are set apart through considerable white space, as if Rankine is 
presenting block quotations or a dramatic script. While some of the lyrical dialogue fragments 
are reported as autobiographical accounts of the speaking subject’s conversations, others are 
presented as possibly imagined or internalized exchanges with ambiguous participants, as in the 
following example:  
I felt it too.  
The loneliness?  
I let it happen.  
By feeling?  
By not not feeling.  
                                                        
44 These dialogic lyric passages are appear frequently throughout the text, on pages 16, 31, 58, 62, 89, 99, 103, and 
119. 
  
 81 
That’s too much …  
Like dying? 
Maybe, or death is second.  
Second to what?  
To loneliness.  
Define loneliness. (58) 
This lyrical dialogue is typical of DLMBL in its presentation of an ambiguous speaking subject 
and an interlocutor and in its use of abstract language and content. Thus, the lyrical dialogues 
contrast sharply with the concrete specificity of much of the prose paragraphs and micro-essays 
of DLMBL. At the same time, these lyrical dialogues convey conventional lyric articulations of 
interiority and feelings, often focused, as they are here, on the titular theme of loneliness and its 
correspondence to death. However, in its ambiguity and abstraction, the speaker’s interiority and 
emotion are indirectly represented, as in the use of the double negative; in this passage, the affect 
of the speaker’s loneliness is experienced “By not not feeling.” Thus, as Wills argues of 
Hejinian’s My Life, we have interiority without “representation.” Furthermore, the use of the 
lyric line to present dialogue alerts readers to a key departure from a conventional lyric’s 
presentation as the self-expression of the poet who forges a unified voice to speak in a 
monologue. Although the topic of these exchanges is loneliness, the self in these lines is always 
in conversation. Rather than expressing the ideas and feelings of a solitary figure, the lyric lines 
deliver an exchange, one of question and answer, which underscores the self as dialogic. 
Whether these lyrical dialogues represent a self and another or an internal conversation, they 
articulate a concept of the speaking subject as a dialogic construction. Thus, while the presence 
of lyric dialogues preserves traditional lyric’s affirmation of interiority and the significance of 
  
 82 
individual emotion, it does so by shifting away from both a model of the lyric as monologic and 
from direct representation of a particular person’s feeling.  
In addition to the presence of lyrical dialogue, how else might DLMBL be considered lyrical? 
I suggest that the text asks readers to expand our notions of the postlanguage lyric to encompass 
more than the conventional lyrical poetic line. The extensive use of prose insists that we allow 
postlanguage lyric to take in a prosaic register in form, content, and character. The text therefore 
encompasses various contemporary cultural discourses directly, without the distortion of certain 
conventional lyric’s “expressive” emotionality. The use of understated prose, frequently coupled 
with graphic and verbal depictions of the turn of the twenty-first century, stretches to point to 
both the overwhelming nature of contemporary catastrophes (9/11, the prevalence of violence 
perpetrated against African-American men, conflict in the Middle East) and the underwhelming 
inadequacy of response, both cultural (code-orange alerts, human rights violations in the 
American criminal justice system, Operation Iraqi Freedom, consumerism) and personal 
(antidepressants, electronically enabled voyeurism, channel surfing).  
The use of understated prose is present an important passage that occurs early in DLMBL—
one that I will return to again over the course of this chapter—where the speaker discusses 
watching a televised news report about George W. Bush’s imperfect memory of the trial 
following the brutal murder of James Byrd, Jr. Byrd was an African-American man who was 
beaten and dragged to death in 1998 by three white supremacists in the town of Jasper, Texas. 
The discussion is interspersed with photographs of the ground where Byrd’s dismembered body 
parts were found, and a photo of Byrd’s face, taken while he was still alive. Byrd’s photographic 
portrait is followed by subdued commentary:  
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I forget things too. It makes me sad. Or it makes me the saddest. The sadness is 
not really about George W. or our American optimism; the sadness lives in the 
recognition that a life can not matter. Or, as there are billions of lives, my sadness 
is alive alongside the recognition that billions of lives never mattered. I write this 
without breaking my heart, without bursting into anything. Perhaps this is the real 
source of my sadness. Or, perhaps, Emily Dickinson, my love, hope was never a 
thing with feathers. (23)  
In the statement, “I write this without breaking my heart, without bursting into anything,” the “I” 
tries to distance herself from what can be the overpowering domination of the expressive poet in 
the throes of self-righteousness or hysterical emotion, for such extremes of affect place the focus 
on the poet herself. At the same time, the speaker settles on no easy place in terms of feeling, 
wondering if perhaps her lack of emotion is in fact the “real source of my sadness.” Emily 
Dickinson, who is often (but not always) considered to be an exemplary poet of American 
Romanticism, is then invoked as both a beloved and a foil. The speaker tentatively disagrees 
with the premise of Dickinson’s well-known poem, “Hope is the thing with feathers.” At this 
moment in DLMBL, hope is not perched in the speaker’s soul, singing continuously throughout 
storms, gales, chills, and seas, as Dickinson’s poem describes.45 Instead, the text’s understated 
prose contrasts with Dickinson’s lyrical flights of imagination. If the conventional lyric, in its 
Romantic and postromantic lineage, is conventionally considered to be the expression of a 
sensitive, solitary figure, given to delicate gestures or emotionally charged flights of fancy, it is a 
genre that can all too easily reinforce the American optimism that is mentioned in this passage. 
This type of optimism, which Rankine acknowledges is theorized by Cornel West, is dangerous, 
for it implicitly denies the reality of American violence and suffering. DLMBL asserts that the 
                                                        
45 The endnotes of DLMBL cite the entirety of Dickinson’s poem, “Hope is the Thing with Feathers” (136). 
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prosaic register in lyric is an important one for contemporary American life, for it can counter 
American fantasies that glorify individualistic “expression” and facile optimism.  
Thus Rankine offers a different kind of American lyric: rather than being individualistic, it 
aims to speak for collective concerns; rather than being sensationalistic or hysterical, it is flat and 
understated; rather than being triumphalist or sensationally expressive, it gropes around in the 
darkness of despair, seeking for the possibility of hope. Moreover, this kind of postlanguage lyric 
must make room for the visual, to demonstrate and explore how our lives are shaped—indeed, 
often dominated—by visual and electronic media. DLMBL argues that, to represent the twenty-
first century self within social and historical contexts, a poetic text must include the experience 
of events that are perceived through electronic media. The text’s engagement with the 
contemporary age—in all its mediated noise—is an intrinsic part of the poethical, as Retallack 
asserts: “a vital poetics must acknowledge the degree to which the rim of occurring and making 
is now formed by the electronic intimacy of this chattering, arguing, densely interimpacted, 
explosive planet” (13-14). Furthermore, Rankine fulfills Marjorie Perloff’s injunction in her 
1991 book, Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media:  
[W]e must avoid the impasse of the Englit or Creative Writing classroom, where 
the literary text too often continues to be treated as an object detachable from its 
context, as if a ‘poem’ could exist in the United States today that has not been 
shaped by the electronic culture that has produced it. There is today no landscape 
uncontaminated by sound bytes or computer blips, no mountain peak or lonely 
valley beyond the reach of the cellular phone and the microcassette player. (xiii)  
DLMBL constructs poetry that acknowledges our media landscape, and in so doing, it explores 
how contemporary notions of individuals’ experiences of selfhood are shaped by dominant 
  
 85 
culture in the early twenty-first century, in particular, forces of electronic media that seem 
foreign to the natural landscapes of conventional lyric poetry.  
Unlike much of the Language poetry that Perloff champions in Radical Artifice, Rankine 
aims to present the self in its social context while retaining the use of the first person singular 
pronoun. This choice to retain the “I” in her poetry involves the matter of representations of 
subjectivity. While Perloff and other advocates of Language poetry argued that poetic use of the 
“I” tends to reify individualistic notions of the self as coherent and disembodied, I argue that 
Rankine retains the “I” to advance a model of social selfhood in poetry as a corrective to 
commonplace, individualistic notions of subjectivity, which overemphasize the individual and 
de-emphasize social relations.  
Subjectivity and Ethics 
Don’t Let Me Be Lonely interrogates commonplace attributes of subjectivity such as 
coherence and inviolability and explores how those concepts, in turn, reinforce atomization in 
American life. Rankine is clearly influenced by poststructuralist thought, and her writings take 
up the problems of the myth of autonomy in language and culture. In an essay on poetic 
subjectivity, “The First Person in the Twenty-first Century,” which appears in a 2001 critical 
anthology on poetics, After Confession: Poetry as Autobiography, Rankine focuses on the use of 
the textual “I” to consider how language both represents and reinforces particular concepts of 
selfhood. She opens the essay by asking, “Is it fair to say there is, in the twenty-first century, a 
greater consensus toward the notion that true coherency is fragmented?” (132). This rhetorical 
question signals her affinity with poststructuralist challenges to traditional accounts of coherent 
subjectivity; the “greater consensus” that she gestures to, but does not name, would be obvious to 
readers in the academy familiar with poststructuralist challenges to the concept of autonomous 
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subjectivity. The problem with the conventional textual strategy of a straightforward, 
unselfconscious deployment of the “I,” Rankine argues, is that it considers the self divorced from 
social context. Rankine rejects the use of the “I” as a kind of disembodied Cartesian cogito by 
emphasizing that the self does not exist outside of time in a suspended state: “the ‘I’ exists in 
time and is married to biological, personal, historical, and cultural meaning” (132). Thus 
Rankine allies herself with poststructuralist critiques of metaphysical and ideological accounts of 
unified subjectivity.  
Nevertheless, Rankine does not abandon the use of the first person. Instead, Rankine aims to 
reconfigure the use of the “I” to articulate a relational self. This resonates with Burkitt’s concept 
of “social selves”; as Burkitt argues, while traditional accounts of unified subjectivity, both 
metaphysical and ideological, have been and ought to be critiqued, the notion of selfhood need 
not and should not be discarded completely. Instead, the self can be re-envisioned as 
fundamentally relational, emerging through social relations and dialogues (27). Burkitt’s 
emphasis on the relationality of the self is a useful articulation of Rankine’s concept of re-
envisioned “I,” one that is embodied, embedded within social contexts, and “fragmented” 
through relations with others. Furthermore, viewing the subject as inherently relational carries 
ethical implications, as philosopher Kelly Oliver argues: “insofar as we are by virtue of our 
environment and by virtue of relationships with other people, we have ethical requirements 
rooted in the very possibility of subjectivity itself. We are obligated to respond to our 
environment and other people in ways that open up rather than close off the possibility of 
response” (15). Indeed, in “The Twenty-first Century,” Rankine frames the exploration of 
subjectivity in ethical terms, for she frames “the constant investigation of subjectivity” as a 
“moral search” whose aim “should be what it means to be human” (135-6). I will explore in 
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more depth the ethical advancement of relational subjectivity in DLMBL later in this chapter; at 
this point, I turn to Rankine’s examination of the problems of coherent subjectivity.   
In “The First Person in the Twenty-First Century,” Rankine frames the issue of the 
textual representation of selfhood as a dichotomy in which two different conceptions of 
subjectivity—the fragmented self and the commonplace idea of the unified self—correlate to two 
different kinds of texts. Rankine argues for the “fragmented text” that conveys the self as 
“broken into,” which she implicitly opposes to a conventional, coherent text that espouses and 
relies on coherence of the writing subject (132). To frame the two textual alternatives—
fragmented and coherent—Rankine uses the metaphors of reality and fantasy. To Rankine, the 
straightforward use of “I” is a conventional textual strategy that indulges in fantasy and 
mythologized privilege: “To abandon the fragmented text—this is the fantasy—is to encounter a 
world of homogeneity, a single ‘I,’ the stillness of it fixed by time; this, we are to believe, is a 
privilege. But not to recognize the instability inherent in any assertion of the first person is to 
believe that the gated community of the text is a place suitable only for fantasy worlds” (135). In 
this description, Rankine characterizes as politically conservative those who would preserve the 
status quo with the “stillness” and “wholeness” of the first-person subject through indicators of 
wealth and status such as “homogeneity,” “privilege,” and “gated community of the text.” 
Rankine’s use of such economic and demographic terminology indicates that the assertion of the 
“coherent” self she critiques is based on the concept of possessive individualism and its attendant 
power dynamics. The text as “gated community” correlates to those with wealth and power who 
would close themselves off in a protective bubble, separated from the perceived threat of those 
who lack “privilege” and would contaminate the “homogeneity” of the single “I.” For Rankine, 
textual coherence perpetuates the pervasive cultural idealization of possessive individualism. 
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Textual fragmentation, however, seeks to upset convictions in possessive individualism and, 
accordingly, the power dynamics of the status quo.  
For Rankine, the representation of coherence in language comes with high stakes. Rankine 
argues that the Western fantasy of coherent subjectivity, the notion that the self is whole unto 
itself, is laden with dangerous power dynamics. “The First Person in the Twenty-first Century” 
links coherent subjectivity and violence:  
[W]hat happens to a coherent subjectivity that has mythologized itself through 
privilege as privilege? No “I” in my mind’s eye is the whole of anything. I am a 
part and so, torn apart by the aggression of the uninterrupted. Hyperbolic as this 
sounds, I look around and see the illusion of wholeness and surety inciting the 
Crusades, slavery, the Battle of Little Big Horn, Shoah, Hiroshima, Pearl Harbor, 
Vietnam, etc. (135) 
Rankine reads the illusion of coherent subjectivity as a key element in the conceptual grounds 
that underpin historical events of violence and oppression. That is, those in power and privilege 
who are convinced of their separation from others feel justified in their own superiority; they 
dehumanize those they see as enemies or inferiors. This dehumanization ultimately results in 
violence towards those who occupy disempowered social categories. Rankine mostly focuses on 
the concept of coherent subjectivity as emerging from Western historical conditions and 
contributing to catastrophes of European and American genocide of indigenous peoples, the 
enslavement of Africans, and the Imperialist bid for global dominance. Rankine’s own subject 
position can add an illuminating dimension to this argument: as an African-American woman 
who emigrated from Jamaica to the U.S. with her family when she was a child, Rankine’s racial 
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status and national origin places her outside of several categories of privilege, which allows her a 
perspective on coherent subjectivity as a mythology built on the material conditions of privilege.  
When Rankine links the concept of coherent subjectivity and oppression in Western 
history, she is making an argument along similar lines as that of Emmanuel Levinas. Although 
Levinas is from a very different cultural background than Rankine’s, his experience as a Jewish 
Holocaust survivor in mid-twentieth century Europe also offers an outsider subject position from 
which to critique Western philosophy and politics. Like Rankine, Levinas argues that the 
individual self’s “‘right to exist’” as celebrated in Western philosophy and politics has had 
disastrous consequences for humanity. In his essay “Ethics as First Philosophy,” Levinas alludes 
to Pascal’s phrase “my place in the sun,” which identifies the Western subject as egocentric and 
imperialistic. Levinas argues that conventional Western subjectivity assumes a “given world at 
its disposal”:46  
. . . my “place in the sun,” my being at home, have these not also been the 
usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed 
or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, 
excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? Pascal’s “my place in the sun” marks the 
beginning of the image of the usurpation of the whole earth. (82)  
Like Levinas, Rankine reads possessive individualism and its illusion of coherent subjectivity—
the myth that the self can survive alone—as a key element in the conceptual grounds that 
underpin historical events of violence and oppression in the West. Because of the high stakes 
involved, Rankine opposes the articulation of coherent subjectivity in language through any 
straightforward deployment of the first person singular. Since the link between the illusion of 
coherent and autonomous subjectivity with acts of violence and degradation sounds 
                                                        
46 This phrase is taken from Levinas’s essay, “Transcendence of Words,” which Rankine also cites in DLMBL. 
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“hyperbolic,” as Rankine acknowledges, it is fruitful to fill in the steps of the link she makes. 
The text of DLMBL offers specific examples of how Rankine works through connections of the 
concept of coherent subjectivity and violence within contemporary American cultural discourses. 
I will now turn to examples of how DLMBL presents cultural discourses, which draw on 
examples from mass media (cinema, television, print and broadcast journalism, and advertising) 
that illustrate how American culture reinforces the mythology of possessive individualism.  
Autonomy: A Law Unto Oneself 
 In what ways does Don’t Let Me Be Lonely demonstrate how contemporary American 
cultural discourses reinforce commonplace convictions about autonomous subjectivity? 
Furthermore, how does the text link the cultural formation of the “ideological I” with unethical 
behaviors that Rankine outlines, such as violence and oppression? I suggest that DLBML 
approaches cultural discourses that approach autonomous subjectivity through the analysis of the 
dual figures of the cowboy and the terrorist, heroic and villainous types who both represent 
autonomy in contemporary American culture. 
In an early section of DLMBL, Rankine investigates the American fantasy of static, 
autonomous selfhood through the cultural myth of the cowboy as depicted in cinematic 
iconography by discussing Spaghetti Westerns in general and Sam Peckinpah’s 1969 film The 
Wild Bunch in particular. The text also includes an illustration of a television displaying a 
representative film scene of three cowboys in the middle of a shoot-out in the Old West: the trio 
are brandishing guns and riding horses through plumes of desert dust (25). The textual and visual 
invocation of American cowboy mythology raises associated qualities of rugged individualism: 
self-determination, toughness, and stoicism. If one considers the etymology of the word 
“autonomy”—auto, “self” and nomos, “law”—it is clear that the term “autonomy” refers to the 
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condition of being a law unto oneself. The iconic figure of the cowboy, as depicted in the 
imaginary world of the movie and television screens, has been traditionally conceptualized as 
either an “outlaw” or as a heroic vigilante who takes the law into his own hands. Thus, the 
American cowboy ethos perpetuates the belief that the subject can establish one’s own laws and 
thus determine one’s own destiny. In her discussion of the cowboy in Spaghetti Westerns, 
Rankine emphasizes the centrality of fantasy for the autonomous American cowboy ethos, 
specifically “the American fantasy that we will survive no matter what” (25). The myths of 
immortality and coherence are two elements of the same American conviction in an autonomous 
self who remains unbroken by outside events, persons, history, culture, or mortality.  
The fantasy-based cowboy ethos is far from benign. Autonomy, the condition of being a 
law unto oneself in a lawless land, is predicated on the use of force, as the still image of movie 
cowboys involved in a shootout indicates. Rather than focusing on a depiction of triumphant 
heroism or vigilante justice, the text focuses on The Wild Bunch, a film in which all the main 
characters die in a final shoot-out. This passage therefore emphasizes the nihilism and violence 
of outlaws who have no social obligations or hope of any larger meaning. The text 
accompanying the image of the cowboy shootout states, “Peckinpah’s The Wild Bunch is worth 
watching because the cowboys in it have nowhere to get to. They’re older and they don’t have to 
make it anywhere because where they are is all there is or rather the end of a genre. Theirs is not 
the Old Testament—no journey to take; nothing promised; no land to land in” (25). The 
commentary on The Wild Bunch portrays the dark side of the myth of rugged individualism 
through negation. Rankine contrasts the cowboys, as true “outlaws,” with the Israelites in the Old 
Testament. In this reading, the freedom that the cowboy figure exemplifies relies on lack—these 
cowboys have freedom but no covenant and, therefore, no promised land. Their destruction and 
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self-destruction is the manifestation of autonomy, where the individual provides a law unto 
oneself, and it is shown to be a life lived through—and ultimately ended by—violence.  
Rankine reads the fantasy-laden cowboy icon as both an exemplar of static selfhood and 
also a projected fantasy of white American masculinity, thus linking the coherent subjectivity of 
possessive individualism to privileged social status. Significantly, Rankine positions the 
cinematic iconography of the cowboy within dynamic cultural and political contexts. While, as 
noted on the opening page of DLMBL, in the mid-twentieth century, the people who died on 
television were either “Black” or “were wearing black” (5), all the cowboys in The Wild Bunch 
die, even though “they are handsome, white, leading men not dressed in all black” (25). Rankine 
acknowledges that The Wild Bunch, produced in the Vietnam era, in fact signifies the “end of a 
genre” that also marks the decline of the era of postwar American heroics (25, 137). With “no 
land to land in,” the cowboys in The Wild Bunch negate the promise of Manifest Destiny and its 
concomitant American Dream.  
While the cowboy movie genre has not returned to the sartorial simplicity of black hats 
vs. white hats, the cultural iconography of the cowboy, and its polarized moral logic, circulated 
potently within the post 9/11 era of DLMBL’s composition and publication. During his 
presidency, George W. Bush famously invoked the idealized figure of cowboy, referenced 
“Wanted: Dead or Alive posters from the Old West in his quest for Osama bin Laden, and used 
black-and-white rhetoric to characterize opposition to his administration. Rankine references 
Bush’s rhetoric and the post-9/11 cultural climate later in the text: “Now it is the twenty-first 
century and you are with us or you are against us. Where is your flag?” (91). 47 After this 
question, a photograph follows of a man holding up an American flag so large that it conceals 
most of his person. The speaking subject then ponders, “It strikes me what the attack on the 
                                                        
47 “Bush: Bin Laden Wanted Dead or Alive.” abcnews.go.com. 2001 Sept. 17. Web. 2015 June 3. 
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World Trade Center stole from us is our willingness to be complex. Or what the attack on the 
World Trade Center revealed to us is that we were never complex” (91). The American cowboy 
ethos of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 political rhetoric bespeaks a simplistic and rigid 
moral worldview that dehumanizes perceived enemies, justifies warmongering, silences critics, 
and implicitly reverts to the mythology of white American masculine privilege. Thus, considered 
in the context of the Bush era’s political rhetoric, the text’s reading of the autonomous American 
cowboy figure in Spaghetti Westerns in general and The Wild Bunch in particular resists the 
revitalized American cowboy ethos in post-9/11 American culture.  
DLMBL also draws directly from contemporary political events to consider the other, 
salient outlaw figure from American cultural discourse: the terrorist. While DLMBL briefly 
alludes to the cultural hysteria surrounding the figure of Osama bin Laden, the text resists the 
commonplace equivalence between terrorism and Muslims from the Middle East. Instead, 
Rankine considers the 2001 execution of the domestic terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, a disgruntled 
U.S. Army veteran and white supremacist who killed 168 people in the 1995 bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. DLMBL notes Timothy McVeigh’s use of 
the poem “Invictus,” which McVeigh delivered in lieu of a “final statement to the media” before 
his execution (47). In so doing, Rankine draws connections among violence, the American myth 
of autonomy, and poetry that espouses coherent subjectivity. This passage is structured like 
many of the episodes in DLMBL: it is a prosaic meditation framed by the speaking subject’s 
experience of watching the news on television. It begins by referencing a news report on 
McVeigh’s victims and includes a graphic illustration of a television that features the photograph 
of an empty chair outfitted for execution by lethal injection (140). The verbal text highlights 
McVeigh’s privileged social status as a white man by suggesting that, because he is “visually the 
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American boy next door,” the media attempts “to immunize him from his actions” with a focus 
on the possibility of forgiveness (47). The text then considers how McVeigh used poetry reveal 
his conviction in inviolable subjectivity as an extreme form of possessive individualism. 
McVeigh had scrawled the famous lyric poem “Invictus” by Victorian poet William Earnest 
Henley on a piece of paper as his final statement before his execution. In the discussion of 
McVeigh’s execution, the text cites the well-known closing lines of Henley’s poem: “‘It matters 
not how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll, I am the master of my fate: I 
am the captain of my soul’” (47).48 The quoted lines of Henley’s poem trumpet self-
determination, and they demonstrate McVeigh’s conviction that his subjectivity was entirely 
autonomous, beholden to no social compact. Placed in the context of McVeigh’s execution, the 
quoted lines from Henley’s poem highlight the domineering and militaristic overtones of the 
deployment of the coherent first-person subject, who claims to be “master” and “captain” of an 
inviolable self. Rankine’s reference to McVeigh’s quotation of “Invictus” illustrates the 
connection she sees among coherent poetic subjectivity, possessive individualism, and violence, 
for, as a domestic terrorist, McVeigh’s dangerous fantasy of autonomy transformed into the 
violent reality of his actions.   
The poetic lines from “Invictus” serve as a foil to the project of Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, 
which aims to construct a different kind of “American lyric.” “Invictus” may be understood by 
many contemporary Americans as an exemplary model of traditional lyric, that is, one that is 
easily recognizable as “poetry” as we have been taught in school classrooms: its rhyme and 
meter is regular, its tone is triumphant, and its function can be interpreted as “inspirational.” 
Furthermore, although Henley was a Victorian Englishman, not an American, “Invictus” can be 
                                                        
48 Notably, unlike other lines of cited poetry in the main text or endnotes of DLMBL, Henley’s lines are not 
presented formally, with offset margins and clearly demarcated lineation. By not honoring the text’s poetic line, 
DLMBL visually signals disapproval of the original lyric, McVeigh’s appropriation, or both.   
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interpreted as a celebration of grit and self-reliance, which are often mythologized as particularly 
American values. In contrast, largely prosaic text of DLMBL deflates the triumphalist tone of 
Henley’s lines, which accords with the bombast and jingoism that surfaced in American post-
9/11 public rhetoric. Furthermore, the lyric subjectivity of “Invictus” can be read as a foil to 
Rankine’s re-articulation of the poetic first-person subject. If the conventional lyric, in its 
postromantic lineage, is considered to be the expression of a solitary figure, given to emotionally 
charged flights of imagination and grand gestures, it is one that can readily buttress the 
mythology of American possessive individualism. DLMBL, written in post-9/11 America, seeks 
to write a different kind of lyric with a different poetic subject.  
 The cowboy and the terrorist are two cultural types that have been particularly potent in 
the post 9/11 era. The representation of both of these figures DLMBL resist the romanticized or 
exotic stereotypes circulating in twenty-first century culture: the cowboys in The Wild Bunch are 
not romanticized, nostalgic heroes, but participants in nihilistic destruction, while the terrorist the 
text discusses at length is neither foreign nor Islamic but the “American boy next door.” In 
contrast with stereotypes, DLMBL links both kinds of outlaw figures, who seek the fantasy of 
autonomy, as ultimately participating in a living death. The cowboys in The Wild Bunch embark 
on an expedition to nowhere but their inevitable deaths: “For them, life and death are 
simultaneously equal and present” (25). Similarly, in a discussion on terrorism, Rankine 
references Hegel’s essay “Philosophy of Right” to observe that the terrorist is truly outside the 
law because he does not fear death and therefore cannot be controlled “by governments and 
councils” (84). Rankine paraphrases Hegel’s point that “terrorists embody that state of beyond; 
they are freedom embodied. They bring life to that deathly state of lawlessness” (84). 
Consequently, there is a breakdown in social relations: “The relationships embedded between the 
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‘I’ and ‘we’ unhinge and lose all sense of responsibility. That ‘you,’ functioning as other, now 
exists beyond our notions of civil and social space” (84). As with the cowboy in The Wild Bunch, 
the ultimate “freedom” of the terrorist comes at the cost of being marked in the cultural sphere as 
already dead (84). In these discussions, the text assigns the cherished American ideal of freedom 
to the provenance of the outlaw and the condition of living death. The autonomy of possessive 
individualism is thus irresponsibility, a space in which the ties between the “I” and “you” are 
severed. This reading of autonomous subjectivity as linked to irresponsibility, violence, and 
living death indicates that Rankine’s understanding of ethical subjectivity must be configured 
within social relations.  
The Commodified Subject 
In addition to the investigations of cultural iconography that focus on the American myth 
of autonomy, DLMBL critiques the economic processes of American consumer capitalism that 
reduce individuals to participants in a market economy. The concept of possessive individualism, 
born of the marriage of Western individualism and capitalism, advances the idea of the self as 
sole proprietor of its qualities and capabilities. Burkitt argues that “this type of individualism 
could be corrosive of human society, because each person is understood as bound to others only 
through the competitive market and nothing more” (2-3). In DLMBL this reduction of individuals 
to participants in a market economy is illustrated in an example of the speaking subject’s sister, 
whose two children have both died in a car accident. The speaker has a telephone conversation 
with her sister about meeting with an insurance claims adjuster: “my sister is distracted because 
she has been asked to assess the value of her dead children’s lives. She has to meet with an 
insurance adjuster. . . . He wants her to put together information on her children, think of it as a 
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scrapbook, he’d said. Report cards, medical records, extracurricular activities” (77). Rankine 
analyzes the use of this “scrapbook”:  
Each activity is a sign, a sign that points to social class, which points to potential 
worth. The private school, the tennis lessons, the soccer team, the scuba medal, 
the collection of exotic fish or lack thereof were all heading somewhere. It is not a 
destination we need to arrive at since clearly the children did not arrive there. 
Ultimately no one lives in that place. It is a place of compensation divorced from 
compassion. (78) 
The text aims to render absurd the quotidian activity of life insurance claims adjustment. 
Rankine frames insurance claims as an activity that demonstrates the “corrosive effects” of 
possessive individualism: worth is tied to signifiers of consumption and, therefore, class. In the 
nowhere place of “compensation divorced from compassion,” human lives are assigned a dollar 
amount. In a market economy, the devastation of death is compensated monetarily, a move the 
text frames as incommensurate.   
Additionally, DLMBL critiques possessive individualism as it emerges through consumer 
culture. DLMBL resonates with a body of cultural criticism that argues that, in a Western 
contemporary culture dominated by consumer capitalism, the subject is so profoundly shaped 
through the purchase of commodities that the distinction between the self and purchased 
commodities becomes elided. The ethos of possessive individualism has its roots in the ideals of 
enlightened, rational self-interest, but rather than viewing participation in consumer capitalism as 
a rational choice that individuals make, some cultural critics argue that the perception of 
selfhood is affected by processes of advertising and consumption on a fundamental level. For 
example, sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues that identity has altered in the globalized 
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contemporary age, which he calls “liquid modernity,” for so many people are not tied to local 
places and communities. Within “liquid modernity,” as older communities have become 
dislocated, we go shopping for identities and means for basic social interactions, just as we do 
fashions on sale (74). Bauman argues that it is important to see that contemporary consumer 
capitalism does not organize consumer life through normative regulations but seduces them 
through the manipulation of consumers’ desires for commodities (76). Sut Jhally shares this 
emphasis on seduction and further emphasizes the processes of advertising. Jhally argues that 
consumer capitalism works through the process of marketing: the “power of advertising comes 
from the need for meaning. . . . If it is manipulative, it is manipulative with respect to a real need: 
our need to know the world and to make sense of it, our need to know ourselves” (196). Far from 
being meaningless activities, we watch television, respond to advertising, and participate in the 
consumption of commodities precisely because these activities provide answers in our search for 
who we are.  
Viewed in conjunction with Bauman and Jhally’s insights on the subjectivity within 
consumer capitalism, DLMBL offers concrete examples of how the distinction between the 
subject and commodities is so easily elided. Rankine presents the speaking subject as a consumer 
who realizes that, pre-9/11, the sense of self that she had previously found inviolable has turned 
out to be built on the commodities she had purchased. At one point, the speaking subject 
hearkens back to a pre-9/11 age, not as a golden era, but as a commodified one in which identity 
was purchased: “My flushing toilet, my hot water, my air conditioner, my health insurance, my, 
my, my—all my my’s were American-made. This is how I was alive. Or wasn’t alive. I was a 
product, or I was like a product, a product of and like Walt Disney’s cell animation—stylishly 
animated, somewhat comic. I used to think of myself as a fearless person” (93). In this list of 
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possessions, Rankine emphasizes commodities that middle-class Americans tend to think of as 
necessities to keep consumers feeling clean, comfortable, healthy, and safe. Thus Rankine points 
to how the idea of inviolable selfhood within possessive individualism—confident, fearless, 
protected—is a construct built out of the commodities that consumers purchase. Moreover, by 
remarking that “all my my’s were American-made,” Rankine observes that the construction of a 
“fearless,” inviolable self through consumption of commodities is a particularly American 
phenomenon, born out of the “American fantasy that we will survive no matter what” (25). As in 
the arguments of Bauman and Jhally, Rankine argues that our sense of self is one that cannot 
exist without products; thus, the distinction between “my my’s” and the self collapses, so that, 
ultimately, “I” is virtually a “product.” Furthermore, Rankine’s comment “This is how I was 
alive. Or wasn’t alive,” asserts that our drive to purchase what are perceived as necessities to stay 
alive robs us of the very life we seek to preserve. Selfhood, constructed out of commodities, 
allows us the feeling of inviolability, but this is ultimately an illusion.  
DLMBL further argues that advertising perpetuates possessive individualism by 
promoting a subjectivity constituted by commodified and idealized representations of the self. 
Rankine characterizes the U.S. in the boom times of the late twentieth-century as a culture 
obsessed with finance and consumerism: “To roll over or not to roll over that IRA? To have a 
new IMac or not to have it? To eTrade or not to eTrade? Again and again these were Kodak 
moments, full of individuation; we were all on our way to our personal best. America was 
seemingly a meritocracy. I, I, I am Tiger Woods. It was the nineties” (91). Rankine points out 
how the American late-twentieth century preoccupation with finance and consumption offered 
identities packaged by commodities and marketing slogans. In the discourses of advertising, self-
improvement entirely takes the form of consumption and market participation. For example, the 
  
 100 
“individuation” of the self, what marks off one as distinct from others, is captured and displayed 
as “Kodak moments.” The concept of the “Kodak moment,” itself an advertising slogan, 
encourages individuals to experience oneself only through the documentation of an idealized 
self-representation, which is possible only through the purchase of commodities. Furthermore, 
Rankine’s reference to Nike’s 1997 marketing campaign, “I am Tiger Woods” illustrates the kind 
of social function that Jhally argues advertising serves (148). Rankine points out how, in the 
1990s, Nike seized upon discourses of social progress, self-improvement, and the American 
dream. She highlights how Nike played on Americans’ desire to believe that they live in a 
“meritocracy” where everyone across racial and ethnic boundary lines is given the opportunity to 
succeed, as exemplified by Tiger Woods, who comes from a multi-racial background. But the 
text points to how the images of meritocracy and multiculturalism did not so much represent a 
reality as it did broadcast advertising campaigns whose motives were profit-based. What may 
look like something new—a man of color achieving in a sport long dominated by privileged 
white men—was a valorization of possessive individualism, with Tiger Woods as a 
contemporary exemplar of the self-made man. The message from Nike’s advertising encourages 
the consumer to identify with an idealized self-image, to buy the idea “I, I, I am Tiger Woods” 
when “I,” average Joe consumer of Nike products, will never be an exemplary multi-millionaire 
like Tiger Woods. Advertising leads consumers, who are searching for identity, to a false 
identification that is ultimately pre-packaged, superficial and empty. 
In addition to exploring how marketing and consumerism packages the self as a product, 
DLMBL explores the concept of branding within advertising. The text provides an illustration of 
how the selfhood of the consumer becomes lost within the processes of advertising, branding, 
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and consumption as the speaking subject describes a conversation she has while visiting her 
grandmother in a nursing home:  
My grandmother tells me that since the doctor told her to stay away from 
cigarettes she now smokes the longest ones she can find. Actually she continues 
to smoke a pack of Marlboros a day. I tell her Philip Morris is changing their 
name to Altria. From behind a screen of smoke my grandmother says, We should 
all change our names when we don’t like what we see in the mirror. It’s an easy 
way to distance the self from the self, I say for the conversation’s sake (109).  
The endnotes to this episode cite a study on Philip Morris published in the American Journal of 
Public Health, which reported “the company’s name change was a public relations effort to 
divorce itself from its reputation as primarily a tobacco company without actually hurting its 
sales in those divisions” (151). In the endnote, Rankine identifies the corporate method of “re-
branding” as a cynical ploy for profit-based motives. In the main text, re-branding is extended to 
an activity that the subject can engage in. This re-branding can be read as an activity enabled by 
and indicative of Bauman’s concept of “liquid modernity,” in which identities and social 
connections within a globalized marketplace are so unstable and fluid that they can be made and 
re-made through the purchase of commodities. Rankine sees this casual type of identity shopping 
as a method leading to self-alienation, “an easy way to distance the self from the self.” She likens 
consumption to corporate re-branding, an indication that the self lacks integrity.  
Furthermore, this passage underscores that, while modulating who one is through the 
purchase of different commodities, the consumer’s power is quite limited. In this example, the 
grandmother, consuming the damaging product that Philip Morris sells and profits from, thinks 
she is a more powerful consumer than she is. She believes that she outsmarts her doctor by 
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smoking longer cigarettes in order to smoke fewer and therefore be healthy, but the truth is, her 
consumption habits are virtually unchanged, and they benefit the company, not herself. As a 
result, her person has become lost in the commodity: she is visually described as partially 
concealed behind cigarette smoke. This example presents a double layer of hiddenness: Philip 
Morris tries to hide themselves through re-branding, which is essentially a process of 
mystification, while the grandmother is shrouded behind the consumed commodity, hidden from 
view. The image of the cigarette smoke implies that the cigarettes the grandmother consumes in 
fact consume her body. Rankine explores how the processes of advertising seduce consumers 
into thinking commodity consumption can provide a means of shaping and identifying the self, 
with the result that the consumer alienated, lost within the commodity that is being consumed.  
While the body of the grandmother is consumed through cigarette smoking, DLMBL 
includes an exploration of how a consumer’s body, and therefore sense of self, can be distorted 
through body-altering commodities such as Botox. Rankine notes that Botox, approved by the 
FDA in 2002, can diminish the appearance of ageing by lessening the appearance of frown lines 
(150). To Rankine, the diminishment of the appearance of ageing seeks to defy mortality but 
ultimately erases the life that has been lived by distorting the body. After remarking that she has 
just turned 40, she states,  
On television I am told I don’t want to look like I am forty. Forty means I might 
have seen something hard, something unpleasant, or something dead. . . . With 
injections of Botox, short for botulism toxin, it seems I can see or be seen without 
being seen; I can age without ageing. . . . I could purchase paralysis. I could 
choose that. Eventually the paralysis would sink in, become a deepening 
personality that need not, like Enron’s ‘distorting factors,’ distort my appearance. 
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I could be all that seems, or rather I could be all that I am—fictional. Ultimately I 
could face reality undisturbed by my own mortality. (104)  
Through the purchase of Botox, individuals can hide behind a mask of paralysis. The purchased 
paralysis, which appears to be only on the surface of one’s face, permeates the self. This is 
because, as Rankine points out, our previous experiences become embodied; our faces are 
indelibly marked by having seen “something hard, something unpleasant, or something dead.” 
Rankine plays on the irony that contemporary Americans read actual life and death experience as 
that which distorts facial features, when Botox, the paralyzing agent, is in fact doing the 
distortion. Rankine’s insistence upon the embodiment of previous experience aligns her thinking 
with Smith and Watson, who argue, “the body is a site of autobiographical knowledge because 
memory itself is embodied” (Reading Autobiography 49).  
Furthermore, Rankine points out how Botox is a commodity that affects the self more 
deeply than mere appearance. The facial mask of Botox allows the consumer to “see or be seen 
without being seen,” which forestalls the possibility of genuine social encounter. If one has 
artificially paralyzed one’s face, one can then control one’s reactions and emotions, and 
spontaneity would be avoided. As one becomes more distanced from undesirable events, one in 
turn becomes more distanced from others. This foreshortened ability to engage in social relations 
is particularly damaging if we consider the self to be fundamentally what Burkitt calls a social 
self. In Burkitt’s words, “To have a self is to be able to orient oneself in the social world; to be 
recognized by others and to be called to account for your actions, having the capacity to 
reciprocate” (193). I argue that Rankine subscribes to this notion of the social self, and the Botox 
example indicates the importance of the social dimension within the self. The subject who has 
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created a face that does not age, that does not wear previous experience, has limited her capacity 
to be a social self.  
Self as Spectator 
An important dimension of atomization within consumer culture that DLMBL also explores is 
how mass media provides the crucial structure that allows for a contemporary culture of 
spectatorship to permeate everyday life. Cultural theorists have linked consumer capitalism to a 
culture of spectatorship, made possible by mass media, which denies interpersonal interactions. 
Marxist theorist Guy Debord makes a compelling analysis of social relations in the media age in 
his 1967 book, The Society of the Spectacle. Debord defines the term “spectacle” to refer not 
only to the product of media technologies or the images they broadcast but to the whole 
economic and institutional apparatus supporting consumer capitalism; essentially, “spectacle” is 
the ideology of capitalism transformed into the material world (13, Thesis 4). The society of the 
spectacle has profound implications for the subject and social relations. Debord argues that, 
within post-industrial capitalism, “social life is completely taken over by the accumulated 
products of the economy [and that] entails a generalized shift from having to appearing” (16, 
Thesis 17). In other words, since the advent of electronic media in the mid-twentieth century, 
there has been a sea change wherein all aspects of social life have become so thoroughly 
commodified that social relations are now “mediated by images” (12, Thesis 4). To Debord, the 
spectacle negates life; in his words, “all that once was directly lived has become mere 
representation” (12, Thesis 1). Furthermore, the economic system of the spectacle relies upon 
and perpetuates social isolation. All commodities of advanced technology, from television to 
cars, serve to advance social isolation (22 Thesis 28). “Spectators are linked only by a one-way 
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relationship” to the spectacle, which only “maintains their isolation from one another” (22 Thesis 
29).  
Influenced by Debord, postmodern theorist Jean Baudrillard also articulates the problem of 
the consumption of mass media in his 1972 essay, “Requiem for the Media.” In this essay, 
Baudrillard argues that the mass media “fabricate non-communication”: “if one agrees to define 
communication as an exchange, as a reciprocal space of a speech and a response, and thus of a 
responsibility . . . they are what always prevents response” (169-70). In Baudrillard’s analysis, 
the impotence of spectatorship is described in terms of the spectators’ inability to respond or 
otherwise engage in an exchange of speech and, therefore, spectators lack power; mass media 
has power to give, but spectators can only receive (170). Accordingly, Baudrillard argues “we 
live in the era of non-response—of irresponsibility” (170). Debord and Baudrillard’s work 
originates from an overtly Marxist framework that Rankine does not share, and so their proposed 
solutions (such as Debord’s resumption of revolutionary class struggle) are not particularly 
relevant to Rankine’s work. However, their analyses of social problems within the media age are 
still relevant to some of the issues that Rankine addresses in the dawn of a new century, 
including the commodification of social relations, the irresponsibility of spectatorship, and the 
crushing isolation of individuals within consumer capitalism.   
Rankine focuses on spectatorship as a pervasive activity in consumer capitalism by 
positioning the speaking subject early in the text as a regular consumer of electronic media and 
representing textually an environment shaped by this media—in particular, television. In its 
concentration on television consumption, DLMBL follows David Foster Wallace’s 
recommendation in his 1990 essay, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” in which he 
argues that contemporary writers must include television and other pop cultural references 
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because it is simply realistic; American writers who were born post-WWII grew up in an 
environment in which television was always on. Furthermore, Wallace warns, “the most 
dangerous thing about television for U.S. fiction writers is that we yield to the temptation not to 
take television seriously as both a disseminator and a definer of the cultural atmosphere we 
breathe and process” (155). Although Wallace was treating the topic of fiction, Wallace’s 
argument can apply to Rankine’s writing as well. In its examination of American culture, 
DLMBL takes television seriously, including representations of its prevalence. Television and its 
contents are depicted visually or referenced verbally throughout DLMBL, reflecting the 
omnipresence of television watching in contemporary American culture. The text frames its 
speaking subject as one who actively participates in media consumption, for the frequent and 
nuanced references to television shows, film, advertising campaigns, and current events in the 
main text and footnotes indicate an extensive knowledge of popular culture. Television 
consumption and the speaking subject’s coming of age are depicted as coterminous: as long as a 
self has been, there has been TV. From the first page of written text, the speaking subject alludes 
to television as something that has always been part of her memory since childhood, shaping her 
ideas about mortality and the human condition (5). As an adult, the speaking subject is depicted 
as immersed in television viewing, often compulsively: “I leave the television on all the time” 
(15). Moreover, this immersion in television watching is presented as the default cultural 
condition that everyone continually engages, as signaled by the indefinite “you”: “You are, as 
usual, watching television . . .” (7). The pervasiveness of television watching as an activity is 
also depicted through graphic images: illustrations of television sets are shown throughout the 
text, either portraying static or displaying stills from broadcast television, films, or commercials. 
The visual text sets up a reading experience that approximates channel surfing, thus representing 
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the commonplace condition of perception in the contemporary age: our experience of the world 
is as mediated increasingly through screens.  
Rankine argues that spectatorship is such an insidious cultural practice because it promotes 
indifference towards suffering. At the outset of DLMBL, Rankine inveighs against spectatorship 
in an epigraph in which she quotes Caribbean poet and political activist Aime Cesaire: “And 
most of all beware, even in thought, of assuming the sterile attitude of the spectator, for life is 
not a spectacle, a sea of grief is not a proscenium, a man who wails is not a dancing bear . . .” 
(n.p.).49  Rankine’s citation of Cesaire is notable for several reasons. Through the use of 
theatrical metaphors, Cesaire argues that spectatorship discourages social relations. The “attitude 
of the spectator” reduces the reality and gravity of suffering in “life” to a “spectacle” for the 
entertainment of others. When one inhabits the role of the spectator, others are seen as objects: a 
“sea of grief” is reduced to a “proscenium” for the staging of a spectacle; a “man who wails” is 
gawked at like “a dancing bear.” Cesaire’s quote acknowledges that spectatorship is itself a role, 
an “attitude” or that can be assumed, “even in thought.” Spectatorship is also presented as a 
temptation, a condition that Cesaire cautions the reader to “beware” of sliding into. By opening 
the text with Cesaire’s caution, Rankine urges readers to re-evaluate the cruelty and indifference 
of our everyday spectator position. 
DLMBL seeks to denaturalize the spectatorship engendered by the permeation of television in 
contemporary American life. The pervasiveness of television in DLMBL emphasizes that the 
contemporary American habitually occupies the spectator in daily life, which only increases the 
temptation of spectatorship. Furthermore, the quotidian nature of television watching naturalizes 
                                                        
49 Cesaire’s Notebook of a Return to the Native Land (1939) was one of the founding poetic texts of Negritude. 
Negritude was a literary and ideological movement led by French-speaking black writers and intellectuals in the 
African diaspora. The movement demanded freedom for lands colonized by European powers and sought 
recognition for African cultural values (Kesteloot 169). 
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the cruelty of the consumption of human suffering. Cultural critic Mark Miller links 
spectatorship to television viewing; Miller refers to television’s “need to keep us half-engrossed” 
which “has produced a spectacle of easy cruelty” (224). Not only are there so many destructive 
images, but this constant stream of violence “also implies, appeals to, and is protected by a 
cruelty more refined: the cold thrill of feeling ourselves exalted above all concern, all 
earnestness, all principle, evolved beyond all innocence or credulity, liberated finally out of 
naïve moralisms and into pure modernity. We all know that we see through it all, and therefore 
can watch it as if not fascinated by it” (224, 225). Images of violence and human suffering so 
permeate the airwaves we as spectators have, as Miller argues, grown indifferent. Electronic 
media invite us as spectators to treat fellow humans as objects of spectacle, to detach ourselves 
from them. In resistance to this indifference, several of the televised images included in DLMBL 
are of black men, including James Byrd, Jr., Abner Louima, and Amadou Diallo, who are 
victims of racial violence perpetrated by white supremacists or police officers. They are suffering 
humans that Cesaire cautions against treating as mere spectacle. The text displays their televised 
images, and thoughtfully comments on their suffering, in order to denaturalize their cultural 
status as objects of spectacle.  
DLMBL also focuses on how television spectatorship prevents the possibility of social 
relations, perpetuating isolation as a commonplace cultural condition. Cesaire’s quote 
acknowledges that the attitude of the spectator is “sterile” because it produces social isolation. 
The role of the spectator enables and encourages social isolation, for one watches others but does 
not engage with them; in Baudrillard’s terms, one is prevented from having or exercising the 
ability to respond. Debord comments on the vicious cycle of commodity consumption and 
isolation: “The reigning economic system is founded on isolation; at the same time it is a circular 
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process designed to produce isolation. Isolation underpins technology, and technology isolates in 
its turn” (22, Thesis 28). In other words, when one watches a lot of TV, one gets lonely; when 
one gets lonely, one watches more TV. Wallace also describes the vicious cycle of television 
watching and loneliness: “the more time spent watching TV, the less time spent in the real 
human world, and the less time spent in the real human world, the harder it becomes not to feel 
alienated from real humans, solipsistic, lonely” (163). Social isolation begets television 
watching, which only begets further isolation and loneliness. DLMBL can be read as an extended 
meditation on the kind of vicious cycle of spectatorship and social isolation that Wallace 
outlines. The isolation and loneliness diagnosed by Rankine and previous cultural critics serve to 
perpetuate possessive individualism. 
DLMBL further demonstrates how American consumer capitalism enables a culture of 
spectatorship. The text observes how the concept of consumer choice both relies upon and 
promotes the American value of freedom but ultimately perpetuates the practice of passive 
spectatorship and furthers social atomization. The speaking subject reflexively comments on her 
participation in the process of selecting which material to consume and which to avoid. After 
discussing her sadness upon the news of James Byrd Jr.’s violent murder, the speaking subject 
states, “I don’t know, I just find when the news comes on I switch the channel” (23). However, 
this action indicates the emptiness of channel surfing, an activity involving a series of choices 
that resolve nothing. Miller describes the empty promise of “choice” on television as a 
contemporary version of American frontier fantasy of freedom: “TV’s nightly promise is 
something like the grand old promise of America herself. . . . Here all enjoy the promise of that 
very opportunity, that very differentiation which they, and this great land mass, represent: the 
promise of unending choice” (Miller 184, 185). Similarly, Rankine argues that channel surfing 
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and channel programming are consumer choices that encourage the American fantasy of self-
creation and freedom: “You can program your favorite channels. Don’t like the world you live 
in, choose one closer to the world you live in. . . . This is what is great about America. Anyone 
can make these kinds of choices” (24). With its deadpan tone, the text ironically comments on 
Americans’ love affair with consumer choice that is in fact based on the illusion of choice. What 
is “great” about America is how consumer capitalism gives everyone the equal opportunity to 
remain passive spectators; in Miller’s words, TV “celebrates unending ‘choice’” but “the only 
purpose of that spectacle is to promote the habit of spectatorship” (228). Rankine emphasizes 
how spectators, as consumers, ignore and ultimately deny undesirable elements of the larger 
world, an activity that can only further social atomization. The “world” that the consumer 
“chooses,” which can be “closer to the world you live in” indicates how media consumption 
allows spectators to continue to cocoon themselves in an environment fabricated through 
mediated images. Spectatorship is presented as deeply problematic, but equally insidious is the 
activity of turning away. “Choice” through media consumption stands in as an activity that rests 
on and seemingly promotes the cherished American ideal of freedom, but the concept consumer 
of choice actually serves individuals’ desires to block out undesirable social realities while 
sustaining our position as passive spectators.  
Mass Media Culture and Living Death 
DLMBL portrays television watching as a liminal activity that approximates a kind of living 
death, engaged in by those with terminal illness, insomnia, depression, or suicidal tendencies. 
When visiting a friend dying of breast cancer, the speaker states, “We watch a lot of television 
the four days I sit at her bedside” (9). Another friend develops Alzheimer’s, and he desperately 
points to the television attempting to communicate that he wants to “see the lady who deals in 
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death,” which turns out to be the television show Murder, She Wrote (18). Yet another friend is 
having “the depression of his life”; he is unwilling or unable to engage in meaningful 
communication, but he is willing to sit next to his friend and silently watch a DVD (42). In these 
examples, television is portrayed as a liminal space occupied by those who are not fully alive: 
they occupy a borderland between death and life, unable to fully engage or communicate with 
another. In another episode, the speaking subject presents herself as watching television out of 
insomnia: “In the night I watch television to help me fall asleep, or I watch television because I 
cannot sleep. . . . Eventually it is all a blur” (29). In the isolated suffering of sleeplessness, 
television is sought out as a cure, although the experience becomes blurred, unknowable. The 
text further comments on how late night television watching is the provenance of the depressed, 
and pharmaceutical companies take advantage of that fact by marketing antidepressants. The text 
portrays a commercial for the antidepressant PAXIL, and the text contains a graphic image of a 
television featuring a still of the commercial. Across the screen reads, “YOUR LIFE IS 
WAITING.” The speaker says, “I wonder, for what, for what does it wait? For life I guess” (29). 
In this example, late night television is a kind of netherworld, holding the place of life instead of 
constituting actual life. Another episode recounts an indefinite “you” who is watching television, 
“as usual,” when a suicide prevention hotline flashes on the screen; “you” call the hotline and tell 
the man on the other end, “I feel like I am already dead. . . . you add, I am in death’s position” 
(7). The position of the television spectator is one who is “already dead,” occupying “death’s 
position.” In these examples, television is sought after a refuge, but it really is a kind of limbo, 
where those who are isolated and suffering resort to a living death.  
While excessive television consumption is likened to a kind of living death, DLMBL 
discusses Princess Diana’s funeral to underscore our cultural denial of—and ambiguity about—
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mortality. This discussion argues for the spectators’ sense of false intimacy with the princess and 
displaced grief for their own mortality. In her lifetime, Princess Diana had been transformed into 
an object of media surveillance and spectacle that observers could view from their own 
unobserved locations. As Wallace observes, such a one-way relationship is seductive and 
comforting, for television viewers can feel in control of the relation with the people onscreen.  
Spectators not have to bear the emotional costs of a scary, awkward, or difficult human 
interaction (152). The death of Princess Diana indicated the end to the parasocial relationships 
that spectators had with her. Her funeral became a global spectacle, for, as DLMBL notes, 
television brought the rest of the world the images of an English population grieving the loss of 
their princess; the text displays a visual image of a still from the public mourning on an 
illustration of a television set (39). Rankine questions what kind of relation those mourners had 
to the princess, whom they only knew through the media: “Was Princess Diana ever really alive? 
I mean, alive to anyone outside of her friends and family—truly?” (39). Rankine argues that the 
British mourners at her funeral projected themselves and their own emotions on the object called 
Princess Diana: “Weren’t they mourning the protection they felt she should have had? A 
protection they’ll never have? Weren’t they simply grieving the random inevitability of their 
own deaths?” (39). The grief that Rankine specifies is particularly difficult for Westerners in the 
contemporary age because of the entrenched belief in the concept of inviolable selfhood. To 
Rankine, the mass, public displays of mourning for Diana’s death enact the dissonance between 
the denial of death and its reality. The shock of her death correlates with wealth and privilege; 
the most privileged of us should be able to retreat safely within our gated communities and 
survive, but Princess Diana, in fact, did not. The text’s discussion of Princess Diana illustrates 
the epistemological confusion about “real” social connections, life, and death in our media-
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saturated age, while connecting the grief over her death as the recognition of the loss of 
inviolable subjectivity.   
Spectatorial Sterility 
While Princess Diana’s death is an example of an over-estimation of the social ties between 
spectators and celebrities, DLMBL also reveals how another norm of media consumption is the 
passive intake of images and events which position the viewer in “the sterile attitude of the 
spectator,” unable to effect change or respond meaningfully to human suffering. Rankine 
provides an example of consumption of news media in order to explore the experience of the 
subject as passive consumer of mediated images of current events. The speaking subject, the “I,” 
reads the news in the New York Times that South African President Mbeki finally allowed 
antiretrovirals to be accessible to HIV positive South Africans. The news story addressed the 
political obstruction of Mbeki and previous lawsuits filed by thirty-nine pharmaceutical 
companies to prevent development of generic versions of the drugs.50 The news coverage leads 
the speaker to generalize about the paralyzing despair experienced by media consumption (with 
an italicized quotation from King Lear): “It is not possible to communicate how useless, how 
much like a skin-sack of uselessness I felt. I am better than thou art now: I am a fool, the fool 
said, thou art nothing. Is she dead? Is he dead? Yes, they are dead. One observes, one recognizes 
without being recognized. One opens the paper. One turns on the television. Nothing changes. 
My distress grows into nothing. Thou art nothing” (117). In Baudrillard’s terms, the speaking 
subject in this passage is prevented from response, and therefore she feels useless, stymied. 
                                                        
50 Rankine lists the thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies by listing them on the previous pages (115-16). In the 
footnotes, she explains that they are “Pharmaceutical applicants against the government of South Africa: Case 
Number 4183/98” (152).  ankine further emphasizes their names by setting them forth in bold and capitalized letters. 
She lists them prior to explaining that their lawsuit “to prevent South Africa’s manufacture of generic AIDS drugs” 
blocked life-saving drugs from being available to five million HIV positive South Africans. The spare presentation 
of the list—which includes such familiar names as Merck, Eli Lilly, and Bayer—is an example of documentary 
evidence that Rankine finds important for readers to bear witness.     
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Rankine uses a bodily metaphor, “skin-sack,” to convey her feelings of “uselessness.” In a media 
story about the death or survival of the bodies of those infected by HIV, Rankine emphasizes 
how spectators are reduced to inert bodies and their concerns are reduced to nothingness. This 
example illustrates how media consumption leads to the experience of sterility: one can observe, 
but cannot act; one can feel stress, but that energy often becomes “nothing.”  
In this section, Rankine also explores how spectatorship limits one’s ability to engage in 
social relations. As in the section on Botox, where “I can see or be seen without being seen,” 
when consuming the news, “One observes, one recognizes without being recognized” (104, 117). 
If Botox is a commodity that delivers facial paralysis, then the text likens media consumption to 
the spectator’s ongoing, daily paralysis. The crippling feelings of “uselessness” enable the 
television watcher to be lulled into a state where response and responsibility are denied and those 
observed on a screen are reduced to objects of spectacle. The condition of spectatorship, one in 
which we all participate, has become entirely naturalized in contemporary culture. DLMBL, 
however, aims to defamiliarize the everyday occurrence of spectatorship and despair and to 
outline the implications of the kind of non-relations in which Americans participate on a daily 
basis. 
In addition to the examination of the general, sterile condition of media spectatorship, 
Rankine explores how individuals avoid encounters while they are in the physical presence of 
others, thus perpetuating the condition of loneliness invoked in the text’s title. The speaking 
subject self-reflexively acknowledges that she routinely avoids encounters in “real life”:    
In my dream I apologize to everyone I meet. Instead of introducing myself, I 
apologize for not knowing why I am alive. In real life, oddly enough, when I am 
fully awake and out and about, if I catch someone’s eye, I quickly look away. . . . 
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In real life the looking away is the apology, despite the fact that when I look away 
I almost always feel guilty. . . I feel as if I have created a reason to apologize, I 
feel the guilt of having ignored that thing—the encounter. I could have nodded, I 
could have smiled without showing my teeth. In some small way I could have 
wordlessly said, I see you seeing me and I apologize for not knowing why I am 
alive. (98) 
In previous passages, the text has established the naturalization of spectatorship as a default 
condition in daily life. In this passage, Rankine comments on the dynamics of encounter in the 
presence of another—or, more precisely, avoided encounter. In this passage, the speaker presents 
an everyday scenario—walking “out and about” and avoiding eye contact with others. Wallace 
argues that television viewing habituates all of us to these kinds of avoided encounters: “The 
well-trained lonely viewer[’s] … exhaustive TV-training in how to worry about how he might 
come across, seem to other eyes, makes riskily genuine human encounters seem even scarier” 
(180). Unable to direct the occurrence with a remote control, view it from a screen, or hide 
behind a mask, the speaker tries to avoid being seen, for to be seen brings on feelings of guilt, 
shame, and fear. 
Rankine’s description of the avoided encounter resonates with Jean-Paul Sartre’s account 
of “the Look” in Being and Nothingness. While Sartre’s Existentialist philosophy is currently 
unpopular and generally criticized for having the kind of individualistic worldview that Rankine 
expressly opposes, Sartre’s account of “the Look” can be used to articulate the avoided 
encounter of DLMBL to illuminate how interpersonal interactions are often reduced to hostility, 
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distrust, and shame.51 However, while Sartre universalizes such hostile relations as intrinsic to 
the human condition, I suggest that his paradigm of intersubjective behavior aptly describes the 
toxic culture of possessive individualism and solipsistic spectatorship described in DLMBL.  
Sartre argues that the solitary individual, in a non-reflective mode of being, is solipsistic. 
As long as one can see and not be seen, then one lacks consciousness and assumes the self to be 
the center of the universe. Moreover, Sartre argues, one does not feel shame or guilt when alone 
(222). However, the presence of the Other disrupts this position. When one is seen by an Other, 
the look brings the self to consciousness. This consciousness is inherently uncomfortable, for 
when the Other appears, “I” am thrust out of solipsism and “put in the position of passing 
judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other” (222). As a 
result, the self’s fantasy of control evaporates. Moreover, for Sartre, interpersonal relations are 
depicted in hostile terms. He presents two examples to illustrate the anxiety-producing effects of 
“the Look.” The first example is of a soldier crawling through the brush, wary of attack: “The 
look which the eyes manifest, no matter what kind of eyes they are is a pure reference to myself. 
What I apprehend immediately . . . is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which can be hurt, 
that I occupy a place and that I can not in any case escape from the space in which I am without 
defense—in short, that I am seen” (259). In this passage, encounter means vulnerability to 
exposure and violence. In his rhetoric, Sartre builds up to the simple fact of being seen (“I am 
seen”) as a horrifying climax to a disastrous turn of events. In his second example, Sartre depicts 
a man peeping through a keyhole when another comes along the hallway and catches him in his 
voyeuristic act. Prior to “the Look,” the voyeur at the keyhole is able to see and not be seen, and, 
consequently, feels no shame or guilt. Upon being discovered, the voyeur knows he is judged, 
                                                        
51 Steven Earnshaw points out that Existentialism, with its preoccupation with freedom and individual choice, is 
generally perceived as “anti-social,” in contrast with the “current critical and philosophical drive towards founding a 
communitarian ethic” (169).    
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and he feels shame. Sartre universalizes the example of the voyeur by arguing that shame reveals 
that our existence is not as the center of the universe but that we exist as an object of the Other’s 
look: “Now, shame . . . is shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that 
object which the Other is looking at and judging” (261). For Sartre, encounters with others bring 
about consciousness of one’s existence, but the reality of that existence as fundamentally out of 
one’s control disrupts the comforts of solipsism and voyeurism.   
One can read DLMBL as articulating, and critiquing, a vision of post-9/11 American life 
as an Existential nightmare. Accustomed to the passive comforts of spectatorship through 
electronic media—itself a kind of peeping at the keyhole—the speaking subject of DLMBL 
avoids the active engagement of encounter. In Rankine’s text, the individual consumer/spectator 
is accustomed to routine voyeurism via television—seeing, but not being seen. When the “I,” in 
the physical presence of another, runs into the possibility of being seen, the automatic response is 
to “quickly look away” in order to avoid recognizing that “I see you seeing me.” Upon 
encountering another, a consciousness of the self’s existence surfaces (“I am alive”), but it is 
immediately accompanied by confusion (“I don’t know why I am alive”) and shame (“I need to 
apologize because I don’t know why I am alive”). The speaker attempts to hide, to avoid 
confusion and shame, but this attempt brings on feelings of guilt for ignoring “the encounter.” 
The spectator/consumer “I” prevents the possibility of encounter, feels ashamed, and the cycle of 
spectatorship and loneliness continues. Ultimately, it is this very Existential nightmare—
characterized by solipsism, sterile spectatorship, and the avoidance of encounter—that the text of 
DLMBL aims to resist.  
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The Fragmented “I” 
Up to this point, I have focused on how Don’t Let Me Be Lonely frames the cultural problems 
that both contribute to and result from entrenched beliefs in coherent subjectivity. I will now 
shift to the writing and reading strategies that Rankine advances to address these problems. If we 
isolate ourselves in the hermetic world of televised non-reality and chance encounters with 
others lead us to feel trapped in an Existential nightmare, how can we work to find meaningful 
interpersonal relations with fellow members of our local and global communities? If 
consumption of commodities and electronic media reduces the self to the “sterile attitude of the 
spectator,” what kind of ethical practices can counter this reduction of the self to spectatorship? 
In my poethical reading of DLMBL, I contend that the text illustrates how reading and writing 
certain kinds of poetic texts produce a model of relational subjectivity that invites ethical 
engagement.  
How can a writer use the first person singular ethically in a twenty-first century text? How 
does DLMBL deploy the pronoun “I,” which looks unified, coherent, and inviolable, while 
conveying that the “I” is part of larger social context? A return to Rankine’s essay “The First 
Person in the Twenty-First Century” sheds light on how language and subjectivity operates in the 
text of DLMBL. In “The First Person,” Rankine argues for strategies of fragmentation to convey 
a representation of subjectivity that is fractured and therefore realistic. As stated earlier in this 
chapter, Rankine insists that the “I” must be grounded in a social context. However, the grounds 
of social context are unstable, for the “I” is continually “broken into”: “we are always being 
broken into (visually and invisibly) by history, memory, current events, the phone, e-mail, a kiss, 
calls of nature, whatever” (132). Rankine’s list of disruptions positions fragmented subjectivity 
as a concept that is both proved by and immediately relatable to everyday experience. This list 
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also indicates the writing strategy of disruption as it relates to both content and form. In 
reference to the self as interrupted by “history, memory, current events, the phone, e-mail,” 
Rankine places the concept of fragmented subjectivity in terms of an individual’s daily life in 
contemporary culture. The interruptions Rankine catalogues demonstrate that the social contexts 
that both ground and fragment the self are large and small, historic and quotidian, hi-tech and 
corporeal. As a result, textual content includes both larger, historical phenomena and the minor 
ephemera of everyday life.  
Formally, in order to convey the instability of subject within a text, strategies of 
fragmentation are used, such as “ruptured syntax” and “irruption, interruptions, and 
discontinuities” (133, 134). Rankine avows that she uses strategies of fragmentation in her own 
work and implies that fragmentation most realistically conveys the self’s existence through time: 
“In time, the path of the first person crosses borders, strays, pauses, and repeats to cross borders, 
stray, pause, or repeat. The ruptured syntax and the fragmented text are used to suggest, and 
perhaps reflect, the process by which existence (being in time) is enacted” (134). In contrast to 
representations of sovereign or stable subjectivity, linguistic rupture and repetition are necessary 
to illustrate the self as dynamic through time. Furthermore, for Rankine, the use of textual 
fragmentation and reflexivity in the exploration of subjectivity does important ethical work: “The 
writer’s attempt to insert into, redirect, juxtapose, or interrupt the first person, demonstrates a 
desire to write with awareness and integrity within the knowledge afforded us in the twenty-first 
century” (133). For Rankine, formal recognition of the incoherent, unstable, and relational nature 
of the individual is essential for writers who aim to ground their work in an ethics aware of 
contemporary, poststructuralist intellectual discourse. 
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Indeed, DLMBL uses textual interruption, repetition and juxtaposition to resist the 
sovereignty of the conventional lyric “I,” instead portraying the first person subject as “broken 
into” by multiple cultural and personal discourses. The speaking subject acknowledges how 
thoughts running through her mind originate from the speech of others, both from personal and 
public sources. One place where the text uses the strategies of interruption and repetition occurs 
towards the beginning DLMBL, where the speaking subject refers a slate board with a message 
on it that was scrawled by a friend who had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s: “This is the most 
miserable in my life” (17). A visual image of the slate board with the scrawled writing is 
included, and is then repeated on the same page. The speaker discusses the thoughts running 
through her head: “One day I hear, as if he is standing next to me, the poet Joseph Brodsky 
saying, What’s the point of forgetting if it’s followed by dying?” (17). Brodsky’s voice keeps 
“entering the room every time I look up” and the two phrases keep repeating and alternating: 
“this is the most miserable in my life what’s the point of forgetting if it’s followed by dying this is 
the most miserable in my life what’s the point . . . I can’t stop people from saying what they need 
to say. I don’t know how to stop repetitions like these” (17). Rankine uses interruption and the 
repetition of the visual and verbal texts to represent how the subject’s thought process is 
incoherent and “broken into” by other discourses.  
In another example of interruption, the subject discusses how she was “broken into” by 
an e-mail that she received shortly after 9/11: “Walking home I find myself singing softly to the 
tune of “Day-O,” Come Mister Taliban give us bin Laden. This version of the song along with its 
accompanying animation was passed on to me via e-mail and now I can’t stop myself” (85). 
Following this commentary, the text includes a visual image of the e-mail’s caricatures of 
George W. Bush and Colin Powell. The e-mail’s visual and musical parody enters the speaking 
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subject’s consciousness, thereby becoming part of her internal dialogue. The email, despite its 
tone of jocularity and playful refrain, is all about a bid for power on a geopolitical scale, and it 
ultimately espouses a militaristic worldview. Ultimately, in resistance to the email’s assertions of 
power, the speaking subject lacks sovereignty. The “I” “can’t stop” singing “Day-O,” “can’t stop 
people from saying what they need to say,” “can’t stop repetitions like these.” The textual 
interruptions, repetitions, and juxtapositions produce a first person “I” who is very different from 
the lyric “I” who is “master” or “captain” of the soul; they construct a fragmented “I” who is 
continually pervaded by external discourses. 
Furthermore, DLMBL uses interruption and repetition in order to resist the convention of 
the “expressive” lyric “I” and to replace it with a first-person subject as “broken into” by 
discourses that originate from elsewhere. An example of this interruption happens in a passage 
that I mentioned earlier in this chapter, when the speaking subject has an emotional outburst 
upon watching a television news account about then-president elect George W. Bush’s imperfect 
memory of the grisly murder of James Byrd, Jr. After mentioning both Bush’s problematic 
presidential win and his flawed recall of the criminal case, the text follows with the comment: 
“You don’t remember because you don’t care. Sometimes my mother’s voice swells and fills my 
forehead. Mostly I resist the flooding, but in Bush’s case I find myself talking to the television 
screen: You don’t know because you don’t care” (21). Here we see a hysterical emotional 
response muted and distanced from the poet— rather than representing the repeated italicized 
words of outrage as the poet’s unique emotional response, the speaking subject attributes it to her 
mother’s voice, which she struggles to resist. On the next page, she comments on her own 
emotionality: “Then, like all things impassioned, this voice takes on a life of its own: You don’t 
know because you don’t bloody care. Do you?” (22). While the “voice” may come to life, it is 
  
 122 
distanced from the writer. The text does not depict a writer “finding” or “expressing” her voice 
in the vein of the twentieth-century “voice poem.” Instead, while experiencing a strong emotion, 
the speaker says (shouts? hears in her head?) a variation of her mother’s sentiments. In contrast 
with the conventions of “expressive” poetry, the writer is not presented as owning or even 
originating the words or their tone. Instead of a direct progression from provocation to response, 
there is a dialectic process of emotional flooding and restraint, the articulation of another’s words 
and a self-conscious reflection on those words. The speaking subject’s thoughts are presented as 
porous, emerging from a process whereby an internal voice is constituted through ongoing 
dialogues with other voices. Thus DLMBL reveals the subject’s interiority, but it is one over 
which no unified “I” exerts total control.  
The Scripted “I”: The First-Person Social  
In addition to fragmentation and interruption of the lyric “I,” Rankine argues for the 
necessity of textual reflexivity in order to refute commonplace beliefs in coherent subjectivity. In 
the essay “The First Person in the Twenty-First Century,” Rankine maintains the presence of the 
“I” in her writing, but she argues that she does so only while signaling an awareness of what she 
believes is the illusory and unstable nature of the first person: “As fictionalized as the space of 
poetry and prose can be, I still feel that the construction of a self must demonstrate a 
consciousness of its scriptedness” (134). Rankine argues that reflexivity indicates a textual 
awareness of the incommensurability of the “languaged self” and the physical person behind it: 
“In truth, no one exists behind the languaged self” (134). The coherent “I” is a textual 
construction, one that is entirely fictional. Rankine thus insists on the poststructuralist stance that 
“no one exists behind” the lyric “I” in order to dismantle the entrenched belief in a coherent 
subject that is perpetuated by conventional use of the first person in written texts. Reflexivity, 
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which signals the position of the “I” as a self only existing in language, is necessary to challenge 
conventional depictions of coherent subjectivity and, consequently, the commonplace myth of 
autonomy.  
Furthermore, Rankine insists that the first person also bears a social responsibility: “Most 
of us have been around enough to know that the ‘I’ ultimately has a responsibility to the 
intelligence (think humanity) of the ‘you.’ Some might say that recognition of responsibility on 
the page is what makes use of the first-person social” (132). Reflexivity, in Rankine’s work, is 
tied to ethical concepts of responsibility and sociality. The demonstrated awareness of the self’s 
scriptedness transforms the first person singular into a “first-person social” by demonstrating the 
responsibility of the writing “I” towards the reading “you.” I suggest that Rankine’s poetics 
resonate with Blasing’s conceptualization of lyric as rhetoric and the lyric “I” as an “ethical 
figure of the intending speaker” (35). Rankine, as postlanguage lyric poet, demonstrates 
Blasing’s model of the lyric “I” as an ethical figure by insisting on the speaking subject’s 
reflexivity. In order to sustain credibility with readers, who are also aware of the interventions of 
poststructuralism and Language writing, the postlanguage lyric poet must demonstrate an 
awareness that the lyric “I” is a subject who exists only in language. 
DLMBL signals a recognition of the writing self’s scriptedness in order to distance the 
text from the uncritical deployment of the first person singular and move towards a textual “first-
person social.” Two elements of a self-conscious “I”—recognition of both its scriptedness and its 
social responsibility—are articulated in direct comments on the relation between the writer and 
the presence of the “I” in an episode concerning a conversation between the writer and her 
editor. The editor asks the speaker to expand on her personal take on the topic of her article, 
  
 124 
which is liver failure (54). The speaking subject ponders this comment and extends it to broader 
questions about the first person subject in writing:  
I understand that what she wants is an explanation of the mysterious connections 
that exist between an author and her text. If I am present in a subject position 
what responsibility do I have to the content, to the truth value, of the words 
themselves? Is ‘I’ even me or am ‘I’ a gear-shift to get from one sentence to the 
next? Should I say we? Is the voice not various if I take responsibility for it? What 
does my subject mean to me? (54) 
This passage demonstrates a consciousness of scriptedness of the “I” by posing a series of 
rhetorical questions that ultimately position the “I” on the page as serving both grammatical and 
social functions. The description of the “I” as a “gear-shift” between sentences highlights the “I” 
as a grammatical function, one that Blasing theorizes similarly: “Grammatically, the ‘I’ is a 
shifter; empty of lexical value, it indicates that discourse is taking place” (29). In keeping with 
Blasing’s analysis, however, the speaker recognizes that the lyric “I” carries significance beyond 
its grammatical function. The questions imply that “I” cannot be identical to the self of the 
author, that “no one exists behind the languaged self,” but mysterious connections between the 
author and text remain. This passage thus reflexively acknowledges the “I” as a pronoun with a 
shifting referent while at the same time foregrounding the matter of authorial responsibility, 
which is referred to twice. The “I” on the page may not be identical with the living author, but 
the text still acknowledges that the author has an ethical obligation to her readers. The speaking 
subject recognizes a “responsibility on the page” to the “content” of the text, and this 
responsibility implicitly extends to the “you,” the reader of the text.  
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 Furthermore, Rankine also raises the question of whether or not “we” would be more 
accurate to use than “I,” for “we” can invoke the self as “various”; in other words, the self 
emerges from part of what Charles Taylor calls larger “webs of interlocution” (qtd. in Parker 10). 
Significantly, Rankine poses these issues in a series of questions; while building towards an 
argument, the question marks point to a lack of ultimate resolution. Although the mystery of the 
connections between author and text is not resolved, the reflexivity of DLMBL signals a 
recognition of the writing self’s scriptedness and responsibility.  
Further destabilizing the conventions of the lyric “I,” the author’s consciousness of the 
scriptedness of the textual self is evident through interchangeable pronoun usage. At times in 
DLMBL, the “I” slides into other pronouns such as “we” and “one” or “you.” For example, upon 
reading a newspaper account of a thirteen-year-old African-American boy, Lionel Tate, who was 
convicted of the murder of a six-year-old girl and tried as an adult, the text states “I, or we, it 
hardly matters, seek out the story in the Times” (67). After explaining further details of the case, 
the text alternates between “we” and “I.” There is an initial comment on the collective 
consumption of the media account of the Tate case: “In this moment we are alone with the facts” 
(67). This observation is then followed by an individual act of perception and reaction: “I see the 
tears have run relatively parallel down his mother’s cheeks. What I have is a headache” (67). The 
pronominal switch from “I” to “we” and the disclaimer that the singularity or plurality of the first 
person “hardly matters” distances the text from the commonplace assumptions that accompany 
the conventional use of the “I” as a record of singular, autobiographically based experience. The 
pronomial interchange further emphasizes how consumption of news media is an experience that 
exists in both individual and collective registers, thus positioning the self as always within a 
larger culture. The conventional use of “I” cannot adequately address the individual and 
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collective nature of the experience of mass cultural representations of events. The recognition of 
the scriptedness of the self in the discussion of the Lionel Tate case defamiliarizes the “I” and 
articulates the mass cultural consumption that is experienced through the first person singular 
and first person plural. 
The Death of the “I” 
In addition to Rankine’s discussion of the Lionel Tate case, pronominal 
interchangeability surfaces frequently in DLMBL. I suggest that Rankine links the technique of 
pronominal interchangeability to one of the text’s major themes, namely, the ambiguous 
borderline between life and death. DLMBL carries on an extended use of pronominal 
interchangeability to link the theme of living death to both the loss of the coherent textual first-
person subject and, with it, textual content as verifiable truth claim. While the opening sequence 
of DLMBL begins with a first person narrator, the third episode in this sequence signals a remove 
from the “I,” for it includes a second person narrative about an individual’s call to a suicide 
hotline. The passage begins with general statements, using “one” or “you” in place of “I”: “Or 
one begins asking oneself that same question differently. Am I dead? You are, as usual, watching 
television . . . when a number flashes on the screen: 1-800-SUICIDE. You dial the number. Do 
you feel like killing yourself? The man on the other end of the receiver asks. You tell him, I feel 
like I am already dead . . . I am in death’s position” (7). This episode seems to have the intimate 
details of a confessional narrative, yet the text establishes a distance from the person of the writer 
with the use of “you” as a general pronoun, flattening any sense of conventional individuality. 
During the telephone conversation, “you” and “I” become indistinguishable. The text signals 
that, although an “I” is invoked, it is subjected to a kind of death: unstable, unmoored from any 
direct referent, “in death’s position.” The shift from the “I” to general pronouns subvert the 
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expectation for life writing as truth claim; the point is not whether or not the author made a call 
to the suicide hotline in real life. The use of “you” to indicate a general pronoun instead points to 
commonplace experiences such as habitual television consumption (“You are, as usual, watching 
television”) and the contemplation of suicide and death (“This kind of thing happens, perhaps is 
still happening”) (7). Furthermore, in this episode, the suicide attempt is as ambiguous as the 
pronouns are: the “suicide hotline is called,” in the passive voice, but the “you/I” protagonist 
never claims to attempt suicide. Through the use of interchangeable pronouns, the text refuses 
the conventions of either confessional poetry or prose life writing by sidestepping questions of 
the author’s verifiable life experience.  
The episode with the suicide hotline caller also explores inadequacy of American 
language and social ideals—particularly, the pursuit of happiness—to describe the idea of the 
self in flux. As a result of the suicide hotline call, the paramedics come to the door, and the 
second-person speaker attempts to explain the situation: “You explain to the ambulance attendant 
that you had a momentary lapse of happily. The noun, happiness, is a static state of some 
Platonic ideal you know better than to pursue. Your modifying process had happily or unhappily 
experienced a momentary pause” (7). Rankine argues that the rhetorical articulation of one of 
Americans’ most cherished values, the pursuit of happiness, is flawed, for its goal is the self’s 
possession of a static condition, as linguistically articulated in an abstract noun. Instead, Rankine 
counters with “happily,” an adverbial, and thus “modifying,” concept.52  Rather than happiness 
as a condition to “pursue” and thus possess, the self undergoes a “modifying process,” that is, a 
process of almost continual flux. The emphasis on the self as undergoing a “modifying process” 
implicitly opposes Platonic, static forms with an embrace of the Aristotelian notion of happiness 
as ethical activity—that is, “a certain sort of activity of soul in accord with virtue” (Aristotle 
                                                        
52 The endnotes also reference poet Lyn Hejinian’s 2000 book, Happily, which explores the topic of happiness. 
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18).53 Thus, the self in flux is identified with “happily,” ethical action and vitality; in contrast, 
the self in stasis, in the form of a “momentary pause,” is linked to isolation, passive 
consumption, and “death’s position.” The “momentary lapse of happily” not only violates 
grammatical orthodoxy and, thus, immediate intelligibility, but is also met with social 
conventions and practices that insist upon stasis. The authoritative figures in this episode do not 
recognize this “momentary” loss of “happily.” The man on the hotline says, “Don’t believe what 
you are thinking and feeling”; the paramedic invokes the law: “you need to come quietly . . . Any 
resistance will only make matters worse. By law, I will have to restrain you” (7). Thus, within 
social structures, claims of flux are met with opposition and restraint by authorities; the subject 
must be complicit in its limitations, or she will be shackled. In this example, Rankine counters 
the static subject of possessive individualism with the concept of the self in flux. If, culturally, 
we all have been conditioned by the “American fantasy” of survival (25), the text seeks to 
dismantle that fantasy while at the same time observing American language and culture 
continually insists upon the static subject. 
DLMBL includes many other examples of death, dying, and experiences of dwelling in a 
suspended state between death and life.54 The text’s focus on death both highlights the mortality 
that American culture continually wishes away, and also paradoxically underscores its 
investment in how Americans can be more alive through a reconfiguration of the ideas of 
selfhood and mortality. DLMBL asserts that, counter to the entrenched American fantasy of the 
self as static, immortal, and sovereign, one must confront the reality of disintegration—through 
                                                        
53 Retallack emphasizes the Aristotelian notion of happiness in her discussion of poethics (18). 
54 Further examples of those occupying an ambiguous area between life and death in DLMBL include a fictional 
sister grieving for the loss of her husband, son, and daughter in a car accident; a friend with breast cancer who has 
“her personality . . . overshadowed” and “imprinted” by the “condition, her death” (9); and Lionel Tate, a juvenile 
criminal tried as an adult and sentenced to life in prison: “In the time it takes for the appeal to happen he will be a 
dead child in a an adult prison. He will be alive as someone else” (67).  
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death, loss, movement—as a necessary and ethical condition for life. Rankine implicitly makes 
this argument at the conclusion of the book’s first sequence. After discussing a friend who is 
dying from breast cancer, the text poses the question, “Why do people waste away?” and 
concludes with a quote from Gertrude Stein, who, the text notes, “herself died of stomach 
cancer” (11). The quotation, from Stein’s 1945 book Wars I Have Seen, points out how the very 
existence of the “I” is predicated on death: “‘if everybody did not die the earth would be all 
covered over and I, I as I, could not have come to be and try as much as I can try not to be I, 
nevertheless, I would mind that so much, as much as anything, so then why not die, and yet and 
again not a thing, not a thing to be liking, not a thing’” (11). This quote from Stein invokes a 
logical argument that mortality is necessary condition for one’s existence, for “everybody” must 
die in order to clear physical space for other inhabitants; otherwise, “the earth would be all 
covered over.” The use of understatement—as in the observation that one will “mind” the fact of 
one’s death “so much”—signals that Stein’s statement is also a parody of a logical argument, for 
how can mortality be reconciled in such facile terms? Upon closer examination, one can read 
Stein’s repetition, “I, I as I” as producing an insistence that highlights a double meaning for the 
loss of the “I”: both one’s physical death and the loss of the “I” as the naturalized concept of the 
individualistic self. The argument points out the attachment to the individualistic “I” is at odds 
with the recognition of mortality as an ethical condition for life. The recognition of mortality is 
ethical in the awareness that both the loss of the possessive “I” is necessary to cede space for 
others, and that others’ mortality was a gift for the “I” to be alive at all. The quote from Stein 
vacillates between the ethical recognition of mortality and the attachment to the individualistic 
self: “I” can “try as much as I can try not to be I,” but the loss of the “I” is noted as “not a thing 
to be liking.” In the Stein passage, the text gestures toward the replacement of the sovereign, 
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stable “I” of possessive individualism with an ethical self who strives to recognize his or her 
interdependence with others. In Levinas’s terms, this move is an attempt to concede the 
necessary relinquishment of “my place in the sun.” It is through the recognition of the self’s 
limits, including the limitation of mortality, that, paradoxically, the self can extend outward in 
order to engage in ethical activity and thereby embrace life. A death of the sovereign “I” occurs, 
which thus makes room for the vitality of a relational self.   
Ethical Practice of Media Consumption: From Spectatorship to Witness  
While much of DLMBL concerns the textual representation of a kind of living death 
through isolation, spectatorship, consumerism, and the ideology of possessive individualism, I 
argue that, as a poethical text, it also gestures towards revitalizing experiences that emerge 
through ethical practices. In her formulation of the poethical, Retallack draws on the Aristotelian 
“ethos of rising again and again to the occasion of those activities that require strenuous 
engagement of one’s whole being—intellect, passions, sensual presence, meditative awareness” 
(18). Retallack emphasizes the ethical as activity, in contrast with passive consumption; 
furthermore, the “strenuous engagement of one’s whole being” bespeaks a sincerity and 
seriousness of purpose that is inimical to the ironic detachment of the media-saturated 
spectator.55 While many of the episodes in DLMBL I have discussed up to this point illustrate or 
enact the enervating and isolating effects of media saturation, the qualities that Retallack 
invokes—endurance, presence, awareness—are incorporated in the text’s movement towards 
ethical practice. Through these qualities, and the adoption of a stance of sincerity and 
                                                        
55 Retallack opposes the poethical to the passive consumption of mass culture: “There’s been a continuum from the 
popular culture of the early part of the twentieth century to the mass culture of today that has become increasingly 
fantasy bound, increasingly dependent on the fantasy logics of a consumer-centered me-ethos”; “passivity has been 
naturalized by our consumer ethos. It’s thought to be natural to want to sleep one’s way through life. I don’t think 
it’s ‘natural’ at all to scratch only the media-induced itch” (33; 31). 
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engagement, the text allows for the possibility of moving away from “the sterile attitude of the 
spectator” and towards the ethical position of the witness.  
In my reading, I draw on philosopher Kelly Oliver’s concept of witness. Oliver considers 
the process of witnessing as the fundamental ability to respond to and address others; 
accordingly, witnessing “is the basis for all subjectivity” (7). To Oliver, subjectivity, as 
intrinsically intersubjective, has an inherent responsibility that involves both “response-ability” 
or “condition of possibility of response” and an “ethical obligation to respond and to enable 
response-ability from others” (15). The necessary and difficult process of witness—in the double 
meaning of eyewitness and in the sense of bearing witness to the unseen—enables a richly 
dialogic subjectivity that fulfills the ethical obligation of “response-ability.”56 DLMBL takes up 
the difficult but necessary process of bearing witness in the media age, and in so doing, advances 
a relational subjectivity that is inherently ethical. 
DLMBL offers the possibility of ethical media consumption through the self-conscious 
interrogation of the speaker’s stance as would-be witness through its rejection of spectatorial 
detachment. In the episode that cites the speaking subject’s reaction to James Byrd, Jr.’s murder, 
the text shifts away from Bush and towards the speaking subject’s recognition of her own 
forgetfulness: “I forget things too. It makes me sad. Or it makes me the saddest. …the sadness 
lives in the recognition that a life can not matter. Or, as there are billions of lives, my sadness is 
alive alongside the recognition that billions of lives never mattered” (23). The responsibility for 
remembering and recognizing the suffering of James Byrd, Jr. is directed away from Bush and 
onto the speaking subject. This commentary is an example of an attempt to deploy the “first-
                                                        
56 Oliver develops her theory of witness as the basis of subjectivity by partly building on and partly departing from 
poststructuralist theorists, in particular Judith Butler, who espouses what she considers neo-Hegelian theories of 
intersubjectivity based on recognition and visibility. Oliver argues that subjectivity based on “recognition” 
normalizes antagonistic relations and proposes witness as an ethical alternative.  
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person social,” for it uses reflexivity to signal to readers the writer’s recognition of her 
complicated position as potential witness to human suffering. For a writer who aims to engage in 
the ethical practice of witnessing, the presence of the “I” is vexed: how does a writer use 
reflexivity to acknowledge her presence as witness without having a self-aggrandizing “I” 
overpower the human suffering she seeks to bear witness to? While the text self-consciously 
points out that the “I” does not enact a performance of heightened lamentation—without 
“breaking my heart, without bursting into anything”—it acknowledges an alternative temptation, 
which is to remain in the spectator’s position of ironic detachment. By spectatorial irony I am 
referring to the sense of “postmodern cool,” co-opted and perpetuated by television, which 
encourages spectators to ridicule others for entertainment and deeply fear ridicule in turn; as a 
result of “postmodern cool,” spectators avoid “passé expressions of value, emotion, or 
vulnerability” (Wallace 181).57 The speaking subject implicitly invokes spectatorial irony as she 
questions the cool reserve with which she writes of her sadness at the “recognition that a life can 
not matter,” which quickly expands into “billions of lives” that “never mattered.” Finally, the “I” 
self-consciously acknowledges the inadequacy of her ultimate response as a witness, for, in this 
episode, she ultimately reverts to the stance of the passive spectator, as she says, “I don’t know, I 
just find when the news comes on I switch the channel,” thus distancing herself from the 
knowledge of human suffering. This commentary models a process that attempts to make the 
first person social through the acknowledgement that there is no easy position in which the 
speaking subject can reside in its attempt to witness to human suffering.  
Whereas the commentary on the murder of James Byrd, Jr. focuses on the difficulty of 
acting as a witness in the media age, DLMBL does not foreclose the possibility of the ethical 
                                                        
57 Wallace argues that pervasive postmodern irony, spread through television, is an agent of “great despair and stasis 
in U.S. culture” for it serves no constructive function (171, 183). 
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practice of witness. The text points to the potentially ethical practice of witness not despite but 
through consumption of mass media. Earlier in this chapter, I observed that the cultural criticism 
of Debord and Baudrillard can elucidate some of the problems of media spectatorship that 
DLMBL diagnoses. However, unlike these and other critics of the “culture industry,” such as 
members of the Frankfurt School of critics, DLMBL does not present the refusal of media as a 
strategy to counter the enervating effects of media saturation; instead, the text allows for the 
possibility of ethical practice through engagement with the media.58 In my reading of DLMBL as 
advancing the possibility of ethical media consumption, I apply Alison Landsberg’s concept of 
prosthetic memory. In contrast to Debord and Baudrillard, Landsberg joins cultural critics such 
as Stuart Hall and John Fiske, who argue that there is the possibility for individual acts of 
“meaning making” in the consumption of mass-media commodities, thus allowing for social 
transformation within consumer capitalism (Landsberg 145). Landsberg theorizes that prosthetic 
memory is a new form of cultural memory made possible in modernity through advanced 
communication technologies such as television, newspapers, film, and the Internet. Through 
consumption of mass-mediated representations of events, “an experience occurs through which 
the person sutures himself or herself into a larger history . . . the person takes on a more personal, 
deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not live. The resulting prosthetic 
memory has the ability to shape that person’s subjectivity and politics” (2). Landsberg 
acknowledges that the reception of mass cultural commodities is not inherently progressive, but 
argues that, nevertheless, prosthetic memory has the potential to foster ethical thinking by 
building empathy across historical periods, races, classes, and nations (145, 152). Although 
                                                        
58 Emma Kimberly has advanced one possible way to read DLMBL as ethically engaging with the media as 
modeling the process of de-naturalizing and interrogating media images and thus enabling compassionate human 
relations in the fear-based cultural climate after 9/11. While we share an interest on ethical reception of mediated 
images, my exploration differs in a focus on the speaking subject’s account of witnessing and an application of the 
concept of prosthetic memory. 
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Landsberg’s study focuses on historical narratives, the concept of “prosthetic memory” 
nevertheless has relevance for Rankine’s writings on twenty-first century culture because both 
Landsberg and Rankine explore the process of the consumption of mass media as a important 
force that shapes modern subjectivity, and both seek a way to orient ethical thinking in a media-
saturated age. 
DLMBL indicates that the reception of mass mediated culture has the potential to foster 
ethical thinking through the embodied experience of prosthetic memory. The speaking subject 
notes her bodily reactions to media accounts of two different black men who are victims of 
police brutality. The text discusses Abner Louima, who was “sodomized with a broken 
broomstick while in police custody,” and Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant who 
was shot to death in his Bronx apartment building (56, 142). The verbal text is juxtaposed with 
photos of the men within illustrations of television sets, a placement which underscores the 
speaking subject’s relation to the men as facilitated through the media (56, 57). The speaking 
subject prefaces the visual and verbal descriptions of these men with accounts of her own bodily 
torment: “I get a sharp pain in my gut. . . . Not quite a caving in, just a feeling of bits of my 
inside twisting away from flesh in the form of a blow to the body. Sometimes I look into 
someone’s face and I must brace myself—the blow is on its way” (56). After the discussion of 
Louima’s debilitating assault, the speaker says, “Instinctively my hand braces my abdomen” 
(56). Furthermore, following the account of Diallo’s death, the speaking subject remarks, “There 
is no innovating loss. It was never invented, it happened as something physical, something 
physically experienced” (57). In these comments, Rankine highlights the speaking subject’s 
experience of bodily pain; this emphasis on the viewer’s bodily experiences by proxy accords 
with Landsberg’s concept of prosthetic memory. In DLMBL, the speaking subject’s memory of 
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an event is “prosthetic” in that she does not have a “natural,” lived experience of the events she 
describes, for she instead engages with them through the media. Moreover, as Landsberg 
theorizes, such “memories, like an artificial limb, are actually worn on the body; these are 
sensuous memories produced by an experience of mass-mediated representations . . . Also, 
prosthetic memories, like an artificial limb, often mark a trauma” (20). In DLMBL, the speaking 
subject learns of the trauma suffered by Louima, Diallo, and Byrd through “mass-mediated 
representations” that nevertheless translate into the subject’s “sensuous” memory of bodily pain. 
The subject’s physical experience of pain indicates empathy towards suffering others that stands 
in marked contrast to the detached attitude of spectatorship. In DLBML, Rankine asserts, “to feel 
loss to the point of being bent over each time” is a way “to value each life” (57). The speaking 
subject’s adopted experience of each trauma of police brutality as a “personal, deeply felt 
memory of a past event through which he or she did not live” is an example of a type of witness 
through media consumption (Landsberg 2).  
DLMBL demonstrates that, in contrast to “sterile attitude of the spectator,” the fruitful 
position of ethical witness allows for the possibility of hope. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed 
an episode where the speaking subject registers her despair as she reads in the New York Times 
that antiretroviral drugs had been denied to millions of HIV positive South Africans by President 
Mbeki. Within the same episode, the subject also declares both her relief, as well as previous 
disturbance, when she reads that Mbeki has reversed his decision and allowed the antiretrovirals: 
“My body relaxes. My shoulders fall back. I had not known that my distress at Mbeki’s previous 
position against distribution of the drugs had physically lodged itself like a virus within me”; 
“Such distress moved in with muscle and bone” (117, 118). In this passage, the use of bodily 
metaphors—“like a virus” and “distress moved in with muscle and bone”—again indicates the 
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formation of embodied, prosthetic memory, and therefore a level of participation on behalf of the 
media consumer that goes beyond the abstracted relationship between spectator and spectacle. 
Within this proxy embodiment, the speaker has shifted from spectatorial detachment to the 
adoption of an attitude of openness and vulnerability. This effect on her continues, as she hears 
the good news that the sanction against the drugs has been lifted: “Its entrance by necessity 
slowly translated my already grief into a tremendously exhausted hope. The translation occurred 
tremendously, perhaps occurred simply because I am alive. The translation occurs as a form of 
life. Then life, which seems so full of waiting, awakes suddenly into a life of hope” (118). 
Although “tremendously exhausted,” the language of life, hope, and awakening stands in direct 
contrast to the theme of living death that pervades much of DLMBL. Whereas the sterile attitude 
of the spectator leads to the numbness of living death through the change of the channel, the 
ethical stance of witness delivers pain and relief, despair and hope. The experience of witness is 
not a simple shift to comforting thoughts, for it signifies a strenuous engagement with others’ 
suffering. Thus, the text advocates for and demonstrates a process of subjective openness to 
others through news media accounts.  
In addition to the foregoing examples, DLMBL theorizes that poetic texts are able to be 
engaged actively in the “meaning making” processes of media consumption that ultimately result 
in the ethical practice of witness. In addition to describing and advocating for witness, the text 
theorizes the practice of poetic witness by linking the bodily experience of prosthetic memory to 
the process of composition. Through a reference to the work of contemporary poet Myung Mi 
Kim, the text theorizes ethical practice by linking the physical experience of prosthetic memory 
to the process of poetic witness: “Myung Mi Kim did say that the poem is really a responsibility 
to everyone in a social space. She did say it was okay to cramp, to clog, to fold over at the gut, to 
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have to put hand to flesh, to have to hold the pain, and then to translate it here. She did say, in so 
many words, that what alerts, alters” (57). In this passage, the process of the poem begins with a 
prosthetic memory, an embodied experience of pain in the reception of mass-media accounts of 
human suffering, which the poet then “translate(s)” into the poem’s language. The concluding 
phrase “what alerts, alters” plays on a double meaning: the bodily sensation of pain “alerts” the 
poet, thus altering her consciousness, and the poet “alerts” readers through writing, thus 
potentially transforming others’ thoughts and feelings. The poem conceptualized as “a 
responsibility to everyone in a social space” has the potential to catalyze cultural transformation 
through the process of witness. The verbal and visual texts of DLBML enact the role of witness 
as it details the suffering of victims of violence and social injustice.59 The practice of witness 
through writing of poetic texts fulfills the responsibility and “response-ability” that is at the heart 
of intersubjectivity.  
Writing as Ethical Practice 
The establishment of the possibility of poetic witness is only one dimension of how 
DLMBL holds up writing as a potentially ethical practice. As the text DLMBL nears its 
conclusion, it pays increasing attention to the topic of responsibility/“response-ability.” In the 
final four sections of the text, I find a shift in tone, one that moves away from a sense of deflated 
despair or numbness and towards an emerging, tentative sense of hope. While this movement is 
non-linear, and does not present a simple progression across the disjointed episodes of DLMBL, I 
argue that several glimpses of hopefulness accumulate momentum within the text’s concluding 
sequences. Furthermore, several episodes in the concluding sections of DLMBL emphasize the 
instrumental role that the arts can play in countering the enervating effects of media saturation 
                                                        
59 In an interview for Jubilat, Rankine remarks that men like Byrd and Louima “needed to be brought back in 
images” because media accounts and political conversations had erased them in gestures of closure (23). 
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and consumerism. Specifically, DLMBL draws on Levinas’s ethics to highlight the ethical 
potential of language.  
Earlier in this chapter, I referenced some of the broad strokes of Levinas’s critique of 
Western ideology, with its insistence on “my place in the sun,” and I have observed the 
resonance of this critique with Rankine’s stated values. At this point, I turn to a more in-depth 
consideration of Levinas’s ethics in order to explain how DLMBL builds models of other-
oriented subjectivity and writing as ethical practice. My earlier delineation of Sartre’s 
Existentialist philosophy as it theorizes “the Look”—the hostile gaze and potential encounter that 
the speaking subject of DLMBL avoids—can be a productive entry point to Levinas’s thought. 
Levinas’s ethics directly criticize the hostile relations between self and other that he sees as 
intrinsic to Sartre’s Existentialism, for he argues that Sartre’s model of intersubjectivity is 
basically Hegelian in the struggle for domination (Keltner and Julian 55). Furthermore, Levinas 
faults Sartre for what he sees as his erroneous priority of ontology, or existence understood as 
“being in itself.” Sartre argues that “existence precedes essence,” where “existence” refers to the 
“being in itself” or “being for itself” of an individual and “essence” refers to purpose. “Being in 
itself” is likened to the subject in a state of self-containment and, therefore, mastery. Sartre 
asserts that individuals are in tension between the desired condition of “being in itself” and the 
problematic “being for others.” Contra Sartre, Levinas argues that ethics, or “being for the other” 
is the “first fact of existence” (Eskin 21). In Totality and Infinity, Levinas posits that the face of 
the Other, both in in flesh and in language, interrupts the subject’s autonomy and demands a 
response (82-84). The welcome of the Other involves the recognition of the Other’s radical 
alterity, that is, the irreducibility of the Other to the subject’s own thoughts or classifications 
(Totality 48-50). Thus, the ethical encounter Levinas describes is not an occurrence where the 
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subject imposes its will to shape the Other or assimilates alterity to the sameness of the self, but, 
instead, involves the subject’s openness toward the radical alterity of the Other. 
Near the conclusion of DLMBL, Rankine deploys Levinas’s ethics directly in order to 
position writing as an ethical practice that can counter the loneliness invoked the book’s title and 
throughout its lyrical dialogues. In the penultimate section of the main body of the text, Rankine 
cites from Levinas’s essay “The Transcendence of Words”:  
Then all life is a form of waiting, but it is the waiting of loneliness. One waits to 
recognize the other as one sees the self. Levinas writes, “The subject who speaks 
is situated in relation to the other. This privilege of the other ceases to be 
incomprehensible once we admit that the first fact of existence is neither being in 
itself nor being for itself but being for the other, in other words, that human 
existence is a creature. By offering a word, the subject putting himself forward 
lays himself open, and, in a sense, prays” (120).60  
In this passage, Levinas refers to his philosophical critique of Sartre’s Existentialist ontology. 
Rather than appearing ex nihilo, “human existence is a creature” in that it emerges only through 
intersubjective relations, and those relations are based in the subject’s responsibility for the 
Other. In Levinas’s words, “I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics, here, does not 
supplement a preceding existential base; the very node of the subjective is knotted in ethics 
understood as responsibility” (Ethics and Infinity 95).  
                                                        
60 Although Levinas is a philosopher who often draws on Judaism, in this chapter, I follow critics such as Attridge 
and Jenkins who incorporate Levinasian ethics into their discussions of literature without applying the religious 
dimension of his thought. This secular appropriation accords with Rankine’s citation of Levinas. While quoting 
Levinas’s ethical claims for speech, she includes his concept of speech as a kind of prayer but is quick to distance 
herself from the religious dimensions of Levinas’s ethics. Immediately following the citation of Levinas, the next 
episode in the text describes an encounter with a Christian missionary handing out evangelical pamphlets on the 
street. The speaking subject admits that “was brought up this way”—that is, as a Christian—but she still throws 
away the pamphlet (121). I read the inclusion of the evangelism episode to signal the text’s distance from any 
particular religious faith. 
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The passage of Levinas cited in DLMBL, framed by the speaker’s meditation on “the 
waiting of loneliness,” contends that “being for another” provides the antidote to the isolation 
and sterility borne from the Western glorification of self-sufficiency. While Levinas is cited 
directly only once in DLMBL, a Levinasian focus on responsibility for the Other, and this 
responsibility as an antidote to loneliness, is articulated earlier DLMBL, in a lyrical dialogue 
situated roughly halfway through the text: 
Define loneliness? 
Yes. 
It’s what we can’t do for each other. 
What do we mean to each other? 
What does a life mean?  
Why are we here if not for each other? (62) 
The text links loneliness to feelings of uselessness that signifies the absence of ethical practice, 
what “we can’t do for each other.” This lack of action indicates the responsibility of the self for 
the other, a responsibility that is confirmed by the final question, “Why are we here if not for 
each other?” which points, by negation, to Levinas’s concept that responsibility for the other 
precedes the existence of the self. Furthermore, a few pages after the citation from 
“Transcendence of Words,” the theme of loneliness resurfaces in another prose poetry section. 
The speaking subject states that she experiences a sense of loneliness in the face of the worlds’ 
suffering and death: “This loneliness stems from a feeling of uselessness” (129). Loneliness 
borne from uselessness essentially re-states the definition of loneliness as “what we can’t do for 
each other.” If loneliness stems from uselessness, from the inability to do for another, then the 
converse must be true; interconnectedness is achieved through useful action, and through 
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responsibility one takes for the other. DLMBL implies that the problem of loneliness can be 
addressed through the Levinasian stance of responsibility for the other.  
Furthermore, with its focus on the “subject who speaks,” the passage by Levinas from the 
essay, “The Transcendence of Words,” emphasizes how language is a means of extending the 
subject in relation to the other. In the essay, Levinas uses the literary character of Robinson 
Crusoe to illustrate the importance of speech as positioning the self in relation to another: 
“[Crusoe] finds in his encounter with Man Friday the greatest event of his insular life. It is the 
moment when finally a man who speaks replaces the inexpressible sadness of echoes” (148). In 
contrast to the “sadness of echoes,” speech—in the encounter between self and other—disrupts 
the existence of the self “as a subject and a master” (149). The disruption of speech is necessary, 
for it heals the “sadness” of solipsism and re-dresses the imbalanced power dynamics that 
accompany the assumption of the self as “master.” Indeed, the loss of mastery indicates that 
while there is much to gain in the encounter with the Other, there is also much that is risked. The 
statement “the subject putting himself forward lays himself open” bespeaks a stance of sincerity 
and vulnerability on behalf of the one who uses speech. Like witnessing, speaking conveys an 
approach that contrasts starkly with spectatorial detachment. With its reference to Levinasian 
thought, DLMBL embraces a stance of openness, sincerity, and humility, and applies this stance 
to writing as an ethical practice.  
It is important to note that DLMBL tempers the idealistic possibilities of writing as ethical 
practice by presenting the occupation of the writer as well intentioned but far from omnipotent. 
Instead, text represents the speaking subject as a writer who has socially responsible intentions 
but is beset by feelings of despair and futility. In one episode, the text describes a dream in which 
the speaking subject has a conversation with a replacement mourner, who is signified by “she”: 
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“In the dream we talk about what a lonely occupation she has chosen. No, she says, you, you are 
the one with the lonely occupation. Death follows you into your dreams. The loneliness in death 
is second to the loneliness of life” (122). This description is self-reflexive, for the “lonely 
occupation” the mourner speaks of indicates the speaking subject’s occupation of writing. 
Several pages later, Rankine acknowledges that, as a writer, she has ethical intentions, but 
struggles with feelings of uselessness and loneliness: “Or, well, I tried to fit language into the 
shape of usefulness. The world moves through words as if the bodies the words reflect did not 
exist. The world, like a giant liver, receives everyone and everything, including these words: is 
he dead? Is she dead?” (129). The speaking subject thus questions the impact any writing can 
have on the “world,” which processes everyone and everything indiscriminately, including 
bodies, alive and dead. As a result, the writer feels despair and loneliness due to such feelings of 
“uselessness” (129). This kind of loneliness and uselessness that she experiences as a writer is 
likened to a condition of death through the fictional writer, Costello, the title character of J.M. 
Coetzee’s 2003 novel Elizabeth Costello: “Then Coetzee’s Costello says in her fictional lecture, 
‘for instants at a time I know what it is like to be a corpse’” (129).61 While acknowledging her 
struggles with feelings of uselessness as a writer, Rankine acknowledges that she is not alone 
among in her frustration to be of use to the “world”; not only does Rankine cite Coetzee’s 
fictional character, Costello, as a writer who feels dead at times, but she also quotes fellow 
contemporary poet Fanny Howe, in her struggles with despair in contemporary American 
culture: “‘I learned to renounce a sense of independence by degrees and finally felt defeated by 
the times I lived in. Obedient to them’” (128). DLMBL represents writing as a project based on 
an ethical foundation, an attempt to “fit language into the shape of usefulness,” but it also 
                                                        
61 Coetzee, J.M. Elizabeth Costello. New York: Viking Press, 2003, 76-77. In the endnotes of DLMBL, Ranking 
describes Costello as “an aging novelist who is struggling with a writer’s greatest fear, a loss for words” (154).  
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demonstrates that the attempt to engage with the world through language is an activity fraught 
with feelings of loneliness, uselessness, and despair. Thus, the speaking subject as writer is far 
from the authoritative and omnipotent author of Enlightenment humanism. She is instead a 
writing subject that self-reflexively acknowledges her limitations. 
Instead of presenting the writer as a domineering figure, the speaking subject of DLMBL, 
ultimately makes what Retallack articulates as a “poethical wager.” Retallack argues that the 
artist wagers that, over time, cultural change can occur through “contributions to climates of 
value and opinion” (3). The possibility for cultural change is akin to the butterfly effect—an 
artist cannot know or control any of the possible effects of his or her work, and effects may be 
infinitesimal and subject to many “swerves”; nevertheless, the artist seeks to guide a project with 
courage, concern, and responsible awareness. (3). Far from a creative work emerging from the 
perspective of the unique and exceptional artist, a text’s poethical dimension is revealed through 
its orientation towards a reading audience, and advocates poetic texts that invite collaborative 
meaning-making between poet and reader. While grappling with a sense of futility and despair, 
the speaking subject as writer in DLMBL ultimately takes the Levinasian risk of laying herself 
open through the writing project. Indeed, it is only through this risk that the text surfaces from an 
atmosphere made toxic by spectatorship, consumerism, and isolation. Indeed, a key way for one 
to work through and out of the living death of loneliness in DLMBL is through lyric as encounter 
between poet and reader.  
Poetic Handshake: Writing, Reading, and Ethical Encounter  
As I’ve mentioned earlier in this chapter, Rankine’s poetics articulate her intentions 
towards the ethical foundations of her writing, particularly in its emphasis on the responsibility 
of the “I” to “the intelligence (think humanity) of the ‘you’” and the use of reflexivity to indicate 
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“the first-person social” (132). In addition to the alignment with Blasing’s model of lyric as 
rhetoric, which depends upon the poet’s credibility to establish the lyric “I” as an ethical figure, 
Rankine’s poetics also resonates with Water’s claims that lyric tends to be fundamentally 
concerned with address to the reader. I read DLMBL as a poem that conveys, in Waters’ words 
“a dependence on the later reader, seeking her answering pressure” (144). Indeed, Waters’ 
critical exploration of lyric address includes an extended exploration of Paul Celan’s poetics, 
which DLMBL cites directly as well.  
DLMBL extends the Levinasian view of speech as an ethical act through the citation of 
the poetics of Paul Celan, thus constructing a Levinasian-Celanian model of poetry as a life-
sustaining, ethical encounter. On the final two pages of the main text, DLMBL includes the 
citation of letter in which Celan likened a poem to a handshake:  
Or Paul Celan said that the poem was no different from a handshake. I cannot see 
any basic difference between a handshake and a poem—is how Rosemary 
Waldrop translated his German. The handshake is our decided ritual of both 
asserting (I am here) and handing over (here) a self to another. Hence the poem is 
that—Here. I am here. This conflation of the solidity of presence with the offering 
of this same presence has everything to do with being alive. (130)  
Paul Celan’s metaphor of the poem as a handshake is used to theorize how engagement with the 
reading and writing of poetic texts can be way for one to recognize her intersubjectivity and 
thereby work her way out of the living death of isolation, towards a sense of “being alive.” The 
textual invocation of Celan’s metaphor of a poem as a handshake acknowledges a sense of 
engagement, responsibility, and openness to being remade on behalf of both writers and readers. 
The declaration in DLMBL that the simultaneous assertion of a self and a handing over of the self 
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“has everything to do with being alive” is an indication that poetry has the potential to be a life-
sustaining encounter. Rankine’s move towards a poetics of encounter is inherently ethical, for it 
offers the recognition of the self as fundamentally constituted by and responsible for relations 
with others.  
Notably, the metaphor of the handshake is a bodily metaphor—a “solidity of presence”—
that relies on the notion of touch. Waters similarly underscores the notion of presence in his 
analysis of Celan’s handshake metaphor in the book Lyric Touch, an extended analysis on poetic 
address. Waters observes that Celan’s description envisions poetry “as a means of real contact” 
by someone who, in Celan’s words, “‘carries his existence into language’” (160). Both Rankine 
and Waters highlight how Celan’s poetics of encounter depends upon on the idea of presence. 
The commentary in DLMBL notes, “the handshake is our decided ritual of both asserting (I am 
here) and handing over (here) a self to another” which involves a “conflation of the solidity of 
presence with the offering of this same presence” (131). Waters similarly observes that “A 
handshake greets, but it also seals and affirms; it verifies something, or testifies to it” (160). 
Namely, the handshake affirms is the shared presence of writer and reader: “[t]his is 
communication in which two bodies touch, in which misgivings about response may evaporate. 
As Celan says, it is (or can be) a matter of presence, of reality” (161). This metaphorical 
handshake indicates “two human beings sharing, with their pronouns I and you, the same 
ontological space” of the text, despite the distances of space, time, and mortality (161). Waters 
argues that, when it occurs, the lyric address of the reader brings to us the “consciousness of our 
own reading’s historical singularity” and the accompanying “thought that may move us, 
sometimes, to take responsibility for being the poem’s reader” (161). Waters insists that, for such 
an encounter or touch to happen, it must be voluntary on behalf of the reader: “Any feeling of 
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obligation here will be your feeling, not a burden imposed by another. If, trusting, you make the 
attempt, and reach to take the offered hand, it is of yourself you become aware, open, obliged” 
(162). Thus, the very model of reading as ethical encounter is based on the reader’s reception and 
the reader’s active responsibility. Textual encounter cannot be imposed from a domineering 
author, for it can only arise as the reader extends herself forward in the event of reading. 
In my reading of the invocation of Celan’s poetics of the handshake in DLMBL, I suggest 
metaphor of touch rather than vision also accords with Levinas’s thinking. As Oliver observes, 
Levinas rejects vision “as a distancing sense that mistakenly puts the subject at the center of the 
universe” (204). Levinas reads the gaze as akin to the Sartre’s hostile Look: distant, 
objectivizing, and totalizing (Otherwise than Being 63). In contrast, Levinas argues that “[s]ocial 
relations . . . are the original deployment of the Relation that is no longer open to the gaze that 
would encompass its terms” (Totality and Infinity 290). On the other hand, touch considered as 
caress is a means to connection between self and other: “In starting with touching, interpreted … 
as caress, and language, interpreted not as the traffic of information but as contact, we have tried 
to describe proximity as irreducible to consciousness and thematization” (Levinas, Basic 
Philosophical Writings 80). Whereas the distance of the subject’s gaze reduces the Other to 
subject’s intellectualizing and categorizing operations, the proximity of touch articulates a way 
of relating that does not revolve around the subject’s sole experience (Oliver 206). Levinas then 
extends this conceptualization of the proximity of touch to language “as contact.” Celan’s 
handshake metaphor for language as social contact similarly replaces the connection of touch 
with the cruelty, isolation and disembodied elements of the spectatorial gaze. The Celanian 
handshake indicates a sense of mutuality and respect that the text of DLMBL highlights as it 
states that the handshake both asserts a self and hands over “a self to another.” Thus, language 
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can be conceptualized as Levinasian-Celanian contact in which both subject and Other extend 
themselves and both enact “response-ability” by answering and enabling one another’s response. 
DLMBL thus offers what I call a Levinasian-Celanian model of poetic text as ethical encounter in 
which the writer and reader come into meaningful contact. 
DLMBL does not confine this notion of encounter to poetic or literary texts alone. Indeed, 
Rankine offers an example of a musical performance by American gospel singer Mahalia 
Jackson in order to gesture towards art’s potential to transform listeners/readers profoundly. 
Through reception of art, listeners/readers are depicted as able to both come to life and towards 
an ethical stance. The speaker describes the response to a publicly screened documentary of a 
performance Jackson gave in 1971:  
In the auditorium a room full of strangers listened to Mahalia Jackson sing ‘Let 
There Be Peace on Earth’ and stood up and gave a standing ovation to a movie 
screen. Her clarity of vision crosses thirty years to address intimately each of us. 
It is as if her voice has always been dormant within us, waiting to be awakened, 
even though “it had to go through its own lack of answers, through terrifying 
silence, (and) through the thousand darknesses of murderous speech.” 
Perhaps Mahalia, like Paul Celan, has already lived all our lives for us. Perhaps 
that is the definition of genius. […] And even though the lyrics of the song are, 
‘Let there be peace on earth and let it begin with me,’ I am hearing, ‘Let it begin 
in me.’” (97) 
Mahalia Jackson’s performance is experienced within a collective, but the text emphasizes its 
power is its ability to register its message within the individual listener. This description 
foregrounds the performance’s ability “to address intimately each of us,” that is, to appeal to 
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listeners as addressees. The performance’s effects depend upon on the listener’s openness to 
alteration of herself through encounter with the work of art. But it does not foreclose the 
possibility of the listener modifying the artwork; in this example, the speaker adapts the lyrics of 
“Let There Be Peace on Earth” to “‘Let it begin in me.’”  
Significantly, the episode describing Mahalia Jackson’s performance inaugurates the shift 
from despair to tentative hope that I trace in the final four sections of DLMBL. The text connects 
the self’s exterior and interior registers through the experience of artistic performance, for it links 
the outside—the voice of Jackson—with the “dormant” voice “waiting to be awakened” within 
the listener. The metaphor of dormancy and awakening signals the movement from exhausted 
resignation to a culture of living death towards a stance that is at once ethical—concerned with 
the well-being of others—and more fully alive. Indeed, the shift towards such an ethical stance is 
exhibited in the content of song lyrics from “Let There Be Peace on Earth,” which embraces 
pacifism and fraternity, in contrast to the hawkish and divisive rhetoric of the post-9/11 era.  
Furthermore, Rankine links Jackson’s and Celan’s artistry as sharing a common “genius.” 
The text compares Jackson’s voice to Celan’s comments on language in a speech he gave when 
he received the Bremen Prize. In the speech, Celan asserts that, through the Nazi occupation and 
the Holocaust of World War II, language “had to go through its own lack of answers, through 
terrifying silence, (and) through the thousand darknesses of murderous speech” but nevertheless 
“went through and could resurface, ‘enriched’ by it all” (Celan 34). In citing this passage, 
Rankine compares Jackson’s voice to Celan’s poetic language and implicitly points to the 
suffering that these two artists faced during their lifetimes as members of persecuted minority 
groups. During the Holocaust, Paul Celan was incarcerated in a labor camp and lost his parents. 
As Rankine observes in the endnotes to DLMBL, Mahalia Jackson, a famous African-American 
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gospel singer and civil rights activist, “faced particular adversity in the later years of her life” in 
the political upheavals of the 1960s and in her personal life and health (149). The statement 
“Perhaps Mahalia, like Paul Celan, has already lived all our lives for us,” and the Hegelian 
assessment that “the man who is better merely expresses this same world better than the others” 
points to the lived experience of the artists who vividly express the world in which they live.  
In the comparison between Celan and Jackson, the text advances a kind of art that is both 
rooted within a historical time and positioned towards a receiving audience across time. In the 
Bremen Prize speech, Celan contends, “the poem does not stand outside time. True, it claims the 
infinite and tries to reach across time—but across, not above” (34). Similarly, Rankine claims 
that Jackson’s “clarity of vision crosses thirty years.” Poetry and other arts that reach “across 
time” stand in contrast to conventional ideas of the Romantic vision of transcendence, where the 
poet reaches “above” historical reality. As Retallack explains “Stereotypical romanticism, the 
idealist strain, was not about being tossed in the messy turbulence,” but this perception of 
cultural realities is flawed, for “[t]o rise above the occasion is to miss it” (37). Poetry that “tries 
to reach across time,” on the other hand, indicates an orientation of the art that recognizes the 
artist’s social milieu while also moving towards a receiving audience, whomever that audience 
might be. In Celan’s words, poems are like a “letter in a bottle: “poems are en route; they are 
headed toward . . . Toward something open, inhabitable, an approachable you” (34). Celan also 
describes poems as “gifts to the attentive”; as Waters explains, poems “can give of themselves 
precisely because they are not timeless but are the vessels of time’s lapse, as that lapse is felt” 
(Waters 161). This ability of art to reach across time and express “this same world better than the 
others” indicates the possibility of a hopeful response to the quagmire of feeling “defeated by the 
times” one lives in. 
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What conclusions can be drawn from Rankine’s extended comparison between Jackson’s 
musical performance and Celan’s poetry? The concept of poetry as akin to performance can be 
illuminated by Derek Attridge’s argument for writing and reading as ethical practice in The 
Singularity of Literature. Attridge argues that literature can be considered a performance that 
 is enacted in the reading process (87). Like Waters, Attridge concludes that the creative act of a 
written text (or literary “work”) is figured as an “other” for which readers are called to take 
responsibility (Singularity 33). Attridge insists that to read responsibly does not indicate one 
correct reading, but it does depend upon a reader’s recognition of a text’s singularity and alterity. 
Moreover, reading responsibly involves opening oneself to the possibility of being remade by a 
literary text. Reading as ethical practice is not a closed circle, however, for it also involves 
imagination and creativity; indeed, responsible reading leads to the creation of new works. Thus, 
a reader can, by the act of reading, enact the performance of literature, and the impact of that 
performance can spark the reader, in turn, to write or to produce other art creatively (Singularity 
92-3). By viewing the concluding sections of DLMBL in light of Attridge’s view of literature as a 
performance that can be enacted through reading and transformed into ethical practice, we see 
the impact of the example of Jackson’s musical performance: Jackson’s voice awakens and 
transforms a dormant sense of life and hope within the listener. The purpose of the performance 
is not its own endpoint; it, too, can be considered in terms of Retallack’s butterfly effect, a force 
that can effect cultural change, infinitesimal and unpredictable as that change may be. The text of 
DLMBL emphasizes the speaker’s adaptation of the song lyric’s “‘Let it begin in me” to highlight 
art’s potential to spark new creation and hopefulness within the listener/speaking subject.  
I further extend Attridge’s understanding of ethical reading to DLMBL to read how the 
speaker, as a relational subject, is positioned as an active—and responsible—reader of numerous 
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other poetic texts. While numerous discourses are present in DLMBL, poetry takes on a 
particularly significant role, for the text includes entire short poems and lines of poetry by Celan 
as well as Czeslaw Milosz, César Vallejo, and Fanny Howe. Notably, there are several 
introductions of citations that refer to the voice of poet as if embodied, in direct address to the 
speaker. Celan’s poem is introduced with the statement “Paul Celan whispers in my ear” (61). A 
line from Joseph Brosky’s poetry is quoted “as if he is standing next to me”; despite Brodsky’s 
death, “this fact does not stop his voice from entering the room every time I look up” (17). The 
presence of both poetry and poets’ voices in the course of the text bespeaks the centrality of 
poetic encounter that is present throughout DLMBL; the speaking subject is involved in various 
poetic handshakes as a reader of multiple poetic texts. Ultimately, as an active and responsible 
reader, Rankine engages in the process of responsive reading that Attridge outlines, through the 
formation of another creative text. 
The visual and verbal texts of the closing pages of DLMBL position the book as a call for 
ethical relations within contemporary American culture. The penultimate page of the main text of 
DLMBL concludes with the quotation and commentary of Paul Celan’s poetic handshake and a 
photograph of a billboard in a field alongside a highway. The billboard broadcasts, in black text 
on a white background, a single word with ending punctuation: “HERE.” The final page includes 
a commentary on the significance of the poetic assertion of “here”:  
Or one meaning of here is ‘In this world, in this life, on earth. In this place or 
position, indicating the presence of,’ or in other words, I am here. It also means to 
hand something to somebody—Here you are. Here, he said to her. Here both 
recognizes and demands recognition. In order for something to be handed over a 
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hand must extend and a hand must receive. We must both be here in this world in 
this life in this place indicating the presence of. (131)  
The image of a billboard sign along the highway that reads “Here.” echoes the visual imagery of 
the cover, where the title, Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, broadcasts from a similar billboard sign, also 
in all capital letters. Thus the monosyllabic assertion “Here.” in the final pages revises and adds 
to the plaintive supplication of the title. The word “Here.” and the following commentary also 
emphasize the presence of the world and the subject’s position within it: “[i]n this world, in this 
life, on earth. In this place or position.” Moreover, the images of the billboard signs that visually 
frame DLBML resonate with a particular American-ness: the emptiness of both the field and the 
roadway signify an openness and potential that co-opts and revises imagery of the frontier 
regularly invoked within American cultural mythology. The visual imagery indicates an expanse 
of relatively open American landscape, but it is one shaped by the contemporary age with the 
highway and road signs signifying predetermined passageways and mass communications. Early 
in the text of DLMBL, a citation from Cornel West states, “hope is different from American 
optimism” (21); similarly, the image of the billboard reading “Here.” represents a kind of hope 
that is in contrast to the empty idealism of American optimism. Like the rest of DLMBL, the 
image of this landscape does not represent an idyllic fantasy of the American frontier, but the 
quotidian reality of contemporary life, thus reinforcing the understanding that we have no choice 
but to forge ahead in everyday life, from wherever we are. By using billboard signs, which 
clutter the American landscape with advertising messages, Rankine thus replaces the standard 
American reduction of human relations of commerce to those of ethical relations through the 
offer of openness of the self to the Other.  
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The concluding commentary of DLMBL emphasizes the textual articulation of relational 
subjectivity as an ethical gesture. It restates the earlier commentary on Celan’s poetic handshake 
with its similar emphasis on shared presence within the poem as it states, “In order for something 
to be handed over a hand must extend and a hand must receive. We must both be here in this 
world in this life in this place indicating the presence of.” By extending forward to any passersby 
on the roadway, the billboard is a visual approximation of the Celan’s metaphors of poetry as a 
“letter in a bottle” that may wash up on the shore of whomever is the recipient (Celan 34-35) or 
poems as “gifts for the attentive” (Celan 26). Significantly, the statement “I am here,” which 
Rankine states three times in the final two pages of text, articulates a re-wording of the Biblical 
formulation “Here I am,” which Levinas invokes as the avowal of the ethical stance of the self 
towards the other: “The tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility … To say: here I am 
[me voici]. To do something for the Other. To give.” (Ethics and Infinity 97). The “I” of “I am 
here” in DLMBL is an “I” that only occurs in a relational dynamic. The relational dynamic is 
crucial in its ability to sustain life, for, in contrast to the isolation of living death, it “has 
everything to do with being alive.” This life-sustaining practice only occurs through the relation 
that occurs between self and other—in Rankine’s reading, between reader and writer.  
DLMBL emphasizes the poetic handshake/encounter as a place to begin. “Here” situates 
DLMBL as a lyric that is a event that occurs as an encounter between self and other, for there is a 
reiteration of both the handshake and the gift: “In order for something to be handed over a hand 
must extend and a hand must receive” (131). The assertion of “here” forges a meaningful 
encounter, the possibility of the movement from “I” to “we””: “We must both be here in this 
world in this life in this place, indicating the presence of.” The unfinished statement gestures to 
an openness rather than a closure of possibilities—the “we” is forged by the process of 
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“indicating” and the invocation of “presence of” whatever may be present. While I argue that the 
concluding sections of the main body of the text of DLMBL are of paramount importance for 
reading DLMBL as a poethical text, the articulation of the Levinasian-Celanian model of poetic 
encounter in the ending does not evince an orderly sense of closure or finality. Instead, the 
concluding sections outline the flux of a creating consciousness that gestures towards a place 
from which writers and readers begin to participate in the creation and reception of creative texts.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
“THE STRANGE WHOEVER THAT GOES UNDER THE NAME OF ‘I’ IN MY POEMS”: 
LYRIC SUBJECTIVITY AND ETHICS IN FANNY HOWE’S LATER POETRY 
In this chapter, I explore the poetry and poetics of Fanny Howe, a prolific writer who has 
been producing poetry, fiction, and literary essays since the 1960s. While Howe, who was born 
in 1940, is from an earlier generation than Claudia Rankine and Elizabeth Robinson, I am 
including an investigation of her writings in this project as she has continued to produce 
considerable output into the twenty-first century. Furthermore, Howe’s poetry has, if anything, 
gained in recognition in recent years, as she has received several prestigious awards, and her 
recent writings remain politically and culturally relevant.62 In this chapter, I focus largely on 
selections of Howe’s later poetry, prose-poetry, and poetics. In particular, I reference selections 
of poetry and essays on poetics that are reprinted or originally appearing in turn-of-the twenty-
first century collections, including Selected Poems (2000), The Wedding Dress: Meditations on 
Word and Life (2003), and On the Ground (2004). I emphasize writings from this later time 
period not only because they are contemporaneous with the works of Rankine and Robinson and 
thus speak to a similar historical moment—all three poets, for example, address 9/11 within their 
writings—but also because Howe’s poetry and writings on poetics in the late 1990s and early 
twenty-first century respond to contemporary discourse on American lyric poetry, which is 
situated squarely within the postlanguage moment. Rather giving extended attention to Howe’s 
earlier poetry of the 1970s and 1980s, which was contemporaneous with the ascendancy of 
Language writing, I will focus on more definitive postlanguage poetic texts from the late 1990s 
and the twenty-first century. There are two exceptions, however, for I will draw upon two 
                                                        
62 Howe won the 2001 Lenore Marshall Poetry Prize for Selected Poems, a 2008 Award in Literature from the 
American Academy and Instituted of Arts and Letters, and the Ruth Lily Poetry Prize in 2009 (“Fanny Howe.” 
poetryfoundation.org). 
  
 156 
excerpts of poetry originally published in the 1980s (and reprinted in Selected Poems in 2000) in 
order to demonstrate some of examples of how some of Howe’s earlier texts demonstrate lyrical, 
even romantic qualities that are put into conversation with modernist/avant-garde elements. 
Finally, as with my exploration of Rankine and Robinson, I take up Howe’s writings that 
theorize and/or demonstrate her engagement with and intentionality towards what I argue are 
ethical articulations of postlanguage lyric subjectivity.63 Therefore, some of Howe’s prose essays 
that address poetics, politics, ethics, and spirituality directly apply to my project, while, for 
example, her works of fiction are not as relevant.  
Also, as with my investigation of Rankine’s writings in chapter one, I am engaged in a 
poethical investigation of Howe’s postlanguage lyric poetry. Thus, in this chapter, I pose similar 
questions, including, what model of lyric subjectivity does Howe’s poetry and poetics offer? 
How does Howe present an ethical articulation of the lyric “I”? Since Howe’s poetic texts are 
often look more like postromantic lyric than Rankine’s do, my exploration of Howe’s hybrid 
writings focuses on the question of Howe’s poetic lineage. What poetic predecessor(s) of Howe’s 
can be identified in order to explain her use of poetic forms? How does Howe draw on certain 
poetic lineages to advance an ethical deployment of lyric poetry? Furthermore, as I take up the 
question of Howe’s ethical considerations, I find that Howe’s spiritual and intellectual 
engagement with Roman Catholic theology is so fundamental to her writing that any inquiry 
must incorporate her approach to theology in conjunction with her ethics. Thus, in this chapter, I 
also ask, what ethics does Howe advance in light of her theological beliefs? How do her ethics, 
in conjunction with her theological approach, shape her postlanguage lyric writing? Further, with 
these considerations of Howe’s theology and ethics in mind, what relations between writer and 
                                                        
63 Notably, Howe exerts a considerable influence on the other two poets in this dissertation, particularly Robinson, 
who has cited the importance of Howe’s writing in several essays and interviews. 
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reader are advanced in Howe’s writings, and how might these relations promote writing and 
reading as ethical practices?  
In this chapter, I argue that Howe’s lyric subject indicates a postmodern “turn to the 
other” that contributes to a redefinition of subjectivity as “being-in-the-world” for the other 
person and thus allows for an ethical deployment of the lyric “I” that is other-oriented rather than 
self-centered. With this recalibration of ethical subjectivity, Howe’s theologically-inflected 
poetic texts sustain the presence of a lyric “I” that is acknowledged as a construction while still 
registering both the subject’s exteriority and interiority. Furthermore, her postlanguage lyrics 
reference subjective experiences of immanence and transcendence. Howe’s ethical deployment 
of lyric subjectivity can be illuminated by tracing her poetry’s inheritance of George Oppen’s 
Objectivist exploration of the ethics of poetry writing, its embrace of liberation theology, and its 
resonance with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Taken together, these tracings reveal Howe’s 
ongoing articulation of a subjectivity that emphasizes “relationality, interdependence, and 
solidarity, based on the philosophical theology of otherness and difference” (Alain Mayama 95). 
Critical Considerations of Howe’s Lyric Subjectivity 
Howe is an innovative poet who overtly embraces the possibility of transcendent and 
mystical experience within contemporary life and poetry. Furthermore, as many critics have 
noted, her poetic texts register the presence of both interiority and exteriority in the deployment 
of the lyric subject. Transcendence and interiority are concepts that are both strongly associated 
with the lyric tradition and may often carry a theological resonance, as they do in Howe’s work. 
Further, approaches to transcendence and interiority are essential to a consideration of Howe’s 
articulation of lyric subjectivity. As Clair Wills argues, Howe’s poetry does not fit neatly into the 
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“two-camp” critical paradigm of 1990s poetry criticism64 because her texts draw upon theology 
to cross the bounds of the lyric subject’s exteriority and interiority, simultaneously rejecting a 
unique, private subjectivity while nevertheless avowing individual agency (“Marking Time” 120, 
122).65 Furthermore, like the other postlanguage lyric poets I investigate in this dissertation, 
Howe recognizes the lyric subject as a construction in her writings, as in Forged (1999), where 
she refers to “my self” as “a fiction.” At the same time, Howe’s texts often draw on her lived 
experiences and register a sense of interiority. Romana Huk also comments on Howe’s approach 
to subjectivity in analyses of Howe’s 1985 poetry collection, Introduction to the World, and 
Howe’s 2004 book of literary prose essays and prose-poetry, The Wedding Dress. Huk notes that 
Howe acknowledges that there is no “inner life” in “our postmodern sense”—that is, there is no 
private, self-created, sealed interiority that exists apart from culture and language (“Alphabets of 
Unknowing” 70). Huk argues that Howe’s poetics advance a decreation of self “that gives itself 
                                                        
64 Wills is not alone in focusing on Howe’s lyric subjectivity and noting that Howe’s approach to the lyric subject 
fits with neither the mainstream, postconfessional embrace of the lyric “I,” nor the Language poetry school’s 
abjuration of the subject. A special issue of Spectacular Diseases, entitled A Folio for Fanny Howe, includes several 
essays on the topic, including a reprint of Wills’s essay “Fanny Howe’s Transcendent Poetics,” and an essay by Huk 
that I discuss at greater length. Other contributions include Rae Armantrout’s reading of Q in which she argues that 
“Howe proposes that the way beyond the bog of the discredited self is to imagine ourselves as part of a nomadic 
collectivity” (44); Paul Green’s observation that Howe’s lyric subject shows an isolated, reclusive, or hidden self 
(54); and Peter Middleton’s contrast between Howe’s poetry and the “conventional” verse of the poet Louise Glück. 
Middleton observes that Howe’s first-person lyric foregrounds subjective temporality between different moments of 
consciousness that are typically conflated in conventional lyric poetry’s reportage of self-consciousness, where the 
present lyric self acts as if it can neutrally mirror the previous subject of self-consciousness (87, 88, 99).  
65 Wills analyzes the serial poems O’Clock and Q, from the 1990s, through a theological lens to argue that Howe 
seeks to open a transcendent dimension within the everyday worlds of humanity, nature, and language. Wills goes 
on to argue that Howe’s poems, despite their lyrical impulses and transcendental dimension, align with postmodern, 
avant-garde concerns that focus on the conscious deployment of language rather than straightforward representation 
(122-3). Wills’s analysis also focuses on Howe’s understanding of time. As with her intellectual influences Samuel 
Beckett and Simone Weil, who value the ideal of “the anonymous or prophetic voice which speaks out of the void” 
in order “to fuse human speech with the voice of eternity,” so Howe advances the idea that “the written word which 
must bridge the gap—and this is precisely because writing is a temporal phenomenon. . . . poetry, by representing 
both the language of ordinary human interaction, and its temporal and spatial limitations, can reach outwards 
towards the eternal” (123). Wills suggests that Howe’s work can be understood within a revolutionary Marxist 
perspective, “indebted to Walter Benjamin’s concept of the ‘Now’ time—a moment of revelation or illumination—
which he sets against the idea of a developmental or teleological mechanism of history”  (123). Wills also reads 
Howe’s lyric “I” in gendered terms by arguing that Howe demonstrates in O’Clock “a specifically feminine sense of 
the rhythms of traditional practice and everyday life” by describing women’s submission to the traditional 
homemaking duties as a “spiritual discipline” (120).  
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to the other . . . Such thinking foregoes closure and thereby ‘receives the future,’ unfulfillable 
without the other; it allows for a very new, postmodern enactment of a very old, even biblical 
‘truth’—one usually stated as a contradiction: that one must lose one’s self to otherness in order 
to save it” (“‘A Single Liturgy’” 673).66 In their arguments, both Wills and Huk emphasize the 
ways in which Howe’s religious convictions inform her deployment of the lyric “I” because her 
work draws on spiritual experiences that lie beyond the conventional bounds of the self and 
necessitate the loss or immersion of self.  
In my poethical consideration of Howe’s exploration of transcendence/immanence and 
interiority/exteriority, I examine two main threads of argument: a consideration of Howe’s lyric 
poetry in relation to its American poetic lineage and, building on the analyses of Wills and Huk, 
an investigation of Howe’s theology in relation to her poethics. First, I will situate Howe’s 
writing in relation to twentieth century poetry and poetics, and then I will turn to an extended 
consideration of the theological and ethical framework for Howe’s writings. The organization of 
this chapter somewhat differs from others in this dissertation; rather than starting the chapter 
with a description of Howe’s use of poetic form, I consider Howe’s use of form diffusely 
throughout the chapter by first considering her poetic classification and then turning to her use of 
serial (or what she terms “spiral”) form. My approach differs in this chapter partly because it 
                                                        
66 In “‘A Single Liturgy,’” Huk observes that Howe merges transcendent and prosaic realms through language in the 
form of poetry, prayer and liturgy by “unraveling what she refers to in her poetry as ‘forged’ unifiers,” that is, 
“forged fictions about chronology, progress, and her location in their pictures of time” (662). In an earlier essay, 
“Alphabets of Unknowing: Fanny Howe’s Signature of Anonymity,” Huk clarifies that this unraveling is both akin 
to post-structuralism/Derridean deconstruction insofar as it “moves within the delusional confines of ‘the text’ as 
‘world’ in order to contemplate ‘God’ as the space that underwrites writing at the same time that it interrupts it,” 
and, like Derrida, Howe remains “committed to speech” (66). At the same time, Huk argues that Howe diverges 
from Derrida and Derridean philosophers insofar as they tend to either embrace, or struggle with, the silence of 
apophatic or negative theology in the movement toward otherness; as a result, Howe avoids Derrida’s 
transhistorical, and therefore transcendent, position in his critiques of language (66). While I agree with Huk’s 
conclusion that Howe avoids the transcendence of transhistorical critique, my inquiry centers on the ways Howe 
navigates transcendence, material and social realities, and ethics.  
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allows me to situate Howe’s poetic classification in relation to Romanticism and modernism, and 
partly because I consider at length Howe’s serial/spiral poetry in terms of its ethical 
commitments and poetic lineage. As I consider Howe’s classification as a poet, I am guided by 
the following questions: What implications does Howe’s poetry have for the ethical 
considerations of transcendence and immanence within contemporary poetry criticism? How 
does her poetry deploy subjectivity, in particular, the interrelation between interiority and 
exteriority within the lyric subject, in order to advance ethical postlanguage lyric poetry? 
Howe’s Poetic Classification and the Problem of Transcendence 
While various critics approach Howe’s poetic classification differently, all emphasize her 
lyricism. Some of the commentary and the criticism on Howe tend to treat her poetry as sui 
generis. Daniel Kane notes that, while Language school poets have credited her as a “colleague 
and influence,” it is nevertheless “hard to associate Howe with a given ‘school,’ as her work 
really resists classification” (68). Other critics emphasize a certain timeless quality of her lyric 
voice. Paul Hoover includes Howe as “postlanguage lyric” poet because her work illustrates “the 
natural inclination of poetry toward sweetness and depth of expression” and the presence of 
subjectivity (xlvii), while poet-critic Ann Lauterbach asserts that in Howe’s work, “a classical 
lyric voice is annealed to a spiritual quest buffeted and embattled by resisting political and social 
realities” (182). Other critics, meanwhile, have treated Howe’s “lyric voice” by comparison to a 
Romantic lineage. In a brief introduction to a 1992 interview with Howe, Manuel Brito asserts 
that her poetry “return[s] to those early voices such as Keats, Dickinson, Yeats, Thomas,” a 
catalogue that highlights the Romantic and often visionary inclinations in lyric poetry (97). 
Meanwhile, critic Albert Gelpi offers an extended comparison between Howe and Emily 
Dickinson. Indeed, in her writing on poetics in The Wedding Dress, which I will reference 
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throughout this chapter, Howe positions her approach within the category of lyric poetry,67 and 
Howe herself admits that, in contrast to Language writers, she is “unable to free myself from the 
charged vocabulary of a romantic” (Brito 102).  
Certainly, Howe’s engagement with poetic “transcendence” would seem to situate her in 
the postromantic tradition. Her engagement with transcendence and certain romantic tropes can 
be seen in this passage from the longer the 1985 poem, Introduction to the World: 
There is nothing I hear as well as my name 
Called when I’m wild. The grace of God 
Places a person in the truth  
And is always expressed as a taste in the mouth  
Walking with your arms wide open (Selected Poems 10) 
In this poetic section, from earlier in her career, Howe delineates a vision of cosmic 
transcendence by drawing a parallel between the lyric “I,” who expresses in a state of spiritual 
ecstasy, with the expedition of the first man in space, Soviet cosmonaut “Yuri Gagarin orbiting 
Earth.” Howe gestures to an experience of transcendence through “[t]he grace of God,” which is 
“always expressed,” by invoking an analogy wherein the subject literally rises above the earthly 
realm. 68 The text positions the speaking-subject, “Fanny,” as able to transcend her immanent 
subjectivity, as she “may never be found or returned.”  
If one were to examine only the vision of transcendence from the passage cited above, 
one might conclude that Howe’s focus on the otherworldly places her squarely within the 
postromantic tradition. As I will demonstrate, Howe’s extensive writings address much more 
breadth of content, but even the inclusion of such visions of transcendence problematizes 
                                                        
67 See the essay “Bewilderment” in The Wedding Dress, 5-23. 
68 “Yuri Gagarin: First Man in Space.” Ed. Jim Wilson. Nasa.gov. Nasa. 13 April 2011. Web. 29 April 2015.  
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Howe’s easy status as an “innovative” poet, as the concept of “transcendence” has largely been 
denounced within twentieth and twenty-first century avant-garde poetry and poetry criticism. 
Poetry that exalts or enacts experiences that transcend empirical conditions, such Romantic 
(Wordsworth, Shelley, Coleridge) or neo-romantic poetry of the sublime (Yeats, Crane), and 
poetry which aims to transcend contemporary social realities in order to convey eternal and 
ahistorical truths (T.S. Eliot), has been criticized variously as escapist, elitist, hidebound, and 
outdated.69 In other words, postmodern/avant-garde poets and critics have charged poetries of 
transcendence for being unethical: rather than orienting towards others, the poetic enactment of 
“rising above” often aggrandizes the poetic subject, positions the conventional lyric subject as 
directly expressing thoughts and feelings that originate from a sealed interiority, and ignores or 
downplays social and political realities. Furthermore, postmodern critical perspectives 
problematize spiritual experiences that involve transcendence or mysticism, which poet and critic 
Elizabeth Robinson defines as “an experience of presence or union that resists rational 
explanation” (“Persona” 92). The emphasis on union within poetry of transcendence—that is, the 
lyric subject’s sense of union with the divine or the natural world—tends to encourage the 
concept of a unified subject and anthropocentric worldview, contrary to poststructuralist theories 
that emphasize a model of decentered subjectivity. Thus, a poetry of transcendence is usually 
read as focusing either inwards, within an enclosed interiority, or beyond, towards the 
otherworldly, in contrast with a poetry of immanence that focuses outwards, towards others and 
things within the world. Thus transcendence would present a problem for the contemporary 
experimental poet who approaches religious or spiritual experiences of transcendence; as 
Robinson remarks, “[a] transcendent mystical experience, it would seem, is no longer available 
                                                        
69 See Charles Altieri, “The Objectivist Tradition”; Marjorie Perloff, Radical Artifice; Joan Retallack, The Poethical  
Wager.  
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to the postmodern poet” (“Persona and the Mystical Poem” 92).70 Within postmodern critical and 
cultural contexts, how can a poet, such as Howe, develop religious poetry that is at once 
innovative, spiritually engaged, ethically deployed, and socially relevant?  
A productive way to address the issue of Romantic/lyric transcendence in Howe’s poetry 
is to acknowledge the other major poetic lineage that Howe draws upon, which is modernism. By 
surveying examples of Howe’s poetry and poetics, Howe ultimately puts the lyric tradition, 
including Romantic strains of lyricism, in conversation with modernism. Indeed, other critics 
emphasize Howe’s innovative techniques as revealing a modernist influence. For example, Paul 
Green also compares Howe positively with Dickinson—whom he situates in the modernist 
canon—and emphasizes their shared poetic process of “hiding,” while at the same time 
observing Howe’s similarity to the American modernist William Carlos Williams (57). 
Similarly, Wills notes that the attention Howe pays to poetic measure illustrates her indebtedness 
to Williams, although she also concedes Howe’s expressive lyricism (126). Most relevant for my 
project is Romana Huk’s brief observation that one of Howe’s poetic predecessors can be 
identified as the American Objectivist poets of late modernism, particularly George Oppen 
(667).71 Building on Huk’s observation, I suggest that it is fruitful to consider Howe’s work as a 
syncretic hybrid of postromantic/lyric and modernist/innovative poetry—in particular, the type 
of modernist poetry written by the Objectivists, an avant-garde American poetic movement that 
began in the 1930s and continued through the mid-twentieth century. Although their reach was 
initially limited in scope, the writings of the Objectivists have ultimately become an influential 
force within multiple innovative American poetic movements. 
                                                        
70 In “Persona and the Mystical Poem,” Robinson argues that, contrary to this understanding, postmodern poetry can 
approach issues of transcendence, and she explores such possibilities in her analysis of Jack Spicer’s poetry. 
71 Huk mentions  Oppen as a precursor to Howe in specific refererence to both poets’ shared influence of 
phenomenological theologian Jean-Luc Marion. 
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Sincerity, Ethics, and the Objectivist Nexus  
Howe’s poethics, in terms of a deployment of lyric subjectivity that emerges through the 
processes of perception and encounter, can be illuminated by reading her work as participating in 
what Peter Quarterman and Rachel Blau DuPlessis call the “nexus” of American Objectivist 
poetry. In positioning Howe in the Objectivist lineage, I not only expand upon Huk’s comparison 
between Oppen and Howe but also draw on the work of Tim Woods, who maps twentieth 
century American poetry in terms of the “Objectivist coalition” and the emergence of diverse 
trajectories of “new ethical poetics” (“Ethical Diversity” 453). Woods’ poetic genealogy aims to 
counter-balance the conventional critical narrative’s emphasis on modernist formal innovation by 
investigating an “ethics of form” and excavating a “discourse of responsibility” (Poetics 1, italics 
his). In his survey of twentieth century American poetry, Woods insists upon the centrality of 
Objectivism, a late modernist poetic movement which adopts and redefines the developments of 
earlier modernist poetry (such as collage and the inclusion of “non-poetic” materials) while 
developing “a powerful utopian and ethical vision . . . of openness to unimagined possibilities” 
that “call for a radical transformation of the present” (Poetics 2, 10). While tracing various 
Objectivist trajectories through many American twentieth century poetic movements, including 
the Beats, the Projectivist/Black Mountain school, the New York school, ethnopoetics, and the 
Language school, Woods’ ethical framework foregrounds the recalibration of poetic subjectivity 
as other-oriented (“The Ethical Diversity” 454). Understanding how features of Howe’s lyric 
poetry are shared with the earlier Objectivist poetic texts of George Oppen can illuminate the 
ethical foundations of her writings and her deployment of a postlanguage lyric subject as that 
which is preserved “while respecting the difference of the (other) object” (Woods, Poetics 11). 
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Howe’s work shares with Oppen’s multiple dimensions that have ethical implications: 
much of their poetry operates on the Objectivist principle of sincerity, they share similar formal 
strategies with the use of the serial poem, and they both search for an “ethic for living” that 
dwells in doubt of, and resistance toward, received ideologies. Furthermore, unlike certain strains 
of later Language writing, Objectivist poetry does not deny interiority, for it explores the poet’s 
perceptions, feelings, and thought processes. Both Oppen and Howe retain the lyric subject as a 
perceiving and conscious agent that emerges through the dynamic interplay with others and 
things in the world. While the lyric subject in their texts register an interior dimension, this kind 
of deployment of the lyric “I” is ethical in its fundamental turn towards the other.72 Whereas 
Howe’s work departs from Oppen’s in that it is overtly rooted in her Catholic faith, her 
exploration of spiritual and mystical experiences does not run counter to Oppen’s poetics. 
Oppen, who is from Jewish background and is best characterized as non-observant, 
acknowledges that his poetic texts emerge out of “moments of conviction” (Oppen in Dembo, 
“The ‘Objectivist’ Poet” 161). Furthermore, critics, including Norman Finkelstein and Jeremy 
Hooker, observe that a visionary and mystical strain is present in his poetry. While Howe’s often 
transcendental poetry would seem to depart from Objectivism, for Objectivist poetry has been 
read as anti-sublime and anti-transcendent, this is true only insofar as “transcendent” language is 
considered as embodying an ahistorical or eternal truth, completely removed from immanence. 
However, as I will argue, Howe’s understanding of the transcendence of language, like 
Levinas’s, is fundamentally relational: transcendence of the interhuman is not transcendence as 
                                                        
72 Like Woods, Critics Peter Nicholls and Matthew Grant Jenkins argue that Oppen’s exploration of perception and 
encounter and his turn towards the other demonstrate an ethical stance that can be illuminated through the ethics of 
Emmanuel Levinas. Both Levinas and Oppen reject a self-centered subjectivity and share a stance of orientation to 
the other, an acknowledgement of the other’s radical alterity, a humility in the face of the other, the avoidance of the 
reduction of the other to recognizable and identifiable categories, and an openness to encounter with the other that 
allows a rupture in the poetic subject. See Peter Nicholls, “Of Being Ethical: Reflections on George Oppen,” Journal 
of American Studies 31.2 (1997) 153-70. Reprinted in DuPlessis and Quartermain, eds. The Objectivist Nexus: 
Essays in Cultural Poetics, 24-53. 
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separate from immanence. Here, I follow Woods, who argues that Oppen also espouses poetry of 
transcendence akin to Levinas’s ethical philosophy, for Oppen composes a modernist poetry of 
the sublime that advances a poetic language that transcendence insofar as it is relational (Poetics 
224). 
To place Howe within the Objectivist lineage is to argue for an inheritance that Howe 
does not recognize. In interviews and in her prose works on writing, Howe writes extensively 
about many intellectual influences from the fields of theology, mysticism, philosophy, as well as 
literature. However, when it comes to claiming an English-language poetic school or lineage, 
Howe demurs, stating that, rather than the notion of “influence,” she prefers the concept of 
“correspondences” in which writers and thinkers within a certain historical era share many 
conceptual affinities and approach contemporaneous issues (Winter Sun 67). Although she 
acknowledges her admiration of certain English-language poets, such as the iconoclastic 
Romantic poet William Blake, Howe emphasizes her early love of world poetry from various 
traditions (Brito 103). For example, in The Wedding Dress, she asserts that her use of the lyric is 
akin to early Celtic poems of journey and pilgrimage and medieval Sufi lyric in its “wide swing 
between experience and transcendence” (WD 22). Thus, Howe’s discussion of the lyric resonates 
with an approach like Brewster’s or Blasing’s, which identifies a long lyric tradition in a variety 
of cultures in the Western world and beyond. Further, Howe’s embrace of poetry from a broad 
range of cultures does not preclude a likeness to American Objectivism, which, as Charles Altieri 
argues, follows a broader “objectivist tradition” that has sources as wide-ranging as “Sappho to 
Flaubert to Zen” (“The Objectivist Tradition” 32). Altieri defines the broader objectivist lyric 
tradition through its concentration on the poet’s perception of things in the world, as opposed to 
the symbolist poet’s use of objects to serve the construction of metaphors (26). Howe’s anti-
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symbolist poetry, in its tendency to concentrate on perceptions of things in the world, I suggest, 
appears to be both inspired by the broader “objectivist” lyric traditions, and also, in its formal 
strategies and its ethical stance, an heir to the specific American Objectivist line. 
How is American Objectivist poetry characterized? The term “Objectivist,” as a proper 
noun, applies Altieri’s broader, non-symbolist description within the specific parameters of the 
twentieth century American modernist poetry that follows the Imagist poetic movement. In a pair 
of seminal 1931 essays that establishes the American Objectivist poetic school,73 Louis 
Zukofsky advocates for poetry that focuses on “historical and contemporary particulars” 
(“Program: ‘Objectivists’ 1931” 268) in order to serve the principle of “sincerity,” which he 
describes as a process wherein “[w]riting occurs which is the detail, not mirage, of seeing, of 
thinking with the things as they exist, and of directing them along a line of melody” (“Sincerity 
and Objectification” 273).74 Like Imagism, Objectivism draws on the immediacy of material 
reality, but the principle of sincerity goes beyond Pound’s “direct treatment of the thing,” for it 
does not follow a straightforwardly empirical model in which the poet’s mind merely reflects the 
world of objects (Hatlen 42). According to Altieri, “sincerity” releases Imagism from serving a 
merely descriptive or empirical function by “freeing imagist techniques into methods of thought” 
(32). Altieri explains the principle of sincerity further:  
Sincerity is usually not self-expression. Rather, it involves insistence on the 
surface of the poem as concerned primarily with direct acts of naming as signs of 
the poet’s immediate engagement in the areas of experience made present by 
                                                        
73 In the essays, Zukofsky references himself, Charles Reznikoff, and George Oppen as Objectivist poets. They were 
loosely affiliated poets who lived in New York and shared similar socialist views in the 1930s; William Carlos 
Williams also associated with Zukofksy and, later, Lorine Niedecker and Carl Rakoski were classified as 
Objectivists (Woods, Poetics of the Limit 5). 
74 Rachel Blau DuPlessis and Peter Quartermain reference Zukofksy’s words when they explain that “Objectivist” 
poetics “has come to mean a non-symbolist, post-imagist poetics, characterized by a historical, realist, 
antimythological worldview, one in which ‘the detail, not mirage,’ calls attention to the materiality of both the world 
and the word” (3).  
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conceiving the act of writing as a mode of attention. Sincerity involves refusing 
the temptations of closure—both closure as fixed form and closure as writing in 
the service of idea, doctrine, or abstract aesthetic ideal. Sincerity can take the 
form of presenting any form of direct experience—perceptions, feeling, alogical 
or [Charles] Olson’s post-logical movements of thought—that is intensified in the 
act of writing. (“The Objectivist Tradition,” 33) 
According to Altieri, the Objectivist principle of sincerity is fulfilled by poetry that resists 
closure, and that self-consciously demonstrates the poet’s engagement with experience and the 
act of composition “as a mode of attention.” “Experience” is broad enough to include the poet’s 
perceptions, feeling, and thoughts within the act of composition, but the focus is primarily 
directed on otherness, not on the expression of a purely interior realm of the self.75 
An example of Objectivist sincerity occurs in Oppen’s well-known poem “Psalm” from 
This in Which (1965), whose epigraph references Thomas Aquinas’s quote “Veritas sequitur esse 
rerum,” that is, “Truth follows from the existence of things” (Hatlen 42). “Psalm” depicts “The 
wild deer bedding down— / That they are there!” and goes on to describe details of the deer: 
“Their eyes / Effortless, the soft lips / Nuzzle and the alien small teeth” (CP 78). “Psalm” 
illustrates the Objectivist principle of sincerity as it centers on poet’s direct act of engagement 
with and attention to the details of things that exist in the world: deer, eyes, lips, teeth, grass, 
woods. This engagement with the experiences of the natural world resists the closure of fixed 
form, symbolism, or the service of a rigid ideology or monolithic concept. While the text does 
                                                        
75 Critic Burton Hatlen explains that, in “Sincerity and Objectification,” Zukofksy adds the following key variables 
to poetic perception and composition with Objectivist poetry: the centrality of the poet’s ethical responsibility when 
knowing, seeing, and therefore acting upon the world; the recognition of desire, that is, the acknowledgment that 
“[o]ur minds . . . want to lay hold upon things that make up the world”; “a sense of historical process,” in which 
things of the world exist in dynamic relation within history; and the understanding that language is not a transparent, 
neutral medium, for words themselves are material particulars that help make up the world (42-43). 
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not focus on self-expression, it registers the poet’s presence through his perceptions and thought 
processes. The near repetition and awed starkness of the lines “That they are there!” and “They 
who are there,” comments upon the mystery, indeed, the miracle of the deer’s existence; choice 
adjectives chronicle the alterity of the “strange” woods and the deer’s “alien” small teeth. The 
lines in the final verse, “The small nouns / Crying faith” displays a consciousness of composition 
and an awareness of language as medium that is far from neutral or precise,76 for it, in fact, rests 
upon a desire to know the things of the world and a belief in language—as “small” and 
inadequate as it is—to approach such an experience.77   
The poetic principle of sincerity is linked to the Objectivists’ ethical stance. Ethics is 
central to Oppen’s poetics in particular.78 Alan Golding argues that Oppen “sees his poetry as an 
effort to formulate an ethic for living” (227), and sincerity is linked to this pursuit, for, as Blau 
du Plessis and Quartermain state, “[f]or Oppen, sincerity is above all an ethical term” (9). As 
Oppen argues in an essay on poetics, poetic perception and encounter are central to poetics of 
sincerity: “It is possible to find a metaphor for anything, an analogue: but the image is 
encountered, not found; it is an account of the poet’s perception, of the act of perception; it is a 
test of sincerity, a test of conviction, the rare poetic quality of truthfulness” (“The Mind’s Own 
Place” 31). Oppen’s poetics of sincerity observe how metaphor can be ethically problematic 
                                                        
76 Oppen comments on language’s opacity in his 1968 volume, Of Being Numerous, where he states “Words cannot 
be wholly transparent” (186). Moreover, the Objectivist emphasis on materiality of language is also evident in a 
1968 interview, in which Oppen offers his own definition for another key Objectivist term, “objectification,” as “the 
making an object of the poem” (Oppen in Dembo 160). 
77 This poem’s title, “Psalm,” the reference to Thomas Aquinas’s notion of “Truth” following existence, the explicit 
reference to faith, and the implicit references to mystery demonstrate what Oppen calls “moments of conviction.”  
In an interview, when Dembo asks him, “What exactly is the faith?” Oppen replies, “Well, that the nouns do refer to 
something; that it’s there, that it’s true, the whole implication of these nouns; that appearances represent reality, 
whether or not they misrepresent it: that this in which the thing takes place, this thing is here, and that these things 
do take place” (163). 
78 Critics have identified characteristics of Oppen’s (and the Objectivists’) poethics to include the following tenets: a 
resistance to the power dynamics of the status quo; an other-orientation vs. a universalist orientation; and the 
function of poetry “as a force of witness based on careful and impersonal attention to socially expressive particulars” 
(Altieri “Transformations of Objectivism,” 314).  
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because it can signal the imposition of the poet’s mind on an object or person. Instead, Oppen 
insists on the centrality of the “act of perception.” “Psalm” can serve as an illustrative example: 
the “quality of truthfulness,”—Aquinas’s “Veritas”—that follows the existence of things 
emerges as the result of the poet’s perception of the deer, not a poetic quest to “find” a metaphor 
and then craft a representation out of their likeness to another thing. Moreover, Oppen makes a 
distinction between finding and encountering an image; rather than sought out, the “image,” or 
poetic representation, is to be directly rooted in the experience of encounter “with things as they 
exist.” Oppen’s poetics of sincerity strives for the ethical actions of poetic perception and 
encounter with things in the world, and it rejects poetry in which images and metaphors convey 
the controlling imposition of the poet’s mind.  
Howe’s poetry can be situated within the Objectivist nexus, for many of her poetic texts 
fulfill the Objectivist principle of sincerity that is evident in Oppen’s “Psalm.” For example, a 
passage from early in the serial poem, Poem From a Single Pallet, first published in 1980 and 
excerpted for Selected Poems in 2000, Howe includes a description of a natural landscape, full of 
wildflowers: 
The wildness of the flower is all in the tone 
Where the yellow goldenrod’s a chirrup 
 
When its chaperone is sleeping, Queen Anne’s Lace 
Appears beside chicory, seemingly for beauty’s sake 
This passage demonstrates how the speaking subject engages with an experience, establishes the 
act of writing as a mode of attention, and comments on the process of lyric composition. The 
landscape is observed directly, for while there are metaphors such as the dormant “chaperone” 
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and the “the thistle factory” that the bees travel to, the flowers, bees and rocks are named directly 
and are not symbols that stand in for other ideas. Yet the text is not description alone, for it 
comments on the process of lyric composition and the materiality of language—that is, language 
is material, with both visual and aural qualities. In particular, the text calls attention to lyric as a 
synthesis of sight and sound with the phrases “the goldenrod’s a chirrup” as well as the 
references to the audible and the voice in the following lines:  
It’s audible, if you see it— 
 
color & strain of voice, among purples 
an indifferent shoulder (rocks) raised to dim 
 
the passionate voice (2) 
 Furthermore, the floral wildness in the opening line depends on the “tone,” a term that can 
signify both visual and aural characteristics. The insistence on the marriage of sound and sight 
underscores the synesthesiac experience of both the composition of lyric poetry, where 
perception through the poet’s open senses—vision and hearing—transforms into song, and in the 
process of reading lyric poetry (aloud), in which the acts of seeing a visual text and hearing its 
sonic effects are combined. “It’s audible, if you see it” also establishes the text’s consciousness 
of writing as a mode of attention. As with the Objectivist emphasis on “the detail, not mirage,” 
Howe’s text insists that the poet can perceive the things of the world more clearly through a 
devoted attentiveness. Moreover, the phrase “seemingly for beauty’s sake” demonstrates the gap 
between the landscape as it exists and as it could seem to exist according a lyric poet’s aesthetic 
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ideal; this phrase thus illustrates Howe’s resistance to aestheticize the scene by the imposition of 
the poet.  
This poem also demonstrates sincerity and an ethical, other-orientation through its formal 
lack of closure: like Oppen’s “Psalm,” it uses short, spare lines and rejects fixed form. 
Furthermore, Howe’s passage avoids the finality of ending punctuation, encouraging an open-
ended reading experience. This openness is further underscored by the use of considerable white 
space around the unrhymed couplets, which encourages meditative pauses in its reading. 
Additionally, movement is present, for this passage presents an evanescent experience—the 
month of October is approaching, the blooms will fade with the change of the season, “the 
passionate voice” of the final line is soon to be darkened by the shadows of “an indifferent 
shoulder (rocks)”—which brings the passage of time and, therefore, dynamism, rather than 
stasis, into the description of a natural scene. There is also a lack of closure on the level of 
meaning; the text invites the reader to participate in this process of attentiveness rather than 
insisting on one monolithic interpretation of the landscape’s description. The invocation of 
“you,” the reader, who is beckoned to discern the “passionate voice”—that is, to see and hear 
it—highlights both the consciousness of the composition process and the reader’s role as active 
participant. I suggest that Howe’s openness of form and content, as well as her use of the 
vocative, indicates an ethical use of poetic language in its other-orientation. Otherness is present 
in its exploration of exteriority and its address to the reader perception. This section of Poem 
from a Single Pallet demonstrates Howe’s fulfillment of the Objectivist principle of sincerity in 
its exploration of “things as they exist,” the awareness of composition as mode of attention, and 
the rejection of closure.  
  
 173 
At the same time, the inclusion of “the passionate voice” serves as an example of Howe’s 
stated use of the “charged vocabulary of romanticism.” The phrase indicates tropes that are 
associated with conventional lyric—both intensity of emotion and the emphasis on the singular 
lyric “voice,” which, at the time of this poem’s original publication, was much disparaged in 
Language writing’s critiques of the “voice” poem. Yet, in another mixture of auditory and visual 
descriptors, “an indifferent shoulder (rocks)” rises “to dim / the passionate voice”; in its 
appearance, the exterior world subdues the still-present lyric voice. Thus, with the inclusion and 
reduction of the “passionate voice,” this excerpt from Howe’s earlier work both illustrates her 
lyric roots and provides an example of how she puts the principles of modernism/Objectivism in 
conversation with Romantic lyricism. 
Objectivism and Lyric Subjectivity 
In its resistance to a controlling poetic egotism, the ethics of poetic sincerity surface in 
the Objectivists’ critique of conventional lyric subjectivity. They resist the imperialistic “lyrical 
ego” that is present in certain strains of Romantic poetry or expressive, neo-romantic poetry (Du 
Blessis and Quartermain 6). Unlike the Romantic or neo-romantic poetry that turn towards the 
subject, the focus is neither on the imaginative faculties of the poet nor on real-life narratives 
from the poet’s life. As Woods argues (referencing the poetry of another Objectivist, Zukofsky), 
Objectivist poems can be read “not as an autobiographical portrait of the poet but as the activity 
of reading and writing one’s life as an open-ended development” (Poetics 165). In Objectivist 
poetry, the presence of the lyric subject emerges through dynamic interplay with others and 
things in the world and the process of composition. As Oppen remarks, “the data of experience 
… is the core of what ‘modernism’ has restored to poetry, the sense of the poet’s self among 
things,” (“The Mind’s Own Place” 32) and this relationality is evident in the opening lines of 
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1968’s Of Being Numerous: “There are things / We live among ‘and to see them / is to know 
ourselves’” (Collected Poems 147). To Oppen, the self can only be accessed through its relations 
to others. Thus, his project aims to restore a relational ethic to poetry and a poetic subjectivity 
that espouses an other-orientation.  
Both Oppen and Howe resist dominant, ego-centric accounts of subjectivity within American 
culture and poetry. In Of Being Numerous, Oppen critiques the individualistic values espoused in 
American culture, including the heroism of the self-sufficient figure. Oppen instead reads the 
solitary figure as baffled by catastrophe—“Obsessed, bewildered / By the shipwreck / Of the 
singular”—or lifeless—“The isolated man is dead, his world around him exhausted” (CP 151, 
152). In resistance to a poetry that champions individualism, Oppen seeks value in participation 
among others: “We have chosen the meaning / Of being numerous” (CP 151). Oppen’s poetic 
subject—here, the plural “we”—insists on the value of being one of many, participating in, but 
not controlling, a greater collective or “unmanageable pantheon,” in an experience that is an 
“Occurrence, a part / Of an infinite series” (CP 148, 147). Howe’s poetic subject also extends to 
Oppen’s “numerous” and “infinite series” with her affirmation in the poem “Kneeling Bus” from 
On the Ground (2004): “Hello air / infinity is colonizing my mind” (55). Rather than the imperial 
lyric ego, Howe’s poetic subject is the one colonized, shaped and informed by things and others 
in the world. Like Oppen’s, Howe’s poetic subjectivity is ethically deployed as it is within 
dynamic interplay among things of the world, rather than a controlling ego. 
In addition to their shared resistance to the dominant cultural narratives of individualistic 
heroism, both poets resist the cultural scripts advanced by psychoanalysis and psychologically-
informed Confessional poetry. Oppen’s poetry challenges what he sees as the mid-twentieth 
century cultural affirmation of self-absorption, perpetuated by psychologically driven 
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understandings of the subject. In “World, World-” from This in Which, Oppen advances a 
critique of 1960s era confessionalism by rejecting psychoanalysis as a trend whose “soul-
searchings” are “prescriptions” dictated by the medical establishment.To Oppen, this “medical 
faddism” encourages a self-absorption that amounts to an “attempt to escape” through a self-
indulgence that is fundamentally narcissistic, “To lose oneself in the self.” In contrast, Oppen 
states, 
The self is no mystery, the mystery is  
That there is something for us to stand on. 
  
We want to be here. 
The act of being, the act of being  
More than oneself. (CP 143) 
Oppen asserts that soul-searching is a misguided attempt to uncover “mystery,” or experience 
that meets the limits of the rational. While Oppen embraces the exploration of mystery, he 
critiques the direction of current poetic inquiry and aims to re-direct it towards experience of the 
world. This rejection of soul-searching inwardness does not only advance a cultural critique but 
also articulates a poetic stance as well. In resistance to the psychoanalytic culture and 
Confessional poetry in which, according to Oppen, lyric subjectivity loses itself “in the self,” 
Oppen positions the lyric “I” in relation to and among others and things with an emphasis on 
“The act of being / More than oneself.”  
Similarly, Howe rejects Confessional and postconfessional poetry for what she sees as 
the inert attributes of “static, fixed-place poems with a confessional personal base” (WD 21). 
Furthermore, Howe resists reduction of the self to psychoanalytic categories. She remarks to 
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Brito that she “chose to break away from a Freudian and psychoanalytic vocabulary,” in 
exchange for a language of theology that she finds more freeing (102). It is crucial to note, 
however, that Howe defines “freedom” not as autonomy, but, in part, as including “a lightness, a 
sense of relationship to nature and society which is balanced and non-dominating” (Brito 102-3). 
Howe comments on what she sees as the confinement of psychological categories in the title 
poem of On the Ground: “Terrified of being first? / of being dirt? / Of being ambushed or 
embossed? Personally / I want to batter my way out of this cage of psychology” (34). To Howe, 
the language of psychology imprisons through the act of embossing, that is, the imprinting of 
permanent classifications on individuals through language. Whereas Oppen’s poem characterizes 
psychoanalysis and confessional poetry as an attempt to escape, and Howe’s characterizes them 
as immobilizing, the critiques of both Oppen and Howe similarly reject the dominant 
psychoanalytic paradigm of subjectivity, for it limits one’s ethical engagement within the world. 
In resistance to received ideologies and dominant poetic trends, both Oppen and Howe explore 
poetry in order to participate more fully, freely, and ethically within a larger community.  
Ethics and Form: Serial Poetry, Spiral Movement, and Howe’s Poetics of Bewilderment  
After noting what cultural and poetic scripts of subjectivity that Oppen and Howe reject, I 
now turn to consider, what type of poetic subjectivity do they advance, and how is it deployed 
within their poetic texts? Altieri suggests that the Objectivist poets’ deployment of poetic 
subjectivity is ethical in that the “compositional acts themselves articulate a relational ethics” 
(Altieri 314). In Oppen’s case, the resistance to egoistic poetic subjectivity is enacted in his 
frequently chosen form of the serial poem. Oppen uses serial form to enact, in Woods’ words, 
the “activity of reading and writing” experiences with others and things in the world as “an open-
ended development.” A serial poem is a sequence of short, untitled lyric poems grouped under a 
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shared title. Although “series” implies linear development, Oppen eschews coherent narrative or 
structures to order his serial poems, and thus rejects earlier modernist poetic attempts to order 
fragments through mythopoesis, as in the seminal works by T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound.79 In 
contrast to the domineering practice of mythopoesis, Oppen investigates the “problems of 
collective identity,” resists the egoistic imposition of order on exteriority, and examines the self’s 
relations to other as ongoing processes (243). These concerns are enacted formally; Oppen’s 
poetic lines are spare and use little punctuation. Thus the serial poem, on both the structural and 
linear levels, resists closure and therefore exemplifies the Objectivist ideal of “open form” rather 
than form as “controlling imposition” (Altieri, “The Objectivist Tradition” 33).  
The form of the serial poem is also noteworthy as it is an interface between the short 
form of the lyric and the longer form of the epic poem. As Golding argues, in Oppen’s work, the 
serial poem allows for an ethical function that traditional deployments of both the lyric and the 
epic tend to inhibit; whereas the short lyric formally tends towards closure and tidy resolve, epic 
poets aim to alter the will of a people through a totalizing vision (90, 88). Conversely, Golding 
reads the “disjointed structure” of Oppen’s serial poem as what “results from his perceiving and 
writing in isolated ‘moments of conviction.’ The term ‘conviction’ implies . . . that he sees his 
poetry as an effort to formulate an ethic for living” (90). Furthermore, Golding reads the form of 
Oppen’s serial poems as inhabiting a dialectical movement that enacts the relationality of the 
subject, for “the relationship between particular fragment and overall series” reflect “an 
epistemological and social dilemma, that of the relationship between individual and community” 
(91). With the form of the serial poem, Oppen’s poetic texts enact the ethical deployment of the 
poetic subject who does not seek to control either the text or the larger world around him; 
                                                        
79 Nicholls characterizes mythopoesis as egoistic because “the self’s relation to the other is generally construed as 
one of domination and is characterized by discontinuity and separateness” and Pound, in particular, “came to invest 
more and more heavily in a unitary model of social process” that resonates with his fascist politics (242, 43). 
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instead, the poetic subject emerges as an individual always influenced by and interacting within a 
larger community. When Oppen asserts that his poetry emerges from “moments of conviction,” 
this statement indicates that the poetic subject has values that guide his efforts to live ethically, 
but such conviction emerges and forms through time and within specific contexts; thus it resists 
rigid dogmas or abstracted ideologies.  
Like Oppen, Howe frequently uses the formal strategy of the serial poem, and, similarly, 
her use of form enacts an ethical deployment of poetic subjectivity. Howe’s own “disjointed” 
lyric sequences similarly resist both the closure of personal, narrative-based short lyric and the 
“controlling imposition” of myth that occurs in both traditional and modernist variations of epic 
poetry. Indeed, Howe affirms that she “hate[s] myths” and tends to resist symbolic writing (Brito 
103). Similarly, Howe’s style tends to be spare and stripped-down, and, like Oppen, many of her 
poetic lines are short and use little punctuation, thus also resisting closure. Thus, like Oppen, 
Howe deploys the serial poem to advance an ethical articulation of lyric poetry.  
Despite their similarities, Howe’s use of the serial poem form is not identical to Oppen’s. 
Howe theorizes her use of the serial poem as a “spiral poem,” that is, a use of form that enacts 
the non-linear development of the subject’s perception of experience. The form of the 
serial/spiral poem is an essential element to what she calls the “poetics of bewilderment” in The 
Wedding Dress. To Howe, “[l]anguage, as we have it, fails to deal with confusion” and, thus, 
“bewilderment begins to form, for me … an actual approach, a way—to settle with the 
unresolvable” through language (14). Within the poetics of bewilderment, lyrical movement, 
change, and disorientation are essential to perceive the world anew by collapsing reference 
within language (15). To Howe, the spiral poem is able to enact the “whirling that is central to 
bewilderment” in language; further, bewilderment is “the natural way for the lyric poet … Each 
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poem is a different take on an idea, an experience, each poem is another day, another mood, 
another revelation, another conversion” (18). To Howe, the spiral poem is connected to the 
processes of the lyric subject perceiving and interpreting experience through time. While typical 
uses of language are beholden to before-and-after sequencing, the spiral allows language to 
demonstrate that “[m]entally, an effect precedes its cause because the whole event needs to 
unravel in order for it all to be interpreted. The serial poem attempts to demonstrate this attention 
to what is cyclical, returning, but empty at its axis. To me, the serial poem is a spiral poem” (17). 
Howe’s concept of the spiral poem, situated within the “poetics of bewilderment,” is rooted in 
her value of itinerancy and her rejection of stasis, fixed certainty, dualisms, and “monolithic 
answers” (WD 15, 20). While a “series” may imply linear progress, Howe’s emphasis on spiral 
movement resists both the concept of linearity and contemporary culture’s teleological model for 
progress and closure. Instead of poetry as a simple linear progression, Howe draws on models of 
nomadic journey or wandering to convey whirling or spiraling movement with no closure or 
fixed telos.  
Howe’s model of the serial/spiral form, situated within her poetics of bewilderment, ties 
directly to her conceptualization of lyric subjectivity. In her writing, Howe distances her 
autobiographical person from the lyric “I” in her poems. In several writings she uses the 
designation “Q” from the Latin term “Quidam,” or “one unknown,” to refer to the “strange 
whoever who goes under the name of ‘I’ in my poems,” and she even titles a serial/spiral poem 
Q (Wedding Dress 20, 6;“Q” in Selected Poems, 17-30). Furthermore, Howe likens her poetic 
approach to medieval Sufi lyric poetry, where “the author is at one level empty of personality, a 
limited observer of his own isolation, and at another he is awake and interpreting” (22). Indeed, 
Howe gestures to the emptiness of the lyric “I” in “Kneeling Bus,” from On the Ground when 
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she indicates, “I am no one” (63). Furthermore, in her writing on poetics, Howe emphasizes the 
passage of time and the dynamism and fluidity of the “unknown” lyric subject: “Q–the Quidam, 
Whoever, the unknown one—or I, is turning in a circle and keeps passing herself on her way 
around, her former self, her later self” (The Wedding Dress 20). Howe asserts the centrality of 
movement and dynamism to the “I”—or “Q”—indeed, the spiral movement that whirls around 
the subject, but without the closure of a perfect circle. Considered through the movement of a 
spiral, the subject is modified, reconsidered, and changing through time and space. Howe 
elaborates further on the lyric “I” in her commentary on sequences of lyric poetry: “Sequences of 
lyrical poems have the heave, thrill, and murmur of the nomadic heart. Though they may at first 
look like static, fixed-place poems with a confessional personal base, they hold the narrator up as 
an idea, even an abstract example, of consciousness shifting in its spatial locations” (The 
Wedding Dress 21). Howe explicitly distances her use of the lyric “I” from that of Confessional 
poetry, which she identifies with both personal content and stasis. Instead, Howe embraces the 
idea of lyric poetry as “nomadic,” and likens her approach instead to early Celtic poetry, where 
the lyric “never went as high as myth, but never went as low as the purely personal, in describing 
the harrowing nature of pilgrimage” (WD 22). Moreover, to Howe, the point of the lyric is not to 
invite readers into a poet’s autobiography: “[a] signal does not necessarily mean that you want to 
be located or described. It can mean that you want to be known as Unlocatable and Hidden. The 
contradiction can drive the ‘I’ in the lyrical poem into a series of techniques that are the reverse 
of the usual narrative moments around courage, discipline, conquest, and fame” (The Wedding 
Dress 6). The enactment of wandering in Howe’s poetic texts resists the dramatic development 
of character and the accompanying moves of narrative climax and closure, thus further disinvites 
readers from a focus on poetic autobiography.   
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An experience of the wandering lyric subject appears in the serial poem Forged, first 
published as a chapbook in 1999 and then re-printed in the 2004 collection On the Ground.  
Forged uses the trope of a train journey in England to convey the lyric subject’s experience of 
wandering. The train’s motion parallels the movement of the lyric subject’s consciousness as it 
wanders, considering various perceptions, feelings, and movements of thought. Forged 
demonstrates Howe’s formal and ethical affinities with Objectivist poetry in general and Oppen’s 
in particular. Forged begins by demonstrating a consciousness of the lyric subject as a textual 
construction. The title of Forged can refer to a forged item as a counterfeit production, or it 
could be a forged object that is created through the heat of a furnace or oven. Both senses are 
alluded to in the opening lyric of the sequence when she refers to “my self” as “a fiction”: 
sold by tickets to this trip my self 
a fiction as fixed as the crucifixion 
or tracks hammered into banked quarters 
 
 
where logic can carry you to hell 
but gives a spatial unity that in essence is emotional (3) 
In this opening section, the text demonstrates what I suggest is the requisite postlanguage lyric 
move, that is, the use of reflexive commentary to emphasize the lyric “I” as a linguistic 
construction, in order to self-conciously advance, in Blasing’s terms, the lyric “I” as an 
intending, ethical figure. Like Rankine, Howe indicates her awareness that, to deploy lyric 
ethically in the postlanguage moment, the text must demonstrate the distinction between the 
person of the author and the “I” on the page. But the lyric “I” is not the only element that is 
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“forged.” As with Oppen, Howe joins the poetic tradition of iconoclasm: the title and trope of the 
opening sequence recalls William Blake’s lament over the “mind-forg’d manacles” of the 
suffering populace he witnesses in his poem “London.” Howe includes a social critique by 
arguing that the process of self-fabrication involves the illusory notions of “fixed” self by 
dominant cultural notions of subjectivity. The concept of the self that is conventionally described 
in language is “forged,” that is, fictional, fixed into a place of permanence through the process of 
construction through language. She argues against this fixity, likening it, with the reference to 
sonic echo of “the crucifixion,” to the violent oppression of those who seek spiritual salvation. 
Also, with the image of “tracks hammered into banked quarters,” fixity is compared to the 
indelible scars in the earth by industrialization, that is, the forged materials of train tracks. The 
forces of fixity in both these similes include materials forged in furnaces—nails in the cross, or 
the railroad tracks—thus asserting that the processes of social and linguistic fixity are as hardy, 
indelible and destructive as the production of man-made material for both industrial development 
and instruments of torture. While the permanence of the train tracks enables the passengers’ 
physical mobility, Howe positions this material progress as ultimately leading to defeat, for the 
tracks are “where logic can carry you to hell.” Howe thus inveighs against the materialism and 
abstract rationalism of capitalist modernity that upholds the power structures of the status quo. 
While “logic,” or reason alone, encourages the “fiction” of a fixed self, Howe asserts that such a 
stance relies on an appeal to an emotionally comforting concept of “spatial unity”—that is, the 
idea of the subject as a coherent whole. Thus, Howe subverts the value of rationality—and the 
concept of coherent subjectivity built upon it—by observing that it is fundamentally irrational.  
The spiral movement of Forged is in evidence as the poem continues, for Howe echoes these 
images later in the poem with reiterations of the comparison of industrialism to the crucifixion—
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“It must be the case that the train / is this century’s model Cross” (18)—and the critique of 
predominant notions of subjectivity: “Personality likewise imitates / fakery like this” (24). 
Furthermore, a passage from Forged theorizes this spiral movement and the development of the 
subject through time: 
Successive déjà vus  
ended then remembered 
overlapping since leaving  
the building materials of sequential plot 
 
Behind time thickens and deepens (5) 
While the speaker in Forged takes a train journey, which implies a linear journey from A to B, 
the text resists a linear narrative or “sequential plot,” instead recognizing how the individual 
subject actually considers past time as “overlapping,” thickening and deepening. Previous days 
spiral back to the present in the form of memory and “déjà vus.” The serial form of Forged 
indicates a spiral movement that conveys not just the lyric subject as a construction but also the 
subject as formed through time, created out of the interrelation between exterior and interior 
dimensions of the subject’s experience. In line with Howe’s emphasis on bewilderment, the 
spiral movement does not necessarily lead to clarity, for the concluding line, “while eyes grow 
blind with cosmic winds,” indicates the inevitable moments of disorientation within whirling and 
change. 
Liberation Theology and Howe’s Poethics 
Thus far, I have considered Howe’s poethics by looking at some of the formal features 
and informing ethics of Howe’s poetry in relation with the work of the Objectivist poet, George 
  
 184 
Oppen. At this point, in order to delve more deeply into Howe’s ethics and her articulation of 
postlanguage lyric subjectivity, including an exploration of subjective transcendence and 
interiority, I turn to consider how theology informs Howe’s poethics. Howe’s worldview is 
informed by her Catholic faith, and therefore, unlike many of her avant-garde contemporaries, 
her poetry is avowedly faith-based rather than secular. A key strain of Howe’s theological 
perspective is indebted to the teachings of contemporary liberation theologians, including 
Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff, and Clovis Boff, whom Howe references as influential in the 
autobiographical prologues to Introduction to the World (1986) and The Wedding Dress (xii).80 
Both Wills and Huk have noted this influence on Howe. Wills alludes to liberation theology’s 
impact on Howe in terms of her focus on the poor (“Marking Time” 131). Moreover, Huk speaks 
of Howe’s particular version of “‘theology of liberation’” as a syncretic, “catholic and socialist” 
approach that centers on the poor but avoids “engulfing otherness into the false oneness of I-
ness” (“Alphabets of Unknowing” 74). However, neither critic considers Howe’s poetry and 
ethics within the particular hermeneutics of liberation theology, the analytic task to which I turn 
now. I will further explore this influence on Howe’s thought by providing an overview of 
liberationist teachings and enumerating ways that they extend to Howe’s poethics. 
Liberation theology is particularly relevant to consideration of Howe’s poethics because 
it does not oppose the social and the spiritual, the exterior and the interior, the immanent and 
transcendent, but instead insists on their interrelation. Liberation theologians argue that the 
confrontation of social realities is an integral part of spiritual life, and that individuals and 
communities need a spiritual life to heal social ills. According to Michael Lowy and Robert 
Sayre, Gustavo Gutierrez and Leonardo Boff argue that modern civilization, governed by 
                                                        
80 In The Wedding Dress, Howe refers to the theologians by name, whereas, in the earlier Introduction to the World, 
she refers more generally to “A theology of liberation (Catholic and socialist)” as her “over-riding interest (or 
attempt)” during her months of poetry writing (9).   
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individualism and driven by market forces, leads to anonymity and atomization and, therefore, 
spiritual enervation and community disintegration (231-232). In resistance to the alienating 
effects of modernity, liberation theologians advance an approach to spiritual life that is rooted in 
community life and commitment to political action. Emerging in the 1960s and 1970s from a 
diverse range of South American Catholic Church communities called CEBs (“basic Christian 
communities”) and using an epistemology and language of solidarity that parallels Marxism, 
liberation theology “arises out of the specific needs and concerns of the poor,” such as struggles 
for rural land use and the oppressive conditions under Latin American military dictatorships 
(Rowland 637, 635).  
Central to liberation theology is participants’ experience within specific material and 
historical contexts, as Christopher Rowland states: “liberation theology is a form of contextual 
theology, in which the experience and circumstances of the interpreters are given a prime 
importance as the first step in seeking to be a disciple of Jesus” (634). Rowland emphasizes that 
the liberationist approach extends the Catholic doctrine of incarnation to the social realities of the 
impoverished: “[t]he basic theological assumption undergirding this approach is that God does 
not come from outside such a situation but is to be found there, just as much as in the Bible, 
church, and tradition. . . . The fundamental hermeneutic starts from humanity, moves thence to 
God, and then from God back to humanity” (635). Thus, as theologian Alain Mayama observes, 
transcendence and immanence are interwoven, for the proponent of liberationist theology 
“searches for the divine transcendence in a life of commitment to the other human person” (47). 
The “first step” in the work of faith is to “grasp the reality of the context in which one finds 
oneself,” which amounts to “confronting the reality of suffering”; this step is then followed by “a 
stage of reflection concerning orientation towards more insightful action” (Rowland 635). While 
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Howe’s poetic texts are not linear and do not lay out specific stages or steps of reflection as 
neatly as Rowland’s synopsis does, this outline of liberation theology’s “fundamental 
hermeneutic” nevertheless illuminates the spiritual and ethical dimensions of her poetry, 
particularly the centrality of experience and the interrelation between humanity and the divine, or 
what Wills calls Howe’s “incarnational aesthetics.”  
Liberation theology’s advocacy for the poor is also essential to understanding Howe’s 
writings. Howe embraces the liberationist conviction that the marginalized offer valuable, 
alternative perspectives “to that told by the wielders of economic power whose story is 
privileged as the ‘normal’ account” (Rowland 637). Such alternative perspectives inform and 
energize political action; rather than a focus on a transcendent afterlife, liberationist approaches 
emphasize individuals’ and communities’ active agency for change in this world (Rowland 648-
9). Indeed, Howe overtly traces a connection between the possibility and necessity of alternative 
perspectives with the suffering of the marginalized as she links her poetics of bewilderment to its 
attendant “politics of bewilderment”: “[t]he politics of bewilderment belongs only to those who 
have little or no access to an audience or a government. It involves circling the facts, seeing the 
problem from varying directions, showing the weakness from the bottom up, the conspiracies, 
the lies, the plans, the false rhetoric; the politics of bewilderment runs against myth, or fixing, 
binding, and defending” (The Wedding Dress 22-23). To Howe, the politics of bewilderment, 
which is “devoted to the little and the weak,” occupies a privileged position. As with the 
dynamism and disorientation of the poetics of bewilderment, the politics of bewilderment 
counters normative and hegemonic ideologies through processes of disorientation, doubt, and 
interrogation (23). The politics of bewilderment clearly demonstrates the influence of liberation 
theology on Howe’s thinking. In turn, Howe’s poetic texts indicate a liberationist approach by 
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the presence or trace of marginalized persons, which allows for alternative locations “from which 
to view the way the world and the tradition are being used” (Rowland 645).  
Along with overt political commitment, liberationist approaches, emerging from a focus 
on the impoverished, have spiritual and ethical implications that offer a redefinition of 
subjectivity. Liberation theology insists that the poor are not “objects of pity but subjects in their 
own right, with a peculiar capacity to understand the ways of God,” as Rowland explains: “the 
poor are particularly close to God and . . . Oppressed persons mediate God because they break 
down the normal egotism with which human beings approach other human beings” (645). Thus, 
within the framework of liberation theology, marginalized persons offer, or allow for, 
perceptions of experiences and relations that are distinct from those of the privileged “‘normal’ 
account[s]” of influential concepts, particularly subjectivity.  
Furthermore, as Mayama argues, the teachings of liberation theology have significant 
“conceptual affinities” with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, for they both share a fundamental 
turn towards the other (or neighbor), and likewise both “contribute toward a redefinition of 
subjectivity as ‘being-in-the-world’ for the other human person,” in distinction to the Cartesian-
Kantian model of subjectivity, which relies on the model of the self-sufficient, autonomous 
subject (95, 45). According to Mayama, both liberationist approaches and Levinas’s ethics offer 
a model of subjectivity that is ethical in its other-orientation. However, in the treatment of a 
highly socially engaged poet like Howe, it must be noted that Levinasian ethics have been 
critiqued for taking a transhistorical approach. Therefore, I follow Mayama by reading Levinas’s 
ethics in conjunction with liberation theology in order to historicize Levinas’s turn to the other.81  
                                                        
81 Mayama is not alone in his efforts to apply Levinas’s ethics to specific, historical contexts. Closely related to 
Mayama’s argument for the application of Levinas to liberation theology is the work of Enrique Dussel, a Latin 
American political theorist who both critiques Levinas for delivering only an “anti-politics” as “negative critique” 
while asserting that Levinasian thought could be positively applied to a Third World philosophy of Liberation (91). 
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I argue that a model of subjectivity, based on both Levinasian and liberationist thought, 
as “‘being-in-the-world’ for the other human person” can illuminate the ethical deployment of 
the lyric subject in Howe’s poetic texts. This model of subjectivity, Levinasian and liberationist, 
applied to Howe’s postlanguage lyric poetry, thus adds a theological dimension to the 
Levinasian-Celanian model of postlanguage lyric poetry that I advance in chapter two.82 In its 
liberationist approach, the subject’s openness to the Other concentrates on the alterity of 
marginalized individuals who are abject and suffering. Howe’s lyric poetry explores experiences 
in which the lyric subject encounters the presence or the trace of marginalized persons. These 
experiences allow for an ethical deployment of the lyric subject, for in the subject’s “break down 
of normal egotism,” subjectivity as other-oriented, rather than self-centered, emerges.83  
As several examples from Howe’s primary texts will demonstrate, Howe’s poetry often 
addresses what can be considered political issues from a stance of resistance to the status quo. 
Indeed, the liberationist thinkers Howe embraces merge the theological and the political, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Like Dussel, many other thinkers recognize some of problematic or conservative dimensions of Levinas’s writings 
and statements, including his Eurocentrism and androcentrism, but nevertheless find in Levinas’s thinking potential 
approaches to apply to progressive political issues. In the 2010 critical anthology Radicalizing Levinas, editors Peter 
Atteron and Matthew Calarco argue that an emerging “third wave” of Levinas scholarship represents “an explicit 
attempt to situate and explore Levinas’s work within the context of the most pressing sociopolitical issues of our 
time” (x). Essays in Radicalizing Levinas include the following: Judith Butler’s argument that Levinas’s ethical 
imperative of the “face” can be used by those in the humanities employ to counter the dehumanization of certain 
populations within media coverage of events such as the Iraq war; Robert Eaglestone’s essay that both 
acknowledges Levinas’s racially insensitive remarks and asserts that postcolonial theory could benefit from 
Levinas’s dual registers of ethics and politics and his critique of Western metaphysical tradition’s dismissal or 
consumption of alterity; and Robert Bernasconi’s argument that Levinasian ethical thinking can meet the challenge 
of globalization by revealing the subject’s responsibility to the neighbor that surpasses narrow legal obligations. For 
perspectives critical of Levinas’s politics, see Howard Caygill’s Levinas & the Political (London: Routledge, 2002) 
which critiques the centrality of monotheism and the idealization of Israel in Levinas’s thought, and Gad Horowitz’s 
Marxist-oriented criticism that reads Levinas’s (and Derrida’s) emphasis on “impossible justice that arrives by never 
arriving” as a tacit endorsement of the “Western status quo” that opposes (Marxist) revolution (310).  
82As I observe towards the end of this chapter, Howe, too, invokes Celan’s poetics and poetry in her writings, 
specifically in her essays on poetics. I suggest that Howe’s reliance on Celanian ideas of extension towards the 
reader are implicit in her poetry. 
83Thus my reading of Howe’s lyric subject differs somewhat from Huk’s. Whereas Huk sees Howe as 
poststructuralist but moving beyond deconstruction in her refusal of its transhistorical positioning, my argument 
aims to reconcile these two countering impulses in Howe’s writings with Mayama’s liberationist/Levinasian model 
of the subject. 
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“politics of bewilderment” that she avows, which is “devoted to the little and the weak,” is also 
informed by the thinking of political philosophers, including Franz Fanon, Ivan Ilich, and Paulo 
Freire (The Wedding Dress 22, 23, xi). At the same time, in my literary-ethical inquiry of 
Howe’s texts, I must make a distinction between a critical reading that focuses on political 
dimensions and one that highlights ethics. This is difficult in Howe’s case, as her poethics merge 
so thoroughly with her political stance. To distinguish between a political reading and an ethical 
one, I rely on Jenkins’ distinction, as outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, that “ethics 
does not coincide with what poststructuralists would call the political … because ethics for them 
is in essence the limit of power, not the archaeology of its workings” (7). While my readings of 
Howe’s poetry acknowledge her interest in the archaeology of the workings of power, I aim to 
emphasize how Howe also focuses on the limits of power and the ethical solutions afforded by a 
textual modeling of ethical subjectivity, the productive potential in encounter with the alterity of 
marginalized persons, and a recalibration of the (lyric) subject’s perception.  
Perception and Encounter in Howe’s Poetry 
  Like the liberation theology that informs her thinking, Howe’s texts are rooted in 
experience of the world. In order to understand Howe’s ethical deployment of subjectivity, it is 
therefore crucial to investigate how her texts approach experience. In her writings, Howe insists 
that ideas about experience are mediated by socioeconomic and historical contexts, especially 
race, class and gender. Indeed, while her poetry does not often foreground the particulars of her 
personal life, Howe’s worldview is very much informed by her lifetime commitments to work in 
social justice, beginning as a civil rights activist in the late 1960s (a commitment she affirms as 
an inheritance from her father), her early marriage to an African-American activist, and her 
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experience in raising biracial children as a single mother in economically straitened 
circumstances (The Wedding Dress ix-xxvi).  
While, on one level, Howe’s biography and politically-informed stance informs how she 
considers experience, it is important to note that Howe’s poetic texts do not claim to mirror 
empirical reality directly, nor do they present experience as static and easily assimilated to the 
subject’s mind. Instead, as I mentioned in my earlier discussion of Oppen, Howe’s poetry 
explores the processes of perception of experience.84 Like Oppen before her, Howe’s interest in 
perception is rooted in another deep influence on her thinking, phenomenology, which can be 
broadly defined as the study of conscious experience. Huk asserts that Howe advances 
“a/theological poetics,” which she defines as an “‘a theological’ poetics written against itself . . . 
or rather, written in a phenomenological mode, bracketing perception against preconceptions 
about the matter at hand” (“‘A simple liturgy’” 658). By tracing the intellectual influences Howe 
discusses in The Wedding Dress, including the phenomenological religious writers Thomas 
Aquinas, Simone Weil, and Edith Stein, Huk observes how Howe develops a 
phenomenologically-informed theology, one that insists that “the work of faith requires 
continued doubt and questioning” (659).85 Huk notes that, for Howe, doubt is the “pivot of her 
ethics, her politics” because “[d]oubt dissolves our defenses, or at least those protective of the 
self, opening spaces of potentiality enabled by the kind of empathy that welcomes the as-yet-
                                                        
84 Oppen was also influenced by phenomenology; hence, many of observations I make about Howe’s focus on 
perception and experience resonate with Oppen’s work as well.  
85 Other critics also delve into the phenomenological dimensions of Howe’s poetry, and the influence of 
phenomenological thinkers such as Weil and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but their explorations do not treat Howe’s 
deployment of subjectivity as directly as Huk’s does. Rusty Morrison reads Howe through the lens of the Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology to argue that “Howe is a poet who . . . would make of language a means to hear what is 
muted within our contact with things, the prelogical bond preceding our pre-established roads of signification” (89). 
Peter Middleton also refers to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about flesh as an “‘element’ of Being” in part of his reading 
of Howe’s oeuvre (91). Furthermore, Kit Fan focuses on Simone Weil’s influence on Howe to argue, in her reading 
of the serial poem The Quietest, that Howe uses “Weil’s notions of silence, doubt and bewilderment to ‘forge’ her 
own ‘rhetoric of faith’” (133). Finally, Ann Vickery, also reads Howe’s poetry in The End through the “social and 
spiritual philosophies of Simone Weil” although her focus is not on Weil’s phenomenological explorations but on 
“the role of gender in embodied thought” (143).    
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unformulated, the unknown” (673). According to Huk, “Howe’s post-Thomistic, post-
postmodern, even post-phenomenological return to concentration on ‘the writing subject’ and its 
perceptions finally results in a newly expanded and outgoing rather than traditionally self-
centered or self-seeking consciousness” (679). While aiming to reject rigid certainty and 
preconceived notions (Huk 663), Howe’s doubt and phenomenological exploration allows for the 
opening of perceptions of the world. The poetry’s ongoing work of continually perceiving the 
world anew, beyond the dictates of common sense or fixed ideologies, advances a postlanguage 
lyric “I” that is ethical rather than egoistic.  
In addition to Howe’s phenomenological focus on perception that Huk outlines, my 
inquiry considers instances of ethical encounter with exteriority in Howe’s texts. Encounter is 
crucial to understanding Howe’s ethical deployment of the lyric subject because ongoing, 
dynamic interactions with exteriority—human others and the material world—influence and 
shape the subject’s interiority. As Howe describes in The Wedding Dress, the dynamic lyric 
subject of her poetry strives to achieve a condition of openness towards the other and a 
phenomenological recognition of desire for—or intentionality toward—exteriority: “[t]he taste 
and smell of an action, any action, comes from its objective. This is the strange thing about 
relationship. What you desire is what creates your quality. You are not made by yourself, but by 
the thing that you want. It is that sense of a mutually seductive world that an itinerant life 
provides . . . you are always watching and entering . . .” (110). While “watching” indicates 
experiences of perception, “entering” indicates experiences of encounter; the subject does not 
merely observe others and things in the material world, as if from a distance, but meets and 
engages with others. Encounter, as a counterpart to perception, involves the “action” that Howe 
discusses so frequently in The Wedding Dress. The subject cannot be self-created, for it is shaped 
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through his or her desire for and objective—that is, the intention—towards the other. 
Furthermore, as Howe’s value of an “itinerant life,” and her use of progressive terms, “watching” 
and “entering,” indicate, experiences of attentive perception and encounter entail ongoing 
processes rather than static conditions. Howe’s recognition of the ongoing process of self-
creation through the subject’s intention toward exteriority can be illuminated by its 
correspondences to Levinas’s phenomenological ethics, his emphasis on face-to-face encounter, 
and his definition of subjectivity as hospitality. As Mayama contends, Levinasian encounter is an 
occurrence of everyday contact with infinity in the alterity of the Other who is suffering 
resonates with liberation theology, and, I suggest, with Howe’s postlanguage lyric poetry.  
Another example from the serial poem Forged illustrates how Howe explores the 
processes of perception and a textual enactment of an ethical encounter in the description of an 
indigent man. In the poem, the lyric subject is on a train journey in England in the winter, when 
she perceives an image she cannot initially decipher: 
Pitch in a pot in the alley a board 
a leaning rod a thrown cloth 
seems to signify a man huddled but faceless 
a thick ruined guest with his paper cup  
extended torn sneakers (8)  
Howe’s concentration on perception in this passage moves from a misperception to the 
recognition of limited perception, to an encounter with the Other. Initially, the text describes an 
ad hoc assemblage of rubbish which “seems to signify a man huddled but faceless.” At first, the 
speaker sees humanity within bits of garbage, but she realizes that this is based in 
misrecognition. The passage then proceeds ambiguously: at first, the speaker appears to continue 
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to describe an indigent man that the garbage pile resembles, but specific details are added that 
demonstrate a shift to the perception of an actual man who exerts a will and embodies a spirit. 
Details, such as his “his paper cup / extended torn sneakers,” convey the man’s material poverty, 
and his actions are both unclear—does he extend his paper cup to drink from it or to beg for 
money?—and decisive, for he is “reading Upanishads to each of us,” that is, sacred scriptures 
from Hindu traditions. The point where the poem shifts between the initial misreading of the 
garbage and the poet’s perception of the man remains unresolved, and as such the relation 
between the heap of garbage and the indigent man is ambiguous. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition 
between the garbage pile and the indigent man draws on commonplace cultural links between 
trash and members of the poverty-stricken underclass. The juxtaposition also indicates the 
recognition of the poet’s misperception and limited perception. The text moves from a garbage 
heap that seems to signify “a man huddled but faceless” to an impoverished man “reading 
Upanishads,” thus engaging the subject—and “each of us”—in a face-to-face encounter. Thus 
the movement is from the perception of mere garbage to encounter with the Other that involves 
the lyric subject’s recognition of humanity and presence of spirit in the midst of squalor. 
Significantly, Howe describes this man, despite his “ruined” class status and abject condition, in 
Levinasian terms of hospitality, as a “guest.” As such, he is welcomed into the space of the 
poem.  
With the concluding line, “just seven percent of our being visible,” Howe recognizes the 
great limits of the speaker’s visual perception, not only through the reference to a garbage heap 
which initially seems to signify a man, but also the reference to the man as a spiritual being 
whose alterity vastly exceeds what the poet can visually perceive. In resistance to judgments of 
things and people based on cursory visual perceptions and, often, visual misperception, Howe 
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enacts in this passage an encounter with the other that is ethical in its openness to suffering 
alterity. As I discussed in my reading of Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely in chapter two, the 
potentially problematic nature of vision is one that Levinas describes in his ethical philosophy. 
The shift in this passage from Forged, from visual (mis)perception to hearing as the basis for an 
encounter with the Other resonates with the way Levinas privileges discourse and speech over 
vision. Levinas rejects “the notion of vision to describe the authentic relationship with the Other; 
it is discourse and, more exactly, response or responsibility which is this authentic relationship” 
(Ethics and Infinity 87-88). To Levinas, “[t]he presence of the Other (Autre) is a presence that 
teaches us something” and is “fulfilled in the act of hearing” (“Transcendence of Words” 148). 
For Levinas, hearing is a privileged mode of perception because it involves an interrelation that 
avoids the reduction and/or dominance of the gaze: “to speak is to interrupt my existence as a 
subject and a master, but without offering myself up as a spectacle” (“Transcendence of Words” 
149). Howe’s text references an encounter with an indigent man that is ethical in that it avoids 
making him a spectacle, for, unlike the initial, “faceless” heap of garbage, Howe’s text does not 
focus on a physical description of the Other but on his speech. Thus, in a move not unlike that of 
DLMBL, this passage indicates a move from the lyric subject as spectator consuming a spectacle 
to a witness engaged in response-ability and responsibility for the suffering other. While 
including signifiers of material poverty, the text does not reduce the indigent man to identifiable 
categories. Instead, Howe’s description recognizes that the man’s spiritual life indicates depths 
that are beyond what are “visible.” Furthermore, the lyric subject is ruptured by the encounter 
with the other; the poet notes that the man is “reading Upanishads to each of us,” thus 
emphasizing the subject’s act of hearing of discourse as recognition of the presence of the Other 
that moves beyond “pure and simple coexistence” and becomes an ethical encounter 
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(“Transcendence of Words” 148). The insistence on the spirit of the indigent man that exceeds 
visible judgment conveys a lyric subject engaged in an ethical encounter with a suffering Other 
by moving from spectacle to response-ability. 
Furthermore, the passage from Forged resonates with Levinas’s ethics in terms of its 
recognition of the Other’s alterity; while fact of the man’s reading can be described as evidence 
of his spirit, the poem’s recognition of his Otherness exceeds this attempt at categorization. The 
reading of Upanishads provides testimony of the infinity of the Other—an infinity that Howe 
approximates with the phrase “just seven percent of our being visible”—that emphasizes that the 
vast majority of “our being” is beyond what can be visibly perceived. In addition to its 
Levinasian elements, this passage illustrates Howe’s affinity with liberation theology, not only in 
the conviction about the dignity of the poor, but also in the idea that the poor have a distinct 
ability to be close to God. Indeed, this passage serves as an example of the liberationist belief 
that marginalized persons can “break down the normal egotism with which human beings 
approach other human beings” (645). The lyric subject’s recognition of her misperception of the 
indigent man, and the spiritual reading he provides, breaks down the lyric subject’s egotism as 
the alterity of the “guest” shakes her certainty of her perception. The text thus gestures to the 
“interior” of perception as a process influenced by encounter with the Other.  
Exteriority and Interiority, Transcendence and Immanence 
As stated earlier in this chapter, a crucial issue for critical consideration of the 
postlanguage lyric subjectivity is the question of interiority or the subject’s “inner life.” Indeed, 
Language writers’ criticism of the lyric “I,” rooted in poststructuralist critiques of conventional 
ideas of subjectivity, criticizes lyric poetry for its tendency towards expression of feelings and 
thoughts rooted in the lyric subject’s unique, private, and self-created interiority. Yet Howe often 
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speaks of the soul, and interiority and its associated activities—individual will, prayer, 
contemplation—are taken seriously within Howe’s poetry. On this topic, my exploration of 
Howe’s interior register diverges somewhat from Huk’s. While Huk accurately observes that 
Howe alludes to Simone Weil’s invocation of the self as involving a void or emptiness and 
describes Howe as acknowledging that there is no “inner life” in “our postmodern sense,” I 
would like to reframe the discussion by considering Howe’s recalibration of subjectivity as one 
that emphasizes that a subject’s interiority, including a spiritual dimension, is not only deeply 
important but also a site of ethical possibility. As Rae Armantrout observes, Howe’s poetry 
“ask[s] how to reimagine the self, the ‘inner life,’ without putting it in quotes” (43). Interiority is 
neither private nor sealed, but neither is it erased or bracketed. Whereas Armantrout proposes 
Howe’s lyric subjectivity in terms of a nomadic collectivity, however, my inquiry investigates 
the contours of an individual subject’s interiority as it perceives, encounters, shapes, and is 
shaped by exteriority.  
Howe recognizes subjective interiority as continually realized through the equally 
essential, ongoing processes of perception and encounter with exteriority. In an essay on poetics 
in The Wedding Dress, Howe articulates the interrelation of a subject’s interiority and exteriority 
by using a dream image of two selves as two old mothers, a quiet, pensive self—“Way Inside”—
and an active, public self—“Way Out There”—who are “a different embodiment of the same 
actual human” (8). The self that is “Way Inside” informs and is informed by the experiences of 
“Way Out There,” and vice versa. Howe’s dynamic, fluid subject is continually perceiving and 
encountering, watching and entering, continually created through the interrelation of interior and 
exterior, “Way Inside” and “Way Out There.” In her analysis of O’Clock and “Q,” Wills 
observes that Howe uses theology as a means of interrelating the exterior and interior of the 
  
 197 
subject. I would like to expand upon Wills’ observation with a consideration of Howe’s 
interrelation of exteriority and subjective interiority within a Levinasian framework that 
emphasizes the ethical dimension of Howe’s theologically-informed poetry.  
In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas draws on the biblical concept of testimony to explain the 
subject’s obligation to the Other: “[t]he tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility . . . To 
say: here I am. To do something for the Other. To give. To be human spirit” (97). The 
affirmation, “here I am,” is a biblical allusion that Levinas emphasizes in his development of the 
concept of testimony as an ethical relation that interrelates interiority and exteriority. “Here I 
am” references the affirmative responses of Abraham and the prophet Isaiah to God’s call (Ethics 
and Infinity 97n1), and Levinas uses the declaration “Here I am” to describe how an ethical 
relation develops through testimony.86 As Levinas explains in an interview with Philip Nemo, 
“the subject who says ‘Here I am!’ testifies to the Infinite” for “every man, assuming 
responsibility for the Other is a way of testifying to the glory of the Infinite, and of being 
inspired” (Ethics and Infinity 106, 113). Levinas further discusses the relation between interiority 
and the exteriority of Infinity: 
The idea of the Infinite . . . expresses the disproportion between glory and the 
present, a disproportion which is inspiration itself. Under the weight that exceeds 
my capacity, a passivity more passive than all passivity correlative of acts, my 
passivity breaks out in saying: ‘Here I am!’ The exteriority of the Infinite 
somehow becomes ‘interiority’ in the sincerity of the testimony. (Otherwise than 
Being 146-7) 
                                                        
86 As the footnote in Ethics and Infinity indicates, also see Genesis 22.1, 22.7, 22.11 and Isaiah 6. 8 for biblical 
passages that include the phrase “Here I am!”  
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This interrelation between the interior and exterior means that interiority is “not a secret place 
somewhere in me,” but “is that reverting in which the eminently exterior . . . concerns me and 
circumscribes me and orders me by my own voice” (Otherwise than Being 147). Levinas thus 
describes testimony as an experience of divine revelation, in which the “infinitely exterior” 
commands the interior by transforming it through the voice, and the “secrecy” of the interior 
voice dissolves: “the infinitely exterior becomes an interior voice, but a voice testifying to the 
fission of the interior secrecy, signaling to the Other” (Otherwise than Being 147). As Levinas’s 
emphasis on “voice” indicates, this “signaling to the Other” takes place through speech: “[w]hen 
in the presence of the Other, I say ‘Here I am!’, this ‘Here I am!’ is the place through which the 
Infinite enters into language” (EI 106). Levinas adds that this concept of testimony, which 
involves a mode of divine revelation, is not the activity of bearing witness in an empirical sense; 
while it involves speech, it does not deliver knowledge as it is usually understood (107). 
Levinas’s description of testimony as divine revelation can readily be applied to poetic 
composition, for it accords with what Robinson calls the “poetic truism that the poet is a conduit 
for the muse or for the spirit” (“Persona” 93). Moreover, Levinas’s concept of the interior voice 
transformed by the command of the exterior concurs with what Robinson articulates as an 
understanding of speech rooted in mystical experience: “[i]n poetry and mystical utterance, there 
is no necessary disagreement between the simultaneity of the speaker’s voice and the voice that 
arrives from outside” (Robinson 93). Levinas’s theory allows for the possibility of an 
understanding of mystical poetry within overtly ethical terms, for it explains testimony as a mode 
of divine revelation that is based on the subject’s relation to and responsibility for the Other. 
Levinas’s ethics can thus illuminate Howe’s spiritual poetry and her poethics. When Howe 
affirms, for example, in On the Ground (2004), “Infinity is colonizing my mind,” she not only 
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articulates a belief in divine revelation through the world but also references an interiority that is 
formed and informed by exteriority of the Other and, by extension, the Infinite (“Kneeling Bus” 
55).  
The interrelation of exteriority and interiority in Howe’s subject directly relates to what 
she sees as the link between transcendence and immanence in experience and in language. 
Howe’s poetry does not aim to achieve a transcendent vision or experience in some 
universalized, static, unbroken state that is beyond empirical reality in the sense of being severed 
from it. As Wills notes, Howe’s “incarnational aesthetics” assert that the transcendent and the 
immanent are not in opposition but are intertwined: “eternity may be glimpsed through the 
evanescent, unstable and momentary” (125). While I agree with Wills’ insight that Howe values 
the transcendent and immanent as “intertwined,” I would stress that Howe’s theological 
reflections are essentially ethical in their turn towards the other; a transcendent glimpse of 
“eternity” is not Howe’s sole poetic objective. Rather, to use Rowland’s terms, Howe draws on 
liberation theology’s “fundamental hermeneutic” that “starts from humanity, moves thence to 
God, and then from God back to humanity” (635). Furthermore, Levinas’s ethics allow a way for 
understanding how Howe’s poetic exploration of perception and encounter with immanence 
allow for a use of language that is both transcendent and ethical. Levinas’s formulation of 
transcendent language is ethical because it is relational. As Woods explains, in Levinas’s 
writings, “the transcendence of words is therefore not to be found in some eternal message they 
convey or ahistorical truth they embody, but in the fundamental ethical relationship—the being-
for-the-other—that exceeds and overtakes any message” (224). Similarly, Howe’s poetics deploy 
a lyric subjectivity that is fundamentally “being-for-the other,” and her lyric subject’s move to 
transcendence ultimately allows an extension towards others rather than escaping into eternal 
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messages or a realm of pure interiority. While Howe welcomes experiences of transcendence or 
communion with the divine, her texts refuse the idea of transcendence as an escape from the 
harsh realities of social and material conditions experienced by many. Instead, experiences of 
transcendence that are rooted in interiority—contemplation, prayer, mystical union with the 
divine—serve to recharge the lyric subject in the ongoing movement from humanity to God, and 
back to humanity.  
Howe’s exploration of exteriority as interrelated with interiority, and transcendence as 
interwoven with immanence, is illustrated in a passage form the serial poem, “In the Spirit there 
are no Accidents,” which also appears in Selected Poems (2000). It begins with the invocation of 
“Sister Poverty” who is “welcome[d] to my cloister,” and then continues: 
In the world of wretches & the exploited 
Of the accidentally destroyed 
 
The strike of each heart 
In the distant body 
Ups the odds that there’s a why but, why (121)87 
                                                        
87 In this section, Howe cites, without attribution, the words of the poem “Sister Poverty” by Wendy Mulford, which 
appear in Talisman 16 (1996): 151. The relevant passage in Mulford’s poem reads as follows: 
 in the world of the wretched the exploited the  
 wilfully the accidentally  
 destroyed 
 
 the strike of the heart  
 in a distant body  
 ups the odds that there’s a God 
 but why 
In a composition that appears to take the form of a call and response with Mulford’s poem, Howe both draws 
directly on Mulford’s words and alters them. In particular, where Mulford’s passage interrogates the existence of 
God, Howe’s alteration from “God” to “why” shifts from the question of God’s existence to an investigation of our 
human understanding of possible meaning behind suffering and loss.  
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In this text a lyric subject emerges that, on one level, retreats to seclusion, contemplation, and 
prayer within a “cloister,” and thus indicates a “Way Inside” figure. But the cloistered subject 
invites “Sister Poverty” into this seclusion, a figure that calls to mind the Franciscan and other 
religious orders’ vow of voluntary poverty, or the female religious themselves. “Sister Poverty” 
thus synthesizes both the material reality of poverty and the experience of prayerful 
contemplation, and is thus akin to a blend of “Way Inside” and “Way Out There.” Thus, the 
subject’s contemplation and prayer is not transcendent in an escapist sense, but draws on 
experiences of exteriority. In particular, this encounter with exteriority involves the confrontation 
of the reality of suffering as realized through experience of the poor and oppressed; “the world” 
outside is characterized by the “wretched & exploited” and “accidentally destroyed.” Belief is 
invoked—namely, the Christian conviction that “each heart,” or individual member of the church 
(which can be, potentially, any human) is united in the “distant body” of Christ. This spiritual 
framework provides some hope, for it “Ups the odds that there’s a why”—that is, a reason why 
there is suffering in the world. Nevertheless, the lyric subject refuses such a pat solution, and 
concludes this final line of this section with the words “but, why.” The lack of closure in both 
content or punctuation in the final line indicates the speaker’s ongoing exploration of and 
concern with issues of poverty, social injustice, and suffering.  
The exploration of the interrelatedness between interiority and exteriority, transcendence 
and immanence continues in the final poetic section of “In the Spirit there are No Accidents,” 
which concludes with a prayerful invocation of Christ, or “Son the One who was also called 
Sun” whom the subject implores to “Domesticate your fire and send sufficiency.” The section 
continues:  
Zero has gathered into a hole  
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By the road where living gives  
An atavistic echo, the bank’s  
A thief. And I am without  
Retinue. (124) 
“In the Spirit” concludes with a plea for Christ’s aid to relieve the speaker’s spiritual poverty. 
Words that conjure primal needs for basic survival—“send sufficiency”; “living gives / An 
atavistic echo”—are juxtaposed with images of barrenness—“Zero has gathered into a hole”; “I 
am without / Retinue.” The poem then correlates emptiness, rather than provision, to the bank, 
thus rejecting capitalism by invoking its prime institution. With “the bank’s a thief,” Howe thus 
subverts the bank’s conventional social function by insisting that it is not the one who is robbed 
but the one who robs. The bank stands in as a metonymic signifier of the bourgeois-capitalist 
order, and its thievery contributes to the drain on the speaker’s material and spiritual resources.  
The section concludes with the description of “The feel of accidie / Is a collar, metal and 
economic, / When the world takes up no space but I,” a condemnation of the ego-centrism of the 
world dominated by the “I” and a lament over the “accidie” that results (124). “Accidie” is a 
theological term that was common in medieval Europe but whose usage has declined in 
contemporary culture; it refers to “a state of restlessness and an inability either to work or to 
pray” (Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church 10). Accidie is a profound state of alienation, 
similar to the psychological condition of depression, but it is more accurately considered a 
spiritual despair.88 Furthermore, accidie “is generally regarded as affecting particularly monks 
and hermits, who are more liable to it than other persons owing to the outward monotony of their 
                                                        
88 Howe’s use of the term “accidie” in accordance with her comments on her use of theological vocabulary: “I chose 
to break away from a Freudian and psychoanalytic vocabulary to one which seemed to me (and still does [sic] more 
liberating. This was the vocabulary of theology” (Brito 102). She remarks on this shift of vocabulary in The 
Wedding Dress in the section “Catholic” when she asks, why not say “despairing” rather than “depressed”? 
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life” (Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church 10). Interestingly, Howe asserts that accidie, an 
alienation associated with asceticism, can be related to the materialism and individualism of 
capitalist modernity for it, like a “metal and economic” collar, encircles and constrains those in 
its grasp. If materialistic, bourgeois individualism engenders accidie, and accidie leads to the 
self’s isolation and withdrawal, then a solution lies in a focus on both social conditions and 
reenergized spiritual life. As with liberation theology, Howe does not oppose the spiritual to the 
social, but links them. Communion with the divine does not perpetuate the subject’s isolation and 
consequent self-centered inwardness; a lack of spiritual sustenance does. Howe asserts not only 
that the material conditions of poverty and injustice can enervate one’s spiritual condition but 
also that one’s spirituality must be nourished to avoid accidie’s temptation to retreat inward. 
Thus the interior and exterior registers of the self are interwoven: the self is not an isolate 
opposed to social or material conditions. The social and spiritual elements of the self, taken 
together, are able to resist the bourgeois individualism that produces atomized individuals in the 
first place. “In the Spirit There are No Accidents,” Howe’s connection between materialism and 
acedia offers a way of thinking of a poetry of transcendence and prayerful contemplation not as 
an escape from social conditions but as means to combat social withdrawal. It enacts poetry of 
transcendence as a poethical activity, both recognizing social ills and providing a model of 
spiritually sustained, other-oriented subjectivity.   
Bewilderment, Wandering, and Howe’s Poethics 
 So far in this chapter, I have investigated Howe’s poethics by considering her poetry in 
relation to her poetic predecessor Oppen, particularly with her use of the serial/spiral lyric form, 
and within a framework of Levinasian ethics in conjunction with liberation theology. It is 
important to emphasize that while a faith-based orientation towards writing may seem to indicate 
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a preconceived and predetermined course along lines of religious conviction, to Howe, the 
emphasis on spiraling movement within her poetic texts draws on models of mysticism that 
pointedly do not drive the lyric subject towards a fixed telos. Instead, the self is continually 
emptying out and transforming through its experiences. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
Howe links the poetics and politics of bewilderment to what she sees as the high value of 
wandering in life, in thought, and in language. To Howe, the value of wandering productively 
contrasts with normative social values of coherence and fixity, as she argues that the spiral is a 
place “to learn about perplexity and loss of bearing. And even if it is associated with childhood, 
madness, stupidity, and failure, even if it shows not only how to get lost but also how it feels not 
to return, bewilderment has a high status in several mystical traditions” (15). Howe connects 
mystical experiences, such as the disorientation of bewilderment, with ethical practice, and 
advances bewilderment as an ethics as well as a poetics and politics (The Wedding Dress 5, 12). 
Howe insists that a subject’s perception of experience needs to be continually re-adjusted in a 
way that allows for openness to encounter alterity of the suffering Other. Moreover, she offers 
another way to explain her exploration of perception and encounter. Howe’s conceptualization of 
dualistic life-views draws on both liberationist and phenomenological influences in order to 
illuminate her poethics. As Howe explains in an essay in The Wedding Dress, “two fundamental 
and oppositional life-views . . . coexist in many of us”: an “invisible-faithful view” and a 
“materialist-skeptical view” promulgated by the entrenched power dynamics of the status quo 
(WD 12).89 This “materialist-skeptical view,” Howe argues, is the one that many of us live, and it 
                                                        
89 Although Howe here sets forth a binary opposition between faith and “skepticism” or reason that is on some level 
simplistic and didactic, it is important to note that she qualifies her critique of rationalism when she states “Reason 
without the other values becomes evil” (WD “Catholic” 121). Moreover, her advocacy for a life in faith is neither 
prescriptive nor dogmatic. While avowing a Catholic faith, her writings both affirm what she sees as the valuable 
commonalities among faith traditions, and she gestures towards thinking and sacred objects from multiple faith 
traditions, including Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist (Brito 100; WD 6, 13, 22; Come and See 87-88).  
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promotes an egoistic and ultimately enervating value system based on political and economic 
systems that benefit a privileged few while impoverishing many global inhabitants (WD 12). 
Resisting complete submission to such materialistic perspectives and making room for the 
“invisible-faithful” view takes a continual recalibration of perception, a re-seeing of the world 
that is other-oriented and, therefore, inherently ethical.90 
In order to convey the ethical potential of wandering, many of Howe’s writings, like 
Forged, hinge on serial/spiral movement through the use of the trope of journey. In the 
serial/spiral prose poem “Catholic” in The Wedding Dress, Howe draws on the medieval 
theologian and Dominican priest, Thomas Aquinas, as a model of peripatetic thinker from an 
earlier era. At the same time, Howe also frames itinerancy within twenty-first century social 
conditions: “it is imperative to find a virtue in itinerancy because this is the world now. People 
are either fugitives who want to go home, or seekers who don’t want to go home” (119). Howe 
thus positions the activity of wandering as both participating in an inquiry-based strain of the 
Catholic tradition and as an approach to contemporary life and writing that is socially and 
ethically engaged. By resisting stasis, possessions, and security, the act of wandering enables one 
to identify with the materially and/or spiritually homeless, and is thus in line with bewilderment 
as a politics and an ethics. As such, in this emphasis on wandering, the processes of perception 
and subjectivity in Howe’s texts are neither static nor circumscribed, but are, instead, open-ended 
and dynamic. 
                                                        
90 Howe’s emphasis on the movement of perceptions demonstrates the resonance of Projectivist poetics in her texts 
as well, for, as Olson writes of poetic composition in his foundational essay, “Projectivist Verse,” “always one 
perception must must must MOVE, INSTANTER, ON ANOTHER,” formulating, Tim Woods argues, a “new ethic 
of perception,” that allows for Olson’s “ALTERNATIVE TO THE EGO-POSITION” since language in perpetual 
movement, cannot be rigidly programmed, which “diminishes the importance of the dominant, co-ordinating 
subject” (Woods 459). Woods places Projectivist verse as the direct inheritor of the Objectivist poetics, so it makes 
sense that Howe shares parallels with both poetic movements. 
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“Catholic” features an itinerant speaking subject who drives around Southern California 
freeways with no stated destination; indeed, the poem concludes with the affirmation “I keep 
moving” (122). Section 27 describes an area around the American-Mexican border:  
The second border on the other side of the freeway crossing north at the Marine 
training base. Ugly nuclear power plants, the humping hills. Women running 
alone at dawn, aliens sending money home, in their wallets pictures of family and 
friends, love letters, addresses, I don’t want to be here. The canyons are groomed 
and pocked with bourgeois housing developments that are built for eclipse. (117) 
This passage surveys a familiar landscape, in which the physical presence of commonplace sites 
of the twenty-first century American military-industrial complex—the border, the freeway, a 
Marine base, nuclear power plants, residences of the wealthy—are juxtaposed against the 
presence of the marginalized population of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. This passage 
provides a corrective to commonplace perceptions of class, race and legal status. In contrast to 
the dehumanizing nomenclature that is typical in contemporary political rhetoric, these “aliens” 
are humanized by the text’s description of their possessions, such as photos of loved ones, “love 
letters,” and addresses. The contrast between the haves and have-nots in this passage is 
demonstrated by the difference in their possessions and their approach to capital. Whereas the 
“aliens” are characterized as wearing their meager possessions on their bodies, their wallets 
emptied in the action of “sending money” to their families, the wealthy hoard capital in the large 
residences of their “bourgeois housing developments.” The text emphasizes the opportunistic and 
exploitative relationship between the materialist “bourgeois” residents and nature, for the 
canyons have been “groomed” for the aesthetic and domestic pleasure of the inhabitants, while 
the phrase “built for eclipse” hints at the housing developments’—and their owners—welcome 
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of the canyon walls’ shade and obscurity; they hide away in comfort, avoiding the light. 
Moreover, the text demonstrates Howe’s itinerant values, for it weaves a contrast between 
movement and immobility; the running women, “humping hills,” and immigrants sending money 
are dynamic, in contrast to the solid constructions that house the power structures that are lodged 
or “pocked” within the text. The is contrast correlates to Howe’s ethical deployment of 
subjectivity, for it values movement, openness and disorientation rather than possessiveness, 
hoarding, and stasis. 
Furthermore, this passage is phenomenological in that it provides an example of the kind 
of re-calibration of the perception of experience that Howe’s texts advance in resistance to the 
“materialist-skeptical view” that marginalizes immigrants as criminals and privileges the wealth 
and luxury of the “bourgeois” residents. Illustrating Howe’s liberationist influence, this passage 
presents an alternative account that encompasses the point of view of the impoverished “aliens,” 
and humanizes them as economic refugees, in resistance to the “normal” account in accord with 
the “materialist-skeptical view.” Thus, the poethics of “Catholic” rests upon the defamiliarization 
of a commonplace, contemporary landscape in order to acknowledge the alterity of marginalized 
“aliens.” The text illustrates the poetics and ethics of bewilderment: the wandering perspective of 
the lyric “I” enacts a model of disorientation, recalibration of perception, and movement away 
from normative value categories in order to advance an other-oriented subjectivity.  
“9/11”: Ethics and Textual Encounter  
While “Catholic” wanders across one particular American twenty-first century landscape of 
southern California, two poems from Howe’s 2004 collection, On the Ground, survey multiple 
settings to addresses the problems of the post-9/11 geopolitical climate and the fraught role of 
poetry within this context. I argue that, in On the Ground, Howe deploys an ethical vocabulary 
  
 208 
while exploring the inherent limitations of poetry’s power while exploring both postlanguage 
lyric poetry’s responsibility and ethical solutions. In the short lyric poem “9/11,” Howe again 
takes up themes of perception and misperception; she critiques the type of “skeptical-
materialistic” vision perpetuated by America’s military-industrial complex—a view from 
above—which erases difference, fails to recognize otherness, and perpetuates violent actions: 
The first person is an existentialist 
 
like trash in the groin of the sand dunes 
like a brown cardboard home beside a dam 
 
like seeing like things the same 
between Death Valley and the desert of Paran (23) 
In “9/11,” Howe uses the strategy of litany, employing the deliberate overuse of synonyms and 
the repetition of the word “like,” to demonstrate the ethical problem of “like seeing like things 
the same”—that is, the problem of a vision so distant that erases it difference. The kind of vision 
Howe identifies is shaped by an American worldview bent on geopolitical dominance in the turn 
of the twenty-first century. The poem deploys a liberationist approach insofar as it is rooted in 
the experience of poverty, for it surveys a landscape that, if viewed closely, is revealed as 
squalid—litter dots the landscape, and a cardboard box provides the fragile, indeed, doomed 
shelter for the impoverished.  
Most of the poem, however, underscores that these sobering realities are typically not 
surveyed closely:  
like looking down on Utah as if  
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it was Saudi Arabia or Pakistan  
like war-planes out of Miramar 
 
like a split cult a jolt of coke New York 
like Mexico in its deep beige couplets (23)  
The domineering American psyche tends to take a view from above, as in the reference to “war-
planes out of Miramar.” “Miramar” literally means “sea view,” and this phrase refers to two 
kinds of distant vision: the expansive horizon implied in the name “sea view,” and the aerial 
view from the military planes. “Miramar” literally alludes to the annual Miramar air show in San 
Diego, a huge military air show that is a site where America’s military and technological strength 
is staged for audiences of over 300,000 attendees (“Sponsorship”).91 It is from just such “war-
planes” as the ones “out of Miramar” that provide an aerial view that, as in Levinas’s ethical 
critique of vision, erases the singularity of alterity: from such great heights, sites in Pakistan or 
the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and the biblical desert of Paran, appear to be the same 
as places in the American desert, such as Death Valley and Utah. Howe’s reference to “war-
planes” recalls the 9/11 attackers and their use of airplanes as weapons. While not excusing the 
9/11 terrorists, Howe’s emphasis on U.S. air power suggests that America’s militaristic ideology 
and capitalist economy have their own culpability.  
Howe indicates another problematic dimension to American’s distancing vision. The 
allusion to the desert of Paran indicates a Biblical site of itinerancy: it includes the wilderness 
where Abraham travelled and the desert where Israelites spent part of forty years wandering after 
the Exodus in the Sinai Peninsula. However, the Islamic tradition identifies the desert of Paran, 
                                                        
91 For more on the Miramar Air Show, see htttp://www.miramarairshow.com.  
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or Faran, as part of the region of Hejaz, around Mecca, the land where Abraham’s son Ishmael 
and his mother Hagar settled (Firestone 65, 205n18).92 Thus, in the Islamic tradition, Paran/Faran 
is a region identified with pilgrimage. In a poem dedicated to “9/11,” the geopolitical clash 
between the Islamic and Western worlds, the desert of Paran alludes to a site in the holy lands 
that is perceived differently by the two different traditions. The reference alludes to both the 
different perceptions, which carries the potential for conflict, but also emphasizes the common 
geographical roots of the Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions. Moreover, both the biblical and 
Islamic traditions assign the desert a spiritual meaning borne out of journey—whether wandering 
or pilgrimage—and both meanings are erased by the leveling vision of America’s militaristic 
endeavors for world domination. This focus on the flattening level of vision has implications for 
the ethics of poetry writing as well, for it demonstrates its Objectivist poetic lineage in its 
observation of the ethical problems in symbolism and simile. “[L]ike seeing like things the 
same,” is an ethically problematic activity, both within the political world and within the world 
of the poem, and, as Oppen argued, poetic similes and metaphors should be held to high 
standards of accountability. Thus “9/11” highlights the ethical dimensions of the tendency 
towards a dangerous, leveling vision that delivers only sameness. 
In addition to identifying the problematic ethics of leveling vision and reductive poetic 
metaphor, Howe brings in the question of ethics by framing the poem with comments on the use 
of the first, second and third person in language. Indeed, the opening line, “[t]he first person is an 
existentialist,” foregrounds Howe’s embrace of existentialist thought.93 While “existentialist” is a 
                                                        
92 For the biblical references to the desert of wilderness of Paran, see Revised Standard Version, Genesis 21:17-21, 
Numbers 10:11-12, 33; 12:16; 13:3, and 1 Samuel 25:1-4.  
93 In The Wedding Dress, Howe explicitly embraces existentialist thought and challenges postmodernism’s rejection 
of existentialism: “I am at the end of a generation that began with existentialism. . .  We are not by any means done 
with the existentialism of Camus and Sartre, and we don’t see the history of culture in blocks—as modernist one 
minute and postmodern the next—but as a long struggle without interruption” (88). 
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broad term, I read Howe’s reference as indicating a subject that both searches for meaning in a 
world devoid of certainty and assumes responsibility for acts of free will. Almost buried in the 
middle of “9/11”is the line “the second person is the beloved,”  which suggests that a Levinasian, 
direct address to the “second person” indicates the embrace of the Other as beloved. Concluding 
the poem is are the lines “like this, like that . . . like Call us all It / Thou It. ‘Sky to Spirit! Call us 
all It!’ / The third person is a materialist” (23). “The third person is a materialist,” I understand as 
a reference to the philosophical sense of materialism, which is the view that all facts depend 
upon or are reducible to physical processes. The third person as “materialist” indicates the 
circumstance where the other is regarded as a dehumanized object, an “It.” The poem’s 
concluding line, then, situates and re-names the ethical consequences of the leveling vision I 
have identified: the action of “like seeing like things the same” enables the subject to reduce 
others to material categories. Thus, “9/11” comments on pronoun usage to draw a contrast 
between the Levinasian recognition of the person in his or her alterity and singularity through 
second-person address and the dehumanization of the Other as object through reduction to a 
third-person category. 
Howe also gestures to dehumanizing relations as rooted in the materialistic-skeptical 
worldview that the text implies inheres in both the 9/11 terrorists’ and Americans’ militaristic 
ideologies. The text offers an example of dehumanizing violence with the reference to “[a]n 
earthquake a turret with arms and legs.” The collapse of the Twin Towers is likened to the 
disruption of an earthquake, while the poem’s structure of overused synonyms simultaneously 
belies this metaphor: 9/11 had the cataclysmic scale of an earthquake but was pointedly not a 
natural disaster. The violent act of the terrorist attack flattens the distinction between two types 
of events, rendering different things similar. Furthermore, the image “a turret with arms and 
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legs” invokes the scene of 9/11 with economy. This is 9/11, prior to the collapse of the second 
tower, as represented in media accounts: the viewer sees the tower under attack and the flailing 
limbs on the bodies of its doomed occupants. Moreover, the word “turret” is a military term that 
refers to the defensive position on a tower. The violence of the 9/11 attacks transformed the 
second tower into a turret and melded the tower and the victims’ bodies into one object. Thus, 
the terrorists’ violence renders victims’ bodies to mere material by denying their humanity and 
treating them as mere objects to destroy. Furthermore, the words aurally enact violence: in the 
lines “An earthquake a turret,” “like winners taking the hit,” “like a split cult a jolt of coke New 
York,” and “Call us all It / Thou It,” the repeated voiceless stops in “t” and “k” consonants and 
the compilation of monosyllabic words with short vowel sounds produces a staccato harshness 
that underscores the violence and rupture both described in the content and constructed through 
the text’s parataxis.  
The climax of the poem, “like Call us all It / Thou It. ‘Sky to Spirit! Call us all It!’” is a 
lament in the wake of 9/11. Its invocation of “us all” indicates a collective failure to engage 
ethically; both the 9/11 terrorists and Americans in their bid for global domination invite the 
reduction of human relations. The solution, “the second person is beloved,” as realized through 
the direct address of the other and, therefore, the recognition of the other’s humanity, resides 
within the poem, but its presence is obscured within the overpowering litany of equivocating 
simile. While “9/11” allows for the possibility of ethical encounter with the shift from third 
person objectification to second person address, the formal structure of the poem underscores the 
difficulty inherent in collective action. 
“9/11” also comments on the ethics of poetic writing in its commentary on the usage of 
the first person both within the poetic text and beyond. The opening line, “The first person is an 
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existentialist,” asserts that the first person can be ethically deployed insofar as the poem 
recognizes its relation to the other. A poem in an “I-It” relation with the other—that is, a 
domineering lyric “I” that relegates either readers or others within the poem to instruments—
would be ethically problematic. Instead, I suggest that the presence of both “I” and “Thou,” 
indicates that an ethical, “I-Thou” relation is possible within a poetic text. The “second person” 
as “the beloved,” structurally buried in the middle of the text, is nevertheless an important 
commentary on Howe’s poethics as they gesture to the relation between reader and writer. While 
the text does not use the second person directly, it theorizes the vocative, therefore gesturing 
towards the address of the reader. Thus, despite its lack of direct address, I read “9/11” as 
invested in the subject of lyric address to a readership for, as Waters argues, “the second person 
and the vocative do not exhaust the ways in which poems can signal their addressees” (6). Of 
course, it is true that, within the structure of “9/11,” the possibility for the invocation of “the 
second person” as “the beloved,” is almost drowned out by the louder and more insistent cry of 
the larger, materialistic world: “Call us all It!” Thus, Howe recognizes the limitations of poetry’s 
power within a cynical world that is bent on its own destruction while gesturing to the capacity 
of poetry to survive as an ethical force within that world. 
This conceptualization of the lyric as capable of an ethical relation between writer and 
reader is present in Howe’s writing on poetics. In line with Brewster’s argument that lyric is 
fundamentally concerned with the nature of address and Waters’ interpretation of lyric’s 
tendency to reach out to unknown readers, Howe contends that, within the lyric, “A call and 
response to and from a stranger is implied” (The Wedding Dress 19). Furthermore, in the 2011 
collection of poetry and essays, Come and See, Howe, like Rankine in Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, 
draws on Paul Celan’s metaphor of poetry as a message in a bottle to characterize the wonder of 
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finding an unexpected text that in turn has a profound influence on her thinking (83).94 Howe 
also cites Celan’s poetry to indicate an encounter with the unexpected presence of the other: “A 
miracle can be the appearance of another person rising out of an emptiness that we are beginning 
to accept as permanent. As Paul Celan wrote, it is ‘A rumbling: / Truth itself / walked among / 
men, / amidst the / metaphor squall’” (91). In this passage, Howe gestures to the possibility of 
encounter with the other as a contrast with the nihilism of seemingly permanent emptiness. The 
invocation of Celan’s “metaphor squall” indicates the belief in the presence of the human within 
the confusing tempests of figurative language. Thus, Howe draws on Celanian poetics to 
characterize poetry, which addresses and engages with a reader who is at once “a stranger” and 
“beloved,” as attempting to fulfill an ethical imperative of turning towards the other in a world of 
human suffering.  
Modern Poetry: Limitations and Ethical Possibilities  
In another post 9/11 serial/spiral poem of journey from On the Ground, “Kneeling Bus,” 
Howe takes up the tension between modern poetry’s political endeavors and its limitations while 
gesturing to the primacy of the individual subject’s ethical responsibility. “Kneeling Bus” begins 
with an experience of the lyric subject on a bus in a specific, post 9/11 time and place: “the back 
of the M11 / February 2003.” Interspersed with fragmented descriptions of New York City life, 
are scenes both utopian—a vision of individual and universal kindness—and horrific—including 
a section where a “frightened terrorist” kills a girl. At one point, Howe references the political 
intentions of her poetry: “I’ll never write a villanelle / but a chorus of spirals / to muck up your 
wars” (49). Here, Howe aligns herself with postmodern rejection of fixed form—in this example, 
the classical form of the villanelle—and, like the Objectivist, Black Mountain, and Language 
poets, correlates open form with subversion, that is, the attempt to “muck up” the dominant 
                                                        
94 Howe refers to finding a letter written by novelist Ilona Karmel as a Celanian message in a bottle.  
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political order. The implicit you of “your wars” in this passage is the Bush administration, who, 
in February 2003 had engaged the U.S. in the war in Afghanistan and was poised to invade Iraq.  
While Howe’s anti-war political stance is clear, later in the poem, Howe acknowledges 
her own and fellow poets’ efforts to effect change in the world as well as their limitations:  
The poets of my generation 
 
  And younger peck at the egg of the sky. 
  Blue shell, blue shell let all be well outside! 
 
  Tip-tip, won’t crack . . . chip-chip, try try! (60) 
In a metaphor that includes a reference to her own poetic vocation, Howe likens poets of her 
generation and the younger to baby birds who try to chip away at the egg shell of the “sky,” or 
social and historical conditions that surround them. She alludes to her own and other twentieth-
century poets’ will and good intentions, but the image of the poet as a baby bird trapped within 
an eggshell bespeaks both determination and relative impotence, vitality and fragility. Like 
Rankine’s acknowledgement of the poet’s feelings of despair in DLMBL, Howe’s image of a 
poet is a far cry from, say, an empowered activist-poet raising a rallying cry or a vociferous poet-
prophet who plans to shape a culture according to his or her vision.  
This passage also comments on developments in modern poetry directly:  
A hundred years of turnover 
  and four generations later 
 
  we know everything about evil 
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  in the public sphere 
With the phrase “A hundred years of turnover,” Howe extends backwards as well as forwards, 
thus placing poetic efforts in twentieth and early twenty-first century verse, which encompasses 
modernist and postmodernist efforts, into a collective “we.” Thus, Howe makes no distinctions 
here among poetic schools, camps or lineages, instead recognizing that, taken together, the “four 
generations” of poets in the twentieth century and early twenty-first century have gained 
knowledge of “evil / in the public sphere.” But this knowledge continually runs up against limits 
in its application in individuals’ lives, as Howe turns to the question, to both herself and the 
reader, of how to “disassemble / the hypocritical / crippling factor in every body?” The term 
“every body” uses the sonic form of the familiar term “everybody” but separates it into two 
words, thereby emphasizing the individual subject in his or her own body and therefore within 
vulnerability, weakness, and susceptibility to being crippled by moral failings. At the same time, 
“every body” also points to persons in both collective and individual dimensions, demonstrating 
what Woods terms the “ethical turn” of late twentieth century poetry in its emphasis on the 
subject’s responsibility. Poets may know “everything about evil / in the public sphere,” but for 
change to happen “every body” must disassemble their “crippling” hypocrisy. Politics, in the 
form of political analysis, or, in Jenkins’ terms, an archaeology of the workings of power, has 
been a significant achievement within poetry, but it is not enough. Howe’s questions insist upon 
ethical inquiry and ethical correction at both the individual and collective levels.  
 As with “9/11,” “Kneeling Bus” is not without hope, and it likewise offers both an ethical 
imperative for the subject to recognize and responsibility for the Other as well as the recognition 
of the difficulty inherent in such a task. In the middle of “Kneeling Bus,” Howe offers what 
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Woods calls the Objectivist project’s powerful “utopian and ethical vision . . . of openness to 
unimagined possibilities” that “call for a radical transformation of the present” (Poetics 2, 10): 
This has to happen at the exact same minute:  
  . . . . .  
  The people are good  
  The people are tender 
  The people are just 
  and merciful to each other 
  All this has to happen to everyone without exception. (47) 
This vision is ethical in that emphasizes both the responsibility of the individual subject to be 
“good,” “just / and merciful to each other.” This vision is also utopian in that it applies such 
ethical action to all of humanity. Indeed, this vision—as in other moments of vision in Howe’s 
lyrical poetry—demonstrates a strain that is also romantic in its imaginative thrust and visionary 
intensity. But the text does not resolve in the tidy closure and false comfort of this vision, for it 
moves onto questions that highlight the gap between the utopian vision and the suffering and 
injustice in the world: “Why is the messiah dumped in a pit? / Why is the messiah scorned and 
laughed at? / . . .  / No answer. That’s why” (47). These questions, which convey Howe’s 
liberationist conviction that Christ is present within humanity, and especially within the 
marginalized and oppressed, show the textual movement between the confrontation of the reality 
of suffering and an ethical and utopian vision for change in the present, with an emphasis on the 
subject’s responsibility for the other. Furthermore, like the presence of the “beloved” in “9/11,” 
Howe structurally places this hopeful passage in the middle of the lyric sequence of “Kneeling 
Bus,” and thus does not develop a climax that closes with a utopian vision. “Kneeling Bus” 
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therefore eschews both narrative linearity and conventional expectations of postromantic lyric 
movement towards closure. Rather, the utopian vision is gestured to and folded within the 
serial/spiral movement as an imaginative possibility within material realities.  
How does “Kneeling Bus” conclude? As the serial/spiral sequence carries on in 
“Kneeling Bus,” the liberationist swing from humanity to God and return to humanity continues, 
ultimately concluding with the lyric “I” back on the M11:  
  My church is this machine rolling 
  the people along … 
   
  Sometimes I whisper help  
to interrupt my wheeling brain. (64) 
In a departure from conventional, Romantic lyric conventions, the conclusion of “Kneeling Bus” 
does not build to a simplified utopian vision that transcends material conditions. Rather, the 
vision of individual and collective responsibility informs the lyric subject’s perception of the 
immanent conditions of her surroundings. This section demonstrates many features of Howe’s 
poetry that I have identified in this chapter: the trope of the bus journey conveys the itinerant 
lyric subject in continual, bewildering movement, and the text registers both ongoing perceptions 
of the subject’s exteriority and dimensions of interiority, including feelings of despair and 
desperation. Tellingly, the simple word of prayer,“help,” indicates the openness of the lyric “I” 
to the divine, or infinitely exterior, to “interrupt my wheeling brain,” or, in Levinasian terms, to 
disrupt the subject’s egocentrism. This openness is underscored formally, through the 
incorporation of considerable white space and minimal closure through punctuation.  
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This passage reveals Howe’s liberationist influence as it chronicles the presence of the 
impoverished, for “sometimes / my church is a public latrine,” and “Sometimes my church is a 
Franciscan chapel / near Penn Station. Beads rattle. / People sleep, mutter and curse” (64). The 
“Franciscan chapel / near Penn Station” refers to Church and Friary of Saint Francis of Assisi, 
which is run by Franciscan friars, a religious order devoted to service of the indigent (“Mission 
Statement”). Impoverished persons also appear in the poem as they “sleep, mutter, and curse” in 
the Franciscan chapel. It is in the quotidian and humble sites—the city bus, the “public latrine”—
where the lyric “I” makes her “church,” thus conveying the subject’s ongoing and everyday 
connection between immanent and transcendent experiences. Finally, an ethical imperative both 
broadly overarching and humbly quotidian is revealed in the conclusion, as Howe moves 
between the reality of humanity’s suffering, to a reflection on the divine, and back to humanity. 
The closing gesture of the poem, “When I leave this bus / a thanks to the driver is to cross and 
live” concludes Kneeling Bus with the lyric subject’s brief encounter with an Other that takes the 
form of gratitude. This statement of thankfulness allows the lyric subject “to cross”—that is, to 
reach over the boundary between self and Other, as well as to make a blessing through the sign 
of the cross—“and live.” The recognition of the existence of the divine in an encounter with the 
Other is a life-enhancing action.  
Although Howe does not offer a facile optimism or easy solutions, she emphasizes the 
urgent need for the unexpected messages of hope in the twenty-first century. To Howe, writing 
can be an ethical force in the today’s world. Howe explains as much in Come and See, in an 
argument that is similar to Retallack’s articulation of the “butterfly effect,” but through the use of 
theological vocabulary of the epiphanic and the miraculous: 
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A leap out of one’s seemingly determined fate (an act of charity) can come from 
any number of experiences … and this message is offered to the twenty-first 
century as something to be treasured. More than ever, now: to believe there is 
something that is not simply a norm. In a sense, when this epiphany takes place, it 
is a miracle. A miracle is an event that changes the meaning of things. It is like a 
thought that floats free of the surrounding systems and conventions, and enters, 
uninvited, a sentence, a stanza, a conversation, a lab result, and sends it on 
another path. (91)  
Like Retallack’s “swerves,” Howe’s idea of the miraculous epiphany describes any event that 
sets thought, language, and inquiry outside of norms and allows the subject to move outside of a 
predetermined course; and like Retallack, Howe emphasizes these deviations from the norm as 
particularly urgent in the twenty-first century. While any number of experiences can facilitate a 
miraculous maneuver outside such norms, poetic language has a particular tenacity and 
flexibility. Ultimately, Howe sees poetry as a possible counter to nihilism: “poetry itself is a part 
of the mind reserved for resistance to force. Poetry doesn’t just help someone survive, it is a 
survivor itself: fluid, protean, as it passes through walls” (Come and See 89-90). Poetry both 
enables survival and itself endures entrenched power dynamics by transgressing the “walls” of 
the rigid structures of thought and language within the status quo. Like Rankine’s Don’t Let Me 
Be Lonely, Howe’s later poetry offers a postlanguage lyric that advances a means to survival in 
the complexity of twenty-first century American culture. In its insistence on the contact of the 
divine and infinite in the everyday, Howe provides an example of a postlanguage lyric poetry of 
transcendence, rooted in both the Romantic/lyric and Objectivist traditions, that is ethical in its 
deployment of lyric subjectivity, its exploration of perception and encounter with marginalized 
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Others, and its resistance to the dehumanizing power structures within contemporary American 
culture. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DOUBLES, GHOSTS, AND TEXTUAL ENCOUNTERS: ETHICS AND ELIZABETH 
ROBINSON’S POSTLANGUAGE LYRIC POETRY 
In this dissertation, my investigation of each postlanguage lyric poet’s poethics has been 
essentially twofold: an exploration of each poet’s articulation of an ethical lyric “I,” and a 
discussion of each poet’s conceptualization of ethical encounter between poet and reader, 
involving each poet’s implied or direct invocation of a lyric “you.” I now turn to another 
postlanguage lyric poet, Elizabeth Robinson, whose writings also theorize and enact an other-
oriented lyric subjectivity and extend the possibility of lyric as ethical encounter between poet 
and reader. In my exploration of Robinson’s work, however, I shift to apply the theoretical lens 
of Derridean deconstruction and ethics, including the concepts of the doubleness of language, 
hauntology, radical hospitality, and the gift. While Derrida’s ethics build directly on those of 
Levinas, as Derrida follows Levinas’s centrality of the subject’s responsibility to the Other, there 
are key departures from Levinas in Derrida’s ethical thought. Notably, Derrida critiques what he 
sees as Levinas’s idealized vision of experience with the Other by insisting that the subject 
always situates the Other in relation to the self. To Derrida, ethics depends upon this relation of 
sameness-in-difference, and his position consequently emphasizes the continued appearance of 
difference, conflict, and potential for violence in encounter.  
Robinson’s Poetic Classification 
Elizabeth Robinson is a prolific writer of contemporary American poetry and criticism. 
She has written fourteen full-length collections of poetry, or multi-genre collections that blend 
prose and poetry, between 1990 and 2013. She has also published a number of academic articles 
on pedagogy and literary criticism of post-war American poetry; these address topics that are 
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reflected in her poetry as well, including Christian theology, mystic spirituality, poststructuralist 
theory, and literary explorations of the supernatural. Like her poetic predecessor, Fanny Howe, 
Elizabeth Robinson has been identified by Paul Hoover in the second edition of the Norton 
Anthology of Postmodern American Poetry as a “postlanguage” lyric poet, in that her poetry 
embraces lyricism and allows a space for lyric subjectivity (xlvii). I also suggest that Robinson, 
like Rankine and Howe, advances a postlanguage lyric poetry insofar as it hinges upon her 
retention and revision of an ethical lyric subjectivity.  
Furthermore, Robinson’s poetry shares several other parallels with both Howe and 
Rankine. In an interview with Sarah Rosenthal, Robinson cites Howe as a major influence, and 
while both poets avow their Christian beliefs and explore spirituality in their lyric poetry, their 
faith traditions and expressions of faith differ (250-51). In contrast to Howe’s Catholic 
spirituality, which is heavily influenced by the faith tradition of liberation theology and its 
predominant concerns for social justice, Robinson is a Protestant, and her expression of faith—
and much of her poetry overall—does not directly broadcast a political stance. Furthermore, 
while spirituality and mysticism surface in Robinson’s poetry, their presence is often muted or 
indirect when compared to Howe’s. Moreover, Robinson differs from Howe in her direct 
engagement with poststructuralism, but this difference in turn highlights a strong parallel 
between the work of Robinson and Rankine. Indeed, Robinson, born in 1961, is of the same 
generation as Rankine, and they are both poets who started publishing in the 1990s. Moreover, 
both Robinson and Rankine’s engagement with poststructuralism in their writings—including 
self-conscious commentary on their deployment of the lyric “I”—testify to their historical 
context, for they both began working in an era that developed after the Language school had 
established a strong influence on experimental American poetry writing.  
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As with both Rankine and Howe, my application of the classification of postlanguage 
lyric poetry indicates that Robinson cannot be neatly categorized as a member of a particular late 
twentieth/early twenty-first century experimental poetic “school,” but engages with the work of a 
number of poets across lineages and writing communities. Indeed, Robinson herself resists easy 
classification; while discussing her admiration for earlier poets Barbara Guest and Robin Blaser, 
whom, Robinson notes, do not “fit neatly into the proclivity of their peers’ writings,” she poses 
the apt rhetorical question that can be extended to characterize contemporary postlanguage lyric 
poets: “Is it possible that a U.S. poetics, then, is characterized both by belonging to a community 
and being liminal to it?” (Poetry Society of America, n.p.). While resistance to easy classification 
can be an admirable quality for an artist, perhaps Robinson’s own liminal status has hindered 
extensive critical attention to her work thus far. Despite her impressively prolific output, her 
poetry has only been analyzed in one critical article, by Rusty Morrison, who examines poems 
from Robinson’s 2003 collection, Apprehend, alongside the work of Fanny Howe and Barbara 
Guest, through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.95  
Overview of the Chapter 
In this chapter, I aim to initiate further critical consideration of Robinson’s work with a 
particular focus on her poethics, that is, her poetry’s exploration of lyric subjectivity and the 
ethics of reading and writing lyric poetry. First, I will provide an overview of Robinson’s poetic 
form and style and their relation to politics and ethics by drawing on two selected poems from 
Counterpart (2012) and Apprehend (2003), respectively.96 I then begin to consider how 
Robinson theorizes and articulates postlanguage lyric subjectivity by turning to an extended 
                                                        
95 Morrison uses Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to examine Robinson’s poetic explorations of perceptions of 
objects. 
96 I cite only one poem from Apprehend because the particular poem, “Chicken Little,” a treatment of 9/11, provides 
a useful example to explicate Robinson’s political stance and, given its subject matter, can be contrasted with the 
relatively more descriptive and politically charged 9/11 writings by Rankine and Howe.  
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consideration her 2012 collection Counterpart. Specifically, I analyze how the trope of the 
double explores lyric self-encounter through an application of Derrida’s postructuralist theory of 
language, particularly as related to the doubleness of language. I argue that Robinson draws on 
the figure of the double order to complicate the construction and reception of the “I” in lyric 
poetry. Rather than simplistic self-reflection and self-replication, the lyric “I” can be figured as a 
site of doubleness, difference, openness to alterity, and therefore ethical engagement between the 
subject and her surroundings. Furthermore, an essential element in Counterpart—indeed, in all 
three collections of Robinson’s that I have selected—is intertextuality. As emerges in my 
discussion of Counterpart and, to some degree, of each collection I will consider, Robinson’s 
extensive intertextuality can be read as part of her poethics, for it conveys poetry composition as 
a communal activity that necessarily involves reading and responding to other writers.  
I then turn to Robinson’s 2013 collection On Ghosts, which, like Counterpart, also draws 
extensively on supernatural tropes—in this collection, ghosts and haunting—in order to theorize 
how subjectivity inherently incorporates alterity. The text of On Ghosts explores the interaction 
between the self and (often ghostly) Other through accounts of personal experiences and through 
descriptions of writers’ and readers’ engagements with texts and textuality, including the process 
of reading, composition, and translation. In my reading of On Ghosts, I draw on Derrida’s ethics 
of radical hospitality. I also reference Derridean hauntology, which replaces the study of 
being/presence expressed in the near-homonym “ontology,” with the deconstructive figure of the 
destabilizing ghost who is neither fully absent nor present, neither alive nor dead. Moreover, the 
ghost is an intrusion that delivers ethical injunctions, and is therefore akin to the Levinasian 
Other. Accordingly, Derrida’s description of haunted subjectivity illuminates Robinson’s 
concept of an other-oriented subjectivity that emerges, textually, through the interplay of absence 
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and presence, interiority and exteriority. In addition to the exploration of the self as haunted 
subjectivity in On Ghosts, I also consider Robinson’s nuanced conceptualization of lyric voice 
by providing an overview of recent discourse on voice and by applying contemporary poet and 
critic Susan Stewart’s theory of lyric voice to Robinson’s poetics. This investigation of lyric 
voice provides further insight into the way that Robinson’s postlanguage poetics involve the 
subject’s interplay between interiority and exteriority. 
The final part of this chapter shifts towards a consideration of Robinson’s 
conceptualization and direct or implied invocation of the second person, or lyric “you.” 
Accordingly, I turn to an earlier collection of lyric poems, the 2006 collection, Apostrophe, for, 
as the title implies, a central theme of this collection is the poet’s address to the reader through 
the direct or implied invocation of the second person. My readings of selections from Apostrophe 
explore textual encounter between poet and reader as theorized by deconstructionist critic 
Jonathan Culler’s influential interpretation of lyric apostrophe. In my readings of selected poems, 
I also extend my application of Derridean ethics and his concept of the “gift” and return to 
Robinson’s exploration of lyric voice. I argue that, in Apostrophe, Robinson draws on the trope 
of text as gift and foregrounds a discussion of lyric voice to both enable the possibility of ethical 
encounter between the writer and reader through lyric address and highlight the complexities and 
limitations of textual encounter. Furthermore, I argue that Robinson’s exploration of lyric 
address can be elucidated by Derridean ethics that temper some of the more utopian elements of 
the Levinasian-Celanian model of reading as encounter. 
As with the earlier chapters in this project, my poethical exploration of Robinson’s 
writings are guided by questions that focus on lyric subjectivity and the ethics of writing and 
reading lyric poetry. In particular, in this chapter, I ask the following questions: how does 
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Robinson theorize and illustrate lyric subjectivity and related concepts, including self-
exploration, interiority, presence, and lyric voice? What are the ethical implications of her 
approach to lyric subjectivity? How does the ethics Robinson advances for postlanguage lyric 
poetry manifest in terms of the poetry’s use of language? How does Robinson characterize the 
practices of reading and writing lyric poetry as an engagement with ethical encounter between 
poet and reader?   
Description of Robinson’s Poetry: Form, Style, Politics, and Ethics 
To begin my exploration of Robinson’s poethics, I will first consider the form of her 
poetic texts. Formally, much of Robinson’s work appears like “conventional” contemporary lyric 
poetry in that her free-verse lines of poetry often align along the left-hand margin and employ 
relatively straightforward syntax, although at times she plays with both margin placement and 
syntax, as some examples in this chapter will demonstrate. Robinson’s poetry is often spare, and 
even stark, with lines that vary in length, but tend to be terse. Consequently, much white space 
surrounds the words of the text, which Robinson explains in an interview with Rosenthal, as 
indicating her desire to “underline the openness of the page where nothing is said—the listening, 
but never passive, part of the space” (233). Robinson also identifies the tension between her 
attraction to both “clean lines and clean language” and the “messiness of experience” in her lyric 
poetry (Rosenthal 233-34). From the synthesis of formal cleanliness and untidy subject matter, 
there is, in Rosenthal’s words “a carefulness, a lyricism” that emerges in Robinson’s poetry, but 
at the same time “there’s often a jarring quality to the juxtapositions, an asserting of unusual 
links or associations” which results in “a sense of mystery” (234) and a “subtle violence” in the 
subverted “assumptions about how words go together” (239). Moreover, much of Robinson’s 
poetry has a distinct blend of abstract ideas and description of tangible matter; her diction is 
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often comprised of simple, concrete nouns that convey commonplace objects. Rosenthal 
observes Robinson’s Celanian tendency to use words that refer to tangible objects such as “tree” 
and “stone,” while at the same time infusing both the words and those objects with a haunting 
strangeness (249).97 Such an intense concentration on select words and their unsettling 
juxtapositions result in the construction of tonalities that can be alternately strong and subtle.  
For example, the opening poem of the 2012 collection Counterpart, titled “Turn,” 
provides a powerful image in select, concrete terms. “Turn” illustrates the pursuit of the self 
through the metaphor of an ingrown seedling whose development is thwarted. Formally, “Turn” 
is taut, consisting of concise lines of no more than four words each. It offers the images of dual 
courses for seed development of growth into a seedling or one stunted in its growth cycle. One 
possible path opens the poem: 
The one sharp kernel  
makes its bitter  
seedling 
 
Seedling  
Tendered at the end  
of the year. (3) 
 “Turn” illustrates Robinson’s relatively straightforward syntax and clean lines. At the same 
time, the text demonstrates Rosenthal’s observation that, while Robinson deploys diction that 
                                                        
97 In her analysis of Robinson’s poetry, Morrison examines Robinson’s exploration of the perception of objects, in 
which concrete terms takes on complex resonances. For example, Morrison uses Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
theories of perception to explore how Robinson’s image of “blanket” in the poem “House” in the collection 
Apprehend “turns us back toward the missed, the missing territory of objects themselves, if only to show us what we 
no longer see,” thus highlighting “the constructed nature of the field of our experience and the objects we perceive 
to inhabit it” (85-86). 
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describes objects that are everyday, the poem’s descriptions and juxtapositions produce jarring 
effects; the commonplace transmutes into something uncanny. “Turn” presents two courses for a 
seed’s growth, and yet both seem unnerving: the seed can either grow into a “bitter seedling” 
which will be “[t]endered” upon conclusion of the year, or a seed that should or could bloom 
could instead produce only a “green aperture / bitter, tender, self- / pursuing.” The seed imagery 
of “Turn” illustrates the turn inwards as stunted development, a kind of self-encounter as an 
ingrown failure of production; the only creation is an “aperture” or opening that is “self-
pursuing.” Initially, one might read the cracked seed as a condemnation of narcissism, for it 
indicts self-pursuit as a failure to thrive. However, Robinson’s description of commonplace 
objects—both the seedling and cracked seed—as strangely “bitter” outgrowths of a “sharp 
kernel,” resists an easy contrast between a fulfilled bloom and failed seed, and thus produces an 
ambivalence. The repetition between the terms “bitter” and “tendered”/“tender” underscores the 
similarities between the two courses of the kernel’s development or non-development; both are 
vulnerable to forces external and internal, and a harshness of conditions is gestured to, but only 
vaguely, given the poem’s sparing use of description and lack of contextual landscape.  
Moreover, the two courses of the kernel’s development are presented in uncomfortable 
terms; while the “bitter seedling” fulfills its teleology, this is presented as a course not of 
fulfillment but exhaustion. The seedling is harvested at the year’s end, “Some light / year / 
closing / wrung out.” The closure of harvest becomes “wrung out,” or spent. The cracked seed, 
however, presents a process that is simultaneously off-putting—the imagery of “the green 
aperture / bitter, tender, self- / pursuing,” gestures to development that is thwarted, ingrown, 
perhaps infected—and strangely appealing—the cracked seed develops a gap that is at the same 
time an opening. Unlike its counterpart, the “bitter seedling,” the cracked seed has not yet run its 
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course; it is not tendered, nor has it reached an exhausted closure. The final word of the poem, 
the gerund “self-pursuing,” indicates that the cracked seed is still in process: moving inwards, to 
be sure, but through an opening that resists a predetermined or closed course. The jarring 
imagery of the commonplace objects of kernel, seedling, and cracked seed gestures towards 
Robinson’s larger project in Counterpart: an exploration of self-encounter that reveals it to be 
alternately appealing, indulgent, disturbing, and urgent.98 
The environment of “Turn” is exemplary of the settings of many of Robinson’s poems, 
which often have a denuded quality—that is, both stripped down and timeless. While there are 
exceptions, many of her poems are not clearly set in a particular historical era, and, 
consequently, unlike the writings of Rankine and Howe, Robinson’s texts often do not overtly 
refer to specific political realities. Indeed, her corpus includes many poems that consider myths 
and narratives from Western biblical, classical, and folk traditions, and re-tell them in a kind of 
present or simple past tense that appears outside of historical time.99 This approach, which lends 
an atemporal quality to much of her poetry, may make readers suspicious that Robinson’s work 
is apolitical. However, Robinson does not embrace a formalist or New Critical ideal of stable 
universal values that transcend historical and geographical conditions. While Robinson’s poetry 
                                                        
98 Opening a collection of poetry with the imagery of seeds, seedlings, and plant growth recalls canonical poetic 
precedents, such as William Carolos Williams eponymous poem from Spring and All, T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land 
and even as far back as the Prologue to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. Unlike Williams’ embrace of the plants’ “stark 
dignity” as they enter an apparently barren field, Eliot’s dour nihilism as he despairs over the cruelty of lilacs bred 
out of “the dead land,” and Chaucer’s jubilant and eroticized imagery describing the production of “tendre croppes,” 
Robinson’s “Turn” is stripped of a descriptive landscape. Absent are references to spring and the cyclicality of the 
seasons, in either their reassuring or, as in Eliot’s case, inverted forms. Instead, Robinson presents self-pursuit as an 
ambivalent alternative to the teleology of the seed’s “natural” development.  
99 For example, the 2002 collection Apprehend includes treatments of fairy tales in poems such as “Three Little” and 
“Hansel and Gretel”; “Badilyah,” from the 2003 collection Pure Descent, takes up the Old Testament narrative of 
the Hebrews wandering in the desert; and her 2012 collection, Counterpart, includes “Studies for Hell: III” and 
“Doppelgänger,” which re-visits the Icarus myth and the myth of Echo and Narcissus, respectively; the latter will be 
discussed at length in this chapter. Robinson does not treat these narratives as artifacts from the past, nor does she 
update them with contemporary references. Instead, as Robinson describes it, her poetry considers the ordering and 
meaning-making structures of these inherited cultural narratives in order to foreground and therefore disorder and 
disrupt, or at least shift, the meanings of these structures and the language that creates them (Rosenthal 239-41). 
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avoids overt political stances, she does see her work as concerned, on the level of language, with 
“undermining groundless assumptions, querying or displacing. … putting it out of joint. It is a 
way to create or recirculate, remodel an epistemology” (Rosenthal 229). In contrast with 
contemporary poets who take explicitly political positions in their poetry, she sees her work as, if 
not overtly political, nevertheless intrinsically ethical:  
I am engaged in the conversation—on my own terms. That’s a defiant statement, 
but hopefully an ethical one. Even to insist that I require a space for my own 
strategy is my way of insisting that there needs to be many strategies in order to 
constitute a healthy community. Whether or not you are engaging in a larger 
politics in the polis, there is an ethical possibility in engaging with language, 
engaging with relation and possibility in language, that is important. Even the 
most radical community or paradigm can eventually lapse into assumptiveness. 
(Rosenthal 245) 
This orientation towards ethics is fundamental for Robinson. She earned an MA in ethics, and 
she describes how she finds inspiration in Retallack’s work on poethics, particular in the aim to 
resist “ossifying constructs that limit our ability to act as positive agents in an imperiled world” 
(Rosenthal 237, 235). Robinson’s statements on poetics demonstrate her intention to convey a 
strong ethical element in her poetry, and thus her writings are ripe for poethical analysis.  
An example of Robinson’s poetry that demonstrates the limiting forces of “ossifying 
constructs,” occurs in poem “Topple,” a re-visitation of the Chicken Little tale from the 2003 
collection Apprehend. It is an exception that proves the rule; unlike much of her other poetry, 
“Topple” is “about” a specific political event, 9/11. Unlike Rankine and Howe’s 9/11 poetry, 
however, it does not allude to any of the geopolitical contexts or specific details of the terrorist 
  
 232 
attacks, nor does it explicitly critique the particulars of American government leaders’ rhetoric or 
policies. Instead, “Topple” merges broad strokes of the familiar 9/11 narrative with the Chicken 
Little tale, and includes commentary that is rather abstract, with its description of “the sky that 
has fallen” and its aftermath in broad strokes:  
…those  
who try to tack it up 
 frustrate the shape it had wished 
 to be by the one-too-many-fingers 
 of their own obdurate balance. (65) 
Here, the critique that may appear to be leveled at political leadership—that is, “those / who try 
tack [the sky] up” but only “frustrate the shape it had wished to be” out of their own 
intransigence. At the same time, the text’s criticism broadens to encompass any or all of us who 
may stubbornly wish to impose our will upon the world. In the interview with Rosenthal, 
Robinson affirms her distance from overt politicization; about the poem “Topple,” she states, “I 
feel uneasy about it. I tried to tone it down. My concern is that it would seem to grandstand a 
more politicized position, whereas I tend to feel that poetry is most effective when its politics 
don’t whack the reader over the head, but show some understanding of the inevitable ambiguities 
that inhere in any circumstance” (Rosenthal 225). Even when treating a specific political event, 
Robinson’s often de-historicized poetry moves towards abstractions and considerations of 
universal conditions. If we read with the grain of Robinson’s own stated intentions for her 
poetry, which is to interrogate assumptions and circulate a new epistemology—and indeed, that 
is the approach I take in this project—then her stated interest in ethics and language gesture to a 
  
 233 
fruitful means to explore her poethics and demonstrate her texts’ relevance to contemporary 
poetry discourse.100  
Lyric Subjectivity  
At this point, I turn to consider Robinson’s stated position on lyric subjectivity as it 
emerges through her literary criticism and poetics. Robinson directly discusses the lyric in a 
number of essays of both literary criticism and poetics, rejecting conventional ideas of lyric as 
narrowly epiphanic (“Music Becomes Story” 114) or lyric’s commonly conceived status as a 
“limited convention” which functions “to preserve its small bank of ossified knowledge” (“An 
Aesthetic” 183). Rather, she sees lyric as often “dexterous…in plumbing epistemological 
queries” (“An Aesthetic” 183). Robinson’s postlanguage revision of the lyric encompasses the 
concepts of lyric subjectivity and lyric voice. On the one hand, Robinson signals a 
modernist/Objectivist affinity by aligning herself with Perloff’s advocacy of avant-garde 
experimentalism: “what I mean by lyric is an embodiment of thought and experience in the 
material processes of language. Like Marjorie Perloff, I am leery of an approach to the lyric 
poem that would base primarily in ‘a consistent lyrical voice, a transcendental ego’ and prefer, 
with her, to understand lyric … as something that reflects the materiality of language” (“Music 
Becomes Story” 114). On the other hand, Robinson tempers Perloff’s stance with a postlanguage 
reservation that the lyric subject is not to be erased: “[a]t the same time, I am sympathetic to 
[Elizabeth] Willis’s assertion that the lyric poem, while not self-expressive per se, reflects the 
ways ‘that ideas of self or voice are never entirely absent from the tonal shadings of language’” 
(“Music Becomes Story” 114). Robinson instead advances a “stretching (rather than the 
                                                        
100 I take Lynn Keller’s Thinking Poetry: Readings in Contemporary Women’s Exploratory Poetics as a model for 
reading with the grain of contemporary poets and considering their own statements on poetics as useful guides for 
interpretation for their work. One compelling reason to do so is one that Keller states, which is that there has been 
little critical attention to many of the poets whose work she examines; this is certainly the case for Robinson. 
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abjuration) of lyric subjectivity’” (“Music Becomes Story” 115). Robinson’s refusal to dismiss 
all “‘ideas of self or voice’” within the lyric brushes up against what she calls the taboo against 
the lyric “I” in turn-of-the-twenty-first century experimental writing (Rosenthal 250).  
Robinson engages with contemporary poetic discourse through a recalibration of the 
lyric. In particular, as a postlanguage poet, Robinson both retains and revises the lyric “I.” In a 
critical essay on mystical poetry, Robinson argues, “those who disdain the lyric ‘I’ for its 
presumptuous, epiphanic point of view haven’t properly considered the ways that locating the 
movement of a poem within a persona can stretch and dislocate that ‘I’ in surprising, refreshing 
ways” (“Persona” 101). Further, Robinson offers Howe’s poetry as an example of lyric that 
“elucidates that the speaking ‘I’ is essentially exploratory, even playful, and creatively 
irresolute” (“Persona” 98). Like Howe and Rankine, Robinson also seeks to articulate a lyric “I” 
that acknowledges the engagement with alterity as a central element of subjectivity. In a critical 
essay on the poetry of Lorine Niedecker, Robinson references critic Daniel Barbiero’s definition 
of “lyric as circumspective (as opposed to introspective),” a discussion I cited at length in the 
introduction and chapter one of this dissertation. The circumspective lyric, that is, the extension 
of the lyric subject toward alterity, has the potential to be ethical, as Robinson advances, in an 
explanation of “postmodern poetics,” through her citation of poet-critic Ann Lauterbach’s essay 
“Is ‘I’ an Other?”: “‘If the ‘I’ finds its way out of the egotistical sublime and toward the alterity 
implied by all imaginative acts, then it will once again initiate paths away from self-absorbed 
narcissism to a recognition of the linguistic matrix that binds us to each other and to the world’” 
(39) (“Persona” 101). A lyric “I” that engages with and is constituted through alterity—
especially the “linguistic matrix” in which we all participate—has the potential to be ethical in its 
other-orientation rather than inward, self-absorbed, and narcissistic. If Robinson clearly 
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articulates her position on the lyric “I” in her critical writings, how is this other-oriented lyric “I” 
constructed and explored in her own lyric poetry? What are the ethical implications of 
Robinson’s own lyric “I”?  
One poem in Counterpart, “I,” offers a productive entry into Robinson’s investigation of 
lyric subjectivity, for it demonstrates Robinson’s postlanguage stance by advocating for both the 
revision and restoration of the lyric “I.” “I” appears in a poetic sequence, “The Golem,” which is 
named after, and gives homage to, Gustav Meyrink’s 1917 supernatural, German-language 
novel, Der Golem. Meyrink’s Der Golem references and revises Central European golem 
legends, in which a rabbi creates a clay figure as a servant and/or Jewish protector figure through 
the magical use of language. In Der Golem, the golem eventually is revealed to be the unnamed 
protagonist’s doppelgänger, or double. In Robinson’s poetic sequence, “The Golem,” each 
individual poem is named for the English translations of the chapter titles in the Dover edition of 
The Golem. Robinson’s poem, “I,” is named after the third chapter of the novel, which in fact 
refers to the letter “I” that is stitched on the cover of a mysterious book that the protagonist is 
given near the beginning of the novel. The protagonist brings the book to get the “I” on the cover 
repaired. With the poetic sequence “The Golem,” readers can glimpse the dense level of 
intertextuality that permeates many of Robinson’s writings and Counterpart in particular.  
“I” also demonstrates Robinson’s concentration on matters of textuality, that is, her stated 
efforts to query conventional, “ossified” concepts and thus open possibilities for new 
understanding. With the opening lines, “One site in the alphabet / needs mending,” the poem “I” 
implicitly draws from The Golem’s plot about the book cover repair and plays on the chapter title 
from the Dover edition to reference the flashpoint debate in experimental poetry circles, the 
presence of the lyric “I.” The current status of the lyric “I” is broken, but rather than discarding 
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the “I,” it needs to be fixed. “I” then presents multiple images of doubles or repetitions to explore 
the “I”:  
What might be provender 
 releases its dissimilar  
  
 twin: empty hourglass 
 upended. (21) 
The image of the “empty hourglass” alludes to how the lyric “I” often draws on the assumption 
that the first person singular pronoun provides an exact mirror of the writing subject. The 
hourglass’s emptiness provides a metaphor of stagnation, in which the conventional lyric “I”—
the one in need of repair—is a subject that does not dynamically flow through time, but has been 
hollowed out, in an image of stasis and vacuity. The conventional lyric expectation of the “I” as 
static, however, is “upended”; far from being “provender,” or a foodstuff, which can be readily 
consumed and digested, the “I” in language “releases” a “twin” who is in fact “dissimilar.” Yet, 
the poem’s conclusion advocates for the “restoration of the letter,” that is, the revision of our 
understanding of what the lyric “I” can do. In order to restore it, “the echoes,” or repetitions, 
must “unravel,” “stitch / by stitch to make such cloak” to be worn by the lyric subject. This 
image of the unraveled/mended/fabricated cloak implies that, rather than be considered a self-
same double of the poet, the lyric “I” should be more properly compared to a garment to be 
(de)constructed, cast off, and worn anew.  
Robinson’s reference to The Golem to approach the issue of the lyric “I” is an intriguing 
choice, both in its use of a literary figure that is deployed as a doppelgänger and its allusions to 
the significance of language in construction of ideas and identities. In terms of language, 
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Elizabeth Roberts Bair observes, in the golem tales, “we see the centrality of the Hebrew 
alphabet in the act of creation: whether it be the chanting of magical verses, the placing of the 
shem (a paper on which God’s name is written) in the clay man’s mouth, or the carving of the 
word emeth (life) in his forehead, the alphabet brings him to life” (19). In “I,” with its insistence 
on the significance of the “alphabet,” Robinson implicitly draws on The Golem to compare the 
lyric “I” to a golem, a literary double figure created through the power of language both to 
correspond and not correspond to its creator at the same time. Furthermore, the golem as 
doppelgänger, echoes, and the mirror images of “dissimilar twin” and “empty hourglass” are 
only a few of the references to doubles in Counterpart. While the lyric “I,” in what is 
conventionally presumed to indicate isolation and autonomy, might be a site that “needs 
mending,” in Counterpart, Robinson continues to “unravel the echoes” by exploring the inherent 
doubleness of the (lyric) subject.  
Literary Doubles  
Robinson confronts the twenty-first century taboo of lyric self-exploration directly in 
Counterpart. However, Counterpart does not provide an enactment of lyric self-exploration, 
articulated by a first-person subject, as an ultimately comforting experience, enclosed with a 
narrative arc that resolves in an epiphany or otherwise clear conclusion. Instead, through the 
citation of other writers’ texts and a series of lyrics that at times do and at times do not deploy 
the lyric “I,” self-encounter is thematized in Counterpart as an unsettling and fraught experience 
that defies tidy resolution. In these poems, to encounter the self is to confront danger in the form 
of the double, to risk sliding into the temptations of narcissism; as “Turn” demonstrates, moving 
inward involves the chance of becoming malformed, ingrown, infected. Robinson draws on 
tropes of doubleness, including the supernatural figures of doppelgängers and the mythical 
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figures of Narcissus, and Echo, to advance a postlanguage lyric poetry that makes the case for 
the lyric “I” as indicating both the presence and absence of the poet/self that the “I” signifies. 
Robinson’s poetry acknowledges the narcissistic impulse towards lyric self-replication while 
advancing a lyric poetry in which self-encounter revises the doubleness of self-reflection as a 
means to incorporate alterity within poetic language and lyric subjectivity, and therefore indicate 
the ethical possibilities of self-exploration. Counterpart as the title of the collection signals the 
idea that introspection involves the exploration of the counterparts we all carry within. Self-
exploration necessarily involves distance and difference, and if one recognizes the alterity of the 
internal counterpart, then introspection need not be merely narcissistic inwardness; the 
introspective and circumspective may be intertwined. 
Robinson’s use of the doppelgänger figure draws from a motif popular in nineteenth-
century gothic and horror literature, in which a fictional character encounters his or her double 
and reacts with terror (Gonzales 119). As critics Paul Gordon and Andrew Hock Soon Ng 
observe, within literary criticism, the trope of the doppelgänger or double usually centers on 
questions of subjectivity by analyzing fictional characters and personae of “uncanny literature” 
through psychoanalytic theory (Gordon 12; Ng 1, 5). These psychoanalytic readings are rooted in 
Freud’s 1919 essay “The Uncanny,” where the doppelgänger figure lurks within his theory of the 
uncanny, or “feeling of ‘dread and creeping horror’” that emerges in encounters with the eerily 
familiar (Ng 5; Castle 7). While, in “The Uncanny,” Freud alludes to the notion, rooted in 
European folklore, that an individual’s encounter with one’s double signifies a terrifying omen of 
one’s death, Terry Castle observes that Freud’s “colorful theory of the doppelgänger” theorizes a 
return of the repressed in the post-Enlightenment historical era (9). Consequently, in late 
twentieth and early twentieth-century literary criticism, the doppelgänger is typically read in 
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gothic, supernatural, or horror literature such as Frankenstein, Jekyll and Hyde, and The Portrait 
of Dorian Gray through the lens of psychoanalytical criticism to demonstrate that “the double is 
no longer a nemesis without, but has become an enemy within, a shadowy other residing within 
the psyche, threatening to disrupt the stability and coherence of the self” (Ng 3).  
 While criticism of the literary double is dominated by psychoanalytic theory and is 
largely character-driven (Ng 3),101 Gordon and Ng call for alternative critical understandings of 
the trope of doubleness to include considerations of language and rhetoric rather than analysis of 
characterization alone. Gordon draws on theories by twentieth century Continental philosophers 
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida to develop a deconstructive model of the “critical 
double,” which he identifies “with the way all literary and rhetorical texts utilize structures of 
meaning to deny the very structures of meaning on which they are based” (12). Ng builds on 
Gordon’s argument as he asserts that, when considering the double, not only the psychological 
states of literary characters but “the act of writing (together with its ideological thrust)” should 
be investigated as well (4). In Ng’s words, “more than just a particular feature recurrent in 
Gothic literature, doubleness is a fundamental aspect in all writings” (5). Gordon and Ng both 
draw from Derrida and his notion of writing/language as mimicry which, counter to the Platonic 
conception of mimesis as the imitation of a “simple” or singular original that exists in reality, 
instead theorizes a “mimicry imitating nothing … a double that doubles no simple … nothing at 
least that is not itself already double” (“The Double Session” 206). Derrida emphasizes 
intertextuality: all texts begin as at least double, for they stand in relation to what has preceded 
them. Instead of a manifested truth or an “adequation between a presence and a representation” 
                                                        
101 For examples of literary criticism that uses psychoanalytic criticism to investigate the figure of the double, see 
Eugene Crook, Fearful Symmetry: Doubles and Doubling in Literature and Film, Tallahassee: UP Florida, 1981; 
Andrew J. Webber, The Doppelgänger: Double Visions of German Literature, Oxford, Clarendon P, 1996; and 
Andrew Smith, Gothic Radicalism: Literature, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis in the Nineteenth Century. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.  
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there is no reality reflected or produced by language, “nothing other than the space of writing” 
(“The Double Session” 208). Ng draws on Derrida’s ideas in “The Double Session” to assert 
that, “[o]n a rhetorical level, the doubleness … inherent in language is precisely its ability to both 
mimic the object signified, as well as refuse, or deny this identification” (7).  
The Derridean-influenced concept of the “critical double” of language is productive for a 
treatment of Robinson’s use of the double because inherent in Counterpart’s explorations of self-
encounter is the idea of language as always double/plural; rather than stable and ossified, 
language can always be constructively dislocated to open to new possibilities. Furthermore, Ng’s 
concept of the “literary double” and Derrida’s treatment of doubleness as an essential element in 
all writing are productive concepts for my investigation of Robinson’s use of the trope of 
doubleness in her treatment of the lyric subject because Derrida and Ng’s theories represent an 
alternative to the psychoanalytic model of the double as alter ego: 
In the case of the literary double, its presence at once suggests a rupture, or split, 
in the self, as well as points to, when considered alongside the self, a fusion, or 
consummation with the self. Or to state it in a different way: the double, because 
it announces the incompleteness of the self, is therefore ultimately not the “other” 
of the self (although this is how the double is normally viewed) but is integral to 
self … As such, desire is not located in an alter-ego, but within the very ego itself, 
which now functions as both the locus of desire and satisfaction, presence and 
nonpresence. (Ng 6-7) 
Ng’s articulation of a Derridean “literary double” provides a valuable means of considering 
Robinson’s tropes of doubleness: doppelgängers, echoes, and mirror-images. In Robinson’s 
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work, the literary double both “announces the incompleteness of the self,” and investigates the 
lyric “I” as a site which is “the locus of … presence and nonpresence,” identity and alterity.  
Self-Encounter in Counterpart 
Counterpart opens with a pair of epigraphs by Charles Baudelaire and Barbara Guest. 
These epigraphs appear together on the opening page, and are themselves inexact counterparts 
that frame the subsequent text: they both take up the theme of self-exploration, but from different 
angles of approach. The initial epigraph includes an excerpt from Baudelaire’s poem “Man and 
Sea” from Flowers of Evil, “You find it pleasing to plunge into the bosom of your image” (1). 
This quote includes the Symbolist poet’s unnerving address to the reader, “you,” whom 
Baudelaire frames in his collection’s opening as a double—at once “hypocrite lecteur” and 
“sembable,” or counterpart, to the poet himself. The epigraph by Baudelaire describes a self-
encounter in which the mirror image serves as both the subject’s double and object of desire: 
Baudelaire indicates a scene of narcissistic fusion in which the poet and reader are both 
implicated.  
However, Robinson explores the matter of doubling and self-encounter further. The 
following epigraph, from Barbara Guest’s 1978 novel Seeking Air, acknowledges self-encounter 
as an experience both disturbing and necessary:  
The sense of becoming disturbingly real to yourself, that point where the interior 
conversations begin, like daylight picking its way over a bridge, over there to the 
further shore to shine its brightest. The difficult shell halved and the sparse 
interior looked into, a voice appearing and disappearing with the light that fell on 
one’s single self. Difficult to arrange this monodony. A necessity, the act of 
discovering where the self starts, hears itself, and repeats the instructions. (1) 
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The two epigraphs, taken together, capture the paradoxical strains of closeness and distance, 
fusion and rupture, singularity and doubleness within self-encounter—and, I argue, by extension, 
lyric self-exploration. The Baudelaire epigraph highlights the pleasure of “plunging into the 
bosom of your own image,” a phrase that emphasizes the encounter with one’s double or “image” 
as a supreme indulgence, for it alludes to experiences of aquatic immersion and sexual 
consummation. However, this is to speak in a paradox: an image is typically thought to be all 
surface, to have no depth in which to plunge. On the other hand, the Guest epigraph emphasizes 
self-encounter not so much as indulgence as distance by using the image of “daylight picking its 
way over a bridge, over there to the further shore to shine its brightest.” The metaphor of 
daylight across a bridge indicates spatial references to both gaps and linkages: daylight emanates 
from a distant source to illuminate the bridge, and shines the brightest on the “further shore”; 
illumination is made possible only through separation. Instead of Baudelaire’s indulgent pleasure 
of fusion, the Guest epigraph emphasizes self-discovery as a difficult and ongoing process, for 
while the bridge signals the possibility of access, it also indicates the great travel/travail required 
in “the act of discovering where the self starts.” The search for the self—or the source of the 
self—in Guest’s terms is thus not the same as the Baudelairean indulgence in one’s image/ 
reflection/double. Instead, in the Guest epigraph, self-exploration is a “necessity” that insists 
upon the significance of interiority, albeit one accessed through division and therefore 
doubleness: “one’s single self” is likened to a shell that is “halved”; the “sparse interior looked 
into” involves the self as both examined and examiner; “interior conversations” refer to a 
dialogue within the self. The references to both singularity and doubleness in Counterpart’s 
opening epigraphs indicate that encounter with the self is not straightforward. In Ng’s terms, 
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self-encounter may involve the fusion and consummation the self, as Baudelaire highlights, but it 
also involves the self’s interior split and rupture, as Guest emphasizes. 
Furthermore, in the Guest epigraph, language is integral to self-encounter, for Guest 
presents an exploration of “the point where interior conversations begin” and identifies “a voice 
appearing and disappearing” in a difficult “monodony,” or single-voiced chant. A kind of primal 
communication occurs, within a self who is both speaking/chanting and hearing, which signals 
an internal division between speaker/chanter and listener. Furthermore, the phrase, “repeats the 
instructions,” signifies that “interior conversations” are in fact rooted in echoes or mimicry. Thus 
the epigraph by Guest illustrates a conviction that a subject’s interiority is significant—one 
should pay attention to it and “repeat the “instructions”—and, it is implied, should follow them. 
At the same time, self-encounter can never result in a direct or transparent expression of the 
subject’s interiority, for it involves the Derridean “notion of writing/language as mimicry”—that 
is language, even when emerging within the self, is never pure, “original” speech; repetition is 
always involved. With these two epigraphs, Robinson presents the boundary that her poems tread 
within Counterpart. As Baudelaire charges, self-encounter involves the temptation to plunge 
narcissistically into one’s own image. At the same time, self-encounter is a “necessity,” one that 
involves paying attention to one’s “interior conversations,” and using language to “repeat the 
instructions,” which acknowledges the doubleness inherent in that very language. Furthermore, 
while the direction in both epigraphs appears to be inward, Guest’s epigraph recognizes 
difference both within the self and the language that emerges from self-encounter. Therefore, in 
the opening epigraph pair, Robinson indicates that even self-encounter involves division and 
encounter with otherness.   
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Robinson takes up the opening epigraphs’ themes of doubleness within both self-
encounter and language in the poem “Doppelgänger.” The text uses the myth of Narcissus and 
Echo to resist ideas of fixed identity, self-absorbed inwardness, and “ossified” uses of language 
as they may surface in lyric poetry. As with “Turn,” Robinson alludes to disease and decay to 
explore unhealthy self-pursuit; as with “I,” Robinson uses the images of doubles, mirrors and 
repetitions. “Doppelgänger” begins by invoking echoes:  
Cure the echo. 
 
 Identical merges with identity.  
  
 one holds in one’s body (Twin, Irony, Narcissus) 
 like its own  
 
trinket, a name repeated. (43) 
Each of these statements is surrounded by large amounts of white space, which allows them to be 
absorbed by extensive pauses in the act of reading, lending them substantial gravity and creating 
a tone that is serious, even weighty in its pronouncements. The imperative to “Cure the echo” in 
the opening line characterizes the echo as a use of language that is a kind of disease in need of 
remedy. If an instance of language is an echo, it is trapped in a cycle of mere repetition, allowing 
for no difference. Language that is only an echo is a problem as it is connected to the idea of the 
self’s “identity” as “identical,” or fixed and self-same, rather than dynamic and open to alterity. I 
suggest that this is a reference to the conventional view that the lyric “I” is identical with the 
writing subject, which is thereby likened to an illness in need of cure. Acts of doubling that “one 
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holds in one’s body” are parenthetically described in metaphorical, linguistic, and mythic terms, 
“(Twin, Irony, Narcissus),” both observing the multiple ways that the concept of doubleness 
permeates the imagination and language and asserting that the idea of doubleness is so 
naturalized it is virtually embodied. Furthermore, the concept of a fixed identity is protected as a 
“trinket,” or possession held against a body, that is, as “a name repeated,” or continually 
reinforced through reiteration. The references to the ancient Greek myth of Narcissus and Echo 
usher in archetypes that stand in for a dangerously self-absorbed view of lyric subjectivity as 
“reflecting” the subject, and, thereby, a view of language reduced to the circumscribed contours 
of mere self-replication.  
Later in the poem, Robinson alludes more extensively to the narrative of the myth of 
what she calls “Arid Narcissus” who “loves this delusion”: 
 the sound of collision 
 with the water’s surface, 
 
 the isolation  
of precise sameness 
 
battering itself. Absolute.  (46) 
The text refers to the ending of the version of the Narcissus myth in which he dies by drowning 
in his own reflection in the water where he has been gazing. Narcissus’s self-indulgent and 
delusional love of the counterpart that he finds in his reflection leads to his death. In these lines, 
Robinson plays with dry and wet imagery. “Arid Narcissus,” whose self-absorption is linked 
with both desiccation and infertility, denies the possibility of (re)production of anything that is 
  
 246 
other than himself. Water, which could provide a remedy to his aridity, is instead the substance 
that both supplies his delusion and kills him. Robinson’s stark word choice and brief line 
length—“the isolation / of precise sameness / battering itself”—emphasizes the severity of 
Narcissus’s simultaneous self-pursuit and self-annihilation. I read the figure of “Arid Narcissus” 
as standing in for the conventional view of the lyric “I” that is a presumed reflection of the 
writing subject—a construct that is indeed often accused as evidence of the poet’s narcissism and 
self-aggrandizement. “Doppelgänger” both draws on this association and inverts it, associating 
the conventional lyric “I” with sterility and, ultimately, self-annihilation.  
This passage counters images of dry sterility by alluding to the soggy mess of translation:  
How better to translate  
Than to destroy.  
 
The shape of equivalents  
is garbled with wet  
like the synonym for ‘evaporate.’ (46) 
In opposition to the destructiveness of narcissistic reflection and the isolation of echoes, 
“Doppelgänger” poses the possibility of translation and the search for “equivalents”—that is, the 
attempt to approximate alterity through language, however imperfect that process. With the 
terms “translate,” “equivalents,” and “synonym,” “Doppelgänger” foregrounds a Derridean 
understanding of language as always an approximation, never establishing “precise sameness” 
with the object signified. The contrast between destructive aridity and life-giving water is 
extended in the lines “[t]he shape of equivalents / is garbled with wet / like the synonym for 
‘evaporate.’” The term “evaporate” itself may, like its possible synonyms—disperse, vanish, 
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dissipate—indicate the apparent disappearance of water into the atmosphere, but, in Derridean 
fashion, the concept of the dehydrating process of evaporation always depends upon, and carries 
a trace of, its polar opposite, hydration. Furthermore, the word “garbled” introduces the concept 
of lack of clarity, textual error, and inaccurate transmission, thus reinforcing the idea that an 
exact counterpart in language is impossible. Nevertheless, translation, the incorporation of 
synonyms or non-exact “equivalents,” whose meanings may dissipate into plurality and 
inexactitude, is the only fruitful, life-giving alternative to “the isolation / of precise sameness / 
battering itself.” “Doppelgänger” thus thematizes a Derridean embrace of language as inherently 
double in “its ability to both mimic the object signified, as well as refuse, or deny this 
identification” (Ng 7). If we apply the Derridean concept of the doubleness of language to lyric 
poetry and the configuration of the lyric “I” in language, we see that Robinson’s text poses a 
self-conscious, revised deployment of the lyric “I” as always an equivalent, a double that is not 
precisely the same as the original writing subject, but that thereby enables productive 
explorations of the subject and his or her surroundings.  
The conclusion of “Doppelgänger” expands upon the narcissistic vision of self-
destruction by implicitly drawing on the folkloric idea of the doppelgänger as a paranormal 
double, that is, an omen of bad luck, danger, or death:  
Filigree of capillaries  
reduced to a pulse. All flesh  
 
blanched by exposure 
to its own witness 
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and stripped  
away. (47) 
This final stanza continues the theme of the aridity and desiccation of narcissism, but whereas 
Narcissus “loves this delusion”—that his reflection is real—the final lines allude to the 
doppelgänger as the omen of death that Narcissus fails to realize. The lines “[a]ll flesh / 
blanched by exposure / to its own witness,” recall a classic scene of a spooked character who 
might blanch, or turn pale, at the frightful encounter with his or her own doppelgänger. 
However, Robinson extrapolates the sense of “blanch” to indicate not only whitening by 
removing color, but also the stripping away of flesh and the removal of blood as “(f)iligree of 
capillaries” are “reduced to a pulse.” These images reinforce the enervating effects of lyric 
poetry that aims to reflect the conventional lyric subject in its unitary, “precise sameness.” 
Formally, this final stanza enacts the content: centered, rather than aligned at either of the 
margins, it allows for a visual immediacy of how the length of the final six lines increasingly 
diminish in from eight syllables to two, and in the final five lines, the word count decreases from 
six to one. This enactment of diminishment in the final lines of the poem further underscores 
thematic imperative in “Doppelgänger” to re-think conventional lyric self-reflection as, 
paradoxically, not aggrandizement but depletion of the lyric subject.  
Intertextuality and Poethics 
“I” and “Doppelgänger” are examples of lyric poems where Robinson draws on the 
figure of the double to explored the issues of language in lyric, particularly the construction of 
the lyric “I.” As mentioned in my earlier discussion of “I,” in Counterpart, Robinson includes 
layers of intertextuality through many citations of other writers that take up the theme of doubles, 
echoes, and mirror images. Throughout Counterpart, these citations recur between individual 
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poems or poetic sequences, sometimes alone on a page, or, as with the opening epigraphs by 
Baudelaire and Guest, set in pairs. These citations include references to the self-encounter with a 
doppelgänger, as in a quote from twentieth century surrealist author Leonora Carrington that 
appears early in Counterpart: “As I drew near the fire the woman stopped stirring the pot and 
rose to greet me. When we faced each other I felt my heart give a convulsive leap and stop. The 
woman who stood before me was me” (16). This quote, from 1976 Carrington’s fantastic novel, 
The Hearing Trumpet, presents an encounter with the narrator’s doppelgänger as uncanny. 
Quotes such as these contribute to the overall atmosphere of mystery in Counterpart, which 
allows a space for the exploration of weird and even supernatural forces. However, not all 
allusions to doubling involve straightforward doppelgänger scenarios. Another citation that 
appears earlier in Counterpart comes from contemporary experimental poet Martha Ronk, and 
simultaneously gestures toward and denies an encounter with a doppelgänger: “We say it looks 
familiar but not my face and not / looking where one thinks to see it / and not in the window 
passing quickly by” (5). This quote, from Ronk’s 2004 poetry collection, In a Landscape of 
Having to Repeat, indicates that the presence of any double is always at play with its absence: 
the double “looks familiar” but is “not my face”; we are “not looking where one thinks to see it,” 
and “it” is “not in the window passing quickly by”—denials of increasing specificity which insist 
on an absence and nevertheless gesture towards the presence of a figure eerily similar to the lyric 
“I.” The theme of a double that is both absent and present is alluded to again in a quote from 
post-war poet Edward Jabes’ text, The Book of Questions: “‘Have you thought,’ said Reb Sia to 
his New Year’s guests, ‘of the importance of the shadow? It is reflection and the sacrifice of 
reflection. It is man’s double and negation.’ But do not believe that madness has ever left us. 
Like pain, it lies in wait for us at each stage, I mean each time we run up against the word 
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hidden in the word, the being buried in the being” (42). The shadow as a figure of mimicry, 
“man’s double,” gestures to both a simulation of the self that is signified and also, as “man’s… 
negation,” denial of this identification. The shadow as both “double and negation” and the 
reference to “the word hidden in the word” encourages a reading of doubleness that underscores 
a Derridean interplay of presence and absence as well as repetition and difference within 
language. Taken together, these citations from other writers in Counterpart support an ongoing 
argument that the lyric “I,” the image/reflection/shadow of the self as it appears in language, can 
be read as a doppelgänger: the lyric “I” seems like the self, but it is never a perfect replica. 
Language cannot create an exact counterpart. Instead, language, as mimicry, allows for the 
identification of the writing self with the lyric “I” and the revelation of the difference between 
the two.  
Part of the way that Counterpart, repairs the conventional lyric “I” is through the text’s 
high degree of intertextuality. In my exploration of Robinson’s work thus far, I have alternated 
between looking at some of her lyric poetry and her text’s reliance on citation of texts by other 
writers. Indeed, Robinson’s extensive intertextuality is a crucial part of her poethics, for it 
conveys poetry-making as a communal, collaborative activity that necessarily involves reading 
and responding to other writers. In the interview with Rosenthal, Robinson states that she sees 
writing as an intrinsically ethical practice, and places a high value on engaging within writing 
communities as part of the writing process. For example, she contrasts her approach with that of 
the twentieth-century religious thinker Simone Weil, whose work she admires, but whose 
isolation Robinson sees as a dead end, for Weil’s efforts “resulted in an isolation that is counter 
to what I’ve found as the vexed best that any practice (artistic or religious) can offer, which is a 
communal experience” (Rosenthal 232). Robinson continues: “I place an extremely high value 
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on community and I would argue that poetry-making is not a solitary but a communal activity. 
Part of our ethical work as writers, if you will, is to engage with that, to be good readers and 
responders, to participate in some way” (Rosenthal 253).102 Counterpart not only cites the 
writers of Symbolist, Surrealist and/or fantastic literature I have already cited, but also many 
contemporary poets, both “experimental” and “lyric,” including Dennis Phillips, James Thomas 
Stevens, Kazim Ali, Ed Smallfield, Laura Moriarity, Craig Watson, and Pat Reed. The 
intertextuality of this poetry collection exemplifies Retallack’s interest in contemporary poetry 
that “move[s] away from models of cultural and political agency lodged in isolated heroic acts” 
(3). Instead, Counterpart emerges from “a dynamic equilibrium between intention and 
receptivity, community and alterity” and illustrates “[c]ollaborative, conversational values” (3). 
Robinson’s quotation of multiple writers, including both canonical modernist writers and less 
widely read contemporary poets, demonstrate her commitment to poetic composition as a 
process that emerges within a larger writing community.  
Furthermore, Counterpart is highly intertextual in that several of the poems center on 
other texts. Two poems are in homage to early-twentieth-century spiritualist fantasy novels that 
center on a doppelgänger figure—the aforementioned Gustav Meyrink’s 1917 Der Golem and 
the English writer Charles Williams’ 1937 Descent into Hell—and a third is dedicated to Eliseo 
Subiela’s 1986 Argentine film Man Facing Southeast. However, Robinson’s citations are 
provocatively limited; with all of the epigraphs, the writer is cited, but the titles of individual 
books and poems are not. While these citations are rooted in complex theoretical and aesthetic 
discussions, the absence of a detailed bibliography downplays Counterpart as an “academic” or 
                                                        
102 Robinson has participated in the praxis of developing writing communities while she was a poet in the Bay Area 
by working on the magazine 26 with Rusty Morrison, Brian Strang, and Joseph Noble, and Instance Press with Beth 
Anderson and Stacy Szymazcek, as well as hosting poetry readings (Rosenthal 253).  
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scholarly project, and emphasizes Robinson’s creative participation in various artistic and 
spiritual strains in the writing process.103 I suggest that Robinson’s intertextuality as 
demonstrated through the formation of lyric poems in response to other artworks illustrate 
Attridge’s concept of innovative and creative reading and writing practices that emerge from a 
reader’s responsibility (29). These lyrics as creative response represent another way, in addition 
to epigraphs, that Robinson’s poetry signals composition as rooted in a kind of indirect 
collaboration rather than individualistic pursuit.  
On Ghosts: Haunting, Subjectivity, and Alterity 
With the doppelgängers of Counterpart, Robinson engages with the supernatural double 
as a literary trope that enables an exploration of lyric, language, and subjectivity. Robinson’s 
conjuring of the supernatural continues in the 2013 collection, On Ghosts, a mixed genre 
collection of essay, memoir, and poetry wherein Robinson deploys the figure of the ghost to 
investigate how subjectivity is shaped through encounters with the spectral Other in both 
personal experiences and texts. Robinson also extends her inquiry into the development of the 
lyric, particularly the processes of poetic composition, reception, and translation, by using the 
trope of haunting to illustrate the interplay between the presence and absence of a writing subject 
within a text. With her use of the ghost as literary trope, she follows Jack Spicer, a poetic 
predecessor whom she calls a “foundational” poet for her own writing in her interview with the 
Poetry Society of America, and whom she cites in an epigraph of the opening page of On 
Ghosts.104 In a critical essay, “Persona and the Mystical Poem,” Robinson argues that Spicer’s 
                                                        
103 The two novels and this film that Robinson devotes tribute poems to incorporate fantasy elements and share 
strong overtones of spiritualism—that is, they are spiritualist in the sense that they convey the belief that the spirit is 
a crucial element of reality, and they incorporate references to occult beliefs, theological issues, and religious 
allegory. 
104 The opening epigraph reads as follows:“I am the ghost of answering questions. Beware me. / Keep me at a 
distance as I keep you at a distance.” –Jack Spicer 
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poetry reveals that “the figures of the mirror and the ghost” can indicate “the reflective and 
haunting functions of poetry are not merely reiterations of the self, but revelatory sites of 
deformation” (94). Correspondingly, in On Ghosts, the trope of the ghost allows for the 
configuration of a subjectivity that, far from simply straightforward or self-present, is dislocated 
and (de)formed by encounters with alterity. I further suggest Robinson’s exploration of ghosting 
in poetry advances a poetics that accords with Derrida’s ideas of literature as “hauntological” 
insofar as it takes up the play between presence and absence, being and non-being. Hauntology 
figures the literary as an in-between space where writers haunt readers, and are haunted in turn, 
through the activities of writing, reading and citation of literary texts. As Derridean hauntology 
fundamentally involves an ethical injunction to treat the non-living Other with responsibility and 
respect, Robinson’s lyrical, essayistic exploration of ghosting advances an ethics compatible 
with Derrida’s hauntological ethics and his ethics of hospitality—that is, a radical hospitality of 
visitation that builds on Levinasian ethics of responsibility to the Other.  
Presence, Absence, and the Ethics of Hauntology  
The event of haunting indicates the presence of ghost, and the concept of “presence” 
plays a key role in both Robinson’s and Derrida’s writings. In the critical essay, “Persona and the 
Mystical Poem,” Robinson affirms the value of mysticism as “an experience of presence or 
union that resists rational explanation; I do not find it necessary to make explicit a divinity or 
religion tradition or practice in this definition” (92). Furthermore, for Robinson, “presence” is 
intrinsic to poetry’s worth: “[p]resence, as itchy as that word is, provides, in my estimation, the 
most enduring value of poetry. Correspondingly, that poetry can register many sorts of presence 
is a sign of its hardiness” (93). On the other hand, Derrida notably critiques Western philosophy, 
theology, and language for being fundamentally and fallaciously metaphysical—that is, 
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erroneously assuming and overly valuing presence.105 However, while Derrida might seem to 
resist the notion of presence in his deconstructive investigation of binaries, he does not simply 
invert hierarchies and therefore does not simply reject presence and embrace absence. Instead, 
Derrida’s writings suggest “the difference between presence and absence … needs to be re-
thought in a new way” (Shakespeare 56).106  
Hauntology represents a significant development in Derrida’s re-thinking of presence and 
absence that occurs in the later stages of his career. Derrida coins the term hauntology in his 
1993 volume of essays, Specters of Marx.107 Like the famous Derridean concept, différance, 
hauntology is rooted in a play on words: the pronunciation of the French term hantologie sounds 
indistinguishable from the term “ontology,” the study of being; hauntology, centering on the 
absent/present ghost figure, therefore displaces ontology and the primacy of presence (Davis 8, 
9).108 Accordingly, Derrida’s conception of the ghost or specter is a “deconstructive figure … 
[who makes] established certainties vacillate” (Davis 11). The unstable terrain where Derridean 
ghosts haunt is expansive, reaching into translation, phenomenology, history, capitalism, etc. 
Most relevant to my project, Derrida’s absent/present, existent/non-existent specter has 
                                                        
105 In Of Grammatology, Derrida argues that the oppressive “logocentrism,” which is also the “phonocentrism” of 
the Western metaphysical tradition, equates being and meaning with “presence” (11-12). As Gayatri Spivak 
explains, logocentrism emerges from “the human desire to posit a ‘central’ presence at the beginning and the end” 
and the “authorizing pressure” of the center gives rise to hierarchized oppositions” such as presence and absence, 
being and non-being, speech and writing, in which the inferior term buttresses the superior term and is marked as a 
fall (lxvii-lxix). 
106 There are theological implications in Derrida’s rejection of pure absence, for it means, as Shakespeare observes, 
Derrida does not simply reject theism and replace it with relativism, nihilism, or atheism (56). Thus is it not a 
necessary contradiction to apply Derrida’s ideas to Robinson, who embraces a mystical/theological approach to 
many of her writings.  
107 The overtly political argument in Specters—which was written and published in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the apparent triumph of Western capitalism—is that deconstruction had always been a radicalization 
of Marxist thought. In the reception of Specters, many left-leaning intellectuals have taken serious issue with 
Derrida’s claim to Marxism (Davis 8). In addition to the overtly political argument of Specters, Derrida devotes 
considerable space to developing a theory of the ghost, or specter, and applying it to many fields, including 
literature.  
108 Davis notes that there are in fact two sources of hauntology: that rooted in Derrida’s work and a more obscure 
strain developed by the psychoanalyists Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, which focuses on transgenerational 
trauma and the excavation of family secrets (9-10). I focus on Derridean hauntology for this dissertation.  
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implications for literary language. Within literary criticism in the past fifteen years, a number of 
critics have linked the “theme (haunting, ghosts, the supernatural) and the processes of literature 
and textuality in general” (Davis 11). Literary critics who use Derridean hauntology as an 
interpretive lens assert that textuality itself is hauntological as it pivots between existence and 
non-existence and consequently indicates “the structural openness or address directed towards 
the living by the voices of the past or the not-yet formulated possibilities of the future” (Davis 
13).109  
Derridean hauntology is fundamentally rooted in ethics and is thus well suited for 
literary-ethical inquiry. As Derrida pronounces in the exordium to Specters, “[i]f it—learning to 
live—remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death. …So it would be necessary 
to learn spirits … to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the 
companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise, and better. No, 
                                                        
109 Derrida’s development of hauntology is only one critical strain of critical methodologies that take up ghosts.  
Helen Sword, whose 2002 book, Ghostwriting Modernism, explores the influence of spiritualism in modernist 
aesthetics, provides an illuminating overview of contemporary literary criticism that centers on ghosts, haunting, 
spiritualism, and a broad array of interactions between the living and the dead. In addition to poststructuralist critics 
who have developed Derrida’s ideas of the hauntological, critics from a variety of methodological persuasions have 
taken up the ghosts: “For feminist literary critics such as Diana Basham and Bette London, spirit mediumship offers 
a useful paradigm for exploring relationships between authorial empowerment and the politics of gender. For 
postcolonial critics such as Patrick Bantlinger, Marjorie Howes, and Gauri Viswanathan, likewise, spiritualism and 
the occult provide frames of reference for understanding the paradoxes implicit in imperialist doctrines of cultural 
conquest and hegemony. For Marxist critics such as Jeff Nunokawa and Andrew H. Miller, ghosts stand in for any 
of the various cultural agents that exceed and outlast their own origins, acting upon society yet refusing 
embodiment: capital, imagination, fame. For queer theorists such as Terry Castle, Hugh Stevens, and Patricia White, 
ghostliness represents not only a symptom of repression … but also, more ominously, a return of the repressed … 
Similarly, for psychoanalytic critics such as Marjorie Garber and Jacqueline Rose, haunting signals a repetition 
compulsion, defined by Freud not only as a return of the repressed but also as a constituent element of the 
uncanny… For sociologists such as Avery F. Gordon and ethnologists such as Christine Berge, the conjuration of 
spirits is a compensatory gesture, a reaction against various social pressures; Berge argues, for instance, that spirit 
mediums ‘escape the mortuary grip’ of industrialism by turning themselves into ‘spiritual machines’ who can 
therefore better control their own fate. And finally, for cryptographic critics such as Nicolas Abraham, Maria Torok, 
and Shawn Rosenheim, ghosts affirm the interpretive imperative of all modern existence, communicating in code 
(raps, knocks, anagrams, opaque metaphors) from beyond or within the mysterious crypts they inhabit” (162-163). 
To Sword’s extensive catalogue I would add that Joseph Roach draws on cultural studies and performance theory to 
argue that circum-Atlantic culture re-creates itself in the face of death through the performance of substitution by 
surrogation—an uncanny process which rarely, if ever, succeeds, for it continually resists the closure that dominant 
Western narratives of modernity attempt to impose through the attempts at forgetting and segregation of the dead 
and the living (Cities of the Dead, New York: Columbia UP, 1996). 
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not better, but more justly” (xviii). Thus, the hauntological is fundamentally rooted in a concern 
for ethics and justice and is tied to the recognition of, communication with, and overall 
relationality to ghosts. Indeed, Derrida insists on the “non-contemporaneity with itself of the 
living present” as the foundation of the very possibility of ethics and justice:  
no ethics, no politics … seems possible and thinkable and just that does not 
recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for 
those others who are not yet there, presently living …. No justice … seems 
possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all 
living present … before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are 
already dead. (Specters xix)  
Hauntology involves an ethical imperative to offer “respect” and “responsibility” for “ghosts,” 
whom Derrida describes as all others who are not living at present, thus extending to both the 
past and the future. Hauntology does not involve a belief in ghosts, per se, but takes up the figure 
of the ghost with seriousness in order to convey the ethical imperative to look beyond the living 
present. Furthermore, Davis argues that hauntology, which advances the ghost as a 
deconstructive figure who also delivers an ethical injunction to responsibility for the Other, can 
be seen as part of a larger “ethical turn of deconstruction” that started to emerge in the 1980s (9). 
In Davis’ words, “[a]ttending to the ghost is an ethical injunction insofar as it occupies the place 
of the Levinasian Other: a wholly irrecuperable intrusion in our world, which is not 
comprehensible within our available intellectual frameworks, but whose otherness we are 
responsible for preserving” (9).110   
                                                        
110 It is important to note the similarities between the shared approaches of Levinas and Derrida; indeed, Derrida’s 
ethics build on Levinas’ thinking. Shepherd remarks on the similarities between Levinas’s and Derrida’s projects, 
particularly in their respective critiques of Western metaphysics, embrace of alterity, and turn to ethical encounter: 
“one can see a strong correlation between Derrida’s idea of différance and Levinas’ conception of a pre-ontological 
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I would add to Davis’ argument that the ghost as “intrusion” also accords with Derrida’s 
ethics of radical hospitality, which largely build on the ethics of the Levinasian Other.111 In 
contrast to conventional notions of hospitality, Derrida’s hospitality of visitation involves a 
radical openness and vulnerability to a stranger or uninvited guest who has not been expected or 
foreseen (“Hostipitality” 361). While Derrida argues that the hospitality of visitation, or 
“unconditional hospitality” is never truly possible, at the same time it paradoxically serves as the 
foundation for all possibility of all conditional hospitality, insofar as it can exist in the world of 
concrete realities (qtd. in Shepherd 60). Derrida’s ethics of hospitality is central to his thinking, 
for it is at one with his philosophy of deconstruction. According to Derrida, “[i]f every concept 
shelters or lets itself be sheltered by another concept, by an other than itself that is no longer 
even its other, then no concept remains in place any longer. … Hospitality—this is a name or 
example of deconstruction. … deconstruction is hospitality to the other, to the other than 
oneself” (“Hostipality” 364). Furthermore, as Shepherd observes, Derrida’s ethics of hospitality 
dovetails with hauntology, for it “posits an unconditional hospitality of visitation, where the 
guest, appearing as a messianic ghost-like figure, comes to disrupt and disturb our prearranged 
and formalized practices” (58). The encounter with a ghost, as intrusive Other, who both delivers 
an ethical injunction and offers an opening into the strange, the unheard, and that which lies 
beyond the present, thus participates in an ethics of hospitality of visitation. To “learn to live 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
structure of alterity, beyond essence and being. Both philosophers seek to overcome what they perceive as the 
fundamental fault of Western philosophy—its tendency to reduce the Other to the ‘Same’—by replacing ontological 
questions of being with an analysis of the ethical encounter, thus giving philosophical priority not to essence but to 
heterogeneity” (49). 
111 As Derrida remarks in “Hostipality,” there is “no discontinuity between Totality and Infinity—which insisted on 
the welcome … and upon the subject as hôte,” but Derrida adds there there is a “change of accent,” from Levinas’ 
image of peaceful welcoming to “a more violent experience, the drama of relation to the other that ruptures, bursts in 
or breaks in … in other words, of a goodness, a good violence of the Other that precedes welcoming” (364). 
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with ghosts,” with “respect” and “responsibility,” one is subjected to the ghost’s intrusive 
visitation. That is, one serves as host to specters, but on the specters’ terms.  
Haunted Subjectivity 
How does Robinson’s On Ghosts demonstrate a poethics that resonates with Derridean 
hauntology? To begin to address that question, I will first describe the formal qualities of the 
collection. On Ghosts covers much terrain and incorporates prose and poetry, memoir and 
philosophical meditation, and, as with Counterpart, extended intertextuality. In contrast to the 
fantastic subject matter of On Ghosts, the prose tends towards the understated and matter-of-fact, 
and much of the tone of the collection is somber and reflective. Poetry, short essays, and 
ekphrastic explanations of personal photographs—which are described as if the reader can see 
them, but are in fact not depicted—are interspersed among a series of numbered “Incidents,” 
which are frequently framed as the narrator’s autobiographical descriptions of encounters with 
ghosts. The understated tone, straightforward explication of subject matter, and first-person point 
of view is established in the opening “Explanatory Note,” a brief prose essay. In “Explanatory 
Note,” the narrator describes being haunted as a “neutral” and “in some sense ordinary” 
phenomenon of “becoming aware of the presence of presence” that allows for individuals or 
places to be “vulnerable to heightened perception” (3). The tonal matter-of-factness shifts the 
concept of haunting away from commonplace associations with sensationalism or horror and 
reintroduces it as a topic for sober reflection.  
Robinson introduces subjectivity as a major theme to be explored through a 
reconsideration of haunting, and she advances the notion of subjectivity as shaped through 
encounters with alterity. Derrida’s hauntology and his ethics of hospitality can illuminate the 
ethical dimensions of Robinson’s exploration of subjectivity in On Ghosts. Beginning in 
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“Explanatory Note,” Robinson’s description of haunting resonates with Derrida’s radical 
hospitality of visitation, in which the subject is made vulnerable through the intrusion of the 
ghost as Other. The text compares haunting to an infestation: “the perceiver [who] encounters an 
oblique and dubious phenomenon … is not privileged. Rather, the perceiver is prepared for the 
experience on the basis of his or her having, so to speak, been eaten by pests. The condition is 
one of eroded defenses, of vulnerability” (4). At one point, in a later prose passage of On Ghosts, 
Robinson deploys the metaphor of hospitality: “The site of haunting may resist that occupying 
force, may object to the insult on its integrity. The site objects to the insult on its greater 
hospitality” (52). In accordance with Derrida’s hauntology and ethics, Robinson’s ghost also 
intrudes upon the subject and enjoins him or her to participate in the hospitality of visitation. As 
both Derrida and Robinson observe, haunting as visitation upsets the usual conventions of 
hospitality. Robinson’s narrating “I” indeed resists the “occupying force” who has not been 
welcomed in her usual conventions of “greater hospitality.”  
Furthermore, Derrida’s hauntology is tied to an exploration of “presence” and its impact 
on commonplace understandings of subjectivity. I suggest that Derrida’s approach resonates with 
Robinson’s deployment of the trope of haunting in On Ghosts as an exploration of the self and 
mystical experiences of presence or union that cannot be rationally explained. Davis explains 
Derrida’s position on presence and self-presence:  
Derrida calls on us to attend to ghosts, to unlearn what we thought we knew for 
certain in order to learn what we still cannot formulate or imagine. This does not 
entail believing in ghosts in any straightforward sense, since the ghost is precisely 
that of which the existence consists in its not quite existing. The point is to 
explore the presence of what no longer exists or does not yet exist, in order to 
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understand and to experience how it dislocates the self-presence of the subject and 
its contingent realities. (19) 
It is precisely the hauntological exploration of the “presence of what no longer exists or does not 
yet exist” in order to disturb “the self-presence of the subject” that is a dominant theme of On 
Ghosts, as explained in “Explanatory Note.” Like Derridean hauntology, Robinson asserts that 
haunting functions to both de-form and reveal conditions about the subject, for haunting is “more 
disclosive of conditions that locate themselves in specific sites or persons” than it is about the 
nature of phantoms in themselves (3):  
The apparition is not the entity that haunts. What it is, instead, is more like 
metaphysical sandpaper. It debrides, taking away all the dead tissue, and some of 
the living tissue …When the apparition has whittled down your resistance, then 
you are less of who you are than you used to be. This lessening is now the mode 
of the haunting. There’s now a little alleyway, between the self and the not-self, 
newly arrived, and this alley gives free passage to come-who-will, or what-will. 
(5)  
For both Robinson and Derrida, haunting is an experience that is at once both quotidian and 
revelatory. On Ghosts, while at times narrating disturbing experiences, defines haunting as a 
“metaphysical” transformation rather than a horrifying event. Haunting, then, may involve the 
uncanny, but it is not a state to be avoided; rather, it can be explored productively. The very 
process of haunting involves overcoming the subject’s defenses, for the ghost first “whittle[s] 
down your resistance,” or the mechanisms that one deploys in an effort to enclose and protect the 
self. An apparition that “debrides” or “lessen[s]” the self can involve ethical possibility for if, in 
Robinson’s words, “Presence, then, is a way” between the “self and the not-self,” haunting can 
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involve a possibly welcome diminution of the ego-centric/narcissistic subject and offer an 
opening towards alterity. Haunting, that is, the disruptive encounter with the presence of the non-
living Other, can productively allow for the deformation of the subject by dislocating its sense of 
self-presence and wholeness. This deformation of the subject can offer possibility. Robinson’s 
metaphor of the “little alleyway, between the self and the not-self” that “gives free passage” to 
the “come-who-will, or what-will”—that is, the strange, new, and unsettling—illustrates the idea 
Derrida’s haunted subject, open(ed) to the alterity of the ghost. On Ghosts thus deploys the 
figure of a haunted subject who allows free passage to a ghostly Other who hovers between 
absence and presence, existence and non-existence in order to explore poetic composition, 
textuality and lyric subjectivity. Finally, Derridean hauntology can be applied to On Ghosts, for 
Robinson’s collection is a re-thinking of ghosts which acknowledges, as Frederic Jameson 
articulates in a commentary on Specters of Marx, “that the living present is scarcely as self-
sufficient as it claims to be,” and the exploration of the  “presences of presences” can reveal 
much about our world and our selves (“Marx’s Purloined Letter,” 39).  
On Ghosts provides descriptive examples of “presences of presences,” or the subject’s 
encounter with a ghostly Other, in a numbered series of “Incidents” that appear throughout the 
collection. Some of the “Incidents” explicitly refer to death, including the description of 
Robinson’s own experiences surrounding her grandmother’s funeral and a vague reference to a 
child who ends his own life. However, the emphasis on haunting as ordinary becomes more 
pronounced as the “Incidents” progresses, with episodes from include the cliché to the mundane, 
as the narrating subject comments (50). For example, a ghost surfaces in unexplained and 
irksome, quotidian occurrences, such as when a video player’s “tape clicks on mid-narrative 
when no one is there to push the PLAY button on” (14). Several of the later autobiographical 
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passages all involve sleep, or, more accurately, the narrator’s experiences of liminal states 
between waking and sleep—a motif that gestures to the haunted subject as vulnerable, 
experiencing kind of subjective “lessening” or emptying that offers an opening for a ghostly 
Other to occupy. Two of the later “Incidents” describe a ghost as a disrupter of sleep, alternately 
a malicious stalker and/or an intrusive annoyance; as described in “Incident Three,” “another 
mark of the ghost,” whether “[a]bsent or present,” is to be “always incessant” (38). Other 
episodes describe haunting as vaguely involved in pleasurable memories, such as one of 
spending time with a presumably absent friend, and then going to a restful sleep. On Ghosts 
conveys haunting as experiences where the subject encounters a disruptive Other who is 
alternately “absent and present.” These hauntings permeate a large range of lived experiences: 
jarring and placid, traumatic and annoying, life-changing and ordinary.  
Poetic Hauntings  
 An important dimension of On Ghosts further indicates that some instances of haunting 
involve the reading of literary texts and the ongoing development of a literary lineage, as much 
as they do any other kinds of lived experiences. This focus on literary lineage is also in accord 
with Derridean hauntology, which allows for literature to be read as hauntological—that is, both 
existing but not-existing. By extension, I argue, a hauntological view of the literary can 
illuminate how a writer can be both present and absent within a text, a theme that On Ghosts 
develops. Partially, this literary ghosting is a consequence of the citation style in On Ghosts. 
Whereas there was minimal bibliographical information cited in Counterpart, On Ghosts reduces 
citation even more. While some direct quotations include attributions to writers—these tend to be 
contemporary writers whose texts are cited once—many quotations are unattributed. Instead, on 
the copyright page of On Ghosts, Robinson includes a note that states “Unattributed quotes come 
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from Robin Blaser and Barbara Guest,” and so these writers—whom Robinson praises as highly 
influential in interviews, and whose work she cites in other writings as well—are themselves 
ghostly, both present throughout the text and, in their lack of attributed signature, absent. This 
move indicates the extent to which previous poets’ words can permeate a later poet’s thinking so 
much that there are no neatly demarcated boundaries between and across various writers’ texts. 
Two passages in On Ghosts thematize the idea of poet as ghostly presence for the reader. 
In the passage “Incident Four,” the narrator describes the activity of reading poetry as a type of 
haunting imbued with the presence of the departed/departing poet. This haunting, through 
reading, is depicted as a significant event for the subject, just as the haunting by absent or 
departed loved ones and enemies in the other incidents. The text alludes to an unknown “she” 
who is a writer who hovers between life and death, unbeknownst to the narrator: 
I felt then that I needed all her books. Immediately. By my side.  
 
I brought them into bed with me. We lay there warm and at ease together. I was 
suffused with pleasure […] keen contentment. […]  
 
Perhaps the most unearthly of experiences is to feel so thoroughly at ease, so full 
with trust that, for once, the body is not a boundary that hems one in. (45)    
Although the text does not name the writer whose books the narrator contentedly falls asleep 
reading, it would appear to be Barbara Guest, who died in 2006. Robinson describes falling 
asleep to a book open to a page that begins with the words, “The Beautiful Voyage,” which is the 
title of a poem that appears in Guest’s 2003 collection, Forces of Imagination: Writing on 
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Writing.112 “Incident Four” thus describes the writer, Guest, as a ghost: through her books, she is 
both absent and present to the reader. The narrator is “alone,” but feels a kind of togetherness 
with Guest’s words. In an eerie coincidence, the narrator is depicted as somehow needing the 
presence of Guest’s words at the time of Guest’s earthly departure. The reading experience is 
conveyed as “unearthly,” at once intensely embodied—the description emphasizes feelings of 
physical warmth, pleasure, and ease, while the narrator lies in bed—and transcending the bodily, 
for the narrator feels that “the body is not a boundary that hems one in.” This description of 
reading poetry as an “unearthly” experience conveys a positive experience of haunting, one in 
which the haunted subject is “lessened” through her encounter with the writer in an affirmative 
sense. In “Incident Four,” the passageway opened between the “self and not-self” ushers in an 
experience of pleasure and momentary union between the presence of the poet and reader, as felt 
by the reader.  
At the same time, On Ghosts does not depict all encounters with reading and ghostly 
poets as cozy or potentially transcendent; it also offers a poetic haunting in which the reader feels 
awkward and embarrassed. Another prose section, “Visitor,” depicts a writer as a “dead man” 
who is visiting a class the narrator is teaching in order to read some of his poems. The text 
repeats, several times, that the “dead man” does not remember the narrator, and repeatedly asks 
“his companion” who she is and “what [her] role is,” resulting in the narrator’s embarrassment in 
front of her students “because it was I who had invited him to come” (33). Rather than depicting 
a scene where the narrator is “suffused with pleasure,” this encounter between reader and writer 
is awkward in its asymmetry, for the ghost of the writer does not recognize the reader. The 
narrator, as reader, had presumed an intimacy with the writer of which he is completely ignorant. 
                                                        
112 Notably, On Ghosts is formally similar to Guest’s Forces of Imagination, which alternates between short essays 
and formally experimental poems. 
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Rather than addressing the reader, he instead speaks to “his companion,” who is also unnamed, 
and who has to translate the dead man’s words to the narrating “I.” Furthermore, the narrating 
reader had rested her authority as a teacher on the basis of this false intimacy, which the writer 
repeatedly belies. While the narrator and the students feel awkward, the visit is not a complete 
disaster, for “the dead man read his poems with vigor and elegance” (33). In “Visitor,” reading 
poetry does not produce transcendence or contented communion with the dead author, but, 
rather, profound ambivalence. The narrator is haunted by this encounter because she realizes that 
she carries false presumptions about the poet, a realization all the more uncomfortable as it 
occurs in the public forum of the classroom.  
While the “dead man” in “Visitor” is not named, the narration of this episode includes a 
quote by the dead man with an excerpt of text written by Robin Blaser. While the quote is from a 
critical essay of Blaser’s on the modernist poet Mary Butts,113 Robinson’s text presents it in 
staggered lineation so that it looks, formally, like innovative poetry: 
“where he found the ghosts and so settled on the word and a newly posed 
language … [so] it is, I assume,  
 
 with one writer after another  
 
     that the loosened, embattled relation to meaning […] 
 
           turns up the ghosts—” (34) 
                                                        
113 The original quotation can be found in Robin Blaser’s essay, “Here Lies the Woodpecker Who was Zeus” in A 
Sacred Quest: The Life and Writings of Mary Butts. Ed. Christopher Wagstaff. Kingston, NY: McPherson, 1995. 
159-223.  
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This quotation by Blaser foregrounds the idea of a writer’s literary lineage as an ongoing process 
of “turn[ing] up the ghosts.” A writer—who is necessarily a reader of other writer’s texts—
involves being haunted by previous writers, who are simultaneously absent and present. Indeed, 
like “Incident Four,” which alludes to Guest as both absent and present, somewhere between 
dead and alive, so is Blaser, as explained on the subsequent page: “the subject was not yet 
entirely dead, and therefore his status as a ghost is debatable” (35). This quotation is ambiguous, 
as Blaser died in 2009, and On Ghosts is published in 2013. Might the description of the “dead 
man” be based on an autobiographical experience of Robinson teaching Blaser’s poetry while he 
was still alive? Or does it point to Blaser, who, although deceased by 2013, can still be classified 
as “not yet entirely dead” because of his ongoing presence in texts?  
On Ghosts leaves this ambiguity unresolved, just as it illustrates the relationship between 
a writer (as reader) and previous writers as having the potential for a great variety of 
possibilities. There may be authorial hauntings that are filled with ease, pleasure, and even the 
possibility of momentary transcendence, but there is not necessarily an easy rapport between 
writer and reader. Just as On Ghosts portrays haunting as akin to many types of dynamic 
relations there can be between people—fraught, easy, difficult, awkward, annoying—so these 
varying types of relations can exist between a writer and previous writers. What is inevitable is 
that, in the process of writing, a writer necessarily “turns up the ghosts.” I argue that, despite the 
awkwardness and disappointment recounted in “Visitor,” On Ghosts presents a writer as haunted 
by a literary lineage in terms that are ultimately productive, for having “found the ghosts,” a 
writer can still “settle on the word and a newly posed language.” The ghostly presences of Guest 
and Blaser that permeate On Ghosts indicate the alternating modes of embracing and stumbling 
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with literary influences, approaches that may be, at times, bursting with ease, pleasure, and 
inspiration, and at other times, full of discomforts and challenges.  
Voice in Lyric Poetry 
 Thus far, I have focused largely on Robinson’s conceptualization of subjectivity and its 
relation to alterity, including otherness as encountered through poetic texts. A further 
consideration of lyric subjectivity and textuality is the concept of “voice,” which has also been a 
subject of critique in poststructuralist and Language writing accounts of lyric poetry, as, for 
example, in the rejection of the “voice poem” in Language writing. At the beginning of this 
chapter, I mention the postlanguage position on lyric subjectivity and voice, as articulated by 
Willis and cited by Robinson, “‘that ideas of self or voice are never entirely absent from the tonal 
shadings of language’” (“Music Becomes Story 114). Before turning to the next poem, 
“Translation,” it will be helpful to establish in greater detail how the concept of “voice” has been 
theorized in the discourse surrounding lyric poetry, including poststructuralist objections to 
conventional ideas about “voice.”  
Traditionally, “poetry is regularly imagined to be the privileged site of vocal presence,” a 
concept that relies on the notion of poetic texts as secondary vehicles that derive from the 
primacy of oral speech (Richards n.p.). In Of Grammatology, Derrida takes issue with this 
convention and what he considers the tyranny of voice. He claims that the oppressive 
metaphysical tradition of logocentrism “is also a phonocentrism,” that posits an “absolute 
proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being” (12); in other words, 
conventional understanding locates self-presence, being, and meaning within the “voice.” Within 
a logocentric/phonocentric Western metaphysical tradition, the voice is privileged, as it “has a 
relationship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind. … It signifies ‘mental 
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experiences’ which themselves reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance” (11). Derrida 
both demonstrates the fallacy of equating “voice” with the being and presence of the speaker and 
demonstrates how much Western thought and language invest in these metaphysical 
assumptions.114  
 While Derrida’s critique of voice as absolute presence is necessary to understand, 
contemporary poet-critic Susan Stewart has theorized lyric voice in terms that can even more 
fully elucidate Robinson’s position on lyric voice. As Stewart observes, the concept of “voice” 
has persisted in a valued position for many who write and teach American lyric poetry, although 
at times in ways that may be problematic. According to Stewart, creative workshop clichés draw 
on the notion of “the poet finding his or her own voice” but such banalities “substitute a reifying 
and mystifying version of subjectivity for what is in fact most profound and engaging about 
poetic voice—that is, the plays of transformation it evokes beyond the irreducibility of its own 
grain” (110).  
Stewart’s concept of voice both revises the commonplace concept of voice as one’s 
“own” possession that simultaneously stands in for a simplistic and reified concept of 
subjectivity, while at the same time honoring the love a human voice can inspire: 
The “object” of my love for your voice emerges in the relation between my 
history and the uniqueness of your existence, the particular timbre, tone, 
hesitations, and features of articulation by which all the voices subject to your 
own history have shaped your voice’s instrument. In listening, I am listening to 
                                                        
114 Fellow deconstructionist literary critic Paul de Man extends Derrida’s critique. In his essay “Anthropomorphism 
and Trope in Lyric” (1984), de Man condemns “what we call the lyric, the instance of represented voice” as a term 
of “resistance and nostalgia, at the furthest remove from the materiality of actual history” (261, 262). As Richards 
summarizes, de Man condemns the tendency to read voice into lyric as delusional and warns, “lyric reading 
practices that hear voices where there are only words anthropomorphize at their own peril …” (n.p.). Thus, de Man 
aims to strip textuality of any notion of “voice.” I find that de Man’s skepticism and dismissal of a simple notion of 
lyric voice is not applicable to Robinson, for she is interested in retaining and revising the concept of lyric voice. 
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the material history of your connection to all the dead and the living who have 
been impressed upon you. The voice … holds within itself the life of the self—it 
cannot be another’s. (112) 
Stewart acknowledges that voice, while partaking in a speaker’s unique features, is nevertheless 
plural, for it is imprinted by the other voices that have gone before. Indeed, Stewart’s reading is 
compatible with Derridean deconstruction insofar as she notes that all language carries the 
citation of previous language; there is no original “voice.” Moreover, Stewart observes that voice 
is not coincident with the presence and/or being of the speaker, for voice is necessarily 
compound, emerging through a relation between reader and poet and their unique histories. In 
describing the reader’s encounter with a poet’s voice in the poem, Stewart cites Friedrich 
Schiller to explain how the reader leaves his or her own ego to meet with the poet’s words; 
consequently, the poet’s voice is necessarily multiple: 
“Everyday language has for this condition of absence-of-self under the 
domination of sense-perception the very appropriate expression to be beside 
oneself—that is, to be outside one’s ego.” Standing behind, standing before, 
standing beside—all send the voice into a difficult trajectory; it is the trajectory of 
writer and reader who can only project and approximate one another’s presence, 
and it is the trajectory of generations, of the many-branched temporal path 
between the dead and the living. (113)  
Stewart carefully avoids the trap of logocentrism, for she acknowledges that the poet and reader 
can only “project and approximate one another’s presence,” rather than access presence directly. 
Compellingly, in a move that is compatible with Derridean hauntology, Stewart emphasizes how 
the ongoing creation of voices through poetry connects the dead and living.  
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Furthermore, Stewart argues that her understanding of voice takes on a spiritual 
dimension by turning to the Platonic character of Diotima for an analogy: “[t]he individual voice 
is … demonic, mediating, traversing in Diotima’s sense of the (daimon) of love in her discourse 
to Socrates in the Symposium” (112). Furthermore, Stewart claims, “[a]s the daimon of the 
Symposium bore messages by means of incantation and prophecy through the space between 
gods and men, the voice as sound is resolved in the meeting between persons that moves or 
touches those who are in its presence—those touched” (113-114). Stewart’s comparison of voice 
to Diotima’s daimon, a mediating spirit that uses the “voice” that emerges through poetry, is a 
pagan spiritual symbol akin to Derrida’s ghosts. In contrast to a reference to the Judeo-Christian 
God, which may be read as invested in hierarchical relations in a circumscribed religious context, 
the figure of the daimon bespeaks a spiritual, but not specific or dogmatic, dimension of literary 
experience. Stewart’s analogy to the daimon highlights how poetic voice can serve as an 
intermediary vehicle that can traverse space and time and can partake of both immanent and 
transcendent realms.  
I quote Stewart at length because she articulates a valuable understanding of lyric voice 
with attributes that surface in Robinson’s poem, “Translation” (as well as another poem I turn to 
at the end of the chapter, “Speak”). Robinson’s poetry characterizes lyric voice with the 
following features: lyric voice is set on a trajectory that is shaped by, on one level, the meeting of 
the poet and reader in the poem; voice is therefore necessarily compound/plural; voice traverses 
the temporal realms of the living and the dead; and the concept of voice partakes in a strong 
spiritual or mystical dimension.  
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The Ghosts of Lyric: Translation, Composition, Self and Voice 
 One of the poems in On Ghosts, “Translation,” uses the figure of the ghost/spirit to 
explore poetic language, translation as a key element of the process of lyric composition, and the 
complex configuration of the lyric self and lyric voice. “Translation” opens with a quote from 
contemporary American poet James Longley on the topic of poetic texts and translations, which 
he describes, metaphorically, as ghosts.  
… Everything you see on the page is a ghost […] Then the translations are 
ghosts of ghosts, and the voice I give them is at best a mockery of their past life. 
I fear I cannot walk this terrain without falling into chasms of self: self-interest, 
self-pity. How will I be sure that the spirit is speaking in me at all, much less when 
I transcribe, much less when I translate? –James Longley 
In “Translation,” Robinson pointedly varies the typography, Longley’s quotation is in 
typewriter-style font, which foregrounds the writing process as a physical activity in which the 
writer creates the text on the page through the manual manipulation of a machine. Rather than 
effacing the embodied writing process through the use of consistent fonts that are naturalized in 
contemporary word-processing conventions, the typescript font also showcases text as rough 
draft, underscoring writing and translating as a process that, in “Translation,” is characterized as 
vexed. 
In the passage, Longley describes texts, or “[e]verything you see on the page,” as the 
ghost of the corporeal and translations as “ghosts of ghosts.” This idea of translation, the process 
of changing words from one language to another, as turning up ghosts can be read in 
hauntological terms, for Derrida also theorizes the ghostliness of the translation process as words 
differ across texts. In Derrida’s words,  “[a] masterpiece always moves, by definition, in the 
manner of a ghost. … In their plurality, the words of translation … disorganize themselves as 
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well through the very effect of the specter” (Specters 18). The consideration of translation as 
ghostly highlights the impossibility of an exact replication of a text’s original words. Like the 
ghost, a translation always involves differences, approximations, and gaps in meaning; at the 
same time, these gaps allow an opening onto possibilities. This hauntological reading of 
translation recalls Robinson’s poem “Doppelgänger” in Counterpart, which posed translation—a 
double in language that is necessarily an inexact counterpart—as a way to “cure the echo,” or the 
exact replication of speech/text/source/speaking subject, and its attending, destructive narcissism. 
While “Doppelgänger” showcases translation as the best, or perhaps only alternative to 
replication of the same, the Longley’s opening quotation in “Translation” emphasizes how 
fraught the process of translating can be, as translations that are “ghosts as ghosts” can, in their 
shifting ethereality, fail to honor the “spirit” of the previous text.  
After Longley’s quotation, the following verse section expands upon Longley’s anxious 
question, “[h]ow will I be sure that the spirit is speaking in me at all …?”:  
Doggerel Ghost can speak in tongues. 
From the wetness of spirit he twists and is wrung.  
Thirsty language wants to sip from this vessel 
But the language of Ghost never sates, only wrestles. (31) 
In the verse section, Robinson parodically uses the form of doggerel in verse centered on the 
figure of “Doggerel Ghost.” Doggerel is usually a pejorative term in poetry scholarship, 
commonly referring to “Rough, poorly constructed verse, characterized by either (1) extreme 
metrical irregularity or (2) easy rhyme and monotonous rhythm, cheap sentiment, and triviality” 
(Palache, n.p.). The verse section of “Translation,” with its often simplistically rhymed couplets 
(well/shell; up/cup) and metrical irregularity, fulfills the definition of doggerel. In terms of 
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meter, the line length varies widely, and the longer lines sound awkwardly extended, unable to 
be contained in the established meter. This metrical excess enacts what the content describes, 
which is a broken cup, a “vessel” that “language wants to sip from,” but this container leaks its 
surplus content. Similarly, the doggerel form cannot contain the “ghost,” which is figured as a 
broken and leaking vessel elsewhere in On Ghosts as well.115 The use of the choppy verse form 
also enacts the coarseness of the translation/writing process from text to text or ghost/spirit to 
word by demonstrating how writing/translation is a rough process that “never sates, only 
wrestles,” which echoes Langley’s earnest description of the wrestling between the translator and 
texts. The doggerel verse in “Translation” so markedly contrasts Robinson’s more typical formal 
commitments that it can be read as intentional parody. It pointedly, if momentarily, shifts the 
tone of On Ghosts, from one that is reflective and at times unsettling, to one that is comically 
absurd, rather pathetic, and therefore all too human. Writers/translators of words/spirit try, 
bungle, get tongue-tied, are imperfect, broken, leaky, and generally inelegant—but they 
nevertheless continue to try.  
In addition to a consideration of “translation” as the transformation of words of speech or 
text between two languages, the term “translation” can also have a broader meaning, as the 
process of change of something from one form to another. In “Translation,” Robinson gestures 
towards the transformational process from spirit/ghost to text through speech. Specifically, 
lyrical composition can be considered “translation” wherein the poet encounters a spirit or ghost, 
whose message the poet translates by speaking in tongues. Indeed, the activity of speaking in 
                                                        
115 In one episode from On Ghosts, “On the Relation of Mother and Child to Haunting and Ghost,” the text states, “it 
is in the nature of ghosts to be broken” and continues in the narratorial voice: “In what way is a ghost broken, and if 
it were a crushed teacup, glued painstakingly back together, what would emerge? Most likely it would be only a 
teacup. A receptacle, or a disguised, but in either case no longer watertight” (16). Additionally, the image of the 
leaky cup is mentioned the brief essay, “Skepticism,” on the subject of Robinson’s doubt about whether her recently 
deceased grandmother haunted her: “While the doubting of doubt might be at the heart of bereavement, the ugly gap 
where the ghost gets in, gets in with his or her serum of doubt, which doubtless overflows its leaky cup” (27).  
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tongues is referenced in the doggerel verse section, with the lines, “So the student of tongues 
becomes a ghost / and the betrayer of saying his impeccable host” (32). Speaking in tongues is 
also referenced in the concluding prose quotation of “Translation”:  
He says, 
“The God with whom I was partnered in my time learning to speak in tongues is 
no longer in/with/above me. Even when He was, the question of who was 
speaking was difficult.” (32) 
What links does the poem draw among translation, poetic composition, and speaking in tongues? 
The origin of the idea of speaking in tongues is described in the New Testament as a gift 
of the Holy Spirit that descends upon Christ’s followers on the festival of the Pentecost. The 
apostles with the gift of tongues were suddenly given able to speak in foreign languages so that 
others in the crowd, from various nations, could understand them (Acts 2:1-11). Certain 
charismatic Protestant traditions, particularly Pentecostalism, incorporate the practice of 
speaking in tongues into their religious worship. Speaking in tongues, also called glossolalia, 
involves the production of verbal speech that is generally unintelligible to both speaker and 
listeners (Williams 249). In the practice of glossolalia, a type of “translation” occurs: “While 
glossolalia is lexically noncommunicative, in Christian groups the meaning is conveyed to the 
group by an interpreter whose ability to ‘translate’ is [also] considered to be … one of the vocal 
gifts of the Spirit. The ‘translation’ … is not to be regarded as a word by word ‘translation.’ It 
would seem rather that the interpreter … conveys the mood or the inner mental processes of the 
speaker” (Williams 249). Robinson’s references to speaking in tongues gesture to glossolalia as a 
metaphor for lyric composition as the translation of “spirit” into text, and also lend a spiritual 
dimension to the exploration of lyric composition/translation. With this metaphor to glossolalia, 
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poetic language can thus be compared to mystical utterance. While the reference to speaking in 
tongues takes on a particularly Christian overtone, it is notable that the “God with whom I am 
partnered” is an ambiguous figure. As such, I suggest that the spirit/Ghost/God invoked in 
“Translation” is still compatible with both the Ghost of Derrida’s hauntology and Stewart’s 
mediating daimon.  
While “Translation” invokes glossolalia, the text does not resolve in a tidy metaphor, but 
instead indicates the mystery inherent in the processes of ghostly poetic composition/translation 
and gestures to the indeterminable source of lyric voice in any poem. Longley’s question “How 
will I be sure that the spirit is speaking in me at all, much less when I transcribe, much less when 
I translate?” conveys how spiritual translation as textual composition differs from charismatic 
Christian practice, in which the gift of speaking in tongues and the gift of interpreting tongues is 
separated out into two individuals. For Longley, the writer is interpreter/translator, but the 
“speaker” as ghost indicates a figure that is both separate from and therefore exterior to the 
writer, while at the same time interior. On one level, “the spirit” is the one who speaks, but, since 
the spirit (ideally) speaks “in me,” then the writer is the “speaker” as well. This confusion over 
who is speaking, and whether that voice is internal or external, is explicitly commented on in the 
poem’s concluding quotation, which is attributed only to unnamed “He,” a “student of tongues,” 
who becomes a narrating “I.”116 This student of tongues acknowledges that “the question of who 
was speaking was difficult,” while at the same time mourning a lost God who had previously 
“partnered” with him and is now absent. Ultimately, in “Translation,” the question of who is 
speaking in a poetic text is fundamentally ambiguous.  
                                                        
116 While I have been unable to locate the source of this quote, the process of deduction leads me to conclude that 
“He” would be Blaser.  
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In her critical writing, Robinson states this position directly, indicating that the question 
of mystical “presence” and its relation to the lyric subject and/or composing poet, is unresolved 
and unresolvable: “what is the source of poetry and how does it find voice? . . . let me 
acknowledge that the issues of ‘source’ can’t be resolved” (“Persona” 92). This statement on the 
obscurity of the “source” of poetry and lyric voice perhaps helps the reader understand the 
necessary confusion of who is the ghost in the text “Translation.” Not only are both the writing 
subject and the spirit/ghost who is “speaking” within the writing subject alternately present and 
absent, but “Translation” also deliberately obscures who haunts whom, for the “ghost” stands in 
for many elements—the text printed on the page, translations, the spirit that inspires, and the 
student of tongues, who is also the poet. As Robinson states in a later poem in On Ghosts, 
“Nursery Rhyme,” “The ghost by nature is confusion” (37). Rather constructing a fixed analogy, 
“Translation” develops a cluster of slippery and shifting ghosts that indicate the unknowability of 
the exact mechanisms of poetic composition as translation from spirit to language.   
At the same time, the shifting ghosts in “Translation” are used to investigate the issue of 
the presence of self and voice in lyric composition. At first it seems that ghost/spirit/Holy 
Spirit/God is the poetic “speaker,” as in the lines “Doggerel Ghost can speak in tongues” and 
“the Ghost sings from a code: / irritant, error, self-song, and ode,” in which case the poet might 
be only the interpreter who translates what the ghost/spirit says. This division of compositional 
labor might seem to hearken back to the ancient tradition of a divine muse who sings and thus 
inspires the poet to compose. At the same time, the metaphor of the poet as interpreter also 
upends the contemporary lyric convention where the lyric “I” is the “speaker” who articulates the 
poet’s voice/presence directly. Is it then replaced with the postmodern idea of the “scriptor,” that 
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Roland Barthes describes, a kind of passive conduit that enables readers to be the active 
interpreters?  
I argue that “Translation” does not rest with the a simple description of the poet as 
divinely inspired by a ghost/spirit/muse, nor with a stable lyric “I” whose presence is configured 
within the poem, nor a poet as passive scriptor. In the Longley quotation, the narrator observes 
that, in his unsteady attempt to approximate the spirit of a text written by another, there is 
nevertheless a turn towards the self, for he wrestles with “chasms of self” all the more as they 
surface through “self-interest, self-pity.” Thus the process of translation involves both the 
encounter with otherness and self-encounter. In the doggerel verse that follows, these “chasms of 
self” that the writer/translator falls into are echoed in the first line of the verse section, “Self and 
voice fell down the well / excavating its watery shell.” Furthermore, the Ghost who “sings from a 
code” includes in his repertoire “irritant, error, self-song, and ode,” which alludes to other forms 
of lyrical production in addition to doggerel, including both the formal, serious, and complex 
lyric verse of the “ode” and the expressive, introspective lyric form of “self-song.” The types of 
lyrics that the Ghost sings are opaque, as they are from a “code,” and therefore far from direct or 
transparent transmission of language; translation is needed to decipher any lyrical code. 
Furthermore, the references to “self” and “voice” highlight that, in Willis’s terms, shadings of the 
lyric subject and lyric voice are both ever-present, but they are also essentially unstable; the fall 
into a well unearths a “watery shell,” a paradoxical object that, like the Doggerel Ghost’s offer of 
a “broken cup,” is a vessel that both contains and overflows its contents. Doggerel Ghost hauls 
up “Self and voice” but offers only language that “never sates, only wrestles.” Thus, Robinson 
identifies the ghostly presences of self and voice that always surface within lyric composition 
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indirectly, only as “ghosts of ghosts” or translations that must always exceed the vessel of 
language that seeks to contain them.  
Furthermore, the figures of ghosts in “Translation” that shift from the speaker/speaker of 
tongues to poet/student of tongues disrupt the neat boundary between interiority and exteriority. 
This crossing of interiority and exteriority shows lyric voice—as in Stewart’s formulation—to be 
compound, intermediary, and participating in a spiritual dimension that links reader and poet, the 
living and the departed. In her critical writing, Robinson similarly asserts that lyric composition 
can be viewed as akin to spiritual or mystical experience: “[i]n poetry and mystical utterance, 
there is no necessary disagreement between the simultaneity of the speaker’s voice and the voice 
that arrives from outside” (“Persona” 94). This is a configuration of lyric voice that crosses the 
boundaries between the lyric subject’s interiority and exteriority as well as the borders between 
and the immanence of the living world and the spiritual realm of ghosts/the dead. This boundary-
crossing lyric voice therefore challenges both the conventional notion of a poet “finding” her 
singular voice and the avant-garde opposition to the “voice poem” (or “self-song”), for it 
dismantles the idea of lyric voice as straightforward self-expression from a pure interiority.  
Robinson’s notion of ghostly translation that draws on the metaphor of glossolalia allows 
a hauntological reading. “Translation” describes not an attempt of language to copy an original, 
centered presence, but rather explores how difference is introduced through translation of 
language and the processes of writing composition. The figure of the ghost highlights the 
interplay between the absence and the presence of the ghost/spirit. Indeed, “Translation” also 
accords with Derridean hauntology insofar as ethical questions surface within the text. As the 
figure of the ghost becomes more complex through the description of the production of multiple 
types of lyric poetry, the poet or “student of tongues” becomes a “ghost” and “betrayer of saying 
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his impeccable host.” The poet’s betrayal of the “host” indicates that the poet as translator may 
be seen as a guest to spirit/previous texts, but may also be seen as a parasite, as indicated by 
Langley’s reference to the “mockery of their past life” inherent in the process of translation. As 
translation is always leaking, seeping, or otherwise producing excess in its rough approximation 
of previous text(s), so does lyric poetry run the risk of betraying the ghost or spirit which hosts or 
visit.  
The issue of betrayal—the opposite of hospitality—foregrounds the ethical quandary of 
lyric composition that Longley considers so anxiously: given that exact replication is not 
possible, how to speak for the spirit or ghost who speaks in me? In hauntological terms, how can 
one respect the ghost—the alterity and singularity of the Other—in the conversation and 
companionship that Derrida insists is required? To say anything is to risk the “error” that is 
mentioned in the doggerel verse, but silence does not honor the ghost either. On the other hand, 
the term “error” brings up associations with its etymologically linked term “errant,” or 
wandering, a concept often embraced in contemporary poetry, as discussed in the earlier chapter 
on Howe, as well as theorized in the relational poetics of Edouard Glissant. In such a view, 
wandering is embraced as the process of experiencing the world and developing relations to 
develop self-exploration and poetics that is inherently relational; as Glissant argues, “the tale of 
errantry is the tale of Relation” (18). Furthermore, Glissant espouses a nomadism that is 
inherently multilingual, opposed the “totalitarianism of any monolingual intent” (19). In such a 
view, the errantry—or error—of translation is necessary to navigate as a nomad among various 
languages and experiences. In hauntological terms, in order to avoid betraying “the host,” the 
poet can move towards Derrida’s radical hospitality of visitation, which allows an opening for 
the presence of the ghost as visitor and involves the process of learning to speak to/for/about the 
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ghost. While perfect balance among spirit, poet, and texts may never be achieved, this might not 
be the ultimate goal. Translation/composition may always entail loss as previous language and/or 
mystical utterance is transcribed to a new text, but a writer can aim to honor the visiting spirit 
with responsibility as he or she wanders through the writing process.  
Apostrophe, Lyric, and Textual Encounter  
 Thus far, I have described Robinson’s textual encounters between writer and reader in 
ethical terms in two ways. First, I have referenced Robinson’s extensive use of intertextuality, 
which presents writing as inherently citational. This strategy advances writing as an ethical, 
communal activity, for writers are always readers, and part of their responsibility is to respond to 
fellow writers’ works. Second, I have considered the encounter between writer and reader in 
hauntological terms, in which the reading and translating of literature is haunted by the ghostly 
figure of the previous writer. While Robinson allows for encounters between reader and writer to 
carry a range of affective consequences for the reading subject, and visitation by a writer’s 
literary forebears may be an activity that is uncomfortable or fraught—as described in “Visit” 
and “Translation” in On Ghosts—it nevertheless carries great value, as the literary is positioned 
as a potential opening to alterity, a passageway between the “self and non-self,” and therefore 
can enable ethical relations among writers. However, both of these interpretations allow for 
reading as the site of ethical possibilities insofar as they relate to the writing subject’s ongoing 
engagement with a writer’s literary lineage; in all of these instances, the reader is also a writer. 
 I turn now to investigate Robinson’s broader treatment of textual encounter in writings 
that theorize, describe, or enact direct address wherein the writing subject, “I,” addresses an 
unknown reader who is not necessarily a writer. This turn to a consideration of Robinson’s 
relation between an “I” and “you” follows the pattern of each of the chapters of this dissertation, 
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where I begin with a consideration of the postlanguage lyric poet’s articulation of a lyric “I” and 
then examine how their writing theorizes and enacts an ethical engagement with the reader 
through an invoked or implied “you.” While this shift in emphasis from the lyric “I” to the lyric 
“you” largely follows the progression of Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely and could be traced 
more or less chronologically among certain selections of Howe’s later poems, for Robinson, it 
necessitates a turn to an earlier collection of lyric poetry, Apostrophe, from 2006, where several 
selections consider encounter between writer and reader in order to investigate the ethics of lyric 
address.  
Robinson frames Apostrophe with epigraphs that foreground the lyric as a site of 
potential encounter between reader and writer. I suggest that this opening framework sets up an 
exploration of lyric address in Apostrophe that partly coincides with a Levinasian-Celanian 
model of lyric reading as ethical encounter, and partly modifies this model with a Derridean 
emphasis on difference and distance between the lyric “you” and the lyric “I.” The opening page 
of Apostrophe includes a quotation from the influential 1981 essay “Apostrophe” by Jonathan 
Culler, a deconstructionist literary critic. Robinson’s text excerpt’s Culler’s discussion of Keats’ 
eight-line poem “This Living Hand,” wherein the lyric “I” directly addresses a “thou/you” in a 
most ghostly way, as the speaking subject indicates that, through the poem, he will posthumously 
“haunt thy days and chill thy dreaming nights” while holding out a hand “towards you”:  
The poem baldly asserts what is false: that a living hand, warm and capable, is 
being held toward us, that we can see it. The narrator contrasts his life with death, 
proleptically predicting that when he is dead the reader will seek to overcome his 
death, will blind himself to his death by an imaginative act. We fulfill this icy 
prediction…by losing our empirical lives: forgetting the temporality which 
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supports them and trying to embrace a purely fictional time in which we can 
believe that the hand is really present and perpetually held toward us through the 
poem. (7) 117 
Some background information is necessary to help understand Culler’s argument. As a literary 
term, “apostrophe” can be somewhat slippery, as Waters observes:  
Poetic address, especially to unhearing entities, whether these be abstractions, 
inanimate objects, animals, infants, or absent or dead people. … Some poetry 
critics have treated the term apostrophe as interchangeable with the term address, 
so including poetic speech not only to unhearing entities but to the listening 
beloved, friend, or patron or to contemporary or later readers. (“Apostrophe” 
n.p.)118 
Culler applies the term apostrophe interchangeably with lyric address, for his essay investigates 
examples of Romantic lyric poems that address unhearing entities and those that address 
readers.119 Robinson’s text explores apostrophe in both meanings of the term as well; her citation 
of Culler in the epigraph to Apostrophe in fact focuses on Keats’ notable poetic direct address to 
the reader.120 The epigraph includes an excerpt of Culler’s reading of Keats that invokes a 
                                                        
117 The entire text of Keats’ poem “This Living Hand” is as follows: 
This living hand, now warm and capable 
Of earnest grasping, would, if it were cold 
And in the icy silence of the tomb, 
So haunt thy days and chill thy dreaming nights 
That thou would wish thine own heart dry of blood 
So in my veins red life might stream again, 
And thou be conscience-calm’d—see here it is— 
I hold it towards you. (John Keats: The Complete Poems 459) 
118 The term “apostrophe” has roots in rhetoric. It derives from ancient Greek phrase “turning away,” which refers to 
a gesture from classical oratory in which the speaker turns to address someone who cannot hear him. 
119 Not all agree with Culler’s treatment. Critic Douglas J. Kneale, for example, takes issue with Culler’s conflation 
of the terms “apostrophe” and “address.” See “Romantic Aversions; Apostrophe Reconsidered.” ELH 58.1 (1991): 
141-65.  
120 Much of Culler’s essay takes up Romantic odes that use the vocative for unhearing entities, in particular, the use 
of “O” to hail inanimate objects and/or nature. Culler argues that the “O” is a rather embarrassing literary device in 
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disruption of commonplace understanding of temporality through the experience of reading 
apostrophic lyric poetry. The disrupted temporality that Culler describes is the poetic invocation 
of the construction and “embrace” of “a purely fictional time” that occurs with readers’ 
participation through the (temporary) loss of “our empirical lives.” As Culler observes, “This 
Living Hand” rests on a falsehood: Keats’ hand is dead, not living, and is not actually held out to 
the reader. Yet at the same time, the conceit is not entirely false’ the “icy prediction” that the 
reader can overcome the author’s death, as made in the address to the reader, is fulfilled through 
the “imaginative act” of reading the lyric poem.    
The epigraph by Culler gestures to possibilities that emerge from experiences of ruptured 
temporality through lyric poetry. Culler argues that if one “distinguish two forces in poetry, the 
narrative and the apostrophic … the lyric is characteristically the triumph of the apostrophic” 
(149). Culler’s opposition between the apostrophic and the narrative is essential to understand 
because of its implications for temporality: “[a]postrophe resists narrative because its now is not 
a moment in a temporal sequence but a now of discourse, of writing” (152). With apostrophe, 
lyric is freed from “our empirical lives”: “Apostrophe is not the representation of an event; if it 
works, it produces a fictive, discursive event” (153). As a result, Culler argues, in lyric poetry, 
apostrophe has the power to displace the necessity of irreversible loss within temporality. 
Consequently, presence and absence are no longer opposed; this is most clearly seen in the poetic 
form of the elegy, which simultaneously evokes life and death, absence and presence (151). 
“This Living Hand” can be read as an inverted elegy, in which the lyric “I” invokes not another’s 
death, but his own. Keats’ poem insists on his own continued presence by addressing—and 
therefore haunting—the reader. Thus, the lyric as apostrophic—which, if it is understood in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
which the lyric “I” self-consciously performs the self as a poetic visionary. However, the epigraph in Robinson’s 
collection Apostrophe does not take up Culler’s interpretation of apostrophe as an invocation of inanimate objects or 
unhearing persons. Instead, she focuses on his analysis of Keats’ direct address to the reader. 
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broader sense to encompass “address,” as Culler does—may “assert what is false,” in the sense 
that it is not rooted directly in what Culler calls “our empirical lives.” Despite the falsehood of 
lyric address, Culler’s argument underscores a major theme of Robinson’s that I have detailed in 
this chapter: lyric’s essential interplay between presence and absence. Furthermore, lyric’s 
simultaneous absence and presence, as facilitated through the “triumph of the apostrophic,” 
emphasizes lyric as rhetoric. Thus, Robinson’s citation of Culler corresponds with the critical 
notion, also articulated by Brewster, Waters, and Blasing, that lyric is a rhetorical genre, 
fundamentally concerned with the nature of address.  
How does this epigraph by Culler characterize lyric address? The citation of Culler’s 
analysis of Keats’ “This Living Hand” foregrounds encounter between reader and writer, but not 
one that is facile or comforting, as it involves the lyric “I” reaching out with a spectral hand in a 
disturbing way. The hand, if it were in “the icy silence of the tomb,” would “[s]o haunt thy days 
and chill thy dreaming nights / That thou would wish thine own heart dry of blood / So in my 
veins red life might stream again.” This encounter between writer and reader is far from one of 
easy harmony; to Robinson, haunting may be a “neutral” phenomenon, but Keats’s verse deploys 
vampiric metaphors. As I argued earlier, the encounter between reader and writer may, like any 
interpersonal relations, take on any of a range of affective possibilities. Furthermore, as with 
Keats’s poem, lyric encounter may differ from the more utopian overtones of the Levinasian-
Celanian model of textual encounter. I suggest that several poems in Apostrophe allow for the 
possibility that lyric poetry may be a potential site of Levinasian-Celanian ethical encounter, but, 
at the same time, emphasize the continued possibility of difference, conflict, and dissonance 
rather than easy harmony.   
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“Gaps in the Span” and Rejected Gifts: The Problem of Connection 
Several lyric poems in Apostrophe, including “The Nocturnal Bridge,” “Gift,” and 
“Speak,” resist the characterization of facile connection between self and Other, subject and 
object, writer and reader. On the contrary, the problematic nature of the connection between self 
and Other—along with the necessity of the attempt to connect—emerges within several poems of 
the collection, starting with the opening poem of the collection, “The Nocturnal Bridge.” The 
text begins with images of gaps that occur within linkages. The setting is, mysteriously, “Under 
the field”: 
 its flowing substance, 
 
 are gaps in the span— 
  who parts 
 
 but lovers, 
 self from beloved self. (8) 
The supposedly solid terrain of the field is revealed to have, underneath it, water, a “flowing 
substance,” constantly in motion. The titular bridge is initially referred to indirectly, not for its 
function of providing connection, but for where it is discontinuous: the “gaps in the span” refers 
to the “span” of a bridge that is the extent between the bridge supports. “Span” can also refer to 
limited amounts of space or time, and thus further highlights discontinuity, as does the image of 
the separation of the bodies of lovers: “who parts / but lovers, / self from beloved self.” Instead 
of the imagery of erotic connection, the lovers divide, their selves individuate; their span of time 
together appears to be ending. Later in the poem, while connection beckons with the phrase “the 
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bridge / urging / to its trespass,” consummation may be either deferred or already concluded, for 
we are left with an image of a lover’s departure as it recedes into darkness: “The beloved body 
interred / in the free black air” (9). The image is paradoxical: the solidity of the body is 
“interred” not in earth, but in the insubstantial darkness of the atmosphere. “The beloved body” 
is untethered, disappearing into the obscurity of night, and thereby delivering not desired 
connection but the dark freedom that comes with parting.  
The second poem of Apostrophe, “Gift,” further describes a failed attempt at connection, 
specifically, a thwarted attempt at gift giving. It begins with an image of giving as an activity 
circumscribed by the giver:  
 You are to be wrapped securely,  
 to rest now, proffered.  
 The cover soothes itself 
 As it falls across your profile. (11) 
The poem’s opening word, “You,” highlights this poem as boldly apostrophic in its address to an 
inanimate object, the gift, although the indication to “your profile” may imply a double meaning, 
for the “you” may refer to a human addressee as well. The speaker/giver opens by attempting to 
impose her will on the gift; she intends for the gift to be enclosed by being “wrapped securely,” 
“to rest,” to be soothed by the cover that “falls across your profile.” Formally, the opening lines 
enact this will to closure: aligned on the right margin, they comprise one imperative and one 
declarative sentence, both closed with definitive periods at the ends of lines two and four. 
However, the strong imperative and the mention of a “cover” that insists that it is soothing, but 
may be smothering, the “profile” of the potentially human addressee, delivers an image that is 
more disturbing than calming.  
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The scene shifts with the following lines, “But the dream hand lifts ahead of you, / 
casting and castigating” (11). The speaker’s will to secure and enclose the gift through smooth 
wrapping is undermined with the line “But the dream hand lifts ahead of you,” a dramatic 
reversal of the opening lines that is formally situated on the opposing, left margin. The image of 
the hand recalls Keats’ “living hand” that is, in Culler’s words, “really present and perpetually 
held toward us through the poem.” But Robinson inverts this image; this is a “dream hand,” not a 
“living hand.” While Robinson’s wording relegates the ontological status of the hand to a dream 
state, it does not make this image of the hand any less present or forceful. Instead, the “dream 
hand” interrupts the intended gift-giving ritual: any idealized or even everyday image of hands 
welcoming one another through the harmonious offer and reception of a gift is disrupted, as the 
“dream hand” is instead “casting and castigating.” This phrase brings to mind references to a 
hand discarding, throwing, scolding, criticizing, or punishing, with such harsh actions 
underscored by the hissing repetition of the words “casting,” “castigating,” and a few lines later, 
the imperative “Cast,” which is directed towards the gift as “plaything”:  
plaything, this is  
   weary’s bauble 
   all undone:  
   stirring inside 
   in the trinket’s clutch. (11) 
The longed-for security of the opening lines is unsettled, as we are in the “midst of no sure 
thing.” While the diction of the concluding stanza downplays the seriousness of gift, which is 
now likened to a “plaything,” “weary’s bauble” and “a trinket’s clutch,” the speaker’s discord 
and disappointment is evident. As opposed to the intention of the opening line, the gift’s 
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reception cannot be secured. The line “weary’s bauble / all undone” points to an unraveling in 
contrast to the soothed security of the opening; “stirring inside / the trinket’s clutch” gestures to 
movement and the alterity that the giver/speaker cannot control, despite her attempt to “clutch” 
the gift.  
 “Gift” can be read as a meditation on the fraught nature of gift-giving as a means of 
connection between subject and Other. I suggest that it can be productive to read it through the 
lens of Derridean ethics. Derrida explores the concept of the gift in the book Given Time I. 
Counterfeit Money. In opposition to the anthropological explanation of the gift as grounded in 
circles of economy and governed by ties of obligation and expectations of reciprocity, Derrida 
describes the gift as running towards “the measureless and the excessive” (Given Time 7, 91): 
“[t]he gift, if there is any, will always be without border. … The gift that does not run over its 
borders, a gift that would let itself be contained in a determination and limited by the 
indivisibility of an identifiable trait would not be a gift. As soon as it delimits itself, a gift is prey 
to calculation and measure” (Given Time 91). A gift given in the expectation of reciprocity or 
other economic exchange is not truly a gift, for the giver controls the terms of the exchange. 
Robinson’s poem “Gift” illustrates the inherently excessive and unstable nature of gift-giving in 
a Derridean fashion, for there is movement and instability beyond the flattened borders of the 
wrapped present. The speaker/giver’s attempt at control of the gift is also an attempted control of 
the recipient; the resulting “midst of no sure thing” results from the sequence of gift prepared, 
proffered, and rebuked. This series indicates that the interchange between giver, recipient, and 
gift—at least, as the gift as intended to be circumscribed or controlled by the giver/writer—has 
become “all undone.” The conclusion of “Gift” demonstrates how gift-giving is, in Derrida’s 
words, “Not impossible but the impossible” (Given Time 7). 
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 What are the implications of the undoing of the gift-giving exchange in Robinson’s 
poem? Is gift-giving merely a cul-de-sac, one that we should avoid entering? Reading “Gift” in 
terms of Derridean ethics, the answer is no. As Shepherd explains, for Derrida, “the impossibility 
of a pure gift, [like] an unconditional hospitality of visitation, rather than leading to paralysis or 
inaction, is the very dynamic which empowers ethical action, the practicing of hospitality” (64). 
Furthermore, Shakespeare observes that, for Derrida, a pure gift—“one untainted by the 
economy of exchange, reward, gratitude or self-congratulation” is paradoxically impossible and 
nevertheless imperative, for it “leaves its mark in experience” as trace or ashes within actual 
exchange (Shakespeare 149, 162). Therefore, the answer is not to abandon gift giving, but to 
adjust, as much as possible, the gift-giver’s approach. The giver should minimize expectation, 
demand, or constraints in return from the Other. The giver/speaker of “Gift” clearly seeks to 
control the terms of giving, thus contributing to the catastrophic failure of reception. The 
invocation of the “dream hand” that is “casting and castigating” highlights a recurrent theme of 
the extension of the subject towards the other that also appears in “Nocturnal Bridge”: 
connection is desired, but conflict and division surfaces. The gap between the self and other 
cannot be completely bridged.  
In addition to its illustration of the Derridean quandary of gift-giving as an impossible 
imperative, “Gift” concerns language as an exploration of encounter between writer and reader 
within the lyric. Again, a Derridean reading is possible: the speaker/giver has a certain intention 
for the gift, just as a writer has a certain intention for a text, but that does not mean the gift will 
remain securely enclosed within the writer’s intentions. In the process of reception by the reader, 
there may be a “stirring inside” the text, an undoing of the original intentions. Thus, in “Gift,” 
Robinson modifies the Levinasian-Celanian model of lyric as textual encounter through the 
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recognition that there is always the possibility of conflict: the writer can be too rigid in her 
insistence on intended meaning, or the reader can rebuke or discard the gift/text. Indeed, the 
“castigating” “dream hand” in “Gift” inverts Paul Celan’s comparisons of a poem to a handshake 
and poems as “gifts to the attentive. Gifts bearing destinies” (26). Celan’s metaphor of poems as 
handshakes, as cited by Rankine in Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, offers a vision of hands receiving 
one another in a gesture of welcome, which Rankine applies along with a rather idealized 
Levinasian vision of extension of (writing) subject to (reading) other. In contrast, the 
Culler’s/Keats’ “living hand” that extends from the writer instead haunts the reader with more 
chilling overtones, and the “dream hand” in “Gift” demonstrates the difficulty of connection 
through textuality. “Gift” signals an awareness that the text and the reception of text cannot be 
controlled; an absolute correspondence between what the writer intends to give/write and what 
the reader receives/reads is impossible, just as a pure gift is impossible. The “stirring inside / the 
trinket’s clutch” gestures to the possibility of something that may rupture the secure enclosure of 
the borders of the gift; in Derridean terms, the gift/text may overrun its borders and exceed its 
intentions. However, there is the possibility of a positive reading of Robinson’s text as gift. 
Though a textual encounter may fall short of an ideal Levinasian-Celanian “handshake” or 
welcomed gift to the attentive, the Levinasian-Celanian model may still be operative, with the 
caveat that surprise, varied expectations, and productive disruptions may arise. 
I suggest that it is possible and productive to draw on Robinson’s poetry to put Levinas, 
Celan, and Derrida in conversation. While the focus of this dissertation is an analysis of 
postlanguage lyric poetry, the contrasts that I observe between Robinson’s writings and the 
Levinasian-Celanian model as it is advanced in DLMBL allows me to trace a theoretical 
trajectory from Levinas to Derrida. Robinson’s modification of the metaphor of the poem as 
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handshake in turn echoes Derrida’s critique of Levinas. In many his writings, Derrida praises his 
friend’s developments and attributes much of his ethics to Levinas. However, as Steven 
Shakespeare observes, in Derrida’s essay “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought 
of Emmanuel Levinas,” he also critiques Levinas’s ethical philosophy as  
too idealized, too cut-off from the actual experience of otherness as we encounter  
 it. For Derrida, there is no ethics without that relationship of sameness-in- 
difference between me and my other. Only this relationship can be the basis for 
me to desire the other’s well-being. The corollary of this is that the possibility of 
violence can never be wholly eliminated from the world. There is no absolute 
peace or absolutely nonviolent ethics. (92)  
While Levinas posits a subjectivity that extends to the Other as infinite, Derrida insists that a 
subject can only experience otherness “in finitude and mortality (mine and its)” (“Violence and 
Metaphysics” 114-15). Therefore, rather than an absolute extension of the subject in submission 
to the Other’s singular alterity, Derrida insists that “every reduction of other to a real moment of 
my life, its reduction to the state of empirical alter-ego, is an empirical possibility, or rather 
eventuality, which is called violence” (“Violence and Metaphysics” 128). In other words, the 
actual, appearance of the other as finite and mortal always involves the possibility of the subject 
reducing the other to his or her understanding. Thus the possibility of violence always remains, 
here, “violence” encompasses the conflict, oppression, and the bid for mastery that Levinas’s 
ethics aim against. Derrida does not disagree with Levinas’s goals, but insists upon the continued 
appearance of conflict and difference in encounters between subject and others. Consequently, 
Derrida argues for an “economical” ethics that recognizes that “to gain access to the egoity of the 
alter ego as if to its alterity itself is the most peaceful gesture possible” (“Violence and 
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Metaphysics” 128). I suggest that, Robinson’s writings illustrate the kind of a Derridean ethical 
encounter that modifies Levinas’s more idealized vision of ethical imperative. In “Nocturnal 
Bridge” and “Gift,” the subject’s encounter with the Other both gestures towards connection but 
nevertheless indicates the always-present possibility of conflict, difference, and bid for mastery. 
“Speak”: Direct Address, Voice, and the Ethics of Lyric Encounter   
 Like “Gift,” the final poem of Apostrophe, “Speak,” takes up the ethics of encounter 
between the reader and writer through the medium of written text. Unlike “Gift,” however, 
“Speak” explores the encounter between reader and poet through the lyric poem by overtly 
examining the themes of direct address and voice in lyric poetry. Indeed, “voice” is a term that is 
repeated six times, appearing once in each stanza but one. In its meditation on the interrelation 
among reader, poet, and poetic text, Robinson, like Stewart, seeks to revise and complicate 
commonplace notions of lyric voice: “Address is its own metaphysics. See: the / hereafter in 
which I speak, now, solely / in your voice” (72). In the opening lines, “Speak” alludes to Culler’s 
reading of Keats’ “This Living Hand,” with its reference of the lyric “I” claiming to connect with 
the reader from the “hereafter,” which can refer to any future time, but particularly gestures to 
life after death. Unlike “Gift,” which is ambiguous in its use of apostrophe, Speak” clearly takes 
up the topic of direct address to the reader. In “Speak,” address is both enacted—a lyric “I” 
repeatedly invokes a “you”—and, in the opening words of the poem, referenced directly: 
“Address is its own metaphysics.” If address is its own metaphysics, it is one that veers away 
from the Western metaphysics of logocentrism/phonocentrism that Derrida critiques. Robinson, 
like Derrida, rejects Western metaphysics that have been based on the privileging of the exact 
correspondence of the presence of the speaker/writer with the voice, and she shifts to an address 
that focuses on a voice that differs from the subject. The lyric “I” will “hereafter” speak “solely 
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in your voice,” that is, “in a voice I adopt from you.” Rather than a singular voice that can be 
found and secured, the poet’s voice intermingles within the reader’s and is necessarily plural. 
Furthermore, the line “I speak in your voice to say that what / I heard once is also what I said” 
also gestures to the plurality of previous voices/words that have preceded any writer.  
What does the encounter between poet and reader and the text look like in “Speak”? 
While Keats’ “This Living Hand” gestures towards a haunted unity between writer and reader in 
the speaker’s insistence that the future reader must fulfill the poet’s command to give life to his 
hand, Robinson complicates any such vision of poetic union. The poet and reader may be 
“United, but how shall I ever know, speaking / in a voice that I would adopt from you.” Thus, in 
contrast to the persona of the giver/speaker in “Gift,” “Speak” acknowledges that the voice that 
emerges from the relation between the lyric “I” and the addressed “you” can never be fully 
known or circumscribed by the poet. For example, the reader and the writer are depicted as 
reading the same book, but they read from different directions. It is true that “there is / a 
middle”—the poetic text in which writer and reader encounter one another—but the text of 
“Speak” emphasizes poetry not only as a site that allows for encounter but also a site where the 
writer and reader may fail to unite: “Where is it that we do / not meet?” At the same time, 
Robinson resists the extremity of Barthes’ notion of the “death of the author,” for the lyric “I” 
has some agency, and shadings of the poet’s will and desire remain in the poetic text: “and 
where, I do not know, but that a thing I / desire could extend from me. Willful religion / that a 
voice could have its impact” (72).   
While the poet’s desire and will to make an impact remain through the readings of 
various readers, the lyric “I” of “Speak,” unlike either the speaker of “Gift” or Keats’s lyric “I,” 
acknowledges that the outcomes of those desires—the shadings of later voices—are beyond her 
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complete knowledge and control. The phrase “where, I do not know” is similar to Stewart’s 
description of the voice as charting “the trajectory of writer and reader who can only project and 
approximate one another’s presence” (113). Indeed, while it attests to the possibility of 
transcendence through the writing and reading of lyric poetry, “Speak” contrasts markedly from 
“This Living Hand” in its poststructuralist self-awareness. Unlike Keats’ poem, it uses direct 
address self-consciously to project and approximate a reader’s presence while acknowledging 
that the reader will do likewise to the writer, and in this process create a new voice.  
“Speak” also references the presence of a divine/spiritual element in the encounter of 
poet and reader through the text. Like Stewart’s reference to Diotima’s daimon, Robinson 
invokes neither the conventional muse of poetic creation nor the God of the Bible but a 
mediating “god” that delivers messages from the divine and enables the transmission and 
dynamic creation of poetic voices. Both the reader and poet are engaged in a kind of faith as they 
take up the text: “Here is a book in which both of us / believe in god.” This god is invested in the 
possibility of interrelation between reader and writer, the space between where encounter 
happens, imperfect as it may be: “So states the divine voice: that there / is a middle.” The 
conclusion of the poem continues to invoke the divine as the necessary intermediary. The line “I 
carried close my small transcendent, like / a balm” operates on a paradox: the lyric “I” may have 
longed for transcendence, which denotes expansion, but insofar as it was “carried close” and 
used for comfort, like a “balm,” it stayed “small.” This changes, however, with the words, “but I 
have your voice now.” On one level, then, “Speak” gestures to a Levinasian-Celanian model of 
the possibility of transcendence across time in the realm of the intersubjective, as one “speaks” 
and “lays oneself open.”  
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In the closing lines, Robinson plays with another paradox, an overtly spiritual one, as the 
transcendent is made possible through the immanent: “The mutual god is all immanent now, the 
center / that dispenses with pronouns.” The “mutual god,” the diamon-like spiritual figure, 
operates through the intermediating realm of immanence. Thus, the poetic text is configured as 
the in-between, the site of encounter between poet and reader that results in the dissolution of the 
pronouns of the lyric “I” and addressed “you,” for both the writer’s and reader’s identities are at 
least momentarily submerged in the spiritual practice of reading poetry. This idea of poetry as 
encounter accords with Waters also theorizes in his account of lyric address when he states that, 
in “reading lyric, there will be places where the participant roles of speaker, intended hearer, and 
bystander melt together or away; these are moments of wonder” (Poetry’s Touch 51). “Speak” 
concludes on a note where pronouns and therefore participant roles dissolve, and thus allows for 
a Levinasian-Celanian model of reading lyric poetry that allows for an awe-inspiring experience.  
At the same time, I suggest that, while the concluding lines allow for the possibility of the 
wonder of lyric encounter, the transcendent moment should not be overstated. While “Speak” 
gestures to a Levinasian-Celanian possibility for encounter, the poem, like “Gift” and “Nocturnal 
Bridge,” tempers this model with a Derridean awareness that there is always the possibility that 
the speaking and reading “we” do “not meet.” The development of a new voice does not indicate 
a necessarily harmonious encounter between the poet and the reader. Instead, the lyric voice 
developed through the reading of poetry signifies a reader’s creative response that may or may 
not overlap with the writing subject’s original intentions. Thus, I argue, it is necessary to note 
that, just as Derrida’s ethics build on Levinas’s while insisting on the ever-present possibility of 
difference and conflict, Robinson’s model of lyric encounter largely allows for a Levinasian-
Celanian textual encounter while modifying it through a Derridean emphasis on the potential 
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lack of connection between subject and Other. “Your voice” will never be in simple union with 
the voice of the lyric “I,” but the “gaps in the span” may lead to the development of a new, 
compound voice where new and creative possibilities can emerge.  
In Counterpart, On Ghosts, and Apostrophe, Robinson retains but complicates the 
deployment of the lyric “I.” Aided by a poststructuralist understanding of language and 
epistemology, Robinson revisits opens up many concepts related to the lyric “I,” including self, 
presence, interiority, alterity, transcendence, mysticism, and voice. Robinson’s lyric and, at 
times, prosaic explorations involve the ethics of encounter between the writer and reader. To 
Robinson, the experience of lyric poetry always emerges within context of the relation among 
writer, reader, and poetic text. Her postlanguage lyric poetry demonstrates a poethics based on 
the subject’s responsibility to the Other, responsive reading, and the creative potential of 
difference within both self-encounter and lyric voice.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this final section, I provide a brief overview of the central argument of this project, 
which considers ethics and subjectivity in the postlanguage lyric poetry of Claudia Rankine, 
Fanny Howe, and Elizabeth Robinson. I then raise further areas of investigation on the lyric and 
ethics. First, I raise the question, how could genre, specifically lyric essay, be considered in the 
context of the writings of these postlanguage poets? Second, I turn to the question of the body, 
and gesture to possible ways embodiment may be explored in further depth within these poetic 
texts. Finally, I suggest that recent writing, specifically Rankine’s 2014 book Citizen: An 
American Lyric, present an ongoing exploration of lyric encounter that complicates some of the 
ethical premises discussed in this project. 
In this dissertation, I argue that the postlanguage lyric poetry of Claudia Rankine, Fanny 
Howe, and Elizabeth Robinson demonstrates a fundamental investment in the ethical deployment 
of the first person subject. Their formal strategies for the subject’s other-orientation differ. 
Rankine uses fragmentation, interruption, and juxtaposition to demonstrate the violability of the 
subject; Howe uses serial/spiral form to underscore subjectivity as wandering, in flux; and 
Robinson draws on tropes including the doppelgänger and the ghost to underscore the distortions 
of lyric reflections of the self and the otherness inherent in subjectivity. In this project, I use 
contemporary literary-ethical methodology, including the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas, the hauntology of Jacques Derrida, and the poethics of Joan Retallack. Levinas, 
Derrida, and Retallack provide the terminology that describes how postlanguage poetry advances 
models of subjectivity that reformulate the conventional lyric “I.” Rather than domineering, 
narcissistic, or purely inward, Rankine, Howe, and Robinson advance lyric subjectivities that 
demonstrate the self as circumspective, or constituted through its relations with otherness. At the 
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same time, the lyric “I” in these texts reference feelings, perceptions, and spirituality, thus 
retaining elements of interiority long associated with lyric poetry.  
In addition to articulating ethical configurations of the lyric “I,” Rankine, Howe, and 
Robinson retain and revise the lyric by deploying what I term the Levinasian-Celanian model of 
postlanguage lyric poetry. According to the Levinasian-Celanian model, the poetic text is figured 
as a space for ethical encounter between writer and reader. Furthermore, lyric address is 
deployed or explored in these texts. The interpretation of postlanguage lyric text as a site of 
ethical encounter highlights the lyric poetry’s rhetorical or performative functions. In contrast 
with the conventional concept of lyric monologic or expressive, the concept of lyric as rhetoric 
foregrounds address to readers and the lyric text as inhabiting, in Retallack’s words, a “dynamic 
equilibrium between intention and receptivity, community and alterity” (3). In other words, the 
lyric text as a space of encounter is one in which writer and reader actively participate to 
discover and construct meaning. Furthermore, a key element of the postlanguage lyric is the 
postmodern awareness that contemporary poetry does not return to the model of communication 
wherein a writer as self-present subject directly conveys a message to a reader who is also a self-
present subject. In particular, their texts aim to persuade the reader that the respective lyric “I” 
that emerges through their poetic texts is, in Blasing’s terms, credible and accountable. As an 
essential part of establishing their credibility after the interventions of Language writing’s 
critiques, these postlanguage lyric poets use the rhetoric of self-conscious reflexivity to persuade 
the reader of the poet’s awareness that the lyric “I” is a linguistic construct. Therefore, while the 
lyric text is theorized as a site of encounter, Rankine, Howe, and Robinson consistently signal 
the awareness that the “I” and the “you” are textual constructs that gesture to the writer and 
reader.  
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 One issue that is ripe for further exploration concerns each of these poets’ use of form 
and the question of genre.  While I discussed several examples of form with each poets’ writings, 
foregrounding their ethical implications, one aspect that I could explore further is their use of 
lyric essay. Lyric essay plays a key role in Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely (and her more 
recent volume, Citizen), Howe’s The Wedding Dress, and Robinson’s On Ghosts. It would be 
helpful to situate these poets’ use of lyric essay within the literary historical context of American 
prose poetry and delineate its significance for the hybrid form of postlanguage lyric poetry in 
particular. Again, critical reception of Lyn Hejinian’s My Life may provide a fruitful insight on 
contemporary texts that use prose poetry. In her reading of My Life, Lisa Samuels argues that 
Hejinian’s use of prose poetry—that is, the “new sentence” of certain key texts of Language 
writing—is the ideal means to achieve “sincere complexity” (109). Samuels asserts that, as prose 
is our culture’s medium for sincerity and clarity, and poetry is our culture’s language for 
complexity and artifice, prose poetry such as the type in My Life “might afford the best 
opportunity for sincere surface play, for deep artifice, a joining of the power of prose clarity with 
poetic complexity” (109). I suggest that this concept of “sincere complexity” may be at play with 
the lyric essays of the postlanguage poets I analyze here as well. Furthermore, the prose in lyric 
essay in the texts by Rankine, Howe, and Robinson achieve a higher degree of surface clarity 
compared to the “new sentence” of Language writing, and this greater clarity may provide a 
productive way to approaches the classic conflict between avant-garde experimentalism and 
accessibility. Furthermore, I am interested in exploring lyric essay as central to the project of the 
postlanguage retention and revision of lyric conventions, for lyric essay is so often employed in 
these poetic texts as a means of discussing poetics.  
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Another area of possible further investigation concerns the body, which is a central issue 
for feminist poetry and criticism. On the one hand, much of my argument emphasizes how the 
“I” cannot “take on the corporeal,” in the words of Elizabeth Robinson that I cite in the epigraph 
to this dissertation. As Rankine explains in “The First Person in the Twenty-First Century,” the 
self as it appears in language can never attain the “solidity” of the physical body (134). On the 
other hand, the ethical concepts I deploy in this project depend upon bodily metaphors. I draw on 
the body in two main ways in this dissertation. Centrally, the Levinasian-Celanian model of 
poetry as encounter draws on Celan’s handshake as a bodily metaphor, which is then amplified 
by both Levinas’s concept of the face and his emphasis on touch (over vision) as the preferable 
means of encounter. Furthermore, in my reading of Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, I use Alison 
Landsberg’s theory of prosthetic memory to describe the process of how proxy memories can be 
inscribed within cultural consumers as a prosthetic device can be affixed to the body. This idea 
of prosthetic memory is particularly illuminating for Rankine’s writings, I suggest, because she 
is interested in the connections between body, affect, and media portrayals of publicized acts of 
violence and social injustice.    
The question of the body can also be further explored in Howe and Robinson’s work. In 
particular, both poets share an interest in the incorporation of immanence within transcendence 
within a Christian theological understanding of embodied textuality. In her interpretation of 
Howe’s O’Clock, Clair Wills gestures to Howe’s connection between the bodily and the 
transcendent focuses on the connection between spirituality and the “specifically feminine sense 
of the rhythms of traditional practice and everyday life” (“Marking Time” 120). Wills therefore 
notes Howe’s interest in women’s spirituality as inextricably linked to their bodily experience of 
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domestic duties. Ripe for further exploration is the link between Howe’s “incarnational 
aesthetics” and ethics of her poetry.  
Robinson is similarly interested in incarnational aesthetics and the link between language 
and body. In an interview with Rosenthal, Robinson refers to her interest in “word as flesh as 
word” (Rosenthal 237). To Robinson, “the idea of the immanent and the transcendent are 
intimately, sensuously, inextricably braided together,” a view that counters the Cartesian split 
between mind and body (Rosenthal 237). The presence of the body is a salient question for 
Robinson’s embrace of a revised lyric poetry, with the question, as in Olson’s projectivist verse, 
of the presence of the poet’s breath as a transmission of the bodily to poetic form. While 
Language writers such as McCaffrey and critics such as Perloff roundly reject Olson’s emphasis 
on breath, Robinson, in particular, seems interested to revisit this consideration. As Robinson 
explains in an interview, “Language comes from the body: We feel it in our mouths and we 
perceive it in our ears and we see it on the page. But it also conveys meaning and the way 
meaning gets lofted on time as we say the words on breath and air, and this can take a writer or a 
reader through experience that is not completely limited to the way the tongue hits the palate” 
(Rosenthal 237). In the epigraph to this project, I cite a poem from Counterpart, “Allege and 
Elegy,” that notes the distance between the bodily self and the subject in language: “You want 
pronouns to take on the corporeal / but they are … / frizzy, off their marks” (77). At the same 
time, the poem also insists “All is embedded in the lung,” suggesting that while there may not be 
an absolute transmission of the bodily presence in the lyric, the breath, and therefore the body, is 
still an important dimension of Robinson’s formulation of postlanguage lyric.  
Finally, Rankine’s most recent book, Citizen: An American Lyric (2014), provides an 
ongoing exploration of postlanguage lyric encounter and ethics. This dissertation hinges upon 
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what I suggest is Rankine’s a Levinasian-Celanian model of lyric as textual encounter in Don’t 
Let Me Be Lonely. In the Levinasian-Celanian model, there is a mutual recognition that the 
subject and Other are “here,” meeting, if not in the same ontological space, then at least the 
mediated space of the text. Since my writing of chapter 2, Citizen has been published and 
received with widespread notice and acclaim. Citizen shares with DLMBL a subtitle, a similarly 
flat narratorial tone, and the incorporation of visual images. Thus the two texts invite the 
possibility of being read as companion collections.  
However, there are key differences between the two books. Centrally concerned with race 
relations, the text of Citizen interrogates very possibility of ethical encounter between black and 
white Americans. Specifically, the text of Citizen focuses on the inability and/or unwillingness of 
white Americans to acknowledge the presence and humanity of black Americans. DLMBL 
concluded with the importance of the subject’s recognition of the Other as “here.” In numerous 
episodes in Citizen, however, whites consistently refuse to recognize blacks as “here”; the text 
presents an overall critique of white unwillingness to acknowledge that they share the same 
ontological space with blacks. The text demonstrates the problem of encounter from the most 
quotidian “microagressions” to the callous disregard for black lives, as evidenced by the death 
and violence engendered by police brutality, the catastrophic neglect of the victims of Hurricane 
Katrina, and the disparities of social justice for black victims of violence. Citizen does not 
present Levinas’s concept of the face and Celan’s handshake to demonstrate the possibility for 
encounter within either the text or personal experience. Instead, Rankine invokes what Judith 
Butler calls “addressability,” which focuses on the vulnerability of the subject inherent in 
interactions with the Other. Thus, Citizen emphasizes how interaction between self and Other 
always has the potential for aggression rather than ethical action. In the context of my central 
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argument, I ask, what does Citizen imply for the Levinasian-Celanian model of encounter that 
concludes DLMBL?  
Another key difference between the texts concerns pronoun usage. The recurrent 
meditation on the “I” in DLMBL shifts towards a pointed, and repeated, invocation of a shifting, 
racially ambiguous second person. Many sections in Citizen are aimed at a “you,” who is 
sometimes black, sometimes white, and sometimes (as also occurs in DLMBL) the impersonal 
“you” of American colloquial speech, a place holder for “one.” I suggest that this focus on the 
“you” highlights the rhetorical dimension of Rankine’s postlanguage lyric. Rather than 
emphasizing the text as ethical encounter, however, the text of Citizen demonstrates how fraught 
lyric encounter between writer and reader can be, given the complex realities of American race 
relations within the context of white privilege. For example, “you” is often pointedly raced, 
rather than assumed to be white; but the race of “you” also shifts, so that the reader must be alert 
to racially charged nuances of communication.  
While one can contrast many features of DLMBL and Citizen, it would be incorrect to 
characterize differences between the two texts as a shift from the redemptive capacity of the 
interpersonal in DLMBL to the problems of political in Citizen. Citizen opens with an extended 
exploration of interpersonal encounters that devolve into microaggressions, and such episodes 
recur throughout the text with aggregating force to demonstrate how the black subject is 
relentlessly disparaged and viewed with suspicion. I suggest in the introduction to this 
dissertation that there is an implicit feminism in the argument that the interpersonal can 
complement and inform the political. While both DLBML and Citizen explore highly politicized 
events concerning violence and murder of black men, Citizen makes contemporary racism a 
central theme. Furthermore, Citizen includes the (often female) black subject experiencing 
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racially charged microaggressions on an interpersonal level. The cumulative effect of these 
episodes underscores the link between interpersonal and political, and how they inform one 
another.  
Despite key differences, I think that it is nevertheless possible to treat DLMBL and 
Citizen as companion volumes. Butler’s “addressability” cited in Citizen is another way of 
formulating the violability of the subject as “broken into” that I argue was present in DLMBL. 
What Citizen does is place the questions of violation within the context of contemporary race 
relations: blacks continue to be subject to more violations, and whites continue to commit racist 
aggressions and inhabit a relatively untroubled sphere of white privilege. Citizen does not deny 
the possibility of ethical encounter, but rather insists such encounters must be considered within 
the context of race, socioeconomics and the discourses of contemporary media. Rather than a 
representing departure from the Levinasian-Celanian model of postlanguage poetry, I suggest 
that Citizen productively complicates the strategies of the Celanian poetic “handshake” and 
Levinasian, ethical encounter.  
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